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Sławomir Marek Redo1
Blue Criminology
The power of the United Nations ideas to counter crime globally
A monographic study
On résiste à l’invasion des armées; on ne résiste pas à l’invasion des idées.
Victor Hugo, Histoire d’un crime, 1852
Life must be lived forwards, but can only be understood backwards.
Soren Kierkegaard, Danish philosopher, 1813-1855
If to judge the development of criminology only by the number of its fallen ideas,  
its field would have been full of victims.
Jerzy Bafia, Problemy kryminologii. Dialektyka sytuacji kryminogennej, 1978
1	 The	idea	of	this	study	originated	from	the	topic	of	the	author's	lecture	to	the	Council	of	the	Faculty	of	Law	of	the	University	of	Białystok	
(Poland)	at	his	habilitation	proceedings	(2009).
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From the Host of the Thirteenth United Nations  
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
In 2015 the Government of Qatar will host the Thirteenth United Nations Con-
gress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. This book covers the history of all 
international crime prevention and criminal justice congresses, but is a forward-
looking expert text that offers the global readership valuable insights into the ide-
as and practicalities of pursuing effective international counteraction to crime.
Qatar, the Host of several earlier United Nations crime and justice conferences, 
welcomes the publication of “Blue Criminology”. It is a first substantive contribu-
tion to the new perspectives of international cooperation in crime prevention and 
criminal justice that will broadly be discussed at the Thirteenth Congress. 
We encourage academics and practitioners to study this book. We hope it may 
motivate them to rethink the role of the United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme in its common fight against crime and contribute 
to the preparations of the Thirteenth Congress, and  the global counteraction to 
crime in general.
Doha, Qatar, 2012
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Foreword
world should attentively and vigorously pursue its 
research interest in the United Nations world. The 
book is an interface between the two. It offers a com-
mon vocabulary around which scholars and practi-
tioners can engage in shared and informed discourse. 
The United Nations has long been defining glob-
al norms and setting global goals. This book pro-
vides an illuminating account of how over the past 
60 years of its crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice programme, the United Nations managed to ad-
vance the global objective of responding to crime.
This book not only seeks to capture major inter-
national crime prevention and criminal justice de-
velopments spanning from the end of the 18th cen-
tury until now. Its purpose may be best stated in 
UNESCO’s constitution: "Since wars begin in the 
minds of men … it is in the minds of men that the 
defences of peace must be constructed". 
This book convincingly communicates this mes-
sage to readers. A message that should continue to 
be at the centre of global criminological discourse 
and international criminal policy action, including 
education and training. 
Dr. Thomas Stelzer
United Nations Assistant  
Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and  
Inter-Agency Affairs
United Nations, New York, 2012
The United Nations, in its 65-year history, has 
brought to light powerful ideas that have often 
been translated into international norms and laws. 
Sławomir Redo’s Blue Criminology reinterprets, in 
criminological terms, the three major global UN ide-
as of freedom from fear, freedom from want, and sus-
tainable development. 
Although in the history of the United Nations 
there have already been criminological books, the 
present book issues an intellectual challenge, for two 
main reasons. It is probably the first book in crimi-
nology which draws on those ideas in an overarch-
ing, thought-provoking and practical way, inter-re-
lating the past with the present and future through 
its historical lens. This perspective provides us with 
what Sir Winston Churchill observed, namely that 
“The farther backward you can look, the farther in 
the future you are likely to see”. Secondly, the book 
highlights the global dimensions of crime and jus-
tice issues and showcases how the United Nation’s 
crime prevention and criminal justice mandate has 
expanded, especially since the 1990s. This book tours 
the United Nations criminological horizon in three 
ways.
Firstly, it emphasizes the importance of an effi-
cient and humane criminal justice system to effec-
tively address transnational organized crime, mon-
ey-laundering, sea piracy, terrorism and corruption. 
Secondly, the book stresses that crime prevention is 
the first imperative of criminal justice. And thirdly, 
it highlights tendencies, trends, mega or major de-
velopments, rather than focuses on minor crime pre-
vention and criminal justice issues. 
The publication of this book shows that in glo-
bal criminology, United Nations criminology not on-
ly has its rightful place, but also that the academic 
10
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About the Graphic Design
Photographs nos. 1, 9-12, 14-17, 20, 21 and 24 were 
obtained from “UN Photo”, Department of Public 
Information, United Nations Headquarters, New 
York, USA. Photographs nos. 2, 22 and 28 were ob-
tained from the collection of Ms Terhi Viljanen (HE-
UNI). Photographs nos. 5 and 13 were obtained from 
the collection of ISPAC. Photograph No. 25 was ob-
tained from the collection of the RWI. Photographs 
nos. 29 and 40 were obtained from the collection 
of “Fotostudio Pfeifer” (Vienna, Austria). All other 
numbered photographs come from the author’s own 
collection. The photographs in Figure 7 of United 
Nations criminal justice reformers come from the re-
spective collections of Mr Eduardo Vetere, AIC, RWI 
and UNAFEI. All photographs listed in this para-
graph are published with the respective permissions. 
Other photographs in the book come from the Wik-
pedia or other public domain collections. The United 
Nations movie documentaries may be shown subject 
to acknowledgment of the original copyright source 
contained in the movie files.
The back cover photograph of the Author was 
taken in the Austrian National Library at the Imperial 
Palace Hofburg (Vienna), the largest baroque library 
in Europe. Against the background of some 200,000 
books held in its State Hall, one of the most beau-
tiful such halls in the world (on the photograph), is 
shown the celestial globe (1693) by Vincenzo Maria 
Coronelli (1650-1718), a cosmologist, cartograph and 
early Enlightenment encyclopedist. In this book, it 
symbolizes revolving global knowledge in the world 
in which reciprocal academic and practical exchange 
is pursued.
“One picture is worth a thousand words”. This saying 
explains why the graphics of this book play such an 
important function. Most of the graphics in this book 
come from the collection of clip art by Jiri Moucka, a 
Czech graphic artist, and these seem to be especial-
ly well-fitting. Written in a “back to the future” man-
ner, the book is aided by the futuristic graphic design 
of Moucka’s “Blanco Man” in various configurations 
and/or with various artefacts. They range from a sin-
gle-placed individual confronted with the challenge 
of entering into meandering issues that can be suc-
cessfully solved only by acting in concert with other 
actors, to the same individual who at the conclusion 
of this book is himself meandering. At the end of the 
foreword and afterword of the book are copyright 
images of Canadian West Coast native art, courte-
sy of Bomamfg. According to native belief, the Ra-
ven shown in the Foreword symbolizes prestige and 
knowledge. The “bear and frog” image shown at the 
end of the afterword symbolize stability and com-
munication. 
The visuals (graphs, photographs, figures, tables 
and movie documentaries) are intended to provide a 
more comprehensive picture of the information con-
tained in the book. Save one graph (Figure 6), all oth-
er graphs, figures and tables are typical contempo-
rary visual representations and/or metaphors. Figure 
6, which shows “Progressive development of interna-
tional action against crime in the world, 1764-2010”, is 
atypical because it does not follow linear calendar in-
fographics, and instead depicts a cyclical-time devel-
opment of action as a three-dimensional spiral. Al-
though such a historiographic metaphor may be rare in 
contemporary criminological publications, it is meant 
to communicate that when interpreting sequences of 
events in time, not only a linear perspective (dominat-
ing Occidental thought) but also a cyclical (Oriental) 
time perspective is relevant. Both contribute to the Di-
alogue among Civilizations to which the United Na-
tions has committed itself since 1945. 
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Славомир Марек РЕДО
Синяя Криминология
Способность идей Организации Объединенных Наций противостоять 
преступлению глобально
Монографическое исследование
Резюме
ЧАСТЬ ПЕРВАЯ. ПРОТИВ СТРАХА И НУЖДЫ, 
ЗА УСТОЙЧИВОЕ РАЗВИТИЕ
Программа Организации Объединенных Наций 
по уголовному правосудию и борьбе с преступ-
ностью основывается на более чем двухсотлет-
нем развитии преступления и правосудия. Все 
началось с реформ международного уголовного 
права , начатой классической школой уголовного 
права Чезаре Беккарии (1764) и первыми сравни-
тельными уголовными рекомендациями Джона 
Говарда (1777). Его международные начала могут 
быть приписаны Международному Уголовному 
Конгрессу во Франкфурте на Майне (1846), а 
также к последующему ряду двенадцати между-
народных уголовных конгрессов (Лондон, 1872 
– Гаага, 1950). Его программные начала были не 
только развиты выше упомянутыми достижения-
ми, но и все более заметной политикой социаль-
ного благосостояния в эпоху индустриализации 
и урбанизации (модернизации). Особенно во 
второй половине XIXго века и до сих пор модер-
низация встала на европейскую повестку дня и 
распространилась по всему миру. С того времени, 
мандат Организации Объединенных Наций по 
уголовному правосудию и борьбе с преступно-
стью унаследовал программный и всегда дина-
мически изменяемый фокус на «социальное», 
а затем «несовершеннолетнее» и «уголовное» 
правосудие, с особым отношением к положению 
детей в системе правосудия, начиная с вопроса 
их одиночного заключения и благотворительных 
опасений в отношении их благосостояния.
После Второй мировой войны, много детей 
и взрослых как «грядущие поколения» (или 
как-либо другие подобные понятия) были в 
центре международного внимания и действий. 
В 1945 году Организация Объединенных Наций, 
крупнейшая пацифистская межправительствен-
ная организация, опасаясь повторения ужасов 
войны, которая уничтожила миллионы жизней 
и основы существованя и привела к бедности 
народов и наций, начала достигать поставленную 
в ее Хартии цель предотвратить повторение слу-
чившегося путем поддержки социального и эко-
номического развития («устойчивое развитие») 
и прав человека (1948-1987).
В конце концов, с начала 1990-х годов, разви-
вающиеся и развитые страны (члены Организа-
ции Объединенных Наций) совместно пришли 
к ряду многосторонних соглашений, которые 
открыли путь к практической реализации общей 
борьбы с проблемами безопасности, включая 
безопасность людей и городов, а также реформы 
правосудия и сектора безопасности.
На этом фоне, научное исследование и по-
литика Организации Объединенных Наций в 
области уголовного права отреагировали на ос-
новные идеи свободы от страха и нужды и идею 
устойчивого развития и либо самостоятельно 
или совместно внесли в них свою долю.
ЧАСТЬ ВТОРАЯ. МАНДАТ ОБЬЕДИНЕННЫХ 
НЕЦИЙ ПО УГОЛОВНОМУ ПРАВОСУДИЮ  
И БОРЬБЕ С ПРЕСТУПНОСТЬЮ 
С 1946 года, мандат Объединенных Наций по уго-
ловному правосудию и борьбе с преступностью 
постепенно создал в своих рамках различные 
технические аспекты социально-экономическо-
го развития. Все началось с обращения с детьми 
/ подростками и взрослыми, и уже в 1955 году на 
первом Конгрессе Организации Объединенных 
Наций по борьбе с преступностью и обращению 
с правонарушителями были установлены нова-
торские Минимальные стандартные правила 
обращения с заключенными (SMR).
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Двенадцатый конгресс Объединенных Наций 
по уголовному правосудию и борьбе с преступно-
стью, который с тех пор проводится раз в пять 
лет (1955-2010), а также и соответствующие меры, 
принятые сначала более объёмным и инсти-
туциональным экспертным (1950-1991), а затем 
межправительственным механизмами (комиссия 
по уголовному правосудию и борьбе с преступно-
стью) подготовили для Экономического и Соци-
ального Совета, Генеральной Ассамблеи и Совета 
Безопасности (некоторых органов Организации 
Объединенных Наций) осуществимые рекомен-
дации, которые эти органы соответственно объ-
явили как закон Организации Объединенных 
Наций по борьбе с преступностью.
Наиболее заметными среди мягких прав 
Организации Объединенных Наций были выше-
упомянутые SMR, договорное право, конвенции 
Организации Объединенных Наций против 
транснациональной организованной преступно-
сти (2000) и коррупции (2003). Между 1955-2010 
Программа Организации Объединенных Наций 
по уголовному правосудию и борьбе с преступно-
стью приняла в целом около 60 документов мяг-
кого права, и Управление Организации Объеди-
ненных Наций по наркотикам и преступности 
(составная часть Программы) было хранителем 
этих инструментов, а также и трех конвенций 
Организации Объединенных Наций против 
наркотиков и психотропных веществ (1961, 1972, 
1988), и 16 универсальных правовых договоров о 
борьбе с терроризмом.
Именно эти документы нынче являются за-
конодательной сущностью «голубой криминоло-
гии». Со временем она прошла через различные 
этапы развития с большим количеством компо-
нентов социальной обороны (1946-1990). В на-
стоящее время они заменяются другими идеями, 
ориентированными на социальное обеспечение, 
и программами, направленными на продолжение 
цели гуманного и эффективного противодейст-
вия преступности , наркотикам, терроризму и 
виктимизации.
Установление стандартных правил продол-
жается (и включает в себя юридические и дипло-
матические навыки ведения переговоров, из-за 
чего они все более содержут темы Организации 
Объединенных Наций развития и верховен-
ства закона). Выполнение всех этих принятых 
международно-правовых документов в области 
международной реформы уголовного правосудия 
методом технической помощи, онлайнового и 
офлайнового обучения по существу стало оборот-
ной стороной одной медали. Уроки, извлеченные 
из разработки этих правовых инструментов, 
увеличили доступный запас экспертных знаний, 
особенно необходимых для более успешного чем 
ранее проведения различных миссий Организа-
ции Объединенных Наций по поддержанию ми-
ра, которые применяют принципы Организации 
Объединенных Наций по верховенству закона на 
практике.
На картине международной реформы уго-
ловного закона, которая продолжается в мире с 
момента ее научного начала в второй половине 
XIXго века, и которая, в частности, была дина-
мична и плодотворна после периода «холодной 
войны» (1945-1989), когда в пост-конфликтных 
странах начался переходный процесс в области 
правосудия, можно наблюдать не только новые 
формы все более глобализованных преступле-
ний, но и постепенное сближение правовых ре-
жимов для их контроля, и более медленное, но 
очевидное развитие самой борьбы с городской 
и другой преступностью на основе сотрудниче-
ства и партнерства. В условиях борьбы с пре-
ступностью, путем достижения баланса между 
«контролем» и «борьбой», международная ре-
форма уголовного правосудия включает в себя 
в настоящее время альтернативы тюремному 
заключению, восстановительное правосудие, и 
наконец-то, оказание помощи пострадавшим и 
компенсацию. Это относится как к старым так 
и к новым формам преступности, в том числе и 
к транснациональной преступности, включая 
киберпреступность как одну из ее самых совре-
менных и сложных форм.
Итоги работы Организации Объединенных 
Наций в некоторых из этих областей являют-
ся удовлетворительными, а в некоторых нет. 
Реформаторы международного уголовного 
правосудия, среди которых были руководящие 
и технические кадры Организации Объеди-
ненных Наций, сосредатачивались на оказании 
помощи развивающимся странам при изме-
нении их правового и уголовного правосудия 
в отношении таких преступлений в контексте 
меняющихся международных рекомендаций по 
вопросам уголовной политики и идеологических 
концепций прогресса методом различных, хотя 
порой и несовместимых, форм модернизации. 
Со снижением независимости от Секретариата 
Организации Объединенных Наций, как одного 
из главных органов Организации (в отличие от 
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первоначальных идеалов в Хартии Организации 
Объединенных Наций), сотрудники УНП ООН 
и его предыдущие административные единицы 
были предметом различных споров идеологиче-
ского, политического и уголовно-политического 
плана, затрагивающих целостность и производи-
тельность Организации.
Внебюджетно финансируемые программы 
технической помощи и проекты, которые были 
частью программы Организации Объединенных 
Наций с первых лет ее существования, в первое 
десятилетие ХХIго века преобразовались в дея-
тельность подготовки способности и професси-
ональной компетентности по борьбе с преступ-
ностью на основе фактических данных, включая 
национальную ответственность и политические 
обязательства с целью устойчивого изменения. 
Самым последним побочным эффектом подав-
ляющей зависимости от внебюджетного финан-
сирования оказались изменения состава сотруд-
ников ООН с дальнейшей эрозией изначальной 
концепции их целостности.
Стандартами, нормами и передовой пра-
ктикой Организации Объединенных Наций по 
уголовному правосудию и борьбе с преступно-
стью (опубликоваными и показаными по всему 
миру) были поддержены 16 институтов из сети 
Программы и многочисленные неправитель-
ственные организации, чьи национальные, 
региональные и межрегиональные заявки были 
выполнены УНП ООН, через развития партнер-
ских отношений, в ответ на меняющиеся требо-
вания: либо включая противодействия трансна-
циональной организованной преступности и 
коррупции или преступности в городах и среди 
молодежи.
ЧАСТЬ ТРЕТЬЯ. НАЗАД В БУДУЩЕЕ
Несмотря на крупномасштабный сравнительный 
правовой и социально-экономический подход к 
борьбе с преступностью, УНП ООН применяет и 
нейробиологические и аналогичные выводы на 
основе фактических данных, существенные для 
индивидуального риска и защитных факторов 
насильственных преступлений совершаемых 
молодежью и злоупотребления наркотиками, 
опираясь на научные успехи, достигнутые в по-
следнее время.
Будь она микро-или макро-ориентированная, 
«синяя криминология» в основном направлена 
на «народы» (общины / физические лица) и пре-
следует частично другой метод, чем академиче-
ские криминологии, для осуществления мандата 
Организации Объединенных Наций.
Данная книга документирует, что преобра-
зующая способность Программы Организации 
Объединенных Наций по уголовному правосудию 
и борьбе с преступностью была значительной, но 
в некоторых областях больше, чем в других. Про-
грамма приводится в действие, иногда совместно 
иногда отдельно, научными и межправительст-
венными идеями. Она превращает сама себя в еще 
более преобразующие, мощные и целенаправ-
ленные действия, которые могут способствовать 
миру и безопасности в мире. Новая дисциплина 
«Исследование Организации Объединенных На-
ций» была выделена в данном монографическом 
исследовании как один из потенциально влия-
тельных и практических инструментов, чтобы 
распространить идею Организации Объединен-
ных Наций по уголовному правосудию и борьбе с 
преступностью на весь мир.
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Criminología Azul
Un estudio monográfico
Sinopsis
PARTE I. CONTRA EL MIEDO Y CONTRA  
LA NECESIDAD, POR EL DESARROLLO  
SOSTENIBLE
El Programa de las Naciones Unidas en materia de 
prevención del delito y justicia penal hunde sus raí-
ces en más de dos siglos de avances en materia de 
criminalidad y justicia. Estos avances comenzaron 
con la reforma penal internacional abanderada por 
la escuela penal clásica de Cesare Beccaria (1764) y 
los primeros estudios penitenciarios comparados 
de John Howard (1977). El comienzo de su anda-
dura institucional internacional puede atribuirse al 
Congreso Internacional Penitenciario de Frankfurt 
am Main (1846), y a los posteriores veinte congresos 
penales y penitenciarios (Londres, 1872, - La Haya, 
1950). Sus fundamentos programáticos encontraron 
también desarrollo en una política social del bienes-
tar incipiente en la etapa de la industrialización y la 
modernización. De manera especial a partir de la se-
gunda mitad del siglo XIX, la modernización ocupó 
la agenda europea y se extendió por el mundo desde 
entonces. Más tarde el mandato de Naciones Unidas 
en materia de prevención del delito y justicia penal 
heredaría programática y dinámicamente esa pers-
pectiva de la justicia “social” “juvenil” y “penal, espe-
cialmente en relación a la posición de los menores en 
el sistema judicial, su reclusión, y a preocupaciones 
filantrópicas referentes a su bienestar.
Tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la suerte de 
menores y adultos - representada en la noción de 
“las generaciones futuras” (u otras similares)- se 
convirtió en objeto de atención y acción interna-
cional. En 1945, las Naciones Unidas, la mayor 
organización intergubernamental pacifista creada 
hasta la fecha, temerosa de la posible recurrencia de 
los horrores de la guerra que destruyeron millones 
de vidas y de formas de vida, y que empujaron a la 
pobreza a pueblos y naciones, puso en marcha los 
mecanismos de su Carta fundacional para prevenir 
esa recurrencia promoviendo el desarrollo social y 
económico (“desarrollo sostenible”) y los derechos 
humanos (1948-1987).
Desde principios de los noventa, países en de-
sarrollo y desarrollados (miembros de las Naciones 
Unidas) han aunado esfuerzos en un buen número 
de iniciativas multilaterales, destinadas a facilitar la 
operatividad de la lucha en común contra los desafíos 
a la seguridad, lo que incluye la seguridad humana y 
urbana, la justicia y la reforma del sector.
En este contexto, tanto la investigación académi-
ca como la política criminal de Naciones Unidas han 
contribuido autónoma y conjuntamente a expandir 
las ideas fundamentales de la libertad frente al mie-
do y frente a la necesidad, así como del desarrollo 
sostenible.
PARTE II. EL MANDATO DE NACIONES   
UNIDAS EN MATERIA DE PREVENCIÓN  
DEL DELITO Y JUSTICIA PENAL
Desde 1946, el mandato de Naciones Unidas en 
materia de prevención del delito y justicia penal 
ha extendido su alcance hacia distintas facetas téc-
nicas del desarrollo social y económico. Comenzó 
orientado al tratamiento de menores, jóvenes y 
adultos, y ya en 1955 tuvo su primera plasmación en 
el Primer Congreso de Naciones Unidas sobre Pre-
vención del Delito y Tratamiento del Delincuente, 
con sus pioneras “Reglas Mínimas de Tratamiento 
Penitenciario”. 
El decimosegundo de los congresos de Naciones 
Unidas sobre prevención del delito y justicia penal, 
celebrados quinquenalmente desde entonces (1955-
2010), y las actividades complementarios primero 
en forma de asesoramiento experto (1950-1991) y 
después a través de mecanismo sustantivo intergu-
bernamental (la Comisión sobre Prevención del De-
lito y Justicia Penal) han realizado recomendaciones 
viables al Consejo Económico y Social, la Asamblea 
General y el Consejo de Seguridad (algunos de los 
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organismos de Naciones Unidas), recomendaciones 
reconocidas como la legislación de Naciones Unidas 
en materia penal.
Entre las normas más relevantes en materia pe-
nal generadas en Naciones Unidas se encuentran las 
ya mencionadas “Normas mínimas de tratamiento 
penitenciario”, así como los tratados, las convencio-
nes contra la criminalidad organizada internacional 
(2000) y la corrupción (2003). Entre 1955 y 2010 el 
Programa de Naciones Unidas en materia de pre-
vención del delito y justicia penal adoptó alrededor 
de sesenta instrumentos de soft law, y la Oficina de 
Naciones Unidas contra las Drogas y el Delito (que 
forma parte del programa) ha sido el custodio de esos 
instrumentos tanto de soft law, como convenciona-
les, además de de las tres convenciones de Naciones 
Unidas contra las drogas y las sustancias psicotró-
picas (1961, 1972, 1988), y de 16 tratados universales 
contra el terrorismo.
Todo esto conforma la esencia legislativa de una 
“criminología azul”. Una criminología que a lo largo 
del tiempo, ha conocido distintas etapas, con un 
importante protagonismo de la defensa social (1946-
1990), actualmente desplazado en favor de otras 
iniciativas de naturaleza más social y asistencial, 
orientadas hacia el objetivo de un control humano y 
efectivo del delito, las drogas, el terrorismo y la vic-
timización.
La producción y fijación de estándares continúa 
(y requiere de habilidades jurídicas y diplomáticas 
que aseguren su progresivo desarrollo y el “Estado de 
Derecho” en cuanto a las normas de Naciones Uni-
das). En la implementación de todos los instrumen-
tos internacionales adoptados en materia de justicia 
penal, la asistencia técnica y  la capacitación online 
y presencial se han convertido en la otra cara de la 
moneda. Las lecciones aprendidas durante la elabo-
ración de esos instrumentos jurídicos han nutrido un 
acervo de conocimiento experto especialmente nece-
sario cuando se aspira a lograr una implementación 
más efectiva de los principios del estado de derecho 
de Naciones Unidas en sus varias misiones de man-
tenimiento de la paz.
El movimiento internacional de reforma del 
derecho penal ha tenido continuidad desde sus co-
mienzos científicos en la segunda mitad del siglo 
XIX, siendo particularmente prolífico después del 
periodo de la Guerra Fría (1945-1989), etapa en la 
que la que aparece la noción de justicia transicional 
orientada países que han sufrido conflictos arma-
dos. A la vez, se ha asistido a la aparición de nuevas 
formas de delincuencia globalizada, así como a una 
gradual convergencia de los regímenes jurídicos para 
controlarlas, y una más lenta pero evidente tenden-
cia a la cooperación en materia de prevención de la 
delincuencia urbana y de otros tipos. Además de 
perseguir el control del delito, el reformismo penal 
internacional busca un balance entre “control” y 
“prevención”, abordando materias como las alterna-
tivas a la prisión, la justicia restaurativa, y en último 
lugar, la asistencia y compensación de las víctimas. 
Todo ello en relación con viejas y nuevas formas de 
criminalidad, incluyendo el crimen transnacional y 
la emergente cibercriminalidad como una de sus ma-
nifestaciones más sofisticadas y desafiantes. 
El historial de Naciones Unidas en algunos de 
estos campos es satisfactorio, y en otros no lo es. 
Los reformadores penales internacionales, entre los 
cuales se cuentan tanto altos cargos como personal 
técnico de Naciones Unidas, han concentrado sus 
esfuerzos en asistir a países en desarrollo a la hora 
de modificar sus ordenamientos jurídico-penales, en 
un contexto de nociones político-criminales cam-
biantes y de concepciones ideológicas del progreso, 
plasmadas a través de modelos de modernización a 
veces incompatibles.  Con el declive (contrario a los 
ideales originarios de la Carta de Naciones Unidas) 
de la independencia del Secretariado de Naciones 
Unidas como uno de los órganos principales de la or-
ganización, el personal de la UNODC y los organis-
mos administrativos que la precedieron han sido ob-
jeto de diversas controversias ideológicas, políticas y 
político-criminales, que han afectado a la integridad 
de la Organización y a su rendimiento.
Los programas de asistencia técnica financiados 
extrapresupuestariamente y los proyectos que fue-
ron parte del programa de Naciones Unidas desde 
sus primeros años de andadura, se han convertido 
en la primera década del siglo XXI en programas em-
píricos de capacitación y formación contra el delito 
que implican el control nacional y el compromiso 
político hacia los ideales del cambio sostenible. En 
los últimos tiempos, como  efecto secundario de la 
abrumadora dependencia de fondos extrapresu-
puestarios, se ha producido una transformación de 
la plantilla de Naciones Unidas y una erosión de la 
concepción original acerca de su integridad.
En cuanto a la labor de promoción de los están-
dares y buenas prácticas de Naciones Unidas en ma-
teria de prevención del delito y justicia penal (publi-
cadas y diseminadas a nivel mundial), su aplicación 
nacional, regional e interregional ha sido llevada a 
cabo por la UNODC, los institutos que integran la 
red del Programa de Prevención del Delito y Justicia 
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Penal de las Naciones Unidas (PNI), y numerosas or-
ganizaciones no gubernamentales, a través de distin-
tas iniciativas conjuntas, y en respuesta a demandas 
cambiantes: desde la lucha contra la criminalidad 
organizada transnacional, hasta el control de la co-
rrupción o el tratamiento de la delincuencia urbana 
o juvenil.
PARTE III. REGRESO AL FUTURO
Junto con la aproximación a gran escala, comparativa 
y socioeconómica, al control del delito, la UNODC 
recurre también al conocimiento neurobiológico y 
a otros datos empíricos fundamentados en avances 
académicos recientes con relevancia sobre la indivi-
dualización del riesgo y las estrategias de protección 
en materia de delincuencia juvenil violenta y el abu-
so de drogas.
Ya sea micro- o macro- orientada, la “crimino-
logía azul” tiene su objeto de atención en “la gente” 
(comunidades e individuos), y en la implementación 
del mandato de Naciones Unidas utiliza metodolo-
gías parcialmente distintas a las de la criminología 
académica.
Este libro documenta cómo el poder transfor-
mador del Programa de Naciones Unidas en mate-
ria de Prevención del Delito y Justicia Penal ha sido 
considerable, pero en algunos aspectos más que 
en otros. Está presidido, a veces conjunta y a veces 
separadamente, por ideas tanto académicas como 
intergubernamentales.  Se compromete con una ac-
ción aún más transformadora, poderosa y atenta, que 
pueda contribuir a la paz y la seguridad en el mundo. 
Los “Estudios sobre Naciones Unidas”, una disciplina 
emergente, son identificados en este volumen como 
uno de los instrumentos potencialmente influyentes 
y prácticos a la hora de conseguir que el mensaje de 
Naciones Unidas en materia de justicia penal se ex-
tienda por el mundo.
La figura 6 muestra de forma gráfica el desarrollo 
progresivo de la acción internacional contra el delito 
en el mundo, desde sus comienzos en 1764 (Cesare 
Beccaria) hasta 2010, el año del Decimosegundo 
Congreso, y de la reunión del Consejo de Seguridad 
en la que la criminalidad organizada transnacional 
fue declarada amenaza a la paz y la seguridad inter-
nacional. La figura muestra en su parte izquierda los 
datos de importantes conferencias internacionales, y 
en la derecha ideas que configuraron progresivamen-
te la política criminal de Naciones Unidas.  
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Criminologie onusienne
Le pouvoir des idées des Nations Unies dans la lutte contre le crime à l’échelle mondiale.
Une étude monographique.
Synopsis
L’objectif de la dernière section de cette étude 
consiste à présenter en langage clair un résumé de 
nature uniquement descriptive des tendances cri-
minologiques majeures ayant modelé le programme 
des Nations Unies pour la prévention du crime et la 
justice pénale tel qu’on le connaît. 
Pour ce faire, on a extrait l’essentiel du texte 
(corps et boîtes de texte) afin de présenter une syn-
thèse axée sur l’action. 
PARTIE I, CONTRE LA PEUR ET LA PAUVRETÉ, 
POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE 
Le programme des Nations Unies pour la prévention 
du crime et la justice pénale est fondé sur plus de 
deux siècles d’évolution en matière de crime et de 
justice. Ces derniers ont commencé avec les travaux 
internationaux de réforme en matière pénale de 
l’école de droit pénal classique de Cesare Beccaria 
(1764) et les premières recommandations relatives 
à l’étude comparée de la détention formulées par 
John Howard (1777). Les débuts institutionnels du 
programme, à l’échelle internationale, peuvent être 
attribués au Congrès pénitentiaire international 
de Francfort-sur-le-Main (1846) et à la série subsé-
quente de douze congrès internationaux en matière 
pénale et pénitentiaire (Londres, 1872-La Haye, 
1950). Ses débuts programmatiques ne découlent 
pas seulement de ces réalisations, mais également 
des politiques d’aide sociale qui ont gagné en 
importance à l’époque de l’industrialisation et de 
l’urbanisation (modernisation). Dans la deuxième 
moitié du 19e siècle, en particulier, la modernisation 
a touché l’Europe, avant de gagner le monde entier. 
C’est à ce moment que le mandat des Nations Unies 
concernant la prévention du crime et la justice 
pénale a gagné une perspective programmatique 
et dynamique de justice « sociale », puis de justice 
« pour les jeunes » et de justice « pénale », spé-
cialement axée sur la présence des enfants dans le 
système de justice, à commencer par leur isolement 
cellulaire et les préoccupations philanthropiques 
liées à leur bien-être.   
Après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, en tant 
que représentants des « générations à venir » (ou 
suivant d’autres notions similaires), les enfants et les 
adultes ont été ciblés par l’attention et les mesures 
internationales. En 1945, les Nations Unies, la plus 
grande organisation intergouvernementale pacifiste 
de tous les temps, craignant la reprise des horreurs 
de la guerre qui avaient mis fin à des millions de vies 
et de moyens de subsistance, en plus de causer la 
pauvreté chez les peuples et les nations, se sont atte-
lées à la réalisation de l’objectif établi dans sa charte 
visant à éviter qu’une telle situation se reproduise en 
favorisant le développement économique et social 
(développement durable) et les droits de l’homme 
(1948-1987). 
Ainsi, à partir du début des années 1990, les pays 
industrialisés et les pays en voie de développement 
(membres des Nations Unies) ont, ensemble, éla-
boré un certain nombre d’accords multilatéraux qui 
ont ouvert la voie à l’opérationnalisation de la lutte 
commune contre les défis liés à la sécurité, dans la-
quelle s’inscrivent les réformes dans les secteurs de la 
sécurité, de la justice et de la sécurité des personnes 
et des villes.  
Dans ce contexte, la recherche universitaire et les 
politiques des Nations Unies en matière pénale, deux 
éléments qui reposaient sur les concepts de l’affran-
chissement de la peur et de la pauvreté, et de déve-
loppement durable, ont, séparément ou ensemble, 
contribué à ces trois idées fondamentales.
PARTIE II, LE MANDAT DES NATIONS UNIES 
POUR LA PRÉVENTION DU CRIME ET LA  
JUSTICE PÉNALE 
Depuis 1946, diverses facettes techniques du déve-
loppement social et économique se sont graduelle-
ment intégrées au mandat des Nations Unies pour 
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la prévention du crime et la justice pénale. Ceci a 
commencé par le traitement réservé aux jeunes et 
aux adultes, et déjà en 1955, dans le cadre du premier 
Congrès des Nations Unies pour la prévention du 
crime et le traitement des délinquants, on établissait 
l’ensemble de règles minima pour le traitement des 
détenus, un jalon important. 
Le congrès des Nations Unies pour la prévention 
du crime et la justice pénale, tenu tous les cinq ans 
depuis (12 de 1955 à 2010) et les mesures connexes 
prises dans le cadre du mécanisme d’expert qui s’est 
peu à peu spécialisé et institutionnalisé (1950-1991), 
avant de devenir un mécanisme intergouvernemen-
tal de fond (Commission pour la prévention du crime 
et la justice pénale), ont donné lieu à des recomman-
dations viables à l’intention du Conseil économique 
et social, de l’Assemblée générale et du Conseil 
de sécurité (tous des organes des Nations Unies), 
recommandations qui ont été déclarées constituer le 
droit des Nations Unies en matière de lutte contre la 
criminalité.  
Parmi les instruments non contraignants des 
Nations Unies, les plus importants sont l’ensemble 
des règles minima mentionné ci-dessus, le droit des 
traités, les conventions des Nations Unies sur la cri-
minalité transnationale organisée (2000) et contre la 
corruption (2003). Entre 1955 et 2010, le programme 
des Nations Unies pour la prévention du crime et 
la justice pénale a adopté environ 60 instruments 
juridiques non contraignants et l’Office des Nations 
Unies contre la drogue et le crime (ONUDC) (dont re-
lève le programme) est le gardien de ces instruments 
non contraignants et relevant du droit des traités, en 
plus de trois conventions des Nations Unies contre 
le trafic illicite de stupéfiants et de substances psy-
chotropes (1961, 1972, 1988) et de 16 traités universels 
contre le terrorisme.  
Les éléments ci-dessus constituent, de nos jours, 
l’essence législative de la criminologie onusienne. 
L’évolution de celle-ci s’est faite en de nombreuses 
étapes au fil du temps sur le fondement, en grande 
partie, de notions relatives à la défense sociale (1946-
1990), remplacées aujourd’hui par d’autres idées et 
programmes de bien-être social visant à faire avancer 
l’objectif de lutter contre la criminalité, la drogue, le 
terrorisme et la victimisation avec respect et effica-
cité.  
L’établissement de normes se poursuit (et néces-
site des habiletés de négociation, aux plans juridique 
et diplomatique, afin d’assurer l’évolution progressive 
de ces normes ainsi que l’application des instruments 
des Nations Unies relatifs à l’état de droit). La mise en 
œuvre de tels instruments juridiques internationaux 
dans le cadre de la réforme de la justice pénale inter-
nationale par l’intermédiaire d’assistance technique 
sur le terrain et de formation (en ligne ou non) est 
sensiblement devenue l’envers de la même médaille. 
Les leçons apprises à la suite des mesures prises pour 
faire fonctionner ces instruments juridiques ont eu 
pour effet d’accroître l’expertise disponible, ce dont 
on avait particulièrement besoin pour mieux réussir 
les missions de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies 
en appliquant les principes des Nations Unies relatifs 
à la primauté du droit. 
On observe non seulement de nouvelles formes 
de crimes de plus en plus mondialisés, mais aussi une 
convergence graduelle des régimes juridiques visant 
leur répression, ainsi que la mise en place, lente mais 
manifeste, de mesures de prévention des crimes (en 
milieu urbain ou autre) axées sur la collaboration 
et les partenariats. Ceci a commencé dans le cadre 
général de la réforme du droit pénal international 
qui se poursuit de par le monde depuis ses débuts 
scientifiques dans la deuxième moitié du 19e siècle et 
qui a été particulièrement dynamique et prolifique 
après la guerre froide (1945-1989), lorsque se sont 
amorcés les travaux de transition en matière de jus-
tice dans les pays touchés par le conflit. La réforme en 
matière de justice pénale internationale lutte contre 
la criminalité en visant l’atteinte d’un équilibre entre 
la répression et la prévention, mais, aujourd’hui, 
fait intervenir la justice réparatrice, des options de 
rechange à l’emprisonnement ainsi que, enfin, l’aide 
aux victimes et l’indemnisation de celles-ci. Ces élé-
ments concernent les anciens et les nouveaux types 
de crimes, notamment la criminalité transnationale, 
dont la cybercriminalité, de plus en plus courante, 
constitue l’une des formes les plus sophistiquées et 
complexes.  
Le bilan des Nations Unies est satisfaisant dans 
certains de ces domaines, mais l’est moins dans 
d’autres. Les responsables de la réforme en matière 
de justice pénale internationale, notamment les 
hauts dirigeants et le personnel technique des Na-
tions Unies, s’attachent à aider les pays en voie de 
développement à modifier les mesures prises dans le 
cadre de leur système juridique et de leur système de 
justice pénale à l’égard de ces crimes, alors qu’évo-
luent constamment les recommandations de poli-
tiques pénales internationales et les concepts idéo-
logiques sur le progrès, et ce, à la suite de mesures 
modernisation variées, parfois incompatibles. Avec 
le déclin (contrairement à l’idéal fixé originalement 
dans la Charte des Nations Unies) de l’indépendance 
du Secrétariat des Nations Unies parmi les princi-
paux organes des Nations Unies, le personnel de 
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l’ONUDC et des unités administratives précédentes 
ont été au cœur de différentes controverses de nature 
idéologique et politique et concernant les politiques 
en matière pénale, ce qui a nui à l’intégrité et au ren-
dement des Nations Unies. 
Les programmes et les projets d’assistance tech-
nique financés au moyen des fonds extrabudgétaires, 
qui figurent dans le programme des Nations Unies 
depuis le tout début, dans la première décennie du 
21e siècle, sont devenus des travaux de lutte contre la 
criminalité fondés sur les faits visant le renforcement 
des capacités et l’acquisition d’habiletés nécessi-
tant une prise en charge interne et un engagement 
politique, et ce, en vue d’un changement durable. 
En conséquence du recours massif aux fonds extra-
budgétaires, il a récemment fallu modifier la com-
position du personnel des Nations Unies, ce qui a 
entraîné une érosion additionnelle du concept origi-
nal d’intégrité.  
L’application interne, régionale et interrégionale 
des normes et des pratiques exemplaires (publiées 
et appliquées de par le monde) en matière de pré-
vention du crime et de justice pénale, appuyée par 
les travaux de défense de certains intérêts faisant 
intervenir la promotion de ces normes et pratiques 
exemplaires, a été effectuée par l’ONUDC, 16 des 
membres du réseau d’instituts du programme et de 
nombreuses organisations non gouvernementales 
dans le cadre de partenariats qui évoluent selon 
les demandes changeantes, qu’il s’agisse de la lutte 
contre la corruption et la criminalité organisée trans-
nationales, ou bien la criminalité urbaine ou chez les 
jeunes.
PARTIE III, RETOUR VERS LE FUTUR 
Nonobstant l’approche juridique et socioécono-
mique comparative à grande échelle de lutte contre 
la criminalité, l’ONUDC s’appuie également sur les 
conclusions neurobiologiques et d’autres constata-
tions similaires fondées sur les faits qui sont perti-
nentes sur les plans du risque individuel et des fac-
teurs de protection relatifs aux crimes avec violence 
commis par des adolescents et à la toxicomanie. Pour 
ce faire, l’ONUDC s’appuie sur les avancées universi-
taires réalisées récemment. 
Que ce soit à petite ou à grande échelle, la crimi-
nologie onusienne est d’abord axée sur les « peuples » 
(collectivités et individus) et, dans le cadre de l’exé-
cution du mandat des Nations Unies, recourt à une 
méthodologie différente, à certains égards, de celle 
utilisée en criminologie théorique.  
Le livre explique que le pouvoir de transfor-
mation du programme des Nations Unies pour 
la prévention du crime et la justice pénale a été 
considérable, mais dans certains domaines en 
particulier. Ce pouvoir repose sur la théorie et les 
idées gouvernementales, ensemble et séparément. 
Il s’agit d’une force d’autant plus transformatrice, 
puissante et ciblée dans le domaine de la paix et de 
la sécurité dans le monde. Dans l’étude monogra-
phique, on fait ressortir les « études sur les Nations 
Unies », une nouvelle discipline, parmi les instru-
ments pratiques d’influence permettant de diffuser 
dans le monde le message des Nations Unies sur la 
criminalité et la justice. 
La figure 6 illustre à l’aide d’un idéogramme 
l’évolution progressive de la lutte internationale 
contre le crime dans le monde, depuis ses débuts 
en 1764 (Cesare Beccaria) jusqu’en 2010, année du 
12e congrès des Nations Unies, de la réunion du 
Conseil de sécurité à laquelle la criminalité trans-
nationale organisée a été déclarée une menace à la 
paix et à la sécurité internationales, et de l’adoption 
par l’Assemblée générale des Règles des Nations 
Unies concernant le traitement des femmes déte-
nues et les mesures non privatives de liberté pour 
les femmes délinquantes (Règles de Bangkok). 
L’idéogramme montre les dates d’importantes 
conférences internationales et les idées majeures 
qui, peu à peu, ont donné lieu à l’établissement des 
politiques des Nations Unies en matière pénale que 
nous connaissons aujourd’hui. 
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蓝色犯罪学 
 
联合国应对全球犯罪理念的力量 
 
  专题研究 
 
   摘要 
 
第一部分 反对恐惧和匮乏，实现可持续发展  
 
联合国预防犯罪和刑事司法署从长达两个多世纪的犯罪和司法活动的开展中吸取经验。
这些活动起始于贝卡利亚古典刑法学院倡导的国际刑事改革工作（1764）以及约翰•霍华德
的首份监狱比较介绍（1777）。国际体制的起始可归功于在莱茵河畔法兰克福市召开的国际
监狱大会（1846）以及后来十二次国际刑事和监狱系列大会（自 1872 年在伦敦至 1950 年在
海牙）。活动开始后不仅通过上述成果得到发展，同时也通过工业化和城镇化（现代化）时
代日益显著的社会福利政策得到发展。特别是 19 世纪后半叶，现代化进入欧洲日程，从此
波及全世界。从那时起，联合国防止犯罪和刑事司法的权限继承了有计划的、并且总是积极
调整的重点，先是“社会”，接着是“青少年”和“刑事”司法，在司法制度中特别提及儿
童地位，关于他们孤独禁闭的问题以及有关对他们福利的慈善关怀。 
 
第二次世界大战后，“后继各代”（或以任何其他相似的概念）儿童和成年人的命运成为
国际关注和行动的中心。1945 年，联合国这个有史以来最大的和平主义政府间组织，唯恐
曾毁灭千百万生命和生计并导致各国人民和民族贫穷的战争恐怖再次发生，开始通过促进社
会和经济发展（可持续发展）和人权（1948-1987）来防止那些灾难的再次发生，实现其宪
章的目标。  
 
终于，自 20 世纪 90 年代初开始，发展中国家和发达国家（联合国会员）达成了若干多
边协议，为共同应对安全挑战的运作铺平道路，把人类和城市安全、司法和安全部门的改革
也纳入其中。 
 
在此背景下，学术研究和联合国刑事政策 — 双双已摆脱恐惧和匮乏两种基本观念并达
到可持续发展的观念 –-- 自觉地或共同地对这三种基本观念做出贡献。 
 
第二部分 联合国防止犯罪和刑事司法权限 
 
自 1946 年起，联合国预防犯罪和刑事司法权限越来越多地建立于社会和经济发展领域
的各种技术范围。起初是儿童/少年和成年人的待遇，在 1955 年就由联合国第一届预防犯罪
和罪犯待遇大会确立了具有里程碑意义的囚犯待遇最低标准规定(SMRs)。 
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此后，每 5 年召开一次的 12 次联合国预防犯罪和刑事司法大会（1955-2010），由越来
越多的专家开展的相关活动（1950-1991），以及政府间实质性机制（预防犯罪和刑事司法委
员会），向经社理事会、联合国大会和安理会（联合国的一些机构）提出了可行的建议，由
它们宣布分别成为联合国抵制犯罪的法律。 
 
联合国软法律中最为突出的是上面所提到的囚犯待遇最低标准规定(SMRs)、条约法，以
及联合国反对跨国有组织犯罪公约（2000）和反腐败公约（2003）。1955-2010 年间，联合
国预防犯罪和刑事司法署一共通过了 60 件软法律文书，联合国毒品与犯罪问题办公室（其
构成部分）一直是那些软法律和条约法文书的保管单位，外加联合国反对毒品和精神药物的
三个公约（1961、1972、1988），16 个反对恐怖主义的普遍法律条约。 
 
上述各项构成如今的“蓝色犯罪学”的立法要素。它经历了不同的发展阶段，有大量涉
及社会防卫的内容（1946-1990），目前已被其它面向社会福利的理念和计划所取代，旨在继
续推进有效地针对犯罪、毒品、恐怖主义和迫害的人道目标。 
 
标准的建立仍在继续（涉及法律上的和外交上的谈判技巧，以确保渐进和联合国的法治
内涵）。在国际刑事司法改革领域通过实地技术援助及在线和不在线的培训来实施所有已经
订立的这类国际法律文书已经成为同一钱币的反面。在制定那些法律文书工作中获得的教训
增加了可利用的专门知识，对于在实践中应用联合国法治原则，更为成功地执行早先各类联
合国维和任务，是特别需要的。 
 
科学地始于 19 世纪下半叶的国际刑法改革在全世界继续进行，在冷战时期（1945-1989）
结束后尤其富有活力且成果丰富。在此大背景下，冲突结束后的国家里的司法过渡工作已经
开始，人们不仅可以看到新形式的越来越全球化的犯罪，而且可以看到合法政权逐渐合力加
以控制，以及动作较慢但显然是合作的和基于伙伴关系的城市和其它犯罪预防。在抗击犯罪
活动中，通过在“控制”与“预防”中谋求平衡，国际刑事司法改革现在涉及采用替代囚禁
的办法、教改司法、以及给予受害人援助和赔偿的办法。它们涉及新老形式的犯罪，包括跨
国犯罪，而新兴的网络犯罪是最为先进和富有挑衅性的形式之一。 
 
联合国在一些领域的所作所为是令人满意的，而在其它一些领域的所作所为是不能令人
满意的。国际刑事司法改革者们，其中有联合国的高级和技术职员，根据正在演变的国际刑
事政策建议和思想观念的进展，通过各种，有时是毫不相干的，现代化形式，着重于协助发
展中国家改良它们应对此类犯罪的法律和刑事司法制度。随着作为该组织主要机构之一的联
合国秘书处的独立性逐渐衰退（这是与联合国宪章的本来理想违背的），联合国毒品与犯罪
问题办公室的职员和以前的行政单位受制于意识形态、政治和刑事政策的争论，影响了该组
织的正直和绩效。 
 
预算外出资的技术援助方案和项目，自联合国早期以来就是其活动的一部分，在 21 世
纪的第一个十年里已成为一项基于证据、能力和技能培训的抗击犯罪工作，牵涉国内主导权
和政治承诺，以期实现可持续变革。过分依赖预算外资助的近期副作用涉及到改变联合国职
员的组成，进一步侵蚀他们原有的正直观念。 
 
在涉及促进联合国预防犯罪和刑事司法标准、准则和善行（对全世界公示）的提倡工作
的支持下，它们的国内、地区和区域间适用已由联合国毒品与犯罪问题办公室执行。16 个
30
规划网络学会和无数个非政府组织通过正在发展的伙伴关系，应对正在变化的要求：不论涉
及抗击跨国有组织犯罪和腐败，还是国家和地方涉及城市和青年犯罪。 
 
第三部分 回望未来 
 
尽管有了大规模抗击犯罪的比较法律和社会经济手段，但自从联合国毒品与犯罪问题办
公室也应用神经生物和相似的基于证据的结果，近期制作了关系到个人危险以及对青年暴力
犯罪和滥用药物的保护因素的学术进展图片。 
 
不论从微观还是从宏观的角度来看，“蓝色犯罪学”以人（社团/个人）为本，为了执行
联合国权限，寻求与学术犯罪学有所不同的方法。 
 
本书记载了联合国预防犯罪和刑事司法署可观的变革力量，但只是在某些领域。本书的
动力是学术和政府间的思想，有时是共同的，有时是分开的。它赋予自己更大的变革力量和
集中的行动，可以对世界和平与安全做出贡献。“联合国研究”，正在形成的学科，已经纳入
当前的专著研究，被评选为具有影响潜力和实用的文书之一，可以把联合国关于犯罪和司法
的信息传播全世界。 
 
图 6 用表意符号显示世界上反对犯罪的国际行动进展情况，自 1764 年（贝卡利亚）伊
始，至 2010 年第 12 届联合国预防犯罪和刑事司法大会，以及安理会会议上，跨国有组织犯
罪被宣布为国际和平与安全的威胁。表意符号在左侧显示重要国际会议的日期，右侧显示逐
渐成为当今联合国刑事政策的各种思想。 
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














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

























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


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Preface
The atrocities of the Second World War catalyzed 
changes in international cooperation against crime. 
This criminological problematic (the impact of 
wars on crime), has so far been mainly discussed in 
academia. In 1945, when the United Nations (UN) 
was established, it became a launching pad for 
broad-based intergovernmental social and human-
itarian development activities. 
In this study I analyze the question of wheth-
er and, if so, how UN criminological and academ-
ic ideas permeate one another, are complimentary to 
one another or create added value. I do so from the 
academic perspective, to which I was privy, but al-
so from the perspective of an international criminal 
justice practitioner.
I have sought to do so:
First, by outlining the historical and political 
context in which, in the framework of its practical 
developmental action since 1945, the UN gradually 
influenced penal and criminal policy aspects of re-
sponding to crime globally. Originally proposed by 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, they are interpreted in the Or-
ganization as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from 
want".
Next, by outlining the impact of some academic 
criminological ideas on the penal and criminal poli-
cy of the UN and the author’s expectation of an im-
minent change of a criminological paradigm, result-
ing from the emergence of another United Nations 
idea, that of "sustainable development".
The above two points, that is the historical and 
political contexts in which the UN influences penal 
and criminal policy aspects of responding to crime, 
are presented here in an analysis on three levels.
Initially, this study outlines the relation that 
has existed since 1945 between the global develop-
ment of criminological thought and the aforemen-
tioned three UN ideas ("freedom from fear", "freedom 
from want" and "sustainable development"), and also 
the relations with some of its lesser known ideas and 
the penal and criminal policy legal instruments that 
resulted from them. 
Further, this study generally analyzes, through 
the lens of the sociology of knowledge, internal and 
reciprocal relations between academic criminologi-
cal ideas and the above three guiding United Nations 
ideas.
Finally, this study raises the above parts up to a 
higher level of analysis involving UN Studies, a new 
crosscutting academic discipline of knowledge about 
the Organization, aiming at combining the theoreti-
cal and practical aspects of its social and humanitar-
ian developmental activities, including responding 
to crime. This is the aforementioned added value. 
Its essence is a crosscutting United Nations look 
at the global problematic of responding to crime, 
seen not through the lens of particular criminologi-
cal schools of thought or theories, but rather as a cul-
mination of all academic and practical knowledge. 
That knowledge is set out also in a number of “text 
boxes”, several of which have been contributed to 
this study by criminal justice practitioners – “Friends 
of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice Programme” - with whom I have had the 
honour to work on its implementation. I found their 
contributions extremely perceptive and relevant to 
the topic of this study. These text boxes seek to ex-
emplify that amalgamation of criminological theo-
ry with the practice of responding to crime, on their 
own terms and autonomously from one another (and 
indeed also internally). This is needed and is possi-
ble in the area where we have common methodo-
logical standards or common internal and temporal 
paths or sequences of the ideas. In this context, the 
study reveals past and present aspects of the involve-
ment of the United Nations in the international re-
sponse to crime, aspects which are not known to a 
broader audience. 
These aspects contribute to a more general con-
clusion, which is that academic and practical crim-
inological thought (including UN thought), some-
times separately, sometimes jointly, paves the way for 
the global response to crime, orientated towards the 
qualitative improvement of the life of the individual. 
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Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of 
the United Nations and co-founder of the Academic 
Council on the United Nations System, when asked 
what he knows about his Organization, reported-
ly answered that after three months of working in 
it he was ready to lecture about it, after one year he 
started having doubts about whether he knows any-
thing, and ever since he found himself in that state 
of confusion. The U.S. sociologist Robert Merton 
had a somewhat similar observation regarding ac-
ademic science: Studying its new paths surrenders 
the author to the cult of unintelligibility.2 I can only 
second both views. Therefore, in this criminologi-
cal book, confusing as it may at first appear because 
of the way in which many disciplines and issues in-
tersect in it, but also path-blazing as it should be, I 
now would like to add my personal considerations. 
These personal considerations should start by 
noting that I originally intended to write a person-
al account of my work for this Organization, follow-
ing the model of some prominent United Nations 
colleagues.3 After all, my time with the United Na-
tions provided me with many sensitive and sensa-
tional stories, which I have been tempted to save for 
my memoirs. 
It is not for the first time that I have had this 
temptation to write a personal “My Story”. When 
working in Central Asia (1999-2002), I hoped that at 
the end of each week of my stay there I could write 
one page about my exotic but difficult experienc-
es, so that at the end I would have at least 150 pages 
of text ready for print. Instead, I published two aca-
demic books. Apparently, the time has not yet come 
for me to accomplish my original plan, as per the first 
motto of the present book that “No army can resist 
an idea whose time has come”. Even in such sensi-
tive and volatile matters as United Nations person-
nel policy (on which this book touches in several as-
pects, including “who does not like whom”), I started 
to discover more sense than sensation, when it oc-
curred to me that such tricky issues can be more pro-
ductively addressed in the book via the question of 
negotiating skills and training, rather than sympa-
thies and antipathies.
So, after all these considerations, and when I 
eventually abandoned the “My Story” idea, I was re-
quested to prepare a lecture on United Nations crim-
inological thought. That lecture gave me the idea of 
presenting a more comprehensive picture of the top-
ic. Initially I wanted to write it in the form of an his-
torical essay. But I realized that a historical approach 
to studying the roots of crime and the response to 
crime will have value only when it matters for the fu-
ture. That is why this book has as its second motto, 
“Life must be lived forwards, but can only be under-
stood backwards”. And it is this that gave me the idea 
to write this text “back to the future”. 
I further realized that another idea that I had for 
a criminological “essay” would have fallen under the 
weight of numerous tables, text boxes, figures, pho-
tos and other visuals which the book carries, in line 
with the assumption communicated by the third 
motto of this book that “If to judge the development 
of criminology only by the number of its fallen ideas, 
its field would have been full of victims”. Consequent-
ly, I opted for delivering a monographic study, even 
though the noun sounds somewhat too academic, 
given the book’s focus on the practical side of Unit-
ed Nations legal policy, criminal policy and techni-
cal assistance. 
The United Nations, for which I have had the 
honour and privilege of serving for 30 years, is a peo-
ples-centred Organization working for that purpose. 
To achieve it, the founding Charter and declarations 
of the UN contain the culmination of normative 
thinking on how human beings ought to treat one 
another4 in seeking peace and security, and in seek-
ing a world that is safer from drugs, crime and ter-
rorism. Consequently, this book argues for the fur-
ther development of United Nations Studies, and, in 
particular, of United Nations Criminal Justice Stud-
ies. They should be at the core of global academic 
and political interest. The content of those Studies 
content is formed by the reformist, progressive val-
ue-oriented United Nations crime prevention and 
criminal justice standards and norms – continuously 
advancing criminological global knowledge stored in 
the form of rules.5 The argument for combining ac-
ademic and bureaucratic criminological knowledge 
for United Nations Criminal Justice Studies is devel-
oped throughout this book and concluded at its end. 
Its preface should be supplemented by a few oth-
er remarks. 
First, the concept of "criminological" knowledge 
goes beyond its academic meaning. In the present 
study it includes, for instance, ideas from the area of 
2  Merton 1938: 333.
3  Anstee 2003; Di Gennaro 1992; Radzinowicz 1999; Shikita 2004.
4  E-mail communication from Gary Lewis, United Nations staff member (4 November 2010).
5  Jacobsson 2000:41.
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international criminal law and public internation-
al law, which are two separate university-level disci-
plines. The study draws also on international human-
itarian and human rights law. In criminology, both 
would probably find their functional equivalents in 
“humanitarian” and “humane” criminal policy. In this 
study the problematic of crime and deviance is more 
instrumentally connected with this international 
(and especially United Nations) criminal policy mix-
ture (“blue criminology”) than with academic crim-
inology, whether “green”,6 “peacemaking”,7 “peace-
keeping”, “radical”8 or any other kind. 
At U.S. universities, in addition to criminology or 
the sociology of deviance, there is also the discipline 
of "Criminal Justice".9 In the UN, this term - only 
nominally similar to the U.S. term - appeared during 
the 1970s. Since then it has been invoked much more 
often than criminology or the sociology of deviance, 
both of which have retained their academic valour. 
This study, the very title of which includes the noun 
"criminology" and the adjective “blue”, is an attempt 
to look in an academic way at the UN criminologi-
cal and criminal justice problematic of responding 
to crime, as has been done more than once earlier.10
I found “blue” an apt adjective in this book, be-
cause, as will be documented, the origins of the Unit-
ed Nations and of its crime prevention and criminal 
justice mandate involve the humanitarian concerns 
of the Allies in the Second World War. At that time, 
before the D-Day landing on 6 June 1944 under the 
command of U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, his 
orders from the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff read: 
"You will enter the continent of Europe and in con-
junction with the other United Nations, undertake 
operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the de-
struction of her armed forces." The description of the 
unit shoulder-patch of his Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Expeditionary Force states that, "The heraldic 
chief of azure (BLUE) above the rainbow is emblem-
atic of a state of peace and tranquillity the restoration 
of which to the enslaved people is the objective of the 
United Nations'".11 In the seventh decade of the exist-
ence of the United Nations, there have been many 
more ingredients that make its criminology “blue”. 
The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme continues to be one of them.
Within this study’s limits the "blue" metaphor is 
more reflective of the process of the globalization of 
criminology (of which the UN crime mandate is its 
essential ingredient) than a historical metaphor of 
"penitentiary tourism"12 with which international pe-
nal reform started more than two centuries ago. That 
latter metaphor only marks the dichotomy between 
the early contributions of John Howard (1777) and 
other like-minded individual prison reformers-trav-
ellers, and those of their followers. In Frankfurt am 
Mein in 1846 they started formulating their collec-
tive recommendations via international penitentia-
ry congresses, to which the establishment of the UN 
crime mandate has originally been credited. 
The United Nations Crime Prevention and Crim-
inal Justice Programme indeed draws not only on 
both types of these historical penitentiary develop-
ments, but - as emphasized by Margaret J. Anstee, 
then the UN Under Secretary-General Director-Gen-
eral of the UNOV13 - also on the earlier penal reform 
developments (Cesare Beccaria, 1764). Currently, the 
Programme is a meta-representation of an interna-
tional cooperation process in the globalization of 
criminology, including its penal and penitentiary di-
mensions. In that criminology, the blue colour cer-
tainly is within its spectrum, and the UN projects it 
through its own supranational ideas and other con-
tributions. 
6  One definition highlights corporate interests and emerged through corporate redefinitions of green environmentalism. Another definition 
highlights common elements in social movements concerned with environmental justice while emphasizing the commitment of these move-
ments to simultaneously incorporating race, class and gender-oriented issues into green criminology (Lynch & Stretsky 2003:217-238). 
7  Nominally only similar to “peacekeeping” and “peacemaking” as part of the approaches of the United Nations to maintaining global peace 
and security, peacemaking criminology and peacekeeping criminology as academic intellectual currents are, in fact, reminiscent of the early 
criminological views of Bernarldo de Quirós and Enrico Ferri, combining socialism with theology (see part I of this book). According to their 
current proponents, “crime may be eliminated once we establish peace and justice” (Hagan 2010:186).
8  Radical or critical criminology is a branch of conflict theory, drawing its ideas from a basic Marxist perspective (see Figure 1).
9  Eskridge 2003.
10  Carroll 1957; Mueller 1983.
11  Plesch 2008:144. See also WD 268 CO/110, The United Nations Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Second Meeting 
of Advisory Committee of Jurists, June 10, 1945 on art. 3 of the draft United Nations Charter, for a discussion on the name ”United Nations”, The 
United Nations Conference on International Organization, Summary Report of Second Meeting of Advisory Committee of Jurists, June 10, 1945 
(in:) Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. XVII, Part. I, United Nations, New York 
1954: 404-405.
12  Dupont-Bouchat 2002.
13  Anstee 1988:10. UNESCO is another entity which associates itself with Beccaria’s work (See: Problemi Attuali di Scienza e Di Cultura, Secondo 
centario della pubblicazione dell’opera ‘Dei delitti e delle pene’ di Cesare Beccaria. Atti delle Celebrazioni indette, sotto l’alto patronato del Presi-
dente della Repubblica, dall’Acaemia Nazionale dei Limcei e dalla Commissione Nazionale Italiana dell’UNESCO, Roma, Villa della Farnesina, 15-16 
giugno 1964, Milano, Palazzo Marino, 18 giugno 1964, Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei, Anno CCCLXII-1965, Quaderno N.71, Roma 1965).
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Second, because this study has academic ambi-
tions, its readers will determine whether indeed it 
has met that academic standard. The study makes 
positive remarks about several criminological works 
and initiatives, their authors and the animators of 
international and UN criminal policy. During my 
work at the United Nations I met many of them. The 
remarks that I shall be making in the later sections 
of this book may perhaps give the impression that I 
am writing a hagiography, since a diplomatic opin-
ion of the roles and accomplishments of those per-
sons "went into my blood". I cannot deny this. But, 
first and foremost, this account is that of a criminol-
ogist and an international civil servant who seeks to 
account for an academic vision of the UN crime pro-
gramme, to the extent that the study’s formula per-
mits it. For this reason this study seeks to contrib-
ute to the institutional development of the UN crime 
mandate, as much as it is about its criminological 
ideas, in line with its title and the mottos.
Conversely, non-academic or bureaucratic read-
ers may feel that in some places the text is not de-
scriptive enough; it may be short of the proper bu-
reaucratic perspective; it may be overly intellectual 
and meandering, and hence out of touch with the re-
alities on the ground. Admittedly, the book’s narra-
tive contains such incongruence. 
Two dichotomies are responsible for such incon-
gruence. First, especially since this text deals with 
various academic and United Nations issues, there 
are different intellectual writing styles. Tongue-in-
cheek: although the text may be “triple distilled”, it 
still is no “single malt”. Blending fully those styles 
into one seamless text was not possible. Academ-
ic writing has its own idiosyncrasies and ideologies. 
However, as a former UN official and, once more as 
an academic, the point I would like to make through 
this study is that both intellectual writing styles (ac-
ademic and bureaucratic) in this study may still go 
hand in hand, even if on other occasions those hands 
should be separate. Therefore, the present text is oc-
casionally descriptive (bureaucratic) and occasional-
ly discursive (academic).14 
Second, and more importantly, such incongru-
ence has its origin in two only partly compatible kinds 
of global narration: “writer responsible” and “reader 
responsible”. Writer responsible narration empha-
sizes clarity and concision, actions over nouns, prac-
ticality over theory, present over past. It is direct, and 
is explicit over implicit. It is linear – it tends to go 
straight to the point. Writer responsible writing in-
volves a rigid deductive reasoning in the text, and 
the narration tends to be confrontational. Intellectu-
ally, it may be action-specific. Reader responsible 
narration puts the burden of communication on the 
reader. It may be intellectually self-serving. It tends 
to be verbose, ornate, emphasizes subjects over ac-
tions, theory over practice, past over present, implic-
it over explicit. It contextualizes and connects. It may 
be fuzzy. It requires “reading between the lines”, be-
cause it is inductive (lenient) in logic.15 It is also less 
linear than writer responsible narration and it is di-
versionary in building up the arguments. It empha-
sizes social harmony.16 
In most official United Nations documents (res-
olutions, reports)17 one can find several such reader 
responsible features, even though efforts continue 
to make them more writer responsible. Nonetheless 
United Nations documentation suffers from verbos-
ity. That "stock of empty words", that "obsession with 
words", as one UN insider correctly noted, is “off-
putting”.18
14  Because of this prosaic difference it was quite challenging to retain in both types of narration a “global writing style”. Such writing styles 
are implicitly and interculturally very different. They have different assumptions, strategies and goals (Cool 2009: chpts. 1 & 6). The “United 
Nations language” must accommodate them in more than its six official languages can convey. This starts with English as a core working lan-
guage of the United Nations Secretariat and French which is another such language. Through the former, either by the virtue of original (but 
not necessarily native-language) communication, the United Nations Secretariat processes or “recycles” other language texts. In effect, “UN 
language” is an amalgam of all such influences and instrumentalities. 
15  Karl R. Popper (1934/1984:3-5) argued that one of the most serious methodological flaws in social science research involves pursuing induc-
tive logic. This is because of its probability-language “would”/”could” rather than the “yes”/”no” of deductive logic. If we judge United Na-
tions criminology only on the strength of its inductive logic (the UN “language” is very probability-conditioned where “would”/”could” and 
”may”/“can” are often used), then it could never satisfy this argument. However, this argument mattered more in the pre-globalization stage 
(up to 1989) of crime and justice issues than it does today, in the world of recognized plurality of legal cultures. Irrespective of that date, as 
if by definition in intercultural and international studies and especially in international organizations (let alone in the United Nations since its 
inception) it is in their very concept and interest to pursue inductive logic because of that legal pluralism. 
16  McCool 2009.
17  This should not come as a surprise. The United Nations as a client-oriented organization (Member States are really its stake holders and 
employers), must relate to them and relay their substantive recommendations. In less official documents (technical reports, books, press 
releases, etc.), there is much more leeway in simplifying their language. 
18  Bertrand 1996:67 & 78. The press releases of the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI) are much more direct and informative. 
Either directly or through the United Nations Information Service (DPI’s outpost in Vienna), DPI has covered all the important developments 
related to the United Nations crime mandate. The press releases are written in a journalistic manner and help considerably to deliver the United 
Nations criminal justice messages in a newsworthy way.
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Ideally, it would be desirable to enhance writer 
responsible features of “United Nations language”. 
This is because it facilitates better understanding 
among diverse populations in which readers arrive 
with a variety of values, native languages and cus-
tomary beliefs.19 
However, writer responsible narration in the 
United Nations has its own limits. Verbosity may be 
justified, and the context matters. The United Na-
tions as the largest peacemaking organization in the 
world must emphasize social harmony. Seemingly 
superfluous words count - and so do fuzzy expres-
sions and definitions (if not also their absence).20 
Compared with the domestic plane, on the plane 
of international relations, including, occasionally, 
the legislative process, a different logic is at work. 
These superfluous or absent words/definitions may 
in their own ways be useful to consensus building. 
Rather than considering them as oversights or poor 
drafting, we should note how they prevent the in-
ternational community from being slowed down in 
responding to crime. The present text has some of 
these reader responsible features. 
Another reason for the justification is that "Unit-
ed Nations language" is shaped by many thought pat-
terns.21 It is not only intercultural but also global in its 
own terms. Transforming it into one logical thought 
pattern is a considerable challenge. English legal 
terms may have no corresponding term in other lan-
guages and vice versa. The same is true about English 
criminological, political science or other terms.
It is for this reason that this book includes a glos-
sary of terms and a Guidance Note. Both should help 
to clarify otherwise reader responsible text. The note 
provides its readers who are instructors (trainers) 
with a list of study questions for their audiences that 
may be found in some ways quite theoretical but al-
ways focused on practical problems and solutions. 
Further, the book provides in the Annex additional 
bibliographical information about United Nations 
crime and justice developments with a set of photos 
related to their contents. For either kind of audience, 
whether academically or practically-minded, those 
visuals may be helpful in getting to know the Unit-
ed Nations as a living organism that feels, address-
es and responds to the daily concerns of victims of 
crime and offenders in many ways. 
To the above one may add two more facts: not 
only is the author a Slavic native-language Pole ac-
customed to reader responsible text, but also the au-
thor may be overrepresenting in it the Polish aca-
demic contributions at the cost of some others (e.g., 
African, Asiatic, Arabic and European - from the Bal-
kans in particular). Save native English speakers, this 
probably is the predicament faced by all other na-
tive-language educated authors from any country. It 
goes without saying that such insights make crimi-
nology even more global than it would be if domi-
nated only by Western European and North Ameri-
can contributions, particularly written in English.
Likewise, a charge of over-representativeness 
may be formulated because of a somewhat dispro-
portionate number of Canadian contributors to this 
study. In my opinion, this reflects the relevant offi-
cial contribution of Canada to the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, 
a contribution that is difficult to overestimate. In this 
way I want to express my appreciation to this Mem-
ber State for its very many official initiatives direct-
ed at the UN crime programme, which either I wit-
nessed or I was involved in. Canada believes in "good 
international citizenship" for which promotion of 
justice is key for a stable order.22 
Especially from 1981 to 2002, Canada’s repre-
sentatives, many of whom became "Friends of the 
Programme" (and also my friends), made concrete 
substantive and financial contributions to the Pro-
gramme, very constructively and always in a consid-
erate manner. They introduced progressive ideas to 
the UN crime programme, among others through 
UN policy-making bodies. The way in which Canada 
in this way documented "good international citizen-
19  McCool 2009:133.
20  Such an absence of definitions may be demonstrated by two United Nations legal instruments: the ECOSOC resolution providing the Principles 
on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1989), and the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (2003). Moreover, none of the sixteen universal legal instruments against terrorism contain a definition of this offence. The 
term itself is used only three times in the titles of those legal instruments (in two conventions and one declaration). Such outcomes are delib-
erate and also evident in European Union law. Although they are termed “confusing” or (pejoratively) “fuzzy” (non-Aristotelian) logic, in fact 
they document that many international concepts are purposely left ambiguous, indeterminate or even incomplete. The incongruence evident 
at times in international legal reasoning results from varieties in national legal reasoning, varieties which sometimes are fundamentally incom-
patible with one another (See further: Delmas-Marty 2002:99-100; Mathisen 2010:200). In international law, the response to cross-national 
shortcomings of deductive reasoning has led to balancing it out by inductive reasoning entailing ambiguity (Schwarzenberger 1965:8).
21  Redo 2009.This article addresses Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian logic with culturally different mindsets. In this context, it looks at the goal of 
the United Nations of creating “a common language of justice” as a ”meta-language” for humane and effective crime prevention and criminal 
justice policy and project delivery, facilitated by understanding better the need for intercultural communication skills.
22  Axworthy 2001.
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ship" (a term coined by Gareth Evans, Australian For-
eign Minister, 1988-1996), has always impressed me. 
More recently, when negotiating with Canada the fi-
nancial arrangements for one United Nations meet-
ing, to be originally hosted and directly financed by 
one Government, the Canadian representative won-
dered if such financing (payments for airline tickets) 
can be indirectly channelled via the United Nations 
Secretariat, something which apparently is easier for 
Canada to accept than direct Government-to-Govern-
ment payments. This is one of very many examples 
of why I find Canada a country that promotes even 
more than "good" international citizenship, while also 
promoting United Nations "honest brokerage". This 
study, therefore, pays my respect to the Canadian civ-
il service and many of its members with whom I have 
had the honour and pleasure to cooperate. The initial 
dedication on the opening page of this study lists the 
first names of these friends. 
In the peer review process of this book I was 
asked what these friends really did. My response 
was always the same: Those Canadian friends with 
whom I worked closely demonstrated a high State 
ethos. How well they prepared for each and every 
United Nations meeting could be seen by the vo-
luminous documentation that they always brought 
with them from Ottawa. One example serves as a 
good demonstration of this. Since the beginning 
of my involvement with the Canadians in connec-
tion with various preparations for the quinquennial 
United Nations congresses on crime prevention and 
criminal justice, I have not only been aware of their 
immense “home work” in terms of their internal 
consultations, but I have also seen the voluminous 
documentation prepared by them for the congress-
es. In 2010, at the Twelfth United Nations Congress 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, my ad-
miration for the volume of that homework grew fur-
ther, when I saw Lucie Angers and Donald Piragoff, 
two high-ranking Justice Department officials, 
walking into the consultations room with a suit-
case full of such documents. Jeannette Acroyd, Aar-
on Caplan, Vincent Del Buono, James Hayes, Alex 
Himmelfarb, Sabine Nolke, Mary-Anne Kirvan and 
Christopher Ram – all these Canadian friends acted 
in a similar fashion. Hard-working, well prepared, 
always fulfilling the duties of a public civil servant. 
I was therefore not surprised to see that in the after-
math of the Twelfth Congress, among the few coun-
tries that responded on a short notice to the request 
Picture 1. Professor Inkeri Anttila (Director of HEUNI, founding member of the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control) and Giorgio Giacomelli (Under Secretary-General, Director General of UNOV; at the microphone) at the 1992 
handing-over ceremony of the ICCLR&CJP / HEUNI commemorative tableau with the list of 137 members of the for-
mer Committee on Crime Prevention and Control
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of the Secretary-General for advice on how to im-
prove the efficiency of the process involved in the 
United Nations congresses on crime prevention and 
criminal justice, there was Canada.23 The same vir-
tue that I recognize in such public servants I find in 
other nationals, including many Chinese servants, 
as well as international civil servants with the in-
terstate United Nations ethos - those who have the 
“blue blood''. This dedication, then, should be read 
in a much broader way than a casual interpretation 
would have suggested.
The book is also dedicated to my wife Jolanta 
and my son Piotr. Both deserve my utmost thanks 
for supporting me in my personal and professional 
life. Last but not least, this book is dedicated to Fre-
da Adler and the late G.O.W. Mueller - my first “UN 
Chief”. He recruited me into the international civ-
il service of the United Nations. “Freda and Gerd”, 
as old-time colleagues and friends use to call them, 
have been in my mind ever since. We shared very 
many precious moments together and I have always 
admired their professional accomplishments. 
But there is still one more reason to emphasize 
the role of “friends”. Among descendents of Europe-
an immigrants in North America, this term is com-
monly used to describe someone you know well, 
someone you like, and someone you feel a close per-
sonal bond with. Unlike kinships, friendships are 
voluntary among people who see themselves as sim-
ilar in some important ways and who often belong 
to the same social class. Friendship is based on a 
shared activity, event and experience. For friendship, 
it is more important what you do and have achieved, 
than who you are. Thus friendship is really fragment-
ed, but involves shared values.24
“Friends of the Programme” (uppercase “F”) 
which includes lowercase “friends” in a Northern 
American/European sense, is a bigger and more 
formal euphemism. It involves like-minded peo-
ple and entities sharing programme values. It is 
less personal, but still based on ensuing interrela-
tionships which influenced me and, I hope, provid-
ed me with the capacity within this larger intercul-
tural framework to communicate through this book 
important criminal justice messages regarding the 
power of the United Nations to respond to crime 
globally. In return, I hope that through my Canadi-
an and other “friends” and “Friends” coming from 
so many world cultures, I also was able to be more 
intercultural and empathetic to their perspectives, 
which eventually helped to form my own United 
Nations perspective. 
It is through this kind of incorporation (certain-
ly not the only one possible) that I embrace in this 
book the development of United Nations crime pre-
vention and criminal justice policy. Between 1946 
and 1991 it had been developed, inter alia, through 
the expert Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control. In the almost half century of that Commit-
tee's work, it was composed of many eminent crimi-
nologists, lawyers and other experts. Regrettably, in 
this book I have been able only modestly – or not 
at all – to demonstrate the accomplishments of sev-
eral of them. This is because of the formula of this 
study - methodologically less demanding than that 
of a monograph. However, as I am still seeking due 
geopolitical coverage in this study, it includes all 137 
names of that United Nations expert body.25 
Similarly, some may object on methodological 
grounds to two features of this study. First, it focus-
es primarily on the mandate of the United Nations 
in the field of crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice rather than on its presently expanded drugs and 
crime mandate. For this purpose this study employs 
various, not always functionally equivalent, terms: 
"the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme", "the United Nations crime and 
drugs programme" and "the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime", even though what flows from all 
of them should be corollary in terms of a succinct 
and logical development of the entire history (1946-
2011) of what is colloquially termed the "UN crime 
programme". The quoted terms originated in various 
phases of that development. On 18 December 1991, 
the United Nations General Assembly, in resolution 
46/152 (Annex), used the "Programme" designation, 
when at about the same time it also used the desig-
nation “the United Nations International Drug Con-
trol Programme”, on the history of which there are 
other publications.26 
23  E/CN.15/2011/15, Follow-up to the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and preparations for the Thir-
teenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 1 February 2011.
24  In other cultures friendship may be composite or whole (also in shared-values terms). In such a kind of relationship shared values may not 
necessarily be those that should be shared with or by a State. Where this happens, friends are called “brothers” or “sisters”, even if there is 
no kinship, as in the case of Central Asia or Africa (Lustig & Koester 2010:245). 
25  See Table 3 on the enclosed DVD.
26  Ghodse 2008; UNODC 2009; Redo 2011. In 2003, the Secretary-General reconstituted the Secretariat’s portion of the UN crime programme 
mandate, and included it in the newly created United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Glossary explains more differences. 
48
Second, this study offers only a cursory academic 
analysis of its concept of "crime", "drugs" and related 
notions, such as, e.g. "prevention" and "justice". There-
fore, a mere statement that “crime is what has been 
defined as such by national, international or transna-
tional law” will not satisfy a reader who may argue that 
in any society there are types of behaviour expressly or 
tacitly accepted even if under law they are criminal. 
But the book is not about this kind and level of expla-
nation, whether on “crime”, “justice” or “drugs”.
Therefore three other explanations should be 
added here. First, probably much to the surprise of 
many readers, the evolution of the UN crime pro-
gramme mandate has not begun with the imple-
mentation of the UN Charter that in its preamble 
and arts. 1(1) and 2(3) alludes to achieving "justice", 
which "means something different from international 
law ... and ... refers to natural law".27 In the UN crime 
programme specifically, "justice", qualified either as 
"criminal" or "juvenile", has really been only a gradu-
ally and constantly developing concept, driven and 
shaped by various orientations regarding its mean-
ing and scope, as stipulated in the programme’s in-
ternational criminal law and other legal instruments. 
This broad UN definition of "justice" is legal-
ly and diplomatically a very subtle matter. It should 
be embedded in an even broader concept of justice. 
Over decades of development of that concept it has 
followed diffused and often incoherent paths.
Second, unlike the UN drugs mandate, the UN 
crime mandate has not begun by taking over "legal 
control" responsibilities from the League of Nations 
on the implementation of the two international con-
ventions on the suppression of traffic in women and 
children (1921) and on the circulation of obscene 
publications (1933) nor from implementing the Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons 
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others 
(1950). 
Similarly, the UN crime programme has not been 
mandated to deal with the implementation of the 
two first legal instruments against human traffick-
ing: the International Agreement (1904) and the In-
ternational Convention for the Suppression of White 
Slave Traffic (1910), and of one instrument against 
pornography: the International Agreement for the 
Suppression of Obscene Publications (1910). It was 
France that was entrusted to deal with the three of 
them before the birth of the UN. Taking over France's 
functions28 in 1948, the UN has administered all the 
above international instruments, and several subse-
quent ones through its Legal Office.29 Unlike the UN 
drugs programme which took over the responsibil-
ities of the League of Nations involving the imple-
mentation of the Opium Convention (1912), original-
ly pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles, shared until 
1920 between France and The Netherlands, the UN 
crime programme had nothing to do directly with 
those other, originally, French mandates. 
However, save the above, it is a continuation of 
the work programme of the League of Nations, sub-
sequently expanded by other programmatic contri-
butions, all responding to the objectives of the Unit-
ed Nations Charter. In the preamble the Charter 
expresses the determination of the United Nations 
"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person ... to promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larg-
er freedom, and for these ends ... to employ interna-
tional machinery for the promotion of the economic 
and social advancement of all peoples". These broad 
social and economic objectives are further specified 
in articles 1 and 55. In article 1, one of the four ba-
sic purposes of the United Nations is stated as being 
"to achieve international co-operation in solving in-
ternational problems of an economic, social, cultur-
al, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion”.
In article 55, the social and economic objectives 
of the United Nations are also related to the broad-
er aims of the Organization: "With a view to the crea-
tion of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, the Unit-
ed Nations shall promote: higher standards of living, 
27  Commentary 2002, Vol. 1:36.
28  GA resolution III (256) of 3 December 1948.
29  Since 1948, with the gradual development of the UN Bill of Human Rights (1948/1966) and subsequent international legal instruments, a 
considerable portion of criminological work has also been carried out in the UN Secretariat by the Office of the Higher Commissioner on 
Human Rights (Geneva, Switzerland). The Division for the Advancement of Women, another entity of the Secretariat (New York, USA), after 
the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), often described as an international bill 
of women rights, has been carrying out considerable criminological work on violence against women. Outside the Secretariat, several agencies 
in the UN system, including the UNDP, the World Bank, WHO, the UN-HABITAT, UNICEF and UNESCO deal with various criminological topics and 
projects. The latter organization published in The University Teaching of the Social Sciences series its Criminology (Carroll 1957).
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full employment, and conditions of economic and so-
cial progress and development; solutions of interna-
tional economic, social, health, and related problems; 
and international cultural and educational coopera-
tion; and universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion".
Paradoxically then, the UN crime programme 
mandate has neither originated from the Charter's 
"justice" provisions nor from any of the above inter-
national criminal law treaties. Its original feature, 
which until now has remained dominant, is a social 
welfare orientation. 
That orientation can be traced back to the first 
half of the nineteenth century – the onset of mod-
ernization. Then the idea of universalizing certain 
concepts across the world, such as expanding "for-
mal" (classical/legal) justice to "social" justice, had 
its beginning in Europe.30 
Between 1830 and 1920, there were three phases 
of legal reform in Western Europe. Until 1850 legal 
reform had focussed on ascribing individual respon-
sibility and on the risk posed to society by those in 
conflict with law (in line with the classicist criminal 
law school); between 1870 and 1890 on family law de-
velopment, and between 1900 and 1920 on a State's 
involvement in family matters.31
In the middle phase, otherwise known as the 
phase of social justice, that legal reform has started 
getting its first criminological connotations. These 
became very pronounced during the 1870s, when the 
International Penitentiary Commission was estab-
lished. They had been further developed up to the 
First World War, and to the time of the League of Na-
tions. The emergence of the UN crime mandate can 
be associated with these connotations, as will be de-
tailed later.32 
With that penal and social reform orientation, 
from its early time the UN anti-crime programme 
has started assuming international leadership. Ini-
tially this leadership was shown through crimino-
logical research on juvenile delinquency and justice, 
the preparation of a cross-national survey for plan-
ning the combating of the traffic in persons and the 
suppression of the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others, and comparative work on domestic criminal 
statistics and on probation. It was soon extended to 
advocacy on behalf of the humane treatment of of-
fenders and victims, international expert network-
ing, and - last but not least - to assisting in elabo-
rating soft law regulations on responding to crime. 
In any case, that legislative work had been relevant 
in issues regarded as an internal matter of Member 
States.
Between 1946 and 1948 the above founding man-
date has been given its design by the resolutions 
of the UN Temporary Social Commission (later re-
named the Social Commission, and now the Com-
mission for Social Development). From 1949 until 
1991, the initial recommendations on the mandate 
originated from an expert committee, which af-
ter 1983 had reported directly to the Economic and 
Social Council. Since 1992 this reporting procedure 
has been followed by the intergovernmental Com-
mission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. 
From that time to the present, the mandate has de-
veloped and combined various social and interna-
tional elements of crime into the programme on its 
prevention and control. But it was not until 2000 that 
crime in that mandate became a manifestly interna-
tional matter, when the General Assembly approved 
the United Nations Convention against Transnation-
al Organized Crime.33
The above shows the context in which this study 
emerged and the importance of bureaucratic ("ad-
ministrative") criminology.34 As emphasized by one 
of the greatest authorities in the doctrine of pub-
lic international law, in the United Nations what 
is important is its mandate and authority, and in 
academia what is important is its concept and meth-
odology.35 But even within this relatively strict bu-
reaucratic mandate, occasionally the variety of inter-
disciplinary contributions to it made it difficult to 
speak in one "common language" because of differ-
30  Kennedy 2003a:646.
31  Pierre & Dupont-Bouchat 2001:427-428.
32  Here it must suffice to say that at the initiative of Édouard Ducpétiaux (1804-1868), the Belgian general inspector of prisons and public welfare 
institutions, concerned with the overrepresentation of unemployed young people in prisons, the General Statistical Congress (Brussels, 1853) 
called for the development of international comparative surveys that should help to determine ”the economic budget of the working classes” 
(i.e., what is now called ”household statistics”). Low wages were believed to be criminogenic. The Congress also called for a variety of compa-
rable criminal statistics: for young and adult offenders, from offences recorded through imprisonment and on capital punishment executions 
(Levi 1854:10-13).
33  GA resolution 55/25, Annex, 15 November 2000.
34  Walters 2003:36.The term was originally coined in the U.K. Home Office Research Unit. Its staff had “the difficult task of maintaining ‘scientific 
integrity while acting as a servant of the secretary of state’” (T.S. Lodge quoted in: O’Brien & Majid 2008:4).
35  Bassiouni 2003.
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ent terminologies; indeed, this is also the case in the 
academic world.36 
When writing this study, in the quest for locat-
ing the origin and current whereabouts of crimi-
nological ideas, I often crossed the bridge between 
the various disciplines, and between "bureaucracy" 
and "academy", which seem to me otherwise to be 
very secluded domains. As a bureaucrat, I could see 
that the academic world may indeed look very al-
ien to most officials. As a former academic, I could 
"think out of the box" and sense how researchers 
can perceive the distant bureaucratic world. And 
yet in both groups there are similar sub-groups of 
professionals. Among the bureaucrats and academ-
ics there are "generalists" and "empiricists". Empir-
icists are field-orientated persons who prefer do-
ing practical work, instead of sitting in an armchair 
and negotiating their way and vision either through 
the upper levels of the hierarchies or through the 
academic layers of recognition. Similarly, in both 
worlds one will find, among others, "visionaries" 
and "methodologists", "thinkers" and "managers". 
So, despite some evident differences showing the 
divide between "authority" and "science", there are 
also commonalities between the two in terms of 
jointly responding to crime. 
These commonalities will be easily identified 
by the experts involved in this crosscutting work. 
It is for this reason that the current United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme 
deserves more than the present monographic study. 
It merits a new monograph, as it did more than once 
in the past.37 In writing it, those experts will need to 
go beyond the scope of this study and deal further 
with two disconcerting facts: that neither academ-
ic criminology nor the United Nations crime man-
date have managed to enter a larger global picture of 
peace and security in the world, and both remain pa-
rochial in their own terms.
How parochial indeed is shown by a rare aca-
demic book on international relations, United Na-
tions Global Conferences.38 In it, amongst the UN 
global conferences "mirroring the evolving world or-
der"39 there is no mention at all of the United Na-
tions congresses on crime prevention and criminal 
justice, which have been convened every five years 
since 1955, and which historically are the conferenc-
es most rooted in the foundation of the Organiza-
tion. Even more surprising is the absence of UN ref-
erences in criminology proper, as reflected in such 
authoritative sourcebooks as The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminology (2007). 
For some academics this may not be a great 
loss. After all, in academic research the freedom of 
thought and choice are of paramount value, where-
as "administrative criminology",40 such as "UN crim-
inology", perhaps may not be held in high esteem by 
them, and thus would not a topic of choice. However, 
for those who regard the contributions of such crim-
inology as central to global peace and security, the 
respective articles in serious encyclopeadical crimi-
nological sources41 are good demonstrations of that 
36  For example, in the social welfare and developmental assistance fields it is common to speak of the ”exclusion” of people. But this is hardly the 
case in bureaucratic criminology. There, one more often speaks of ”marginalization” – a word that is partly different in meaning from ”exclu-
sion”. And so it is between economics and criminology, criminology and political science, etc. In effect, the UN interdisciplinary crime mandate 
juggles various terms with different scope and precision-levels. For a criminal lawyer all this is particularly challenging, because in criminal law 
its own terms are far more rigorously defined.
37  López Rey 1984; Clark 1994. There are also various ”grey literature” descriptions of the UN anti-crime mandate. For example, for the Ninth 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1995), a brochure on The United Nations and Crime Prevention was pub-
lished by the UN Department of Public Information (DPI 1143/Rev.1/CRM, available at http://www.asc41.com/9th%20UN%20Congress%20
on%20the%20Prevention%20of%20Crime/9th_congress.htm), with backgrounders and pamphlets.
38  Schechter 2005.
39  Ibid.:195.
40  Walters 2003:36.
41  Mueller 1983; Joutsen 2004.
Picture 2. Dusan Cotic (Yugoslavia) and Elias Carran-
za (ILANUD) during an informal discussion at a HEUNI 
semi nar in Helsinki, Finland (1992)
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alternative perspective, even though their authors 
only intuitively (i.e., without explicitly naming that 
goal) make the case for it. 
But there are still too few such cases. In looking 
for more, by a lucky coincidence The Oxford Hand-
book on Political Analysis (2008) came to my rescue. 
I found there the tool facilitating a reconstruction 
of the development of criminological ideas and in-
scribing them into a bigger global picture through 
path dependence analysis. It is "a property of a sys-
tem such that the outcome over period of time is not 
determined by any particular set of initial conditions. 
Rather, a system that exhibits path dependency is one 
in which outcomes are related stochastically to initial 
conditions, and the particular outcome that obtains 
in any given 'run' of the system depends on the choic-
es or outcomes of intermediate events between the in-
itial conditions and the outcome".42 
To put it more visually, path dependence is a pro-
cess comparable to the way in which external water 
can leak through the ground to the interior of the 
house. Where the leaks through the wall will appear, 
depends on how water negotiates its way through the 
ground. In the present case, that “ground” consists of 
layers of academic and United Nations criminologies. 
This may help to show where and how criminological 
ideas originated, how they have been institutional-
ized in academia or the United Nations, and how they 
have moved from one to another. What surprised me 
in criminology is that certain ideas have been treat-
ed in a disconnected fashion: for example the "the-
ory of modernization" is dealt with autonomously 
from "The New International Economic Order", and 
"sustainable development" is dealt with autonomous-
ly from the "right to self-determination". If these ex-
amples are understood here as unrelated ideas, then 
indeed my surprise is justified. Anyhow, that's why 
this study reconnects the NIEO with Western Marx-
ist criminological thought and shows how the United 
Nations crime programme has become an avenue for 
the global advancement of the NIEO. 
Path dependence analysis does not guarantee 
that I was able to connect such ideas in the right way, 
nor that the detected connections are the ones or the 
only ones at work. After all, although the concept 
of "criminology" appeared around 1885 in Italy and 
France, in that it was respectively and almost concur-
rently used by both Raffaele Garofalo and Paul Topi-
nard, the concepts of "crime", "justice" and "preven-
tion" have been around since ancient times.43 Those 
ancient times include not only their judeo-christian 
interpretation, but also much older Egyptian and 
Chinese interpretations. Thus the origin and devel-
opment of certain criminological ideas has or might 
have had different Occidental and Oriental "fathers", 
or a different course, if it all took place. And, there-
fore, last but not least, there may be no such con-
nections between the ideas whatsoever. Thus some 
of those connections identified by the author of this 
study may be claimed to have been made up, for 
there are so many other possibilities "which we can-
not disentangle".44 There is, then, a risk of absurdi-
ty in seeking connections everywhere: while certain 
ideas may seem to be interrelated in substance, their 
development may not necessarily be interconnected, 
and may in fact be autonomous.
In light of the above, the most challenging part 
of the path analysis in this study was pursuing the 
multi-pronged global advancement of the idea of 
sustainable development and finding for it a full 
criminological context. This was not only because 
the challenge required detective investigation of the 
United Nations background to that idea, but also be-
cause of the theological and academic work interre-
lated with it, including the theory of modernization, 
among several other approaches.
To say that those paths meandered may be an 
understatement. It would probably be better to say 
that the paths were serendipitous and, among them-
selves, antagonistic. Consequently, this central part 
of the study is particularly vulnerable to criticism, es-
pecially of the academic sort.
Now the reader may easily judge whether, de-
spite this study's own internal limitations, it never-
theless "toutes proportions gardées" manages to doc-
ument how academic and practical criminological 
thought, sometimes separately, sometimes jointly 
pave the way for the global response to crime in the 
context of peace and security, while it draws on oth-
er sources, makes respective evaluations and seeks to 
retain a geopolitically balanced perspective.
Third, this study documents its theses not only 
on the basis of collected evidence, but also, in its ab-
sence, on the basis of the author's memory. This was 
aided by numerous conversations I have had with 
the Programme's “old-timers”: the late Vincent del 
42  Goldstone 1998:834.
43  Drapkin 1989.
44  Großfeld 2003:177.
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Buono (Canada), Pedro David (Argentina), Marc-
Andre Dorel (France), Luis Molina (Canada), Matti 
Joutsen (Finland), Marcia Kran (Canada), Irene Me-
lup (Poland/USA), Minoru Shikita (Japan), Eduardo 
Vetere (Italy), but also with Kauko Aromaa and Terhi 
Viljanen (HEUNI, Finland).45 
Last but not least, the reviews of the manuscript 
of this book by Duncan Chappell (Australia), Roger 
S. Clark (New Zealand/USA) and Matti Joutsen (Fin-
land) have been critical and helpful in certain areas. 
However, the responsibility for the entire content of 
the book rests with me alone.
That responsibility includes this book’s inabil-
ity to prove certain relays between academic and 
UN practical criminological ideas. That would have 
been possible only if and when such evidence were 
in "summary records", a kind of "travaux prépara-
toires", as the case may be for international trea-
ties, and as the case is regarding the sessions of the 
ECOSOC and of the General Assembly. But there are 
no such records on the sessions of the United Na-
tions Commission on Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice or its predecessor. There are only the sum-
mary reports on those sessions.46
Background summary records are helpful in un-
derstanding the language of the UN resolutions, be-
cause they go into some detail, explaining what really 
stands behind the language of a resolution. Among 
such details the ECOSOC and GA records contain 
names of delegates and of other persons mentioned, 
like, e.g., that of Mahatma Gandhi, who is quoted in 
this study. In the language of UN publications (pa-
pers, books) such substantiating detailed records ap-
pear more often, but still less than in academic pub-
lications. This is because the UN publications are 
usually a synthesis of knowledge, sometimes based 
on preceding meta-analyses. From the academic per-
spective statements in that meta-language may seem 
to be oversimplifications but, more often than not, 
this is a false impression. Moreover, attributing in 
such a case the ownership of a certain idea to a partic-
ular author would lead to another false impression, 
that it was only that single author who launched it. 
Such attributions are more frequent in the academic 
world. They do not happen in practice, at least not in 
the practice of the UN. 
What counts in the UN is the accumulation of 
ideas. When political momentum builds, then one 
would not necessarily be able to retrieve from the in-
stitutional memory the name of the creator of a par-
ticular idea. In the sense of the result (that is not 
referring to a name) it is the same in the world of 
practice and the academic world. However, while in 
the latter this may be due to a reluctance to acknowl-
edge someone's contribution, in the world of prac-
tice (at least that of the UN), this may be sheer ig-
norance, combined with an overriding pressure to 
communicate a problem or an idea succinctly and 
discuss the viable solutions. 
Reemphasizing the above, the overriding idea of 
this study is to inscribe academic conceptions into a 
practical aim of responding to crime in the world by 
the UN and by reconstructing their origin. Driven by 
academic motives, in which methods and concepts 
are by definition most important, this study address-
es their implementation from the standpoint of their 
intended practical global use. 
This intention is materialized in two ways. Ini-
tially, by showing that criminology is not a peripher-
al science which from the outskirts of developments 
observes what happens in their core, but a partner 
discipline for a new science of sustainable develop-
ment derived directly from the mainstream of life. 
Next, that UN social and criminal policy is a rare-
ly used key to unlock the sense of international re-
lationships, both academic and practical. As written 
by the researchers of UN ideas,47 these are too little 
known in the world. 
45  Separately, my thanks go to the young generation of “Friends of the Programme”: Chiara Cirillo (Italy), Sara Grilc (Austria), Lukas Gamlich (Aus-
tria), Ashenafi Gebreegziabher (Ethiopia), Marcela Rodriguez (Bolivia) and Danielle Van’t Hoog (The Netherlands) whose help in visualizing 
certain information, which eventually found its way into this book, cannot be overestimated. 
46  The narrative part of those reports gives a limited idea of the rationale for the decisions and draft resolutions of the Commission. Only in 
contentious cases do the reports include reservations made by Member States, after the consensual adoption of them has taken place. 
Consensual adoption of the decisions/draft resolutions is a customary principle followed by all ECOSOC functional commissions, such as the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice is. The few exceptions involve particularly contentious issues within the mandate of the 
ECOSOC NGO Committee, the Commission on the Status of Women (involving Palestinian women), and the former Commission on Human 
Rights (its successor, the Human Rights Council, is not an ECOSOC body). Making reservations at the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice has in recent years become relatively more common than before, because Member States have had more legislative initiatives 
for draft decisions/resolutions made in the short time before the start of the Commission, thus preventing others from informally negotiating 
the drafts in good time before its beginning. Functionally, it is the Committee of the Whole (COW) of the Commission that should take care 
of the negotiations and iron out the legal details of the draft decision/resolution. But sometimes the negotiations continue in the plenary, 
mostly leading to the eventual adoption of the proposed text. With a few exceptions (particularly involving the recommendations of the NGO 
Committee), the ECOSOC usually approves the draft resolutions, as recommended by the commissions.
47  Haack, Hafensteller & Paepcke 2008.
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It is said that to learn the culture of a nation, one 
should visit its prisons.48 Doing that may show how 
nation’s values are implemented in practice. 
Learning that truth through studying the pris-
ons from the books is certainly not enough, as some 
quite influential criminal justice reformers argue. 
One of them, the Pole Janusz Korczak, a juvenile jus-
tice reformer indeed (whom this study deals with lat-
er on) through the mouth of his child book novel he-
ro "King Matt the First" cautioned about the value of 
academic work on prisons: 
"So ... he wanted to write a scholarly book about 
prisoners in the whole world. How many of them are 
in a country, for what they were sent to prison, are 
they improving, are they treated well, do they die. And 
there is such a custom that if someone writes a schol-
arly book, everybody helps him. And for ten years that 
scholar travelled around the whole world - and he was 
allowed to look into papers … Stupid, he seems to be-
lieve that he will learn anything from them. In the pa-
pers everything is all right". 
More surprisingly, for some reformers even vis-
iting prisons has not been telling enough, as in the 
case of two Frenchmen: Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-
1859) and Gustave de Beaumont (1802-1865). After 
almost a year-long tour of the United States, dur-
ing which they visited a number of American pris-
ons and talked with their directors and inmates, they 
published in 1833 a contentious report on "Système 
pénitentiaire aux États-unis et de son application en 
France" (The Prison System of the United States and 
its Application in France). Even when Tocqueville 
visited the famous Sing Sing prison in New York, 
his mind blissfully started producing reflections on 
American society completely disconnected from his 
penitentiary study.49
Tocqueville took nothing from the report's rec-
ommendations in his much hailed subsequent 
book on Democracy in America, which was the fruit 
of the same visit to the United States. It was as if 
the two topics had nothing to do with one anoth-
er! In that book, he found no value in his earlier 
hard study of the U.S. prison system. There are on-
ly a few remarks about prison reform in that coun-
48  Freely translated from: “man Die Kultur eines Volkes nach der Art der Behandlung seiner Gefangenen (bezw. seiner Verurteitlen) erkennen 
kann“. The statement is credited by Leo Huber (1916:11) to Hans Gross (1847-1915), the eminent Austrian criminologist from the University 
of Graz, one of the founding fathers of academic criminology, who in 1912 opened there the Imperial Criminological Institute. 
49  Pierson 1996, ch. X.
50  Schleifer 1980, ch.1.
51  George W. Pierson, Le ‘second voyage’ de Tocqueville en Amérique, in Alexis de Tocqueville. Livre du centaire 1859-1959, Paris: Ed. Du Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1960:71-85, quoted after Sellin 1964:xvii-xviii.
52  Renshaw 1998:xxix.
try, indeed unconnected with any observations re-
garding democracy. 
In investigating the lack of interconnectivity 
between the first and second book, two reviewers 
reveal that eminent political thinker and histori-
an as Tocqueville was, they found him unable to 
confront the writing of the prison reform report. 
One reviewer explains that Tocqueville "fell into an 
unshakable inertia. ... [H]e could not make himself 
work, and ... confessed: 'I begin to believe that I was 
decidedly stricken with imbecility during the last 
months that I spent in America; we believed that 
it was an attack; but every day the ailment takes 
more the character of a chronic malady; I am still 
where you left me'".50 
Thorsten Sellin, another reviewer, and an emi-
nent U.S. criminologist (1896-1994), adds that a week 
later Tocqueville admitted that his mind still refused 
to stir. "He could neither work nor write. What Beau-
mont called the 'steam engine' of his intelligence ran 
no longer … Tocqueville ... sat for weeks in front of 
some white sheets of paper and finally he left the en-
tire task to his faithful companion and friend". He ad-
vised Beaumont, "Do not wait to see my work during 
your absence. I have not done anything, or as little as 
possible. My mind is in lethargy and I absolutely do 
not know when it will awaken. So bring enough cour-
age, ardour, enthusiasm, and so on for two". In effect, 
Tocqueville's contribution was limited to a statistical 
appendix and notes.51 
Had thus indeed the two rapporteurs, as Pierre 
Marcel would have claimed, indulged themselves in 
their report by developing to no end the effects of 
non-decisive causes for American democracy?52 By 
extension, has contemporary crime prevention and 
criminal justice nothing to do with the state of de-
mocracy in the world? 
This study has, therefore, two additional goals: 
first, to provide its reader with a bigger picture in 
which crime prevention and criminal justice is in-
scribed, and in which criminology is a part of world 
peace and security politics; second, to raise aware-
ness in the academic world of systemic UN ideas by 
resurrecting their genesis and actualizing their con-
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tents, in order to show that humane and efficient 
crime prevention and criminal justice promoted by 
the UN matters in democratizing the world. 
As one can see, this approach takes care more 
of a larger policy picture of crime prevention and 
criminal justice in the world than it does of the de-
velopment of theory regarding this. In this sense, 
this study is largely and programmatically atheoret-
ical. It does not stick to any particular general the-
ory or specific theories of crime, even though in the 
United Nations the concepts of criminogenic and 
victimological functions of poverty and inequality, 
regarded as roots of crime and victimization, seem 
to be the leitmotifs of many of its activities in re-
sponse to crime. Moreover, this study is also "under-
theorized" in the sense that it does not sufficient-
ly dwell on any grand theories to the application of 
which academic comparativists have long alluded,53 
whilst its author nevertheless still aims at a high ac-
ademic standard. 
After all these introductory explanations, from a 
political science perspective, the reader of this study 
can easily find that its author falls into the category 
of idealists (constructivists or, more correctly - be-
cause of its historical theme - reconstructivists). He 
believes in the United Nations, even though the idea 
of justice to which that Programme contributes is 
still an illusion. Like others, therefore, he does keen-
ly realize that the goal of upholding the ideals of the 
Charter is elusive as long as the United Nations is so 
weak, and when its social concerns are the last con-
cerns of the governments and often of public opinion 
in rich countries.54
From a broader social science perspective, the 
author falls into the category of comparativists. He 
sees complex, but still evolutionary progress, in 
United Nations criminology, interrelated with oth-
er advances. He looks for broad comparative brush 
strokes and practical, hopefully increasingly sus-
tainable, solutions rather than for implicit com-
parisons of foreign materials and static observa-
tions. Therefore the ideal reader of this study is a 
person interested not only in analysing the "state 
of affairs", but also in learning how to arrive at a 
more internationally, socially and humanely desir-
able and practical crime prevention outcome. Also, 
rather than being seen as belonging to any particu-
lar school of thought, he sees himself as a pragma-
tist and a "doer" looking for a common-good result. 
This study should document this as well. 
To follow easier its sequence and the sequence 
of all the criminological ideas (both before and af-
ter the establishment of the UN) that are present-
ed, the study ordains them in the matrix. It graphi-
cally comprises their development over roughly 250 
years (from 1764 until 2010). It illustrates their mul-
tilayer flow in 14 rows in a single figure (see the front 
inlay of this book), including the first idea of free-
dom from fear, the question with which the book 
starts below. 
53  Riles 2001:10-16.
54 Bertrand 1996:67 & 91.
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56  Szwedkowski 1947:8.
57  Rappaport 1948:185.
58  See ch. XI.
59  Jamieson 1998:480.
Part I – Against Fear and Want,  
   for Sustainable Development
I Freedom from fear and the 
effects of military conflicts on 
crime and victimization
Shortly after the Second World War, four Polish au-
thors produced criminological studies. One, by Le-
on Radzinowicz, appeared in the United Kingdom 
(London, 1945). The other three were published in 
Poland. The book by Radzinowicz does not contain a 
single word about the atrocities of the Second World 
War. There are only some passing references to the 
“Great War” of 1914-1917. The three other criminolog-
ical books follow the same line. In his book “News 
from Criminological Sciences”, (published in Octo-
ber 1945),55 Józef Jan Bossowski mentions only that 
it was written in the “difficult time of war”. Stanisław 
Szwedkowski,56 another criminologist who produced 
a study on the fight against crime and looked into 
the future of law and order, notes merely that this 
study was “drafted in the period of the greatest ter-
ror in Warsaw in the years 1943/44, and is dedicat-
ed to social workers and to the new generation of 
the fighters for law and order of the Republic”. Final-
ly, Emil Stanisław Rapapport, in his book published 
in 1948, reminded his readers about the postulate of 
the International Association of Penal Law (of which 
he was the vice president before the Second World 
War), an association that was regarded by the United 
Nations as a collective professional advisor in select-
ing the path “to be pursued by the criminal policy of 
civilized mankind.”57 In following that path, the As-
sociation, aware of the criminal policy extremes that 
had taken place in the world, should stress the sub-
jective and material (objective) elements of the def-
inition of crime – quite a perceptive criminal policy 
recommendation, contributing nowadays to the ‘ci-
vilianization’ of domestic criminal law.58
In sum, it seems as if these four authors want-
ed to define war outside the scope of their post-Sec-
ond World War scholarly studies, if not entirely from 
their criminological thought. Could it be that, aware 
as they were of the horrors of war, they wanted to es-
cape its bad memories? If so, they were not the on-
ly ones. Ruth Jamieson,59 who prepared an in-depth 
review of contemporary criminology, concluded that 
it showed a general disinclination to take on board 
war-related issues.
This can be contrasted with others who almost 
from the outset of the war took up this problem. Al-
ready in 1941, the President of the United States, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in a speech to the U.S. 
Congress, identified the right to freedom from fear 
and want caused by the horror of war as two of four 
fundamental rights to be attained by the post-Sec-
ond World War new legal order. (The other two fun-
damental rights are freedom of speech and freedom 
of religion.) These rights were then inscribed in the 
so-called Atlantic Charter which laid the foundation 
of the Charter of the United Nations (“We the peoples 
of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in 
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, 
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights ... 
and to establish conditions under which justice and 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained, 
and to promote social progress and better standards 
of life in larger freedom ...”) The greatest peace-ori-
ented Organization of the world was born. 
In the aftermath of the horrors of the two wars, 
and under the influence in particular of Roosevelt, 
already in 1945 the UN Charter and then in 1948 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated that 
“Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged 
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the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world 
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech 
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common 
people ...” 
After the Second World War, criminological re-
search on the impact of war was renewed in the Unit-
ed States and in Europe. A collection of papers was 
published by the International Penal and Peniten-
tiary Commission (IPPC, 1951). But even before that, 
the United Nations had embarked on a study of the 
impact of the Second World War on crime. The study 
analysed the dynamics of reported homicide and of 
convictions for other offences (1937-1946). Out of 
seven countries on which essential data were provid-
ed, in four (Belgium, Denmark, France and Iraq) the 
report noted that crime had increased at the begin-
ning of the war, in two (Finland and the Union of 
South Africa, now the Republic of South Africa) it 
had increased at the end of war, while in one (Cana-
da) no significant changes were identified (this was 
also the case in South America).60 Regarding Iraq, 
it should be added that although this country had 
seemingly been remote from the epicentre of the 
Second World War, in 1940-41 it had been the scene 
of the British-Iraqi war, a war that could be traced 
back to a coup d’etat in Iraq that had been given mil-
itary support by Germany. 
The UN report suggests that the closer a coun-
try is to the epicentre of war, the more negative is 
the influence of war on crime. More methodological-
ly rigorous comparative analyses of countries which 
either had or had not been involved in the two World 
Wars (1914-1917 / 1939-1945) confirmed that in coun-
tries that had been involved in those two wars, there 
had been a higher incidence of homicide. Moreover, 
a comparatively higher level of homicides had simi-
larly been recorded after an examination of their in-
volvement in twelve other wars (1896-1967). Accord-
ing to the analysts, these findings can most likely be 
explained by the legitimization of violence.61
Other criminological findings suggest that the 
impact of war on crime is diversified and continues 
after its end. Thus, there may actually be a decrease 
in reported crime or in convictions as a result of, e.g., 
the mobilization of offenders released from prisons 
and of a shortage in the labour force (an increase in 
unemployment is believed to be criminogenic), and/
or an increase as a result of evacuations from conflict 
areas (looting) or of fuel and food rationing, plus the 
business dealings made in times of war by white col-
lar criminals which enable them to earn enormous 
profits.62 But war also has a general demoralizing ef-
fect. After the end of a war, this demoralizing effect 
has an impact on economic and violent crime. Its im-
pact on economic crime is a result of unemployment 
and of a steep drop in real wages; its impact on vio-
lent crime is a result of the banalization of evil (to 
use Hannah Arendt’s term), in other words through 
a general depreciation of all values, a weakening of 
social bonds, and a weakening of the respect for law 
and for human life and property.63 
A more contemporary econometric study by the 
World Bank64 sought to determine the correlation 
between economic conditions and the dynamics of 
recorded homicide. Based on World Health Organ-
ization data, a more precise estimate suggested that 
the residual effect of lower respect of law (the so-
called brutalization effect) lasts five years after the 
termination of a domestic conflict. During that peri-
od of time, the level of homicides is 25% higher than 
later on. The most probable motive for this is per-
sonal vendettas carried out by the surviving victims 
in retaliation for the injustices that they had suffered 
during the civil war. 
In the light of such conclusions, the direct mac-
ro-level relationship between crime and war, as in-
scribed in the United Nations Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, had taken on a new meaning during 
the 1990s. From that time on, this Declaration im-
plies freedom from fear from the threats to collec-
tive and individual security, also when these threats 
arise from crime. 
The security concept had thus come to consid-
er the individual perpetrator of an offence. In this 
connection, the concept had also broadened to in-
clude the victims of crime. From the standpoint of 
the development of victimology, this development 
occurred quite late, since one would intuitively as-
sume that fear of the threat of crime is associated 
with the potential victim of crime. However, this was 
not the case with the UN’s diversionary approach at 
that time.
The reinterpretation of freedom from fear in the 
sense of freedom from fear of criminal victimization 
has been somewhat slow. Furthermore, it has met 
60  E/CN.5/204.
61  Archer & Gartner 1984, ch. 4.
62  Barnes & Teeters 1951:9-11.
63  Mannheim 1946:217 & 259.
64  Collier & Hoefler 2004. 
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with occasional resistance and has always been done 
outside the scope of the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights. It can be said that in the world literature on 
victimology (both the academic and the UN litera-
ture), the individual victim of crime has been more 
frequently overlooked than not, and even when seen, 
was seen only in a very fragmentary way. This by and 
large remains the situation today, at least in the UN.65 
In the United Nations, victim issues have always 
had difficulties in achieving parity with the other 
criminological issues that were communicated as 
part of the larger freedom identified in Kofi Annan’s 
message to the world. Victim issues have been dealt 
with almost exclusively through more substantive 
channels. This has happened in three ways.
Nominally, the first time substantive victim is-
sues came up in the context of the United Nations 
was in 1985. It was then, at the Seventh United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (Milan, Italy) and later at the 
General Assembly, that the United Nations adopted 
the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Vic-
tims of Crime and Abuse of Power. The adoption of 
the Declaration was a great achievement. The neces-
sary consensus had been reached despite much re-
sistance along the way. At that time, the available 
measures for consensus-building within the United 
Nations Programme included five expert preparatory 
meetings on the various topics of the Congress, and 
five regional intergovernmental meetings.
Picture 3. Consensus building: Manuel López-Rey, chairman of the Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control, with Minoru Shikita, Chief of the United Nations Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Branch, Eduardo Vetere and the author at the informal consulta-
tions during the interregional Preparatory Meeting for the Seventh United Nations Congress 
on topic III: Victims of Crime – Ottawa, Canada, 1984
65  Continuing this digression, and as an example only, Hans von Hentig of Germany has been identified as the person who established victimol-
ogy as a science. He was an anti-Nazi who fled Germany before the Second World War and settled in the United States. In his first victimologi-
cal publication, which appeared in 1940/1941, there is nothing whatsoever on victims of war crimes. Furthermore, nothing can be found on 
this topic even in a much later publication (2005) that dealt with victims of terrorist attacks, by the then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, In Larger Freedom (A/59/2005). Although this later report draws on the idea of freedom from fear, it cannot be said to contain any 
clear focus on the victims of crime. The victimological aspect is limited to the freedom from fear of terrorism and crime, but only of organized 
crime, and in either case there is no direct reference to victims. It was only in 2009 that the victimization perspective made headway in the 
United Nations counterterrorism field, in the landmark report of the Secretary-General on Supporting Victims of Terrorism. To conclude this 
digression, the concept of freedom from fear that evolved from the horrors of the Second World War may be more fully contextualized with 
the basic legal United Nations instrument, namely the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000).
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Picture 4. Taking a break. Dr Krzysztof 
Poklewski-Koziełł in conversation with 
the author, and Prof. Cherif M. Bassiou-
ni in conversation with Prof. Manuel 
López-Rey and Dr Carlo Sarzana, among 
participants taking a break at the in-
ter-regional Preparatory Meeting for 
the Seventh United Nations Congress on 
topic III: Victims of Crime – Ottawa, Can-
ada, 1984
Picture 5. Leticia Ramos Shahani, Assistant 
Secretary-General, Head of the CSDHA, 
shown with Mino Martinazzoli, the Ital-
ian Minister of Justice at the Seventh Unit-
ed Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers (Milan, 1985), as featured in “Avanti!” 
(Milan newspaper, 28 August 1985), an-
nouncing the adoption of the Declaration 
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power
Picture 6. At the Regional Preparato-
ry Meeting for the Tenth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders (San Jo-
sé, Costa Rica, 1999): Monica Nagel 
Berger, Minister of Justice of Costa Ri-
ca (Chairperson). To her right, Francesco 
Bastagli, Officer-in-charge of the CICP, 
to her left Elias Carranza, Director of IL-
ANUD and other members of the bureau 
of the meeting
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The ideas incorporated in the Declaration ma-
tured well enough in order to arrive at the Congress 
and be converted into United Nations law. Notwith-
standing the fact that this law for the first time ev-
er gave global recognition to the plight of victims, 
the legal concepts of “justice” and “abuse of power” 
have remained so sensitive vis-à-vis one another that 
the implementation of the Declaration has not sig-
nificantly progressed since 1985. Even so, from that 
time on freedom from fear has de facto been globally 
connected with UN victimology issues. Shortly after 
the adoption of the Declaration, in 1989, the United 
Nations adopted legal Principles on the Prevention 
of Arbitrary, Extra-legal and Summary Executions. 
These aimed at the prevention of the victimization 
which results from the attribution of criminal re-
sponsibility without the procedural guarantees nec-
essary for allowing an effective right to defence.
Finally, after the entry into force in 2003 of the 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Air and Sea, both supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
these two protocols became important legal instru-
ments in the countering of the victimization arising 
from transnational crime.
Potentially, the third Protocol supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against Transnation-
al Organized Crime, the Protocol against the Illic-
it Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, which en-
tered into force in 2005, has the same utility.
The concept of the freedom from fear has been 
the subject of continuous underlying political con-
frontations, which have been even more volatile than 
those focusing on the eventual elimination of the 
death penalty in the world. Already Benjamin Frank-
lin (1706-1790) and George Washington (1732-1799), 
who are remembered for example for their contri-
bution to the U.S. Declaration of Independence 
(1776), have been regarded as the proponents of a 
broad right to possess firearms. Franklin proclaimed, 
“Those who would give up essential liberty to obtain 
Picture 7. The United Nations Regional Workshop on Firearms Regulation for Crime Prevention & Public Safety (New 
Delhi, India, 1998). James Hayes (Canada, Coordinator of the United Nations International Firearm Regulation Study, 
seated in the first row, second from the left) with governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental repre-
sentatives
60
a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor 
safety”. Washington said: “A free people ought ... to 
be armed”, and “When firearms go, all goes – we need 
them every hour”. It has recently been estimated that 
74% of firearms manufactured in the world is at the 
disposal of the civilian population, including the pri-
vate policing sector.66
The converse of this idea, that of regulating the 
right of the civilian population to possess firearms, 
was unanimously accepted by the Ninth United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (Cairo, Egypt, 1995). The 
idea was originally launched by the eight econom-
ically and politically most important States in the 
northern hemisphere: Canada, France, Germany, It-
aly, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United King-
dom, and the United States of America (the so-called 
G8 countries). According to official statistics, about 
85% of all the weapons produced in the world have 
been traded by these eight countries. 
Soon after the Ninth Congress, the idea of a res-
olution on firearms was picked up by these same 
countries at the Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice, and at the Economic and So-
cial Council (ECOSOC resolution 1995/27), and then 
by the UNODC, which started a project on firearm 
regulation. The idea finally came to fruition with the 
adoption of the aforementioned Protocol in 2001. 
This historical project was successfully implement-
ed despite the opposition of pro-firearms lobbyists, 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 
Senators, and the National Rifle Association, which 
later requested and received non-governmental con-
sultative status with the ECOSOC. The U.S. Govern-
ment, the power of which to participate in the draft-
ing of that resolution was very much influenced by 
those lobbyists, eventually cooperated in a very con-
structive way in the implementation of that protocol.
The anti-victimization legal UN instruments 
mentioned above, that is the Declaration (1985), the 
Principles (1989) and the protocols (2000/2001), now 
have lives of their own, just as is the case with all vic-
timological problematics before 2000. However, un-
til now they have been treated as subservient to oth-
er parts of the UN work programme. One indication 
of this, as pointed out by victimologists, was the ab-
66  IANSA 2007:3.
Picture 8. Working at the Vienna International Centre on the United Nations International Firearm Regulation Sur-
vey (1997): James Hayes (Canada, coordinator of the United Nations International Firearm Regulation Study is seat-
ed in the middle. On his left is Arkadi Erokhine and on his right Sławomir Redo, both from the Centre for Internation-
al Crime Prevention/CSDHA/UNOV)
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Introduction
The UN firearms regulation study was launched in 1995 
at the Ninth United Nations Congress in Cairo. From 
among the G8 countries, Canada had placed firearms 
on the agenda at the Cairo Congress. Emerging from 
Cairo was the resolution that created the mandate for 
the Study on International Firearms Regulation. The 
Cairo Resolution recognized that “criminal activities in 
which firearms are used have been increasing, in part 
because of an increase in illicit trafficking, at both the 
national and transnational levels”, and invited “Mem-
ber States to take effective action against illicit traf-
ficking in firearms, through mutual cooperation, the 
exchange of information and the coordination of law 
enforcement activities, considering that illicit traffick-
ing in firearms is a widespread transnational criminal 
activity that frequently involves transnational criminal 
syndicates”. 
A. Background
At its Economic Summit held during the same year in 
Halifax, the G8, recognizing the negative economic im-
pact of international crime, began its work on trans-
national organized crime with the preparation of the 
40 recommendations of the Senior Experts Group on 
Transnational Organized Crime. This work continued 
through the Lyon Summit in 1996, with the establish-
ment of the Lyon Group of Experts, which produced 
an action plan to address the 40 recommendations to 
combat international crime, and presented them to 
the 1997 Summit in Denver. The Denver Communiqué 
called for increased efforts to combat illegal firearms 
trafficking through standard systems for firearms iden-
tification and consideration of a stronger regime for 
import and export licensing of firearms. It was then 
recommended that consideration be given to a new 
international instrument - a recommendation that 
was confirmed and strengthened by the Birmingham 
Summit the following year - which called for a legally 
binding international instrument to be negotiated 
within the context of a convention on transnational 
organized crime.2
The first of its kind, the Study served as a catalyst 
for the development of a targeted strategy to deal 
with firearms trafficking. Then again in Washington in 
1997, when the G8 Ministers of Justice and the Inte-
rior were considering the form of the instrument to 
deal with the illicit transnational movement of fire-
arms, Canada was instrumental in obtaining consen-
sus to develop a global, legally binding treaty. 
B. The Firearm Regulation Study
The Study was completed within a fourteen-month 
period and served as a catalyst for bringing countries 
together and strengthening cooperation on this issue 
at the international level. The final report of the study 
shows a high participation rate, with sixty-nine coun-
tries representing 70% of the world population tak-
ing part. The fact that 33 countries co-sponsored the 
resolution resulting from the survey is an indication 
of a high degree of consensus among the participat-
ing countries. The study produced many interesting 
findings, including the fact that while historically most 
countries have import controls, few have export con-
trols and there is no real accountability on exports or 
on in-transit shipments. The study served as a cata-
lyst for some countries which became aware, through 
their responses to the study questionnaire, of the 
magnitude of the problem in their own country. Since 
participating in the Study, several countries have gone 
on to make changes to their laws to increase the ac-
countability of firearms owners and strengthen meas-
ures to deal with illicit trafficking. 
In the Study several principles dealing with the 
connection between firearms and crime secured wide 
consensus: firearms empower criminals and are a 
source of profit in the criminal world. Illicit transfers 
James Hayes
The G8 and Powerful United Nations Criminal Policy Ideas:  
The Case of Firearm Regulation1
BOX 1
1  Excerpted from: James Hayes, The United Nations Firearms Protocol (in:) The Changing Face of International Criminal Law: Selected 
Papers, The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 2002:125-136, 
www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/ChangingFace.pdf.
2  See: A. Scherrer, G8 against Transnational Organized Crime, Ashgate 2009:53.
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of firearms are often carried out by organized crimi-
nal channels and move into civilian markets through 
transnational networks. Globalization - and the 
technology that makes it possible - is contributing 
to the ever-increasing sophistication of international 
firearms smuggling networks. Another important 
principle that has come to light and has received 
widespread recognition is the fact that countries can 
no longer limit their concern about firearms traffick-
ing to what comes into their country, but must be 
equally concerned about what passes through and 
goes out. There is a need for greater accountability 
and transparency over imports, exports and in-tran-
sit shipments. This reflects a widely held belief that 
there should be no safe haven for firearm traffickers. 
Thus a very strong consensus has emerged from our 
international firearms activity: a consensus that the 
central focus of our efforts internationally must be 
on trafficking, and a consensus as to the tools to use 
in order to combat such trafficking. Adequate legis-
lation and regulation, law enforcement, training and 
technology (e.g. for the marking of firearms or for fire-
arms identification), are all important to achieving this 
result, whether we are dealing with peaceful societies 
or with societies emerging from conflict.
C. Results
These tools are contained in the recently adopted 
UN Firearms Protocol. Negotiated in Vienna as part 
of the UN Convention against Transnational Organ-
ized Crime, the Firearms Protocol focuses on crime 
prevention. In this regard, perhaps the most essential 
component of the Firearms Protocol sets out compre-
hensive procedures for the import, export and transit 
of firearms, their parts and components, and ammu-
nition. It is a reciprocal system requiring countries to 
provide authorizations to one another before permit-
ting shipments of firearms to leave, arrive in or transit 
across their territory. It also enables law enforcement 
to track the legal movement of shipments to prevent 
theft and diversion. As is the case with the OAS Con-
vention, these standards will help to ensure that we 
achieve the level of transparency needed to assist 
member states to better target illicit transactions. 
Linked to the import/export/transit regime is the arti-
cle dealing with firearms. 
During the negotiations on the Firearms Protocol 
many important coalitions and dialogues were estab-
lished, not the least of which was between Canada 
and the European Union. Several areas in the Pro-
tocol presented challenges to the EU, particularly in 
the area of import/export/transit authorizations and 
firearms marking. This enhanced control over fire-
arms was seen to be inconsistent with the fluid bor-
der control configurations among countries within 
the EU, which were designed to facilitate trade. The 
European Commission had competence to negoti-
ate these articles on behalf of the (then) 15 member 
states and near the end of the negotiations, on behalf 
of the accession countries. It worked hard to develop 
an approach to balance its trade and crime control 
concerns. During the course of these deliberations, 
the European Commission engaged Canada and oth-
ers in the internal EU discussions of its Multidisci-
plinary Group on Organized Crime and ultimately a 
consensus was reached. With the Commission’s in-
creased emphasis on Justice and Home Affairs issues, 
this alliance was critical. The collective work within 
international governmental organizations in the last 
few years has been followed up by analysis, lobby-
ing and support by non-governmental organizations. 
While initially such groups were primarily active on 
the disarmament side, their increased interest in and 
contribution to the discussions was very useful. The 
British American Security Information Council, and, 
in Canada, the Coalition for Gun Control, shared their 
expertise and resources to foster public awareness 
and education. The Vancouver-based International 
Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice 
Policy facilitated a Canadian-hosted workshop on 
firearms marking prior to the final negotiation ses-
sion for the Firearms Protocol which was extremely 
helpful.
D. Conclusion
I want to stress the importance of the completion of 
the Firearms Protocol and how it brings together the 
work that has been accomplished in the various inter-
national fora. From different starting points we have 
arrived at one main conclusion: the problem of fire-
arms is a problem of crime prevention, crime control, 
including combating illegal trafficking. Combating the 
illegal flow of firearms necessitates greater transpar-
ency in the legal trade—and in legal ownership. Thus 
the problem has a domestic and an international di-
mension for all countries involved. ¢
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sence of any anti-victimization crime policy in the 
United Nations peacekeeping operations conducted 
during the 1990s, when their rule-of-law framework 
was emerging. This framework was markedly absent 
of victim issues.67
Two years later this absence was recognized by 
an international practitioner, Lord Paddy Ashdown, 
the UN administrator responsible for the UN peace-
keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UN-
BiH, 1996-2002). He noted then: 
“In hindsight, we should have put the establish-
ment of the rule of law first, for everything depends 
on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political 
system, the development of civil society, public confi-
dence in police and courts.”68
Since that time, the idea of legal protection of the 
victims of crime became somewhat more viable. How-
ever, this has not become viable enough for Member 
States to be sufficiently sympathetic to elaborate a com-
prehensive Convention on Justice and Support for Vic-
tims of Crime, Abuse of Power and Terrorism, as pro-
posed by the International Society of Victimology.69
A documented genesis of the impact of free-
dom from fear on the United Nations victimization 
problematics can be found in the originally some-
what impulsive position of the British Prime Min-
ister Winston Churchill, the co-founder of the At-
lantic Charter. He regarded Hitler as a gangster – an 
organized criminal (“Contemplate that if Hitler falls 
into our hands we shall certainly put him to death ... 
This man is the mainspring of evil. Instrument – elec-
tric chair, for gangsters ...”).70 He postulated that the 
United Nations should deal with the Nazi criminals 
by extra-legal executions.71
This idea of treating war criminals as organized 
criminals had not, however, been followed in the 
United Nations. The idea was lost in its realities and 
history.72 Even so, methodologically speaking, the 
path development of the idea behind the United Na-
tions Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime can be traced back to the time of the Second 
World War. This is possible only now, after the recent 
opening of the British archives.
Between this original and rather impulsive 
1940s idea and a comprehensive 1990s idea of elab-
orating a United Nations convention against trans-
national organized crime, lies an entire epoch of 
international criminal law. It started materializ-
ing with the establishment of the Nuremburg Tri-
bunal (1945). This became a legal and institutional 
reaction to the atrocities committed by Nazi lead-
ers. Later, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions set the 
first standards for international law for humanitar-
ian concerns on the treatment of non-combatants 
and prisoners of war. In 1993/1994 the universaliz-
ing impulse of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials led 
to the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Later, in 2002, it led 
to the entry into force of the statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court – the United Nations institu-
tion which may not pronounce death penalty ver-
dicts, much less extra-legal executions, nor bring 
to justice organized criminals, even though such an 
idea was proposed in the course of negotiating its 
Statute.
Recalling the historical origins of the United 
Nations convention against transnational organ-
ized crime shows three things about the evolution 
of global criminological thought: how diverse it has 
been, how it has branched out, and what criminal 
policy impact it has had until now. 
Initially, criminological thought depicted Hitler 
and his Nazi accomplices as gangsters and not as 
war criminals. Moreover, Churchill’s impulsive fear 
caused by the atrocities of those criminals initially 
prompted him to cut corners (by opting for extrale-
gal executions). Soon after the Nuremberg trial and, 
later, the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (1966), and finally the ECOSOC Princi-
ples on the Prevention and Investigation of Arbitrary, 
Summary and Extra-legal Executions (1989), the in-
ternational interpretation and regulation of the en-
tire legal problematics of deprivation of life by the 
State followed a different route than that originally 
postulated by the British Prime Minister.
67  Kreso 2000:29; Terril 2000:29.
68  New York Times, 28 October 2002.
69  Among the promoters of the idea of the legal protection of victims of crime are the theoreticians Ezzat Fatah (Egypt/Canada), Jan van Dijk (the 
Netherlands), John Dussich (USA), Brunon Hołyst, Lech Falandysz, Krzysztof Poklewski-Koziełł (Poland), Hans Joachim Schneider (the Federal 
Republic of Germany) and UN practitioners (Irene Melup (Poland/USA)). The contribution of this last-mentioned person is difficult to overes-
timate. Preserving that memorable contribution is a 700-page book published in her honour (Schmidt 2005).
70  CAB 195/1, War Cabinet Minutes, W.M.(42) 47th Meeting – W.M.(42) 155th Meeting : 67-68, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/docu-
ments/cab_195_1_transcript.pdf .
71  Doward 2006.
72  Plesch 2008.
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II Freedom from want and  
the criminogenic function of 
economic inequality 
Also the second idea, that of freedom from want (ali-
as freedom from poverty/economic inequality), con-
tained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
has been reinterpreted.
This evergreen postulate arose out of the con-
viction of the Western countries that poverty breeds 
crime. Since 1945 they have been engaged in the cre-
ation of the welfare state, as an expression of the 
freedom from want and of social security. These 
countries began to feel the burden of crime, which 
continued to grow in its international dimensions.73
The evidence for this was presented in a crimi-
nological study by Mannheim (1946). However, the 
conviction regarding the criminogenic role of pover-
ty had also arisen as a result of the pre-Second World 
War experience with the Great Depression, which 
started in 1929 in the USA and ended at different 
times for different countries during the 1930s or ear-
ly 1940s. 
It was in this light that the allied leaders, partic-
ularly the United States, had since 1941 (cf. the Atlan-
tic Charter) created the basis for the new econom-
ic order. In 1945 the allied countries established the 
so-called Bretton Woods institutions, including the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).
The programmatic goal of these institutions has 
been to ensure economic security in the world, but 
their means to achieve that goal have been modest. 
The goal was originally envisioned to be backed up 
by the IMF’s budget amounting to 50% of total glob-
al imports, but at the official launch this had become 
a mere 1,5%, 33 times lower than the original goal 
– hardly an engine for allowing the United Nations 
system to ensure economic security in the world.74
Ensuring, in turn, human security (a part of 
which is the prevention of crime and victimization), 
has found its way through the Atlantic Charter (the 
sixth principle) into the interpretation of the Char-
ter of the United Nations. In its chapter IX on in-
ternational economic and social cooperation, Mem-
ber States obliged themselves to “promote solutions 
of international economic, social, health, and relat-
ed problems.”75
One of these social problems was the need to 
counteract crime through what, at least since 1831,76 
has been called social defence. However, the ideolog-
ical repertoire for this was developed later by others. 
This ideological repertoire can be traced to the pe-
riod of transition of legal thought from the classical 
to the social (end of the nineteenth – beginning of 
the twentieth century). During that early transition 
period, especially between 1830 and 1850, the focus 
had been on individual responsibility and on the so-
cial danger posed by an offender. Children in conflict 
with the law were treated with more compassion, as 
individuals who could be endangered by degrading 
conditions of solitary confinement.77 
At that time, the criminal law in the Western 
world had started to broaden its agenda, which had 
focused on the individual offender. It added to the 
individualization of criminal responsibility the need 
to make this individualization socially relevant, by 
including various classifications of offenders and of 
the social causes of crime. This coincided with the 
transformation of legal thought from the classical 
(formalistic) concept of the family household as an 
entity regulated by private law (with arbitrary patri-
archal powers) into a household subject to increas-
ing interaction with social legislation through which 
the State wielded its new powers. This public interest 
legislation started to emerge against the background 
of modernization, involving the establishment of la-
bour courts, merchant courts, juvenile courts, and 
social welfare in general. From about 1870 to 1890, 
there was much focus on the family, within which 
the welfare of children and juveniles was seen.78
Social defence (a term which came into wider use 
since the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies)79 as an organized movement was originally 
established in 1937 in Liège (Belgium) by an Italian 
criminal lawyer, Filippo Count Gramatica. But it re-
ally took root in 1949 after its first Congress, under 
73  See further: Knepper 2010. In that book, the contributions of the intergovernmental organizations to responding to the challenge of the inter-
nationalization of crime have been shown to be an echo of British and other Western European and Northern American concerns (1881-1914) 
about the problems resulting from growing interregional transportation and communication, which facilitated anarchism and white slave 
traffic, and later on other transnational traffic in crime. Those concerns eventually prompted Governments to mandate the League of Nations 
(1919-1939) and the United Nations to undertake counter measures.
74  Weiss 2008:229.
75  Art. 55b; Joyce 1966:23, Sunga 2009 ch. 7.
76  Carmignani 1831 quoted by Pasquino 1980:23. 
77  Pierre & Dupont-Bouchat 2001:427.
78 Kennedy 2003a:642-656; Pierre & Dupont Buchat 2001:428.
79  Ferri 1892:432; Prins 1910.
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the leadership of Marc Ancel (1902-1990), a French 
lawyer. By that time, social defence had undergone 
tremendous shifts. It had served as a penological jus-
tification in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, Tsarist and 
Communist Russia, socialist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and, in terms that put a greater 
stress on freedom, in democratic countries of West-
ern Europe.80 Social defence was to be the timely an-
swer to the call for a worldwide humane and effective 
response to crime, to which other comparative law-
yers could not respond in terms of globally common 
concepts of criminal law.81 Up to the present, social 
defence has continued to change its content and di-
rection.82
Ancel, who worked for the UN as a consultant 
in connection with many criminal policy questions 
(such as international criminal statistics, and the 
death penalty), was a member of the founding ad- 
hoc UN expert group (1950), which was the precur-
sor of the current Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice. He had been at the helm of pe-
nal reform. His social defence ideas concerning the 
rehabilitation of prisoners83 and the abolition of the 
death penalty84 found their way into the Covenant.85 
One of the programmatic objectives of the Inter-
national Society for Social Defence is the resocializa-
tion of the offender. Resocialization should involve 
improvement in the offender’s prosocial attitude, 
thus strengthening the security of society. The of-
fender must realize that committing a crime is not 
only threatening, but also detrimental to him or her. 
The social defence movement does not abandon the 
methods of responding to crime that had been de-
veloped in criminal law. However, it postulates far-
reaching modifications. 
The natural consequence of the primacy of reso-
cialization over other goals of punishment is the pos-
tulate to abolish the death penalty (art. 6§6), as a 
contributing element of the right to life. Further, the 
movement postulated abolishing life imprisonment, 
80  Ancel 1965.
81  Riles 2001:10.”In our societies, legislation has ceased to be the only source of law. Moreover considering the essentially national nature of 
legislation, we are moved to ask whether the international unification of law will not advance more certainly by means of methods other than 
legislation” (David 1950: sn 3, at 19).
82  Radzinowicz 1991:32; Walters 2003:30-31.
83  Ancel 1965:6; Ancel 1976:48.
84  Ancel 1962.
85  The method of drafting the Covenant did not allow for direct cross-referencing of the original source ideas with its provisions. Crediting Ancel’s 
contribution comes from my conversations with the staff members of the UN Social Defence Section.
Picture 9. The First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Geneva, 
1955)
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a goal which for some time was incorporated as of-
ficial UN criminal policy. But in the 1990s this pol-
icy was reviewed in the context of establishing the 
first UN ad hoc criminal tribunals (which impose it). 
What remained nonetheless intact has been the goal 
of the resocialization of other offenders (art.10§3). 
The International Society for Social Defence with 
its ideas had quickly entered the UN arena. There, 
it contributed to the creation of the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme. 
The Society’s ideas powered the UN Secretariat, in 
which the Social Defence Section was established. 
With that ideology it was credited86 with beginning 
the post-war criminological studies on poverty. 
In the next generation, social defence ideas 
were prompted by other reformers. Some of them 
were members of the United Nations Committee on 
Crime Prevention and Control (see Table 3, DVD): 
Johannes Andenaes (Norway), Inkeri Anttila (Fin-
land), Simone Rozes (France) and Adolfo Beria di Ar-
gentina (Italy), who was the organizer of the Seventh 
United Nations Congress (Milan, Italy, 1985).
After the death of Ancel, the Fifteenth Con-
gress of Social Defence (Toledo, 2007), co-organ-
ized by the UN Secretariat, discussed the very per-
tinent question of criminal responsibility of soldiers 
for common crimes committed in the course of rein-
stating safety and security through peacekeeping op-
erations in developing countries.87 Even though the 
idea of the social defence movement intellectually 
radiated through the professional circles of develop-
ing and developed countries,88 neither Ancel nor the 
other experts mentioned above, nor their profession-
al associations, went as far as the governments of de-
veloping countries had done after the Second World 
War. 
86  Mannheim 1965, Vol. II:272.
87  As a digression, one can see in this an interrelated academic and UN train of thought, which originated in 2000 with the aforementioned 
articles by Kreso and Terril. 
88  UNSDRI 1971; Williams 1974; Chattoraj 1982.
Picture 10. The Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Lon-
don, 1960)
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Picture 11. The Fourth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Kyoto, 
1970)
Picture 12. The Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Geneva, 
1975). Second from the left is Prof. Inkeri Anttila (at the time Minister of Justice of Finland), President of the Fifth 
Congress, who is greeting Helvi Sipilä, Assistant Secretary-General for Social and Humanitarian Affairs, Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General. At the right is Prof. G.O.W. Mueller, Chief of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Branch, Executive Secretary of the Fifth Congress
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The idea of freedom from want gave a much 
broader impulse to what was originally an anti-U.S. 
group of non-aligned countries (later called the 
Group of 77 and China, presently consisting of about 
130 developing countries from South America, Afri-
ca and Asia). 
Since 1948 they started proposing radical global 
economic and social changes which in time came to 
be known collectively as The New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO, 1974-1992). In 1980 (six years af-
ter the NIEO was initially presented), the Sixth Unit-
ed Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, Venezuela) de-
bated the topic – for the first time ever in the his-
tory of United Nations congresses and its predeces-
sors, and surely not by a coincidence, in a developing 
country. 
The resulting expertise mandated by the recom-
mendations of the Sixth Congress were written for 
the United Nations by Professor Alfred Blumstein 
(who in 2007 was awarded what is known as the 
“criminological Nobel Prize,” the Stockholm Prize 
in Criminology) and by Manuel López-Rey de Ar-
royo, one of the first authors of a book on the United 
89  López-Rey 1957:526. This digression is necessary here, because the ideas which the UN officially promotes may happen to differ from those 
of its expert employees or consultants (as was sometimes the case with the author when he worked in the UN).
Picture 13. Opening of the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders (Milan, 1985): Francesco Cossiga, President of Italy (at the rostrum) with Adolpho Beria Di Argentina, Organ-
izer of the Seventh Congress, sitting to his right, Minoru Shikita, the Executive Secretary of the Seventh Congress, 
Patricio Civili (UN DIESA), the Secretary of the Congress, Mino Martinazzoli, Italian Minister of Justice and Leticia Ra-
mos Shahani, UN Assistant Secretary-General
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Pro-
gramme (1984), and earlier the Chief of the Social 
Defence Section of the UN Secretariat.
López-Rey de Arroyo was the one who opera-
tionalized the principles of social defence. For this 
purpose he enlisted the first government-approved 
15 United Nations social defence observers across 
Member States, mostly drawn from the ranks of 
the International Penal and Penitentiary Commis-
sion. They promoted developments in crime pre-
vention and criminal justice – the nucleus of what 
in the life span of the network (1951-1991) eventually 
peaked with over 300 national correspondents from 
189 countries, including some that were not member 
states of the United Nations. And it was he who felt 
that the social defence movement had spent its intel-
lectual force in the United Nations Secretariat. 
He was also one of the first United Nations crim-
inologists who requested that the publisher of his ar-
ticles include an obligatory disclaimer that the views 
contained in his article “do not necessarily represent 
the views of the United Nations Secretariat”, as was 
the case with his article published soon after the First 
United Nations Congress.89 
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Picture 14. Closure of the Eighth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (Ha-
vana, 1990): Fidel Castro, head of state of Cuba (at the rostrum) with Margaret J. Anstee, Under Secretary-General, 
Director General of UNOV (far right table side) and Henryk Sokalski, Director of the CSDHA (left table side). Behind 
the left corner desk is Michael Platzer, Chief of Cabinet of the Director-General
Picture 15. The Ninth 
United Nations Con-
gress on the Preven-
tion of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders 
(Cairo, 1995)
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That legal clause permitted him to distance 
himself from the idea of social defence inscribed in 
the Section that he headed. He wrote that the term 
social defence is misleading and rather unfortu-
nate. It certainly should not be used to denote any 
concrete school of penal or criminological thought. 
Distancing himself from the roots (the classicism 
of Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) and the positivism 
of Enrico Ferri (1856-1929)), López-Rey merely con-
firmed a clear fact. Namely, that the UN door stands 
open to every humanistic and progressive idea and 
that the domination of any particular school of 
thought or scientific classification, which is the 
premise of academic criminology, has no place in 
the UN programmatic action against crime. From 
social defence the UN was moving towards broader 
objectives of social change.
It was precisely in this way that the UN Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, which 
in its ideological sense emerged from the social de-
fence movement, and organizationally was a de-
scendant of the International Penal and Penitentia-
ry Commission, married substance with form. Since 
that time the substance has been created in cooper-
ation with non-governmental organizations and em-
inent experts. It has been modified, when called for 
by the exigencies of the situation.90 Finally, the new 
situation led to the original name International Soci-
ety for Social Defence being supplemented with the 
words and Humane Criminal Policy.
It seems that López-Rey did not see any internal 
relationship between the social defence movement 
and the ideas of the NIEO on which he expound-
ed91 and for which he had allies in developing coun-
tries.92 The criminological culmination of the NIEO 
(but also the starting point of its gradual fall) came 
in 1985 when the Seventh United Nations Congress 
adopted the Guiding Principles on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice in the context of the New Inter-
national Economic Order. The Congress resolution 
recommended international cooperation on the ba-
sis of sustainable development. It recommended the 
restructuring of the international economic system, 
including “fair distribution of the benefits” and the 
concomitant changes in crime prevention and crim-
inal justice. The General Assembly, to which the re-
port on the Seventh Congress with that resolution 
was submitted, disregarded it by not annexing it to 
its own resolution.93 This lowered the legal impor-
tance of the Guiding Principles. They remained Guid-
ing Principles in name only. 
The failure of the NIEO agenda at the Seventh 
Congress was due to increasing suspicions that the 
United Nations system had become an unfriendly 
political forum and a potential obstacle to economic 
liberalism, i.e. to so-called market solutions to prob-
lems.94
The demise of the NIEO era in the United Na-
tions system came in 1992. Then, the Internation-
al Law Association, a renowned non-governmen-
tal organization with consultative status with the 
ECOSOC, renamed its NIEO programming com-
mittee the Committee on Sustainable Development. 
This signalled the end of intellectual support for the 
NIEO.95 However, its underlying idea, still support-
ed in developing countries, has nevertheless contin-
ued to resurface at various United Nations and re-
gional fora.96 
A counterforce to these broader, politically very 
contentious principles of the NIEO that were de-
signed to introduce a more just social system for the 
impoverished, emerged during the 1970s in West-
ern countries (primarily in the United Kingdom, It-
aly, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Unit-
ed States) and also in South America (Venezuela): 
so-called new or radical criminology, which in an 
earlier guise (at the end of the nineteenth century) 
had been known as socialist or utopian criminology. 
Two Latin American criminologists who had recent-
ly been involved in it deserve mention: Lola Aniyar 
de Castro (1990) and Juan Manuel Mayorca, member 
of the United Nations Committee on Crime Preven-
tion and Control (1982-1984).97 The rise of new Latin 
American criminology was in response to the fail-
ure of the program of the United Nations Econom-
ic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). During 
90 López-Rey 1974:500.
91  López-Rey 1984.
92  For example, in 1983 representatives of developing countries fought for the establishment of NIEO in the United Nations Commission on Hu-
man Rights. Among those speaking in favour was the Egyptian member of the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, 
Ahmad Khalifa (1965-1974), who had served as the Executive Secretary of the Third United Nations Congress (1965, Stockholm). The Commis-
sion knew very well at the time that, in that fight, so far “not much has been achieved” (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/24/Rev.1, §§ 164-165 & 295).
93  GA resolution 40/32 of 29 November 1985.
94  Schechter 2005:78.
95  Ginther & de Waart 1995:6-7.
96  Brems 2001: 62, 98, 105-106, 450-451, 457.
97  Their works most clearly represented a break from modernization theory, in the form of “dependency theory” (see the Glossary). 
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the late 1950s the ECLA had recommended a dis-
connection of the economy of poor countries from 
rich countries, since the former were not earning 
enough from their exported raw materials to pay for 
the imported products manufactured from these 
by the latter. Import substitution and import pro-
tectionist policy was the answer. This first resulted 
in brief economic expansion, followed by econom-
ic stagnation (unemployment, inflation, declining 
terms of trade, etc.) caused by the policy of import 
protectionism.98
The new criminologists found most of their ar-
guments regarding the criminogenic function of in-
equality in the works of Friedrich Engels (1820-1885) 
and Karl Marx (1818-1883), starting with their Com-
munist Manifesto (1848). As Lewis Mumford99 noted, 
in the year when Engels was born, about 75% of the 
population of the world lived below the equivalent 
of US$1 a day.100 Undoubtedly then for Engels and 
Marx it was inequality that bred crime, which was 
committed by the exploited and demoralized perpe-
trators recruited from the underclass, the so-called 
lumpenproletariat. 
Since the time of Engels and Marx, with differ-
ent modifications, the criminogenic function of eco-
nomic inequality has been reinterpreted and veri-
fied in theory and practice in various ways, starting 
by treating it as a cause of crime, but now as a factor 
contributing to crime. 
Those Western criminologists who were con-
ceptually and historically closest to this Marx-
ist philosophy, such as, for instance, the Dutch-
man Willem Bonger101 argued that, basically, crime 
is motivated by the exploitation (victimization) of 
its perpetrator by the capitalist state. The victim-
ized persons strive to secure their existence. They 
are unable to do so legally because the profits of 
their work are taken away from them by the own-
er of the means of production. The owner does not 
feel any need to share these profits with the crime 
perpetrator, because altruism is no longer possi-
ble, as had been the case in early primitive societies 
where goods were shared equally. The owner in turn 
becomes greedy and criminal, because his egoism 
and greed have no limitations, as bourgeois capital-
ism sets none. However, Bonger added, it is not on-
ly egoism but also the poor cultural upbringing and 
education of the lower strata of society and its alco-
holism that become factors. 
This most orthodox (but still somewhat eclec-
tic) interpretation has changed over time. At the 
time that NIEO was in vogue, more sophisticated in-
terpretations appeared in U.S. radical criminology. 
Three of them deserve a short presentation here. 
The first interpretation comes from the early 
1970s. In a well-known article by David M. Gordon 
on Capitalism, classes and crime in America (1973), 
he argued that almost any type of crime in the USA 
can be explained as a fully rational reaction to the 
existence of the structure of capitalistic institutions. 
Exemplifying this general thesis, the author ar-
gued that such seemingly different types of crimes 
such as those committed in the ghettos, by organ-
ized crime groups and by white collar criminals have 
a common denominator. These are inequality, exis-
tential insecurity and competition. They force peo-
ple to be more efficient, but when there are no more 
legal means to make a living, the same factors ex-
plain why someone resorts to crime. The ghetto 
dwellers, particularly young Afro-Americans, have 
no choice when it comes to getting jobs. The jobs 
which are offered to them are usually low-paid, bor-
ing and short-term. Committing crime is more at-
tractive and promising for stable and better living in 
terms of higher income. Imprisonment in such poor 
living conditions may have no deterrent effect be-
cause life outside prison is no less difficult. 
It was much the same with organized crime: it 
responds to social demand, for example for drugs or 
sexual services. Keeping to the first example, the il-
licit trade in heroin is very similar to that in tobac-
co or alcohol. The only difference is that the heroin 
trade is prohibited. Again this is similar to white col-
lar crime. Any way of making a profit is good. Corpo-
rations break the law by fixing prices, making con-
sumers pay more, or by lowering prices, preventing 
smaller companies from competing with them on 
the market. 
The second interpretation was given in 1981 by 
two other radical U.S. criminologists: Reiman and 
Headlee (1981). According to them, crime in capi-
talism is not only a rational reply resulting from the 
conditions of competition, existential insecurity and 
inequality, but a particularly suitable answer to eco-
98  M. Keet, Neo-Marxist Dependency Theories, Dependency and Underdevelopment in Third World Countries, http://www.meteck.org/depend-
ency.html.
99  Lewis Mumford (1895-1990), an American historian and philosopher of technology and science, particularly noted for his study of cities and 
urban architecture. 
100  Mumford 1961:218-219.
101  Bonger 1916.
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nomic crisis, the unfavourable conditions of which 
increase the pressure to commit crime. It is not only 
a rational reply to the lack of social security. It is also 
one of the forms of competition in the face of grow-
ing existential insecurity. 
The same criminologists emphasized that at the 
heart of social and economic inequalities lies the pri-
vate ownership of the means of production and in-
herent to it the class division of capitalist society. 
That division has led to the exploitation of workers 
by the bourgeoisie, but, at the same time, to a great 
material development of capitalism. Socio-economic 
inequalities are particularly acutely felt by the people 
from the reserve labour market and the lumpenpro-
letariat. They are in a particularly difficult life situa-
tion when striving to secure their existential needs 
which is the form of competition for access to ma-
terial goods. It intensifies in a period of cyclical eco-
nomic crises, in the context of which both common 
and white collar crime show themselves as a form of 
competition.
The other forms of lawbreaking are perhaps not 
called crimes, but only because the capitalist power 
holders manipulate the law in their interest. Among 
the white collar crimes we can identify those that are 
of a plebeian character, such as pilfering and small 
embezzlement, and corporate crime. Such forms of 
white collar crime will increase under capitalism. But 
there will also be better law enforcement, and so the 
increase will be controlled. Despite the expected sta-
bilization of white collar crime, corporate profits will 
grow, since there will be different forms of income 
distribution.
The third and probably the most interesting 
criminological interpretation of the influence of in-
equality on crime was carried out with the help of 
statistical analysis. Two radical U.S. criminologists, 
Don Wallace and Drew Humphries, (1980) analyzed 
the impact of modernization, i.e., urbanization and 
industrialization on crime in the United States from 
1950 to 1971. They studied the relationships between 
capital expenditures on industry in certain major 
U.S. urban agglomerations and the level of report-
ed crime. 
They selected five independent variables: the 
size of the labour force involved in production, the 
city hardship index (in comparison with life in the 
suburbs), the geographical location of the city in the 
U.S., its population density, and the size of its po-
lice force. Of these five, the first variable was most 
strongly negatively correlated with the reported lev-
el of car thefts and burglaries. The smaller the labour 
force that was involved in production, the higher the 
rates of those crimes (.78 for car thefts and .46 for 
burglaries).
The city hardship index was most strongly pos-
itively correlated with car thefts (.51) and homicide 
(.35), but also with robberies (.51) and armed burgla-
ries (.37). As a result, the more intensively industry 
was relocated from the city to the suburbs, the more 
crimes were reported against person and property. 
Robberies (.39), car thefts (.75), burglaries (.36) and 
other thefts (.41) were reported less often in the cities 
with a larger police force. The role of other variables 
was regarded as secondary or doubtful. 
The authors suggested that these results may be 
interpreted as confirming the thesis that the lower-
ing of the level of investment leads to an increase in 
interpersonal conflicts and property theft. More pre-
cisely, the transfer of capital leads to class conflict 
arising out of the unequal access to shrinking ma-
terial resources. The more difficult city life becomes, 
the more it involves individual destructive behav-
iours. In a class society these take the forms of per-
sonal and property crimes. The longer this process 
lasts, the more the working class is marginalized, 
and hence the higher the level of reported crime. 
David Greenberg (1981), who commented on the 
above findings, argued that the movement of capi-
tal from one place to another is the result of the suc-
cessful struggle of the working class against capi-
talists. If the living conditions of the working class 
are improved through higher wages and social secu-
rity, then the capitalists, in order to secure the de-
sired profit margin, must move to other locations 
where such payments are lower. This paradox will re-
main as long as there is no overall political control 
in the U.S., and as far as transnational corporations 
are concerned, as long as there is no overall political 
control at the international level – a remark similar 
to the postulates of the adherents of the NIEO. 
These radical criminology findings and the ar-
guments about profit margins have proved to be on-
ly partly correct, due to deregulation. Deregulation 
has led to the lowering of prices for various econom-
ic services. On a broader scale, radical criminology 
could not corroborate its thesis of growing inequal-
ity and crime. 
Moreover, no one foresaw the fall of the coun-
tries of the socialist block in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. Their chronically inefficient economy of deficit 
(ideologically based on the principle of egalitarian-
ism) led to new insights on the criminogenic func-
tion of inequality. 
Two Polish authors, independently of one anoth-
er, contributed to that reinterpretation. The first was 
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Sir Leon Radzinowicz (1906-1999), a British crimi-
nologist of Polish origin. Already at the Second Unit-
ed Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders (London, 1960)102 he ap-
pealed to Member States and the other participants 
at the Congress to not dogmatize criminology. He 
emphasized that criminology should discontinue its 
search for the causes of crime, since it was doubtful 
whether that search could bring any enlightenment
The second Polish criminologist was Leszek Ler-
nell (1906-1981). As a dogmatic Marxist heavily en-
tangled during his early career in explaining the class 
aetiology of crime, he had later become increasing-
ly critical of it in the context of so-called real social-
ism. He saw that it had tamed development by an 
overly ideological policy of economic egalitarian-
ism. Against this background, he remarked in 1973 
that from the mid-nineteenth century through the 
second half of the twentieth century, the United 
States and the capitalist European countries had ex-
perienced an increase in crime. But this could not 
be explained by the falling living standards of their 
populations, as the ideologists of socialist countries 
had portrayed the West. At that time those Western 
countries developed economically and their GDP 
grew considerably.103
The above statement was based more on intu-
ition than on an assessment of comparative crime 
trends (at that time, very little was known about 
crime trends in Poland and other Central and East-
ern European countries, and even less about com-
parative crime trends among them). Moreover, in 
these latter countries, econometric analyses of crime 
trends were unwelcome, since they complicated 
the class analysis of crime.104 Nonetheless, Lernell’s 
largely intuitive statement inscribed itself well into 
the discussion which in the West involved the new 
problematic of the distribution of national income.
That debate began during the second half of the 
1960s by two non-Marxist U.S. econometrists.105 Its 
essence was best expressed by Professor Gary Beck-
er, a winner of the Nobel Prize (1992). In his lecture 
The economic way of looking at behaviour he stated 
that “Some individuals become criminals because of 
the financial and other rewards from crime compared 
to legal work, taking account of the likelihood of ap-
prehension and conviction, and the severity of pun-
ishment.”106 Those rewards are related to the pattern 
of national income distribution. 
In the global criminology of that time (1966-
1990) there was no advanced econometric research 
that could prove that this had been the case in polit-
ical economy. However, as shown for example by the 
earlier work of Bonger (1916), the thesis of the eco-
nomic conditioning of criminal behaviour is not new 
at all. More incisive research findings with crimino-
logical connotations have started to emerge in ear-
nest at the beginning of the 1990s, when the globali-
zation process sped up. 
Initially, at least in United Nations research 
(2001), it has been emphasized that extreme ine-
quality leads to the weakening of social bonds, so-
cial unrest and conflicts and to insecurity of property 
rights. Extreme egalitarianism involves high system 
costs, including corruption-related costs in income 
distribution. 
The United Nations study cited above analyzed 
GNP data (1950-1990) from 73 countries. It found 
that poor countries had a significant spread of in-
ternal income distribution. At the end of the 1990s 
it ranged from 0,25 to 0,71 (the bottom value means 
that 25 % of society had at its disposal 80% of in-
come, the top value means that 71% of the society 
had only 20 % of income at its disposal). The coeffi-
cient of the income concentration in rich countries 
generally had a value below 0,4. This means that over 
1/3 of society had at its disposal 80% of income. The 
recommended value for a just income distribution 
would have been between 0,25 (which is typical for 
Northern Europe) and 0,4 (the U.S., China). 
A later United Nations survey (2006) used GDP 
data, that is the market value of all the goods and ser-
vices produced by labour and property minus the net 
inflow of labour and property incomes from abroad. 
102  A/CONF.17/20, §§ 496-498.
103  Lernell 1973:240.
104  The above is also an example of the idiosyncrasy of academic thought, which is mentioned in general in the preface. Within one criminological 
school (conflict/new/radical/Marxist) there have been considerable conceptual and methodological differences regarding how to present the 
crime problem. While Western Marxists tried to be very conceptually/ideologically engaged (e.g., Gordon) and/or methodologically sophisti-
cated (e.g., Greenberg, Wallace and Humphries), socialist criminologists were only conceptually/ideologically engaged (e.g., Bafia, to a lesser 
extent Lernell in his later works), but methodologically lagging behind their Western counterparts. This is because their academic thought and 
output had been politically conditioned to a much greater extent than that of Western Marxists. Moreover, in the socialist countries there had 
been very little statistical data available (the rest was confidential) for the purpose of making any econometric analysis, let alone a longitudinal 
or even simpler statistical analysis of crime patterns and dynamics. Otherwise criminology would have not existed there at all.
105  Fleisher 1966; Becker 1968. 
106  Becker 1993:390. 
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The survey showed that in 2000 in countries which 
together accounted for 56% of the world’s popu-
lation, 2% of people owned more than 50% of the 
world’s wealth. Therefore, the coefficients of wealth 
distribution were even less desired (just) from the 
postulated ones, namely 0,89, and even higher than 
in 1998 (0,79). 
Against this background finally emerged the 
criminological thesis that the lower the coefficient 
of wealth distribution, the more there is reported 
crime. Using data on reported homicide and rob-
bery (from the periodical United Nations surveys of 
crime trends and operations of criminal justice sys-
tems, 1970-1994) from 34 developing and developed 
countries, a World Bank 2002 multiregression study 
found that the higher the Gini coefficient, the high-
er the level of reported homicide and robbery. More-
over, the more just the redistribution of the national 
income through transfers to the 20% of the popula-
tion that earned the least, the lower the level report-
ed among them of homicide and robbery.
The above pattern had exceptions. For exam-
ple, no such relationship was observed in the case 
of Central Asian countries. These exceptions un-
dermine the explanatory power of the criminogen-
ic function of economic inequality. The World Bank 
study did not reveal the influence of economic in-
equality on reported crime, probably because oth-
er factors prevented that inequality from expressing 
itself through crime. Such a general interpretation, 
i.e., emphasizing the socializing function of a just 
distribution of the national income, may be indirect-
ly drawn from a study published by the International 
Labour Organization (2004). This study involved on-
ly 20 developing countries. It directly suggests that 
a just distribution of national income, which grows 
7% annually because of an increase in employment 
(6% of current job seekers and no less than 1% of pre-
vious-years applicants), leads to general welfare im-
provement. Consequently, and assuming that unem-
ployment has a criminogenic function, an indirect 
conclusion is that certain forms of crime, e.g., street 
and property crime, may have a declining tendency, 
because those who became employed no longer earn 
their living through urban crime. 
But this is yet one more side of the problem, and 
by far incomplete. The above ILO research findings 
disregard the possibility that the 7% increase in em-
ployment may lead to an increase in drug criminality. 
This may be not only because of the increase in the 
purchasing power of the consumer market, but also 
because organized criminals may modify their strat-
egy. If a country that they had used as a transit terri-
tory for drug trafficking begins to show an emerging 
local consumer market which raises the demand for 
drugs, they may begin to use it as a drug destination 
country. Central Asian countries may serve as a good 
example of this changing strategy. Between 1990 and 
2000, there was a seven-fold increase in the num-
ber of drug takers in these countries.107 The notion 
of justly distributed income should incorporate crime 
prevention, as the first imperative of justice, some-
thing which surely is not in place in most countries 
in the world. Moreover, this and many other econo-
metric studies show too little influence of other fac-
tors on crime. For example, not every kind of work 
has the same socializing potential.
Economists say little about other than eco-
nomic factors influencing crime. In his critique of 
the above United Nations findings as oversimpli-
fied, Gary Becker has refined his earlier argument. 
He has recently stated that inequality and the per 
capita income distribution between the lowest 
and highest earnings, can be better understood in 
a broader context of earnings as a part of so-called 
human capital. This capital includes the general 
level of education, vocational training and profes-
sional specialization, nutrition, and investment in 
health. In other words, these are components that 
contribute to personal welfare and to the quality of 
life. This multi-part capital is approximately three 
times bigger than the value of all wealth in the form 
of types of fixed assets.108
This human capital gives inequality a deeper, 
more subtle (soft) and nuanced, but also more pro-
nounced sense. In criminology, in addition to the al-
ready mentioned perception of the punitiveness of 
punishment, one includes a broader sense of rela-
tive deprivation, which is a perception-based feeling 
of depriving someone of a particular economic, so-
cial or cultural opportunity, as a result of which one 
seeks to level it off by crime (the topic to which we 
now turn). 
This dimension was emphasized by the Sixth 
Congress. It took place under the general theme of 
Crime Prevention and Quality of Life, formally pro-
posed by its Executive Secretary, Professor G.O.W. 
Mueller, a U.S. criminologist of German origin. This 
could be the effect of a growing debate on the crim-
inogenic function of relative deprivation. It started 
107  UNODC 2007.
108  Becker 2007. 
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decades earlier with the anomie theory revisited by 
Robert Merton (1939). He argued that social devi-
ance may be a result of the deprivation of institution-
al means to achieve culturally accepted goals.
In their own way, the importance of relative dep-
rivation was emphasized in the United States by two 
other researchers, the sociologist Walter C. Reck-
less109 and the political scientist Ted Robert Gurr.110 
In Poland this was done by Lernell, who correspond-
ed with G.O.W. Mueller.
Reckless and his staff studied the self-assess-
ment of youth. Those youth who did not enter into 
conflict with the law had a better self-image than did 
those who were in conflict. Reckless concluded that 
there are factors that can influence youth not to com-
mit crimes. Gurr generalized the opinion about the 
criminogenic role of relative deprivation. He argued 
that it is a potential factor in social tensions and de-
viance, and in extreme circumstances of riots, civil 
wars and terrorism. Lernell recalled Marx’s view that 
“A house may be large or small; as long as the sur-
rounding houses are equally small it satisfies all so-
cial demands for a dwelling. But let a palace arise be-
side the little house, and it shrinks from a little house 
to a hut.”111 Consequently, Lernell argued that it is 
not relative impoverishment, i.e., that it is not the 
comparison between the bottom and top level earn-
ers, but rather the disproportion in the quality of life 
(fulfilling consumer needs) in a dynamic confronta-
tion in the closest surrounding, that is very instruc-
tive for the aetiology of crime.112 
In the context of the above interpretations that 
broaden the understanding of the criminogenic 
function of inequality, conceptions of want, pover-
ty or unemployment are at the root of crime. Proper-
ty and personal crime may be committed in the feel-
ing of inequality of life chances or, perhaps, because 
of other motivations only remotely correlated, per-
haps quite coincidentally, with inequality that may 
be felt in so many ways. The borders of relative dep-
rivation seem to be transcendental rather than real 
and may be expressed through different motivations. 
For homo economicus the motive of hedonism may 
be likewise important for taking cocaine or joy rid-
ing (the theft of a car), in any case social deviant acts, 
and a crime in the latter case. This adds to the body 
of knowledge which treated with suspicion any the-
ories that related poverty to crime – theories still ad-
vocated in populist interpretations, also in the Unit-
ed Nations. But absolute poverty is not a primum 
mobile of crime, even if it may be for human inse-
curity.113 
Rather, it is the almost omnipotent presence of 
relative deprivation. From it one may draw the con-
clusion about the genesis and eternality of crime, 
hence about the need to revisit the theories on the 
aetiology of crime envisioning its disappearance as 
a massive phenomenon. This is obvious today, but 
surely was not at the time of Jerzy Bafia (1926-1991), 
another Polish Marxist criminologist. For him, views 
such as those of Lernell were only the beginning new 
phases of the development of criminology, which 
only managed to skim over the issue of an alienated 
person in the process of socialization. 
Bafia maintained that the faster one goes 
through those phases and starts formulating gen-
eral tendencies of development of crime and crim-
inality, the sooner one will reach its end, and arrive 
at a new epoch of organization of social life of peo-
ple, read: communism, which will eliminate aliena-
tion and crime. In this perspective, he proposed his 
own theory of a criminogenic situation. It maintains 
that “as a result of dialectic complexities, modifica-
tions and multilayers in the context of which occurs 
human behaviour, crime and criminality, in the ge-
netic and dynamic sense, emerge in effect of the colli-
sion of factors occurring in the first place in the social 
environment, in the emerging subcultures, in person-
ality of human beings, in the presentation of social at-
titudes.”114
The fall of communism in Europe which start-
ed in 1989 as the “Autumn of Nations”, allows us to 
classify this and similar relic theories to the epigonic 
development of Marxist criminology, until that year 
rather very vigorously propagated and modified. Be-
tween 1920 and 1980 Marxist criminology had been 
very popular in Soviet (A.A. Piontkovski (1924), W. 
N. Kudriavcev (1960), A.A. Gercenzon (1962), M. D. 
Sharogrodsky (1968), N. F. Kuzniecova (1969)), East 
German (E. Buchholz et al. (1971)) and Czechoslovak 
science (J. Nezkusil et al. (1978)).
One may compare the dogmatism of Bafia and 
the Czechoslovak, East German and Soviet crimi-
nologists mentioned above with their predecessors 
109  Reckless 1940; Reckless 1961.
110  Gurr 1970.
111  Lernell 1973:181.
112  Ibid.
113  Sunga 2009.
114  Bafia 1978:69.
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one hundred years earlier: the Italian Enrico Fer-
ri and the Spaniard Bernaldo de Quirós. Both main-
tained that nobody should question the belief that 
crime will disappear (even if we do not really know 
how) for the same reason that nobody questions the 
Catholic belief in life after death, even though no-
body knows what it looks like.115
Indeed, nobody questions this dogma in Chris-
tianity. But the Brazilian clergyman Leonardo Boff, 
a Catholic theologian of liberation, argued a thesis 
that is equally difficult to prove, that “The opposite of 
poverty is not wealth – it is justice ... And the objective 
of liberation theology is to create a more just society, 
not necessarily a wealthier one. And the great ques-
tion is, how do we do this ... Our task is not to create 
sustainable development, but a sustainable society – 
human beings and nature together.”116
Even if the latter dictum is dated,117 the entire 
question is not solely rhetorical. In South America 
the socializing and communist and populist politi-
cal movements find their support among the popu-
lation, far more than currently in the former socialist 
block in Eastern Europe. The creeping global crisis 
may strengthen these movements and facilitate the 
return of Marxist ideology in Europe and elsewhere. 
The renewed pertinence of the question of the crim-
inogenic function of inequality can become more 
pronounced than now. Earlier criminological re-
search on crime and economic crisis, which had also 
been a part of the United Nations work at UNSDRI,118 
and later UNICRI,119 may be revisited and updated. 
In the academic world this is already taking place 
in the analytical context of transnational organized 
crime. Acknowledging the international legal origin 
of this concept in the United Nations, and research-
ing it further from the perspective of the Orient and 
the Occident, one U.S. criminologist,120 apparently 
struck by Marx’s foresight, prefaced his article with 
the following motto from his “Poverty of Philosophy”: 
“Finally, there came a time when everything that 
men had considered as inalienable became an object 
of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is 
the time when the very things that till then had been 
communicated, but never exchanged; given, but nev-
er sold; acquired, but never bought – virtue, love, con-
viction, knowledge, conscience, etc. -- when finally 
passed into commerce. It is the time of general cor-
ruption, of universal venality, or, to speak in terms 
of political economy, the time when everything mor-
al or physical, having become a marketable value, is 
brought to the market to be assessed at its truest val-
ue”. 
Marxist criminology now only marginally inter-
acts with the United Nations crime mandate. But it 
has not yet said its last word. The failed experience 
with socialist criminology (1920-1989) strongly sug-
gests that Marxist ideology had been introduced by 
force, with disregard to the negative influence of eco-
nomic egalitarianism rather than by a true and last-
ing popular conviction, informed and evidence-driv-
en policies, genuinely shared intergenerationally and 
internationally. 
At the Twelfth United Nations Congress, it was 
not economic but social and legal egalitarianism that 
received much support. It was credited in Finland 
with a significant reduction of the prison population, 
now the lowest in the European Union. Generally 
(and contrary to the popular perception), research 
demonstrated that there was no correlation between 
increasing crime rates and falling prison population 
rates. Growing prison rates seemed to be more driv-
en by the heightened public fear of crime (a finding 
about which more below) than other factors.
Falling prison rates were attributed to social 
egalitarianism (social welfare through investing in 
the rehabilitation of prisoners) and legal egalitar-
ianism (humanization of conditions of imprison-
ment), both at the heart of United Nations crimi-
nal policy since its inception. The conclusion of the 
Congress debate was succinctly put in journalistic 
parlance by the UNIS: “One should not be jailed for 
being poor.”121
115  de Quirós 1912:72. For contemporary perspectives of Catholicism on crime and criminal justice, see: Oliver 2008 and Skotnicki 2007. Official 
Catholic doctrine does not relate itself with a socialist egalitarian or any other secular criminological interpretation. However, its partisan 
strand of the theology of liberation as an ideological justification for economic egalitarian policy in Latin America, if applied to pre-1989 East-
ern Europe, would have only sped up the agony of socialism there. 
116  Boff 1999:32.
117  See below how development and society have both been amalgamated between 1952 and 1969 into sustained development.
118  UNSDRI 1974.
119  UNICRI 1990.
120  Shpetycki 2007.
121  UNIS/CP/609E, 16 April 2010.
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III Sustainable development  
and its impact on crime and 
crime prevention
Neither Marxists nor neo-Marxists have been able to 
answer successfully the above question on how to at-
tain justice in the world, especially for the poor. It 
was  not the representatives of this now marginal 
philosophical current, but the positivist interpreta-
tions, such as those of Radzinowicz, that put crimi-
nology into the mainstream of political life through-
out the world. In fact, these positive interpretations 
may now be regarded as non-partisan. As such they 
have been quoted by the UNODC (“However cal-
culated, official crime rates are almost always high-
er among the poor, and poor people are more likely 
to be arrested and convicted for a wide variety of of-
fences”).122 They have a strong interplay with social 
welfare and reintegration policies for offenders, drug 
abusers and persons infected with HIV/AIDS.
Thanks to these interpretations, instead of look-
ing only at the relationships between poverty and 
crime, which – as noted before – had had its ideolog-
ical appeal, at the end of 1980s the United Nations 
started discussing the issue of sustainable develop-
ment. This is the key concept in opening the way for 
relations in the world that are more just economical-
ly and socially. 
The essence of sustainable development is the 
right to fulfil the aspirations of the present gener-
ation without limiting the developmental rights of 
future generations. Sustainable development in its 
original sense communicates only that in the inter-
est of the right to development of future generations, 
the development of economy and civilization should 
not be pursued at the cost of exhausting non-renew-
able natural resources and of the destruction of en-
vironment.
In 1987, this original intellectual content of sus-
tainable development was shared with the United 
Nations General Assembly by the World Commis-
Picture 16. At the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Vien-
na, 2000)
122  Governor’s Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee (GJJAC) Policy Brief (January 2008): Community-Based Gang Prevention and Intervention, 
quoted in: Sustainable Livelihood. A broader vision. Social Support and Integration to Prevent Illicit Drug Use, HIV /AIDS and Crime. Discussion 
Paper, UNODC, Vienna 2010:11.
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sion on Environment and Development,123 chaired by 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, at the time the Prime Min-
ister of Norway. It replaced the ideologically defeated 
concept of the New International Economic Order. 
The concept of sustainable development also in-
cludes a self-generating, creative, albeit also conflict-
ing, mechanism. This is geared toward the renew-
al, multiplication and broadening by mankind of its 
own human intergenerational capital in all creative 
areas, including science. 
According to some international lawyers, sus-
tainable development is one of the oldest ideas in 
human heritage.124 Other international lawyers125 
suggest that the origin of the concept of sustainable 
development can be traced to the preamble in the 
United Nations Charter. This was the first UN docu-
ment to refer to future generations (“to save succeed-
ing generations from the scourge of war, which twice 
in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to man-
kind”). They add126 that already the Atlantic Charter 
contained a reference to the idea of sustainable de-
velopment. That Charter speaks of the commitment 
of its signatories to “endeavour, with due respect for 
their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment 
by all States, great or small, victor and vanquished, of 
access on equal terms, to the trade and the raw ma-
terials of the world which are needed for their eco-
nomic prosperity”. 
Political scientists,127 analyzing the genesis of 
the idea of sustainable development, trace its origin 
to another provision of the UN Charter, namely to 
the second part of art. 55(a) (quoted in full above), 
which is the same provision that sets out the man-
date for the UN crime programme. According to this 
provision, “the United Nations shall promote ... high-
er standards of living, full employment, and condi-
tions of economic and social progress and develop-
ment”. 
NGO historians would add that the concept of 
“succeeding generations” is an echo of “rising gener-
ations”, a concept promoted by NGOs involved since 
the mid-1920s in the work of the League of Nations 
in promoting child welfare.128
There is no doubt that the concept of sustaina-
ble development is a historical and political compro-
mise between developed and developing countries, 
and that officially its idea (“sound self-sustaining 
economic development”) for the first time emerged 
in the United Nations General Assembly. In 1961 
the General Assembly declared its First Develop-
ment Decade.129 In 1970, at the beginning of the Sec-
ond Development Decade130 the General Assembly 
agreed to 0,7 percent of the GNP of member states 
as a target for their annual official development as-
sistance (ODA).131 Sustainable development, a very 
hopeful and promising concept, has started its glob-
al journey with a likewise optimistic financial ODA 
benchmark.
When the concept of sustainable development 
matured, it considerably dampened the conflict 
which had emerged between developed and devel-
oping countries soon after the adoption of the Char-
ter of the United Nations. The concept began to be 
interpreted by the developing countries to mean not 
only that development entails economic growth, but 
that a country has the right to decide by itself about 
its economy and natural resources. 
Political scientists noted gradually differenti-
ating paths of development for developing and de-
veloped countries. In 1948, shortly after the Second 
World War, and at the time of reconstruction in the 
West, developing countries started to re-emphasize 
their right to the sovereign disposal of their own nat-
ural resources (a part of the “right to self-determina-
tion”) which had been the precursor of the “right to 
development”.132
In that early phase of post-colonial development 
(1948-1961), however, another view had been domi-
nant. According to this view, it was solely econom-
ic growth that was responsible for reducing poverty 
and the other social problems related to poverty, in-
cluding crime. One of the recommended means to 
foster that growth was foreign capital investments. 
Consequently, the right to self-determine the 
use of natural resources “in the interest of econom-
ic development of the under-developed countries” – 
123  A/42/187.
124  Weeramantery 1997:110.
125  Commentary 2002, Vol. I:34.
126  Schrijver 2007:593-594.
127  Matsui 1995: 53-71.
128  Charnovitz 1997:247.
129  GA resolution 1710 (XVI) of 19 December 1961.
130  GA resolution 2626 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, § 43.
131  80-85 % of ODA comes from 22 developed countries of the OECD, and the rest primarily from NGOs and private charities. The ODA target has 
not yet been reached (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Development_aid). 
132  Matsui 1993:64.
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“one of the fundamental requisites of strengthening 
the universal peace”, was qualified by “the need for 
maintaining the flow of capital, in conditions of secu-
rity, mutual confidence, and economic co-operation 
among nations”.133 The 1961 GA that declared the first 
Development Decade confirmed this basic course of 
action. It recommended that national income of the 
least developing countries expand by 5 % annually.134 
It also recommended steps to “accelerate the elimina-
tion of illiteracy, hunger and disease”, but only in or-
der to increase individual productivity.135
However, already at the time of that first dec-
ade, the United Nations General Assembly (which 
in 1960 accepted 16 newly independent develop-
ing African countries as members) had started to 
speak more expressively in the new language of the 
right to self-determination. In that year the Assem-
bly adopted the “Declaration on granting the inde-
pendence to colonial countries and peoples”136 – a 
landmark in the history of the right to self-deter-
mination. In 1966, after 11 years of negotiations, the 
General Assembly adopted a common article 1 set-
ting out the right to self-determination, in the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. But already in 1962, at the ini-
tiative of newly accepted Asian and African States, 
the General Assembly adopted a resolution on per-
manent sovereignty over natural resources.137 It ex-
tended that permanent sovereignty, earlier inter-
preted only as legal equality of States, to equality 
over the natural resources in their territories.
Slowly a conflict has started to emerge between 
the question of the protection of natural resources 
and the protection of human rights. That conflict 
was ignited by the above resolution. It was interpret-
ed as the legalization of the nationalization of for-
eign investments into the natural resources of coun-
tries. 
Originally, those investments, understood in the 
terms of the 1952 GA resolution, were legally pro-
tected. Expropriation was not accepted. However, in 
many new States, some elites found in the concept of 
the right to self-determination a source not only for 
strengthening statehood, but also for enriching their 
private bank accounts, by looting natural resources 
in their own countries. In this criminological context 
a dilemma emerged. What should be a first priority 
for a State, its development or human rights? “Loot 
or justice”? 
One of the next GA resolutions sought to solve 
this dilemma. In 1969 the GA adopted the Declara-
tion on social progress and development.138 That res-
olution placed the “human person”139 in the centre of 
development. Development had to be not only eco-
nomic, but also progressively social, giving the right 
to benefit from development. Declaring the main 
goal of development to be “the creation of conditions 
for rapid and sustained social and economic devel-
opment” with “new and effective methods of interna-
tional cooperation in which equality of opportunity 
should be as much a prerogative of nations as of in-
dividuals in nations” (art. 12(a)), the resolution, as if 
once more, announced the emergence of the “right to 
development”. Nominally and finally, this took place 
in the context of a resolution of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights,140 and at the Gener-
al Assembly through the adoption of the Declaration 
on the right to development,141 recognizing it as a hu-
man right (art. 1). Nonetheless, it still continues to be 
understood as a legal claim of developing countries 
for transfer of resources from developed countries. 
This working definition of development had less 
in common with the earlier definition of develop-
ment as economic growth and more in common with 
the academic definition of development as a gradual, 
qualitative transition from less to more complex so-
cial forms.142
133  GA resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952. 
134  This is 2% less than the contemporary ILO benchmark suggests for all developing countries
135  GA resolution 1710 (XVI) of 19 December 1961.
136  GA resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.
137  GA resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962.
138  GA resolution 2542 (XXIV) of 11 November 1969.
139  This is probably the first official departure from the “he” language used in the United Nations documents, and a declaration of the need for 
a new gender policy. The ICCPR (1966) uses that “he” language. During the 1980s women issues have become more fully recognized by the 
United Nations in development policies and the technical assistance programmes, as their actors and beneficiaries. With the adoption of the 
General Assembly resolution on “UN Women” (A/64/289), gender mainstreaming has become a central policy issue in the United Nations. 
140  Resolution 4 (XXXV) of 10 March 1979. However, in 1972 the idea of the right to development as a human right was launched by Keba M’Baye, 
then Chief Justice of Senegal, in his inaugural lecture on that subject at the study session of the International Institute on Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. He was encouraged in this endeavour by the Institute’s director, Karel Vasak, the promoter of a “third generation” of human rights 
(see: Brems 2001:451, and ch. XI).
141  GA resolution 41/128, Annex, 4 December 1986.
142  Portes 1976; Smelser 1966; Wallerstein 1979.
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Despite these developments, between 1 May and 
12 December 1974 during the Second Developmental 
Debate (1971-1980) mitigating the political and sub-
stantive differences, the United Nations General As-
sembly separately in three other resolutions, nomen 
omen, declared the introduction of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order (NIEO).
The concept of development started gaining the 
NIEO connotation, departing from development 
stipulated by the covenants (1966), or declared by 
the resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights 
(1979) and the General Assembly (1986). This led 
to criticism from developed countries, particular-
ly the United States. It saw the NIEO as a threat to 
the protection of human rights because of its over-
emphasis on the role of States and not their citizens. 
Everything that had been connected at the General 
Assembly to the NIEO, had started to be opposed by 
the developed countries. 
They argued that the problematics of the pro-
tection of the human environment has, first of all, 
a global human dimension. The afore-mentioned 
World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment was tasked with the assessment of that di-
mension. The Commission re-focused the atten-
tion of the international community away from the 
NIEO, emphasizing the more central question of 
securing for future generations their access to the 
natural resources of the Earth. This also deflected 
attention away from discussions on the right to de-
velopment. As a result, a new compromise under-
standing of sustainable development was adopted 
as a central guiding principle143 (and not as a legal 
principle).144
Because of its centrality, this principle became 
a part of a new scientific discipline, inter alia devel-
oped by the United Nations University, at the rec-
ommendation of the G8. Its goal is to understand 
the relationships between global social and human 
systems and the coexisting risks for the welfare of 
humans and their security. This is a discipline ori-
entated on problem methods and visions of their 
restoration.145
Sustainable development coexists with the right 
to development. Since the relationship between the 
143  GA resolution 42/187 of 11 December 1987.
144  In the scholarly literature, discussions still continue on the positioning of the concept of sustainable development in the normative hierarchy. 
A Western legal commentator argues that it is not a legal rule, and sees the concept merely as a political axiom, a non-legal rule “with a life 
of its own outside the law” (Lowe 2007:99). From the Eastern legal (Islamic) perspective, even if the concept of sustainable development has 
been enshrined in United Nations General Assembly resolutions, such resolutions “cannot be compared with the rights sanctioned by God 
...- an integral part of the Islamic faith ... which suggest that Shari’ah norms prevail in the event of any normative conflict” (Samuel 2010:115).
145  UNU 2008.
146  GA resolution 52/136 of 12 December 1997.
147  Especially from the “rights-perspective”.
two in United Nations resolutions is unclear, this 
leaves space for ad hoc interpretations in various 
other programmatic documents of the United Na-
tions Secretariat and its agencies, even though these 
do not carry the authority of United Nations resolu-
tions. 
Moreover, wherever those resolutions speak 
about the second and third development decade 
(1981-1990 / 1971-1980), they prefer the concept of 
sustainable development rather than the right to 
development, at least since the adoption of Gener-
al Assembly resolution 42/187 of 11 December 1987. 
It should be recalled that also the Seventh United 
Nations Congress contributed to this confusion. It 
adopted its own resolution on the NIEO in which it 
included a reference to sustainable development – a 
real hybrid. 
In 1997 the General Assembly resolution on The 
right to development, adopted by a majority of votes, 
recognized that right as “fundamental”.146 However, 
because of several votes against that recognition and 
additional abstentions by some developed countries, 
that legal feature had not had any impact in Realpo-
litik. It has not been operationalized in the UN crime 
mandate. It is sustainable development that is fun-
damental in the UN crime mandate. The preambular 
paragraph of the above titled 1997 GA, in fact, uses 
the expression social and peoples’ -centred sustaina-
ble development”.
The main topic of the Twelfth United Nations 
Congress, Comprehensive strategies for global chal-
lenges: crime prevention and criminal justice systems 
and their development in a changing world, initial-
ly offered for some Member States a window of op-
portunity to continue with the heated exchanges on 
the right to development,147 but eventually this did 
not happen. It is remarkable to note that Member 
States preferred to stay away from engaging in the 
”development question” of the sort described above. 
With very little substantive discussion over it during 
the Twelfth Congress negotiations, its Salvador Dec-
laration stated that “We consider that international 
cooperation and technical assistance can play an im-
portant role in achieving sustainable and long-last-
ing results in the prevention, prosecution and punish-
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ment of crime, in particular by building, modernizing 
and strengthening our criminal justice systems and 
promoting the rule of law” (§ 8).
One can see that that the UN crime prevention 
and criminal justice programme has gone a long way 
to develop and strengthen its professional and tech-
nical ingredients rather than open itself to politiciz-
ing them.
In all of the above, one can also see the absence 
of a consolidated approach to the question of de-
velopment, the approach which would incremen-
tally build upon previous agreements and accom-
plishments, thus avoiding considerable conceptual 
confusion. But this is the nature of international pol-
itics and also evidence of a difference between prax-
is and science which adheres to more rigorous con-
ceptual regime. 
In sum, even though the development debate in 
the United Nations remains diversified, it has nev-
ertheless contributed immensely to the materializa-
tion of the right to development. There have been 
many research publications analyzing development 
and crime, not only in the context of the moderni-
zation theory, but also more generally. The United 
Nations Social Defence Research Institute (now the 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Re-
search Institute), had been a leader in this.148
From such a genetically interpreted concept of 
sustainable development for criminology and other 
social science disciplines, the following seven points 
emerge.
First, natural resources are a common good of 
mankind. Their protection under criminal law is as 
important as the protection of other common rights 
and freedoms, including one of the four original 
rights, the right of freedom from fear of crime. In ac-
cordance with the classification of those rights pro-
posed in 1977 by Karel Vlasak, Czech/French lawyer 
and scientist, all these rights and freedoms belong to 
the so-called three generations of human rights (lib-
erté, égalité, fraternité), initially formulated during 
the French Revolution (1790). 
The first-generation rights (liberté) include the 
rights providing protection against the abuse of 
power by the State, for example the right to a judi-
cial review of an arrest warrant, the right to a fair 
trial and the right to a person’s privacy, all formu-
lated after the Second World War in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966). The origins of the idea of freedom from fear 
and want may be located in the context of first-gen-
eration rights.
The second-generation rights (égalité) are the 
sociocultural rights and freedoms, for example the 
right to work, to livelihood, to housing and to health 
protection, initially formulated after the First World 
War, and accepted by the United Nations in the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (1966). 
The third-generation rights (fraternité) are the 
collective rights, for instance the right to social de-
velopment, to the protection of the environment, 
and to collective protection of data and information, 
declared in the 1970s and 1980s by various United 
Nations conferences and gradually included in the 
above academic classification. 
Second, the question of the exploitation of nat-
ural resources is or may be connected with different 
forms of inappropriate exploitation of natural re-
sources (environmental crime) and of the distribu-
tion of profits from their sale or, indirectly, it may 
have an impact on the ecological balance (the green-
house effect). This effect may lead to the redistribu-
tion of the budget between State economic and so-
cial sectors (ministries of interior and justice), from 
which the resources to respond to crime are drawn, 
e.g. for responding to trafficking in people. Environ-
mental hardship is an important push factor in mi-
gration. Moreover, unsustainable use of natural re-
sources may involve forms of organized crime and 
corruption, other than trafficking in human be-
ings. The idea of introducing into the United Na-
tions conventions against transnational organized 
crime (2000) and corruption (2003) the provisions 
designed to respond to money laundering must have 
been prompted by the awareness of the embezzling 
of State funds by its elites, illegally enriching them-
selves through unsustainable use of natural resourc-
es (loot over justice). 
Third, an important interdisciplinary element 
of sustainable development is good governance.
Fourth, a necessary step in promoting sustain-
able development in the world is the mobilization 
of the private sector for this purpose. Property rela-
tions change. With these come changes in the struc-
ture and dynamics of crime, especially against prop-
erty. Since 1989 (the beginning of the erosion of the 
socialist system with its legal system favouring crim-
inal law protection of State property over private 
property) when privatization in the global econo-
my accelerated, there has been a parallel emphasis 
148  E.g., UNSDRI 1976.
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on increasing the social responsibilities of the pri-
vate sector, including those elements which original-
ly belonged to a State. The Global Compact initiative, 
which was established between 1999 and 2004 under 
United Nations auspices, is the biggest arrangement 
in the world in this sector, with more than 8700 cor-
porate participants and other stakeholders from over 
130 countries, committing themselves to ethical con-
duct and social responsibility. 
In addition to implementing those responsibil-
ities in the companies that joined the arrangement 
(and they involve environmental protection and re-
spect for human rights, as embodied by the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights) and the rights of em-
ployees, members of the Global Compact commit-
ted themselves to responding to corruption in pri-
vate business through the realization of concrete 
civic and public initiatives, including sharing public-
ly their own anti-corruption experience. In this way, 
the cross-disciplinary idea of responding to corrup-
tion emerged for the first time within the framework 
of the United Nations in the sustainable develop-
ment process, a development which has an institu-
tional framework and practical ramifications. 
Fifth, in the interest of broader practical and 
theoretical pursuit of the concept of sustainable de-
velopment, one may argue that security, the rule of 
law, the administration of criminal justice adminis-
tration, and crime prevention should be treated as 
renewable resources. Their vital energy is social ener-
gy. That energy is not only produced by each genera-
tion for its own use, but also transmitted intergener-
ationally. Intergenerational transmission of cultural 
patterns of behaviour, whether positive or negative 
(crime and violence), is a part of the question of so-
cial, people-centred sustainable development and 
the energy it releases that should drive crime pre-
vention, as re-emphasized in its own way by the UN 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (2002). 
This broader interpretation of sustainable devel-
opment which goes beyond its literal sense of energy 
drawn from non-renewable natural resources of the 
Earth, gradually becomes the source of inspiration in 
the world for responding to crime. For instance, if 
we agree that it is very difficult to alter the personal 
dispositions of offenders,149 would this not then be a 
reason to seek to modify their behaviour by changing 
the social and situational risk factors related to how 
they act, and their perceptions of those factors (so-
cial and situational crime prevention)? How can one 
better motivate communities than by assisting them 
149  Knutsson 2009:9.
in developing and pursuing legitimate ownership of 
certain crime prevention activities, and by encourag-
ing them to increase their own resilience, so this can 
create an investment climate for future prosperity? 
If they fail, who else could succeed? From the Chica-
go ecological school of the 1920s until now (“Broken 
windows”), criminology is replete with evidence of 
community dwellers moving from one residential ar-
ea to another due to a lack of sustainable crime pre-
vention capacities that would enable them to reclaim 
and rejuvenate degenerated residential areas. 
Sixth, and consequently, this inspiration will be 
a basis for a critical and multidimensional analysis of 
the relevance of criminological theories, both from 
their aetiological and preventive side, and a basis for 
developing new theories. This is a global and univer-
sal idea of such a high rank that it breaks all intellec-
tual clichés. It opens a path towards broader recon-
ceptualization and verification of the suitability of 
criminological ideas, especially the older ones. 
Some of them would be invincible, others would 
not. Basically, several sociological theories, most par-
ticularly those belonging to social learning theories, 
would initially qualify for reinterpretation and veri-
fication, if and when they emphasize the importance 
of equal life chances in making rational behavioural 
choices (“rational choice theory”, balance of chanc-
es). But also the aetiological theory of relative dep-
rivation would retain its scientific and practical rel-
evance at the present stage of global socio-economic 
development because its imbalances (sharp inequal-
ities) undermine sustainable development. Uneven 
socio-economic development is regarded as a crim-
inogenic factor. Consequently, that part of sociolog-
ical theories which addresses such issues could be 
reclassified as belonging to criminological theories 
relevant to sustainable development. 
Finally, the concept of sustainable develop-
ment may be instrumentalized and operationalized 
in terms of responding to particular forms of crime. 
So far, the sister term of alternative development has 
been practically applied in order to respond to illicit 
drug cultivation. According to its definition, agreed 
by the United Nations General Assembly, this is “a 
process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation 
of plants containing narcotic drugs and psychotrop-
ic substances through specifically designed rural de-
velopment measures in the context of sustained na-
tional economic growth and sustainable development 
efforts in countries taking action against drugs, rec-
ognizing the particular socio-cultural characteris-
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tics of the target communities and groups, within the 
framework of a comprehensive and permanent solu-
tion to the problem of illicit drugs” (1998). 
In this context, the example of the 2008 ECOSOC 
resolution on Promoting sustainability and integral-
ity in alternative development is unique and a kind 
of study in itself. This resolution is an important 
part of drug control strategy in States where illic-
it crops are grown to produce drugs.150 Contrary to 
other General Assembly programmatic resolutions, 
this resolution very precisely describes the technical 
instruments for alternative development chosen by 
Thailand. Some of them may not necessarily be di-
rectly applicable to a broader group of countries, es-
pecially those with more Western-oriented concepts 
of market economy and society,151 but certainly there 
are several other instruments listed in the resolution 
that are applicable to very many countries across the 
world. The sine qua non condition across their spec-
trum is that alternative development can be success-
ful only if pursued in a peaceful country. 
Military conflicts or civil wars render its applica-
tion futile. Individuals and communities are forced 
into various forms of organized crime in order to 
make a living, as is the case in Afghanistan or Colom-
bia, the world’s major producers of illicit drugs. In 
such countries there are no conditions to opt volun-
tarily for an alternative, better choice. 
Assisting States whose governance apparatus has 
failed (“failed States”) is difficult, but not impossible, 
and is certainly expensive. Such States, used as tran-
sit areas for illicit drug trafficking (e.g., Belize and 
Guinea Bissau), are vulnerable to trafficking in hu-
man beings as source States. They have been the tar-
get of transnational organized crime groups which 
corrupt their officials and gradually take control of 
their governance. The UNODC is actively involved 
in rendering technical assistance to such countries. 
Thus crime prevention and criminal justice are in-
scribed into a bigger picture of law and order in the 
world and of global security.
Under the surface of the same problem of law-
lessness, there is one common denominator: pover-
ty. Underneath poverty, in turn, are a multitude of 
other factors specific to a country, requiring various 
instruments in order to introduce sustainable devel-
opment. But in the global practice of responding to 
forms of organized crime other than illicit drug cul-
tivation in ways that meet the condition of peace-
ful development, there is an evident lack of concrete 
and evaluated sustainable development projects 
which could parallel alternative development illic-
it crop cultivation projects. At this point, the inter-
est in pursuing a similar approach is rather nominal. 
This can be seen in the General Assembly res-
olution on Human Rights in the Administration of 
Justice,152 where the term sustainable development 
had first been invoked in the context of crime pre-
vention and criminal justice. That resolution not on-
ly addressed the precarious position of children and 
juveniles in detention. It also acknowledged that the 
administration of justice, including law enforcement 
and prosecutorial agencies and, especially, an inde-
pendent judiciary and legal profession in full con-
formity with applicable standards contained in in-
ternational human rights instruments, is essential 
to the full and non-discriminatory realization of hu-
man rights and indispensable to democratization 
processes and sustainable development. With these 
formulations, the General Assembly resolution fac-
tored the concept of sustainable development into 
the human rights context, probably for the first time 
ever, since in its 1986 Declaration on the right to de-
velopment it spoke about the related concept. How-
ever, and more importantly, the concept of sustain-
able development was explicitly linked with the role 
of the administration of criminal justice. Recalling 
here that that role was precarious in solving the di-
lemma between “loot or justice”, the General Assem-
bly has demonstrated the relevance of a criminolog-
ical perspective in United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice policy. 
Since then the concept has been repeated in oth-
er General Assembly resolutions on crime preven-
tion and criminal justice, and also in resolutions of 
the Economic and Social Council.153 On both levels 
this rhetoric sounds strong because it sets out am-
bitious and attractive future objectives. However, 
in operational terms, that objective has not yet re-
ceived sufficient attention through technical assis-
tance projects. 
The time between working out the definition of 
sustainable development (1987) until now, has been 
too short indeed for this concept to take root and to 
influence seriously criminological thought and ac-
tion. That only happened in the case of the nascent 
150  This resolution was recommended by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, initially at the initiative of Thailand - a country which successfully 
solved the problem of illicit opium cultivation (ECOSOC resolution 2008/26, Annex, 24 June 2008).
151  The resolution is in this sense politically country-specific.
152  GA resolution 50/181 of 22 December 1995.
153  E.g., ECOSOC resolutions 2004/31 and 2005/22.
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restorative justice movement. Works by the Norwe-
gian Nils Christie (“Conflicts as Property”,1977), a 
member of the United Nations Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control in 1976-1978, and by two 
United States researchers,154 are particularly note-
worthy in this context. Likewise, one more publica-
tion on the influence of sustainable development on 
the functioning of the criminal justice system should 
be mentioned,155 even though it is limited to the con-
text of environmental crime. 
Theoretically, there has been a proposal to define 
the relationship between sustainable development 
and the rule of law by a United Nations declaration,156 
but there is still insufficient weight in criminology 
and praxis to be more general than with regard to 
restorative justice and environmental crime. That 
weight has, however, been appreciated elsewhere in 
the United Nations. In 1992, its Committee for De-
velopment Planning, initially seized by the problem 
of environmental and poverty-related crime and the 
principles of responding to these, went further and 
identified good governance as a general component 
of sustainable development facilitating moderniza-
tion of public administration, hence the humaniza-
tion and efficiency of criminal justice administra-
tion.157
Gradually, over time, the concept of good gov-
ernance has become very popular in democratic so-
cieties. After the establishment of the Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (1992), 
the concept was hotly debated by it. The debate in-
volves the comparison of one model of good gov-
ernance with another, and hence “goodness” is rela-
tive, and so is “governance”. But one of its elements, 
access to justice (an element which in fact predates 
the concept of good governance), has received un-
qualified support worldwide in research and prac-
tice. It is now one of the United Nations programme 
concepts, but has not been defined by any official 
documentation (e.g., resolution, report of the Sec-
retary-General). For this reason it freely relates to 
other legal, political science and developmental 
concepts (e.g., the rule of law, transparency, ac-
countability), at the individual or institutional dis-
cretion of programme or project text drafters. This 
again shows how criminological ideas under one or 
another name move through mutually penetrable 
and permeable academic and bureaucratic worlds, 
and enrich the two worlds when and if a cross-ferti-
lization is acceptable to both. 
Access to justice and restorative justice have be-
come in theory and practice concrete examples of 
criminological and criminal policy contributions 
to sustainable development. Restorative justice, as 
a part of conflict theory, thus stands in opposition 
to the positivist school of criminology. According to 
the latter, nothing is able to restore the situation be-
fore the commission of an offence. And the only pos-
itive (hence the adjective), that is the real objective 
of criminal law, may be to prevent future crimes by 
the same offender through his or her resocialization 
or elimination. 
The innovative concept of sustainable develop-
ment cuts across traditional intellectual boundaries, 
and forces us to regroup the criminological schools 
of thought. In fact, under its guidance not only that 
thought but also the United Nations ideas of freedom 
from fear and want mentioned earlier require a new 
appraisal. In essence, freedom from want is nothing 
else than a need, if not a necessity of sustainable de-
velopment, and freedom from fear involves a neces-
sity of law and order, in short of the rule of law, in 
communities, cities and countries across the world. 
Fear of crime may be a consequence of inadequate 
meeting of security needs neglected in the course of 
unbalanced socio-economic development. 
While this thesis on the possible relationship be-
tween the fear of crime and unbalanced development 
should be put to test, worrisome estimates indirect-
ly suggest that it may indeed be correct. The World 
Health Organization estimates that between 2004 
and 2030 homicide, the most fearsome crime, will 
move up in the ranking list of the causes of death, 
from 16th to 12th place.158 Indirectly likewise, the the-
sis that the feeling of insecurity has worsened over 
time has been delivered in the Brundtland report. 
This report estimated that social and community ur-
ban infrastructure meets only 65% of the needs of 
inhabitants, including the need for security. As a re-
sult of rapid urbanization in developing countries, 
the law enforcement, crime prevention and criminal 
justice apparatus do not possess the capacity to con-
tribute adequately to the sense of justice and to a saf-
er world, and to forming the adequate perception of 
justice, safety and order.
154  Zehr & Mika 1998.
155  Hoffman 2000.
156  Boulokos & Dakin 2001.
157  ST/ESA/234, sec. 5.
158  WHO 2004:4.
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Justice is an inherent human need. Access to justice 
is a human right. 
Introduction
Since 1960s reformers have called upon governments 
to make changes in national legal systems in order to 
enhance “access to justice” for disadvantaged groups 
and citizens at large. The concept arose in the welfare 
state era when there was a growing consciousness of 
one’s rights, and was usually identified with commit-
ting the State to increase social services and widen 
opportunities for dispute resolution.1 
A. Four generations of access to justice
The reformers’ call was heard in the United Nations. 
There have been four successive generations of initia-
tives promoting access to justice. The first, which ended 
in the mid-1960s, focused on reform of bureaucratic 
machinery with some support for the judiciary. The 
criminal justice component of it was hardly recognized. 
The second, the “law and development” movement 
of the 1970s, emphasized legal education for civil ser-
vice lawyers. There were criminal law elements in that 
education. The third, in the 1980s, limited its scope 
to legal institutions per se.2 The United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme’s contribu-
tion of various instruments (e.g., Basic Principles on the 
Independence of Judiciary (1985), Basic Principles on 
the Role of Lawyers (1990), Guidelines on the Role of 
Prosecutors (1990)) occurred in this generation.
With the adoption in 2000 of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration3 which not only set out the 
international community’s development goals, but 
also its goals with regard to human rights, good gov-
ernance and democracy, the UN’s Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Programme began its full-fledged 
contribution to the fourth generation of access to jus-
tice initiatives. In the Declaration, the international 
community stated that “We will spare no effort to 
promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, 
as well as respect for all internationally recognized hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, including the 
right to development” (part V, para. 24). 
B. Lessons learned
Soon thereafter the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations stated that the Organization “has learned 
that the rule of law is not a luxury and that justice 
is not a side issue. We have seen people lose faith 
in a peace process when they do not feel safe from 
crime. We have seen that without a credible machin-
ery to enforce the law and resolve disputes, people 
resorted to violence and illegal means. And we have 
seen that elections held when the rule of law is too 
fragile seldom lead to lasting democratic governance. 
We have learned that the rule of law delayed is lasting 
peace denied, and that justice is a handmaiden of true 
peace. We must take a comprehensive approach to 
Justice and the Rule of Law. It should encompass the 
entire criminal justice chain, not only police, but law-
yers, prosecutors, judges and prison officers, as well 
as many issues beyond the criminal justice system. But 
a “one-size-fits-all” does not work. Local actors must 
be involved from the start. The aim must be to leave 
behind strong local institutions when we depart”.4 
The World Bank in its ground-breaking 2006 study 
“Where is the Wealth of Nations: Measuring Capital 
for the 21st Century” determined that an effective jus-
tice system forms a large part of the intangible capital 
of a society and is a key asset in generating well-being 
Vincent Del Buono
Building Sustainable Access to Justice in the Developing World
BOX 2
1 M. Capelletti and B. Garth, Access to justice and the welfare state. An introduction, pp. 4-7; Lawrence Friedman, Claims, disputes, 
conflicts and the modern welfare state, both (in:) M. Capeletti (ed.), Access to Justice and the Welfare State, European University 
Institute, Firenze, Sijthoff/Brill 1981:251-254.
2 A. Hurwitz, Civil War and the Rule of Law: Toward Security, Development and Human Rights, (in:) A. Hurwitz with R. Huang, War and 
the Rule of Law. Security, Development , Human Rights, London, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers 2008: 6-7.
3 http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf
4 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, doc. SC/7880, Press release of 24 September 2003, Security Council calls on 
Member States to help enhance UN role in establishing justice, rule of law in post-conflict States.
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in a society.5 Without an efficient, fair and effective 
justice system, development will be retarded. How-
ever, the experience to date is that “Rule of Law” pro-
grams have rarely achieved their nominal objectives 
of delivering human rights, security or development. 
There is much anecdotal evidence to indicate that 
they do not do so because they fail to adequately in-
tegrate an analysis of conflict and unfortunately rely 
on “template” strategies for solutions rather than be 
founded on a thorough understanding of the political, 
social and economic situation in a country.6
C. New standards and norms
The most significant recent UN Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme developments which 
have advanced access to justice by enhancing the pub-
lic’s confidence in it have been several new standards 
and norms: The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Con-
duct (2002), Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative 
Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters (2002) and 
Guidelines on Justice Matters involving Child Victims 
and Witnesses of Crime (2005) and the major conven-
tions against transnational organized crime (2000) and 
corruption (2003). The new standards and norms have 
been operationalized in UNODC field projects such 
as those in Africa. Access to justice has also been en-
hanced through the creation and operations of the ad-
hoc and permanent international criminal tribunals 
(1993-2009) which in their substantive and criminal 
procedure codes represent the highest and most gen-
eral expression of United Nations human rights and 
standards and norms in criminal justice. 
Although great strides have been made in en-
hancing access to justice with regard to the criminal 
law especially by removing impunity for those who 
commit genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, far less progress has been made domestical-
ly providing access to justice for the poor in civil and 
family law matters. Core justice institutions both in 
developed and developing world are notoriously 
under-funded, and where they work at all, they are 
over-crowded and give priority to criminal matters. 
The emerging global financial crisis has complicated 
progressive justice reform. 
D. Conditions for sustainable access  
to justice
What are the conditions to continue making access 
to justice sustainable in the developing world? First, 
as already emphasized, strengthening the “core” lo-
cal justice institutions will be essential: the judiciary 
including customary justice mechanisms, prosecutors’ 
offices, bar associations and correctional institutions. 
The “Justice institutions” that need to be strength-
ened also include a wider circle: the legislature, min-
istries of justice and interior, local authorities, law 
reform commissions, law faculties, judicial training 
institutes, research centres, the police and other law 
enforcement bodies and forensic offices. A yet wider 
circle includes institutions which provide a context 
for success, for example, the media, the military and 
insurgent groups.7 Media reporting for instance can 
inform a considered and measured response to inci-
dents of crime or instead whip up an exaggerated fear 
of crime. Where members of the military or members 
of insurgent groups are not arrested and punished 
when they commit ordinary crimes, citizens become 
cynical about the fairness and effectiveness of the le-
gal system. 
Second, the core institutions of justice must be 
adequately funded. In Nigeria for example, since the 
return of civilian government in 1999, the Constitu-
tion guarantees the federal judiciary adequate levels 
of funding and its financial independence from the 
Executive. As a consequence, it has thrived, enjoying 
greater public confidence especially as the National 
Judicial Council has successfully tackled judicial cor-
ruption. The Nigeria Police on the other hand, which 
has been chronically under-funded, under-equipped 
and under-resourced, is still valiantly struggling to free 
itself out from under the dead hand of corruption. 
Third, the network of legal advice and legal as-
sistance centres for the poor and low-income mem-
bers of society needs to be expanded. To avoid small 
grievances festering into major conflicts, poor people 
must have access to forums where they can have dis-
putes resolved on the basis of their rights and the law 
rather than be left with the feeling that they can never 
successfully challenge the exercise of naked power or 
5 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEEI/214578-1110886258964/20744844/Introduction.pdf at p. xviii “For example, if an economy 
has a very efficient judicial system, clear property rights, and an effective government, the effects will result in a higher total wealth and 
thus a higher intangible capital residual. The regression analysis in this chapter shows that human capital and rule of law account for the 
majority of the variation in the residual. Investments in education, the functioning of the justice system, and policies aimed at attracting 
remittances are the most important means of increasing the intangible components of total wealth.”
6 Hurwitz, op. cit. 
7 Ibid.
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brute force. Delivery mechanisms for providing such 
advice may vary from place to place: legal aid provi-
ded by the private bar; citizen’s rights centres; dispute 
resolution mechanisms and training; or paralegals. 
Given that the developing world’s needs are so great, 
almost all efforts are useful. 
Fourth, the poor, especially women, need to know 
their rights and know the law. Given that the poor, espe-
cially women, seldom if ever control the levers of power 
in any society, arming them with knowledge of the law 
and of their rights will enable them to seek justice in 
the face of predatory exercises of power. Knowing one’s 
rights is an essential first step to exercising them. In 
societies with high levels of illiteracy, radio and radio 
drama are highly effective in “public enlightenment”. 
A major 2005-2007 public education and mobilization 
campaign “Promoting Women’s Rights through Shari’a 
in Northern Nigeria”8 was very successful in using radio 
dramas to inform people of their rights and changed 
both attitudes and behaviour towards a greater respect 
and observance of women’s and girls’ rights. 
E. Conclusion
The unwillingness or inability to provide free or afford-
able legal services to the poor everywhere threatens 
to make “access to justice” just empty rhetoric. With-
out massive “public enlightenment” and a substantial 
strengthening of legal aid for the poor,9 the “Rule of 
Law” will be limited to those who can afford it. Thus, 
one of the fundamental values underpinning the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration, “to uphold 
the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at 
the global level”, will go unrealized. While justice will 
continue to be an inherent human need, access to it as 
a human right will have been denied. ¢
8 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/promoting-women-sharia.pdf
9 See E. Skinnider. “The Responsibility of States to Provide Legal Aid” http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/beijing.pdf. Also 
see, The Kyiv Declaration on the Right to Legal Aid, http://dihr.org/legalaid/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=36&Item
id=1, Examples of such strengthening in developing countries can be found in the work of the Open Society’s Justice initiative at http://
www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ncjr/atj
Since the time of its publication, the word sus-
tainability has become the dominant term in the 
field, and operative questions such as those of man-
agement and urbanization have moved to the fore-
front of interest.159
Providing protection is more often put to the test 
in urban areas than in the countryside, simply be-
cause homicide is more often committed in cities 
than elsewhere. This is a well established fact, con-
firmed for example through an analysis of reported 
homicides in 24 cities across the developing and de-
veloped world (1966-1970).160
As the result of the deficit of such State func-
tions, there has been a dramatic growth of private 
security forces and of the promotion of the “archi-
tecture of fear”,161 as exemplified by walled and mon-
itored residential areas. There has also been a grow-
ing demand for firearms for civilian self-protection. 
Some of the firearms wanted by civilians come from 
military stockpiles. Between 1987 (the date of the 
publication of the Brundtland report), and 2001 they 
have been estimated to have grown by 15%.162
From what is currently known, about 8 million 
firearm pieces are produced annually, out of which 
only 10% are deactivated.163 The re-transfer of sec-
ond-hand weapons has the greatest effect on the 
global distribution of guns.164 Apparently 55-60% 
of these re-transferred weapons end up in private 
hands.165 UNODC analysis of the homicide statistics 
obtained through the periodic United Nations sur-
veys of crime trends and operations of criminal jus-
tice systems suggests that about 60 % of homicides 
are committed with firearms in the hands of resi-
dents of five sub-regions of the world (Central Amer-
ica, South America, the Caribbean, South-West Asia 
and Western Europe). In Central America the figure 
may be as high as 77 %, but in Western Europe on-
ly 19%.166
159  Schubert & Láng 2005.
160  Archer & Gartner 1984:105.
161  Angbola 1997:5.
162  SASR 2002:76.
163  IANSA 2007:4-5.
164  SASR 2002:103.
165  SASR 2001:86; SASR 2002:103.
166  Global Report 2008:5 & 55.
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Introduction
Various attempts and projects to explore the integra-
tion of mediation and restorative justice principles 
into the field of criminal law took place throughout 
the 1980s and 90s in Canada, the United States, and 
various European countries.1 It is fair to say that the 
potential appeal and transformative value of these 
ideas were recognized very slowly. The endorsement 
by the United Nations of restorative approaches in 
criminal matters was initially modest, but it could not 
be any faster taking into account its large member-
ship. At the Ninth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(1995) there were several questions involving crime 
victims and restorative justice, but this had little effect 
on its general debate and action.2 As a result, a group 
participating in the NGO Alliance on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice (New York, USA) decided to form 
a Working Party on Restorative Justice to advance this 
question for the United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme. 
Five years later, when the question was once 
more put on the intergovernmental agenda at the 
Tenth Congress (2000),3 its general declaration en-
couraged “the development of restorative justice poli-
cies, procedures and programmes that are respectful 
of the rights, needs and interests of victims, offend-
ers, communities, and all other parties”.4 Another five 
years later, at the conclusion of the Eleventh Congress 
(2005), another general resolution urged Member 
States to recognize the importance of further develop-
ing restorative approaches that include alternatives to 
prosecution.5 At the most, a dozen or so North Ameri-
can and European countries (and also New Zealand) 
actively promoted the adoption of these brief official 
statements; other countries just went along. African 
countries in particular saw in these pronouncements 
a way to highlight the important role traditional con-
flict resolution mechanisms played in their society and 
how they applied to crime. That was about as far as the 
United Nations has gone in order to actually promote 
restorative justice approaches either as a complement 
to the criminal justice process or an alternative to it. 
When the United Nations visited the question 
more specifically, it was not so much to promote the 
use of restorative justice responses to crime, but rather 
to set reasonable limits on its use and offer guidance 
to ensure that restorative justice programmes and pro-
cesses comply with human rights and criminal justice 
standards and norms. As a result, in 2002, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council adopted a resolu-
tion calling upon Member States that are implementing 
restorative justice program to be guided by a set of Basic 
Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes 
in Criminal Matters. The resolution simply noted that 
restorative justice was an “evolving response to crime”, 
with some unique benefits, and that there was a sig-
nificant growth of restorative initiatives, sometimes 
drawing on traditional and indigenous forms of justice. 
It stopped short of recommending the greater use of 
Yvon Dandurand
Integrating Restorative Approaches in the Criminal Justice Process: 
From Slow Progress to Cautious Optimism
BOX 3
1 See further: D. Miers, An International Review of Restorative Justice, Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 10, Home Office, London 2001.
2 By contrast, just about the time of the Ninth Congress, the Council of Europe appointed an Expert Committee to evaluate and assess 
the use of mediation in criminal proceedings within Europe, and in 1999, the Committee of Ministers adopted the recommendation on 
“mediation” and offered 34 principles for member states of the Council of Europe to consider when using it in criminal justice. In 2001, 
the European Union issued a framework decision stating that Member States had to promote mediation in criminal cases and bring 
into force their legal instruments by 2006. Victim-offender mediation is the type of restorative programme favoured by most European 
countries. In many cases it is used an alternative to formal criminal justice proceedings. The model often risks reducing crime to little 
more than a subject for private law, with some arbitration and facilitation by the State. All over Europe, the implementation of simple 
victim-offender mediation programmes has continued since, aided by the solid work of civil society organizations such as the Euro-
pean Forum for Criminal Justice (European Union Council Framework decision of 15 March 2011 on the Standing of Victims in Criminal 
Proceedings, Article 10; http://www.euforumrj.org/About/background.htm) .
3 See in this context: A/CONF.187/NGO/7, Statement of the Alliance of Non-governmental Organizations in Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice: Restorative Justice Handbook, Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, 10 April, 2000. 
4 A/RES/55/59, The Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century, The Tenth United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Vienna, 10-17 April 2000, § 29.
5 A/RES/60/177, The Bangkok Declaration – Synergies and Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
The Eleventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Bangkok, 18-25 April, 2005, § 32.
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that approach. The Basic Principles simply suggest that 
Member States “should consider the formulation of 
national strategies and policies aimed at the develop-
ment of restorative justice”.6 
A. Slow progress
In many European countries, victim-offender media-
tion has become a well-founded practice. Although 
the focus of victim-offender mediation is often still 
predominantly on juvenile offenders, the idea of ap-
plying it more broadly and at various stages of the 
criminal justice process (including after sentencing) is 
slowly gaining acceptance. 
Outside of Europe, the implementation of restora-
tive justice programmes remains relatively limited. In 
the United States, where the proponents of this ap-
proach initially justified their advocacy efforts on a re-
sounding critique of the mainstream justice response 
to crime, these programmes remain relatively margin-
al. In Canada, where some victim-offender reconcili-
ation programmes have existed since the mid-1970s, 
restorative programmes remain very limited, formu-
laic, poorly funded and evaluated.7 Whereas such 
programmes were first proposed as a means to put 
the concerns and issues of victims at the centre of the 
response to crime,8 they are now being valued mostly 
for their participatory characteristics9 and their ability 
to involve the community and various stakeholders in 
finding an appropriate response to individual crimes. 
Conferencing, which is the prime example of partici-
patory mechanisms, is used extensively in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand, mostly for juvenile offend-
ers, and this particular approach is generating a lot of 
interest in Europe and other parts of the world. 
Throughout the world and to different extents, 
countries have experimented with various types of 
restorative programmes. Some of these initiatives 
were quite innovative. However, in most instances, 
restorative practices in criminal matters are rarely im-
plemented on a broad scale. Furthermore, there are 
large and very noticeable gaps everywhere between 
restorative justice theory and practice, between the 
normative restorative justice concept and the way in 
which restorative justice is currently applied.10 
B. Restorative approaches
Restorative justice refers to a process for resolving 
crime by focusing on redressing the harm done to the 
victims, holding offenders accountable for their ac-
tions and, often also, engaging the community in the 
resolution of that conflict. Participation of the parties 
is an essential part of the process that emphasizes 
relationship building, reconciliation and the devel-
opment of agreements around a desired outcome 
between victims and offender. Restorative justice pro-
cesses can be adapted to various cultural contexts and 
the needs of different communities. 
Restorative justice programmes are based on the 
belief that parties to a conflict ought to be actively in-
volved in resolving it and mitigating its negative conse-
quences. They are also based, in some instances, on a 
will to return to local decision-making and community 
building. 
In many countries, the idea of community involve-
ment enjoys a lot of support. New and established 
forms of restorative justice offer communities some 
welcome means of resolving conflicts. The partici-
pation of the community in the process is no longer 
abstract, but rather very direct and concrete. In many 
developing countries, restorative justice practices are 
applied through traditional practices and custom-
ary law. In doing so, these approaches may serve to 
strengthen the capacity of the existing justice system. 
A fundamental challenge for participatory justice is, 
however, to find ways to effectively mobilize the in-
volvement of civil society, while at the same time 
protecting the rights and interests of victims and of-
fenders.
6 United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters, ECOSOC resolution 2002/14 of 24 July 
2002, § 20.
7 J.Latimer, C. Dowden and D. Muise, The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis, Department of Justice, Canada 
2001:23; see also: Special issue: Practice, performance and prospects for restorative justice, British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 42, No 3, 
Summer 2002.
8 Many proponents of restorative justice approaches see the centrality of the victim’s concerns as their main defining characteristics. 
See: D. Van Ness, K. Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice – Third Edition. Anderson Publishing (2006): 141.
9 See the excellent document of the Law Commission of Canada, Transforming Relationships Through Participatory Justice. Ottawa: 
Law Commission of Canada (2003).
10 For an excellent discussion of and some empirical research on that question, see: T. Gavrielides, Restorative Justice Theory and Practice: 
Addressing the Discrepancy, HEUNI, Helsinki 2007.
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C. Promising developments
UNICEF and UNODC have provided technical assis-
tance, training and practical tools to assist countries 
wishing to explore the full potential of restorative 
justice approaches. UNODC, for example, published a 
Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes11 which 
is quite widely used.
Restorative justice programmes have been found 
particularly useful for dealing with young offenders. 
They have been actively promoted by UNICEF in nu-
merous countries, mostly as a form of diversion. Arti-
cle 40 (3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
requires States parties to seek to promote measures 
for children in conflict with the law without resorting 
to judicial proceedings, whenever appropriate and de-
sirable.12 Restorative programmes are perceived as an 
ideal diversion mechanism for children in conflict with 
the law and dozens of countries have experimented 
with this approach. Few of these countries have man-
aged to provide such a diversion alternative on a na-
tional scale. Existing programmes rarely achieve the 
required level of public acceptance required for their 
implementation on a very broad scale, and criminal 
justice resources tend to continue to be channelled 
towards more traditional criminal justice response 
mechanisms. The so-called “pilot projects” tend to 
remain isolated demonstration projects, if they do not 
fade away completely. What is generally still missing 
are more comprehensive criminal justice reform poli-
cies that mandate the use of restorative justice pro-
grammes. Comprehensive criminal justice reforms are 
politically risky and slow to materialize, but the idea 
of a “restorative” alternative to the existing system is 
persistent and still quite powerful.
The real challenge in many countries is to find re-
storative justice applications that are congruent with 
local culture, compatible with the legal system and, 
if possible, building on the existing strengths of that 
system. A basic restorative justice approach can find 
many different expressions if proper care is taken to 
adapt it to the local context. For example, Thailand, 
using the concept of “social harmony”, has known a 
lot of success in using the concept to reshape its re-
sponse to juvenile crime. Vietnam is currently mov-
ing forward with an innovative way of building on the 
existing strengths of its community-level mechanisms 
for responding to juvenile crime and creating more 
opportunities for genuine victim participation in the 
process.
Some of the most fascinating restorative justice 
developments are found in various parts of Africa 
where local traditional processes based on various 
forms of customary law are being transformed slowly 
and used as a basis for new victim-focused participa-
tory resolution mechanisms. Whereas many of these 
traditional mechanisms may have traditionally used 
victim compensation to resolve conflicts, they were 
usually based on various forms of arbitration and were 
not particularly preoccupied with protecting the indi-
vidual rights of the people involved. In many countries, 
these traditional mechanisms are still responsible for 
responding to the bulk of criminal incidents occurring 
outside the cities. As these traditional practices are 
slowly being reconciled with modern criminal justice 
approaches, restorative justice principles offer a blue-
print for their modernization.
In a recent and yet unpublished report, one expert 
notes that in most African countries, the process of re-
forming the justice sector often equates “traditional” 
with “backward”, and “modern” with “advanced”. As 
a result traditional dispute settlement mechanisms 
are still often regarded as obstacles to development. 
Many justice sector experts are apparently prepared 
to assume that traditional justice forums will eventu-
ally die out. However, as has been evidenced in Ethio-
pia and in the rest of Africa, traditional justice systems 
remain as popular as ever. Despite the fact that justice 
sector reform initiatives tend to focus on improving 
the formal justice systems, traditional justice systems 
are still favoured by the majority of the population of 
these countries.13
In Ethiopia, for example, where modern and tra-
ditional justice systems coexist, a project to link the 
11 UNODC, Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes, New York, United Nations 2006.
12 See also: Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10 (2007) - Children’s rights in juvenile justice, Forty-fourth 
session, Geneva, 15 January-2 February 2007.
13 E. Kebede, (2010), Traditional Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Ethiopia and their Roles in Handling Criminal Cases, Addis Ababa, un-
published.
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These general estimates aside, it would be par-
ticularly hard to discern what specific proportion of 
homicides in the five sub-regions is related to gen-
eral insecurity, which in many cases is further com-
pounded by open or guerrilla military conflict. Not-
withstanding Western Europe, where historically 
there has been a steady decrease in lethal violence,167 
it is still evident in every part of the world that hu-
man security is undermined by illegal handgun cir-
culation and use. Generally, police authorities report 
that handguns destined for offenders and others in 
urban areas are the most common small arms in-
volved in the illicit trade of new weapons. This re-
transfer process responds to the demand for hand-
guns by armed groups, offenders and others.168 It 
includes unauthorized and illegal sales, theft, fraud 
and official corruption. They add to insecurity be-
cause these forms of crime undermine the account-
ability, openness and transparency of law enforce-
ment – key components of the rule of law in building 
and maintaining security. 
Security, the perception of crime and violence, and 
the fear of crime become respective sides of one equa-
tion. With such a considerable number of firearms in 
global circulation, including an estimated 10 million 
firearms in the hand of youth gangs in the world,169 it 
is easy to manipulate security and safety issues and in-
fluence the fear of crime. Social and cultural ideolo-
gies of masculinity and femininity are the transmis-
sion belts between global handgun circulation and 
local communities and families, which on their own 
terms react to safety issues and fear of crime.170
The answer to how this transmission belts work 
can best be found in criminology, especially within 
its social learning theories. In this context, Edwin 
Sutherland’s theory of differential association, a gen-
eral sociological theory of criminal behaviour, has 
received considerable verification. (If there were a 
Nobel Prize for criminology, he should have received 
one.171) That theory, in a nutshell, says that “birds of 
a feather flock together”. It enabled Donald Cressey 
(Sutherland’s pupil) to argue that the most effective 
mechanism for exerting anti-criminogenic group 
pressure will be found in groups so organized that 
offenders are induced to join with non-offenders for 
the purposes of changing other offenders.172
14 E. Kebede, (2010), Linking the Formal and Informal Justice System in the Handling of Criminal Cases, The Oromia Experience, 
Addis Ababa, unpublished.
15 J. P.J. Dussich, J. Schellenberg (eds) with a foreword by M.S. Umbreit, The Promise of Restorative Justice: New Approaches for 
Criminal Justice and Beyond, Lynne Riener Publisher 2010.
formal and informal systems in six woredas of the 
Oromia region revealed some of the obvious obstacles 
to these linkages, but also emphasized some of their 
respective strengths. Whereas the formal system may 
offer greater due process guarantees than the tradi-
tional system to the rights of marginalized groups like 
women and children, the traditional mechanism are 
very effective in ensuring that the victim is restored 
or compensated, the offender is reintegrated and the 
families and the community are brought together 
in celebrating the peace and reconciliation that has 
taken place.14 
D. Cautious optimism
There are obviously some reasons for cautious opti-
mism. There are indeed quite a few promising areas 
for further development of restorative justice initia-
tives. Unfortunately, very little support has been of-
fered to the development of such initiatives. One 
should therefore not be surprised to see that the 
concept of restorative justice which is still a promis-
ing and innovative idea15 has not exactly caught on like 
a wildfire. The United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme can certainly do more to 
make this happen. ¢
167  Ibid.:76.
168  A/54/404 ,§16.
169  SASR 2010:115.
170  SASR 2006:301-302.
171  Mannheim 1965: Vol. II:470; Ruggiero 2002:177.
172  Cressey 1955.
92
173  Moser & Holland 1997.
174  INCB 2003:6-7.
But there is more at stake in this precarious 
equation than the balance between security and 
fear of crime. What is involved is the question of so-
cial capital. Social capital refers to the norms, fam-
ily and personal values, expectations, beliefs, skills, 
support services, etc. that are built into social rela-
tions, and that, through social institutions (schools, 
media, faith-based and non-governmental organiza-
tions) and their policies, instil foundations for trust, 
obligation and reciprocity. In addition to human 
capital, the creative and anti-criminogenic value of 
which was recently recognized by the afore-men-
tioned Gary Becker, the social capital in a commu-
nity, or the degree of social bonding according to es-
tablished norms of behaviour, can help to explain 
levels of violence and crime. 
The International Narcotics Control Board (IN-
CB), the independent and quasi-judicial control or-
gan for the implementation of the United Nations 
drug control conventions, argues that communities 
that lack social capital are likely to suffer from more 
crime and violence. Absence or flight of social capi-
tal is exacerbated by increased levels of violence and 
crime that are related to the negative impact of illic-
it drug markets on communities. 
The INCB documents this with the results of 
a World Bank study in Jamaica. The study found a 
cyclical relationship between violence and the de-
struction of social capital in five poor urban com-
munities.173 The INCB observes that as a conse-
quence of violence, employment and educational 
opportunities were reduced, business did not in-
vest in the local area, local people were less like-
ly to build new homes or make home improve-
ments, and freedom of movement was curtailed. In 
turn, those conditions, amounting to destruction 
of the local infrastructure and opportunities, in-
creased the likelihood of violent behaviour, partic-
ularly among young people, since mistrust was en-
hanced and civil norms were challenged. Thus, the 
relationship between loss of social capital and in-
creased violent crime, including violent drug-relat-
ed crime, cannot be ignored.174
The political science perspective (which was the 
premise for the introductory observation on securi-
ty and the fear of crime), shows that between that 
discipline and criminology there remain unexplored 
paths which can be connected and can be mutually 
beneficial. It is true that the concepts and terminolo-
gies are partly different, and are less precise in politi-
cal science. This means that the exploration of these 
paths will not be easy, but it is possible. 
Accordingly, it may be concluded that crime, the 
perception of crime and the response to crime, may 
contribute to general conditions of insecurity with-
in civil society and to tensions between governments 
and citizens, particularly those experiencing politi-
cal and economic instability. This is a bigger picture 
in which “freedom from fear” and fear of crime is in-
scribed, and in which in the connection between in-
dividual factors and global society, criminology has a 
central role as a part of world security politics.
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Figure 2. Understanding and preventing criminal violence globally. 
Source: Adapted from the Handbook on the United Nations Crime Prevention 
Guidelines. Making Them Work (UNODC, Vienna 2010).
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IV Other guiding ideas: human, 
urban security, security sector 
reform and crime prevention
In the light of the above picture, and as a result of the 
merger of development and security discourse, the 
United Nations has been promoting a broader idea 
of human security since the beginning of the 1990s.175 
Originally, however, this took place without refer-
ence to the challenge of crime, and throughout the 
entire process as a reinterpretation of what is meant 
by “freedom from want”. The first results (1990-1993) 
were reflected in a new flagship publication, the 
United Nations Human Development Report. 
As the adjective in the title of the Report mani-
fests, it started to argue that addressing human de-
velopment concerns mitigates the risk of political 
violence. At that nascent time, implicit in the dis-
cussion on the economic sources of conflict was only 
the assumption that poverty and hopelessness (i.e., 
a lack of individual security from economic threats), 
encouraged it.176
That broader human security idea was further 
expanded by the United Nations Human Develop-
ment Report 1994. It argued that both human devel-
opment and human security had an instrumental 
value in the pursuit of peace, since without it “there 
may be no development. But without development, 
peace may be threatened”.177 On this basis, the report 
asserted that the path to peace was sustainable de-
velopment. 
The Report broadened the understanding of the 
scope and underpinnings of violence. It included 
in the concept of human security criminal violence 
against women, and other harsh practices: female 
circumcision, employing bonded labour and slavery. 
It added that “Most people instinctively understand 
what security means. It means safety from the con-
stant threats of hunger, disease and repression. It al-
so means protection from sudden and hurtful disrup-
tion in the pattern of our daily lives – whether in our 
homes, in our jobs, in our communities, or in our en-
vironment … Some of these traditional practices are 
breaking down under the steady process of modern-
ization … Some global challenges to human securi-
ty arise because threats within countries spill beyond 
national borders …The trade in drugs is … a transna-
tional phenomenon – drawing millions of people, both 
producers and consumers, into a cycle of violence 
and dependency … So, when human security is under 
threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere”. Fi-
nally, the Report stressed that human security was 
threatened not only by conditions of deprivation, in-
equity and instability but also by the impact of pop-
ulation growth, illegal migration, economic dispar-
ities between states, pollution and environmental 
degradation. Last but not least, the Report empha-
sized the threat of drug trade and terrorism. The re-
sponse to all forms of those crimes can no longer be 
confined within national borders.178 
This is a very broad concept of human security, 
and one that is difficult to operationalize. Even at its 
core (“most people instinctively understand what se-
curity means”) it is not robust enough to withstand 
the comparative critique. It is intellectually stretched 
almost to the limits. It hardly lends itself to a rigor-
ous treatment, especially if one seeks to establish a 
casual nexus between its violation and a threat to 
international peace and security. This is an impor-
tant issue, because such a violation would trigger ac-
tion by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.179 To make it fit for this purpose, inter-
national lawyers would cut this idealistic definition 
of human security down to size, and in the process 
would certainly leave a few crime-related phenome-
na outside its scope. 
As the “Overview” to that 1994 Report notes, it was 
written as a basis for UNDP input to the agenda of the 
World Summit for Social Development (Copenha-
gen, Denmark, 1995). The Summit, unbound by def-
initional and causal concerns, recognized that social 
justice and social development were preconditions for 
peace (and vice versa). It accepted that violence was 
rooted to some extent in poverty, unemployment, and 
social disintegration. Member States accepted obliga-
tions regarding the safety of people within societies 
and the protection of vulnerable groups. 
175  In its narrow sense, the concept of security involves only military security. Its post-Second World War development in the United Nations 
deserves separate treatment. Here it must suffice to note that the growing portfolio of “good peace-building practices” involved in demilitari-
zation, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) is relevant to laying the foundations for the rule of law in countries emerging 
from conflict (BOX 15), by pursuing proactive initiatives disengaging them from it through programmes and weapons management schemes, 
offering incentives to former commanders, emergency employment to their troops, and community violence reduction programmes (See 
further: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/orolsi.shtml).
176  MacFarlane & Khong 2006:143.
177  UNDP Report 1994:23.
178  Ibid.:3 & 31-34.
179  MacFarlane & Khong 2006:227-230.
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By and large, their acceptance corresponded to 
the criminological language of that time. But the 
Summit was short of language on human security 
that would parallel that of the UNDP Human Devel-
opment Report 1994. There are at least two reasons 
for the Summit’s limitations. First, there was resist-
ance to the human security agenda, which was ap-
parently found at the Summit to be unabashed liber-
al universalism that was insensitive to other cultural 
perspectives on rights. Second, there was little en-
thusiasm on the development side of security in 
other UN bodies, especially in the Department for 
Peace Keeping Operations, the Department for Po-
litical Affairs and the United Nations High Commis-
sion for Human Rights,180 probably partly motivated 
by the fuzzy definition of human security. But there 
was a third reason: in the same year as the Summit, 
also the Ninth United Nations Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice was held (Cairo, 
Egypt 1995). Parts of the Summit’s security agenda 
had been addressed by that Congress, especially in 
respect of starting United Nations work on firearm 
regulation. The subsequent criminological analysis 
which included the respective role of the UN crime 
programme and the establishment of a computer-
ized United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Network was soon to be added.181
Since 1995, the understanding of old and new 
forms of transnational crime has been incorporated 
not only as a part of threat to human security, but al-
so in various other global criminological ideas, and 
into the UNODC bureaucracy. In 2003 the human 
security concept had been elevated institutionally 
and until mid 2010 human security featured in the 
administrative structure of the UNODC. 
In 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change incorporated transnational 
organized crime and terrorism as one of six clusters 
of human security threats (other crime-related secu-
rity threats, such as corruption, had been left out). 
As a result of this selectiveness and all other limita-
tions on the idea of human security, it has become 
little more than a fig leaf under which anything sub-
stantively mandated one or another way had been 
pursued in the UNODC as a human security pro-
ject. It remains there as an expression of the political 
commitment of the UNODC to this idea, associated 
with the reinterpretation of the “freedom from fear”. 
Another United Nations idea has become less po-
liticized, but criminologically clearer, more compact, 
constructive and practical: that of “urban security”, 
assisting in the response to poverty and crime. This 
idea emerged in the second half of the 1990s. Since 
it has an economic underpinning, it can be seen as a 
Picture 17. Gro Harlem 
Brundtland addressing the 
United Nations General As-
sembly (New York, 1987)
180  MacFarlane & Khong 2006:148-149.
181  McDonald 1995:5; Quirchmayr 1998:7-14. See also: Trends. UNCJIN Crime and Justice Newsletter Vol. 2, No. 4 (1995), http://www.uncjin.org/
Documents/newsletter/nr3/start.htm .
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reinterpretation of the idea of “freedom from want”. 
That underpinning clearly came out when the 
first estimates published showed that a considera-
ble portion of mankind (2.6 billion) lived on US$2 or 
less a day, and 1.2 billion on US$1 or less a day. More 
precise and recent UNDP estimates showed that this 
was, respectively, 40% and 18% of the entire world 
population. Of the half a billion poorest in the world, 
75% lived in the countryside, and 25% (ca. 250-300 
million) in urban slums.182
The study of that proportion received even more 
attention when World Bank econometric research 
found that in 1993-2002 there was a process of ur-
banization of poverty, i.e. of an increase in the num-
ber of urban residents living on US$1 or less a day. 
That process had been 30% faster than in the coun-
tryside. Cities act as a magnet for poor village people. 
In them the percentage of the poor rose from 18% to 
24 %, and in the countryside from 38% to 42%, but 
the absolute number of the poor in the countryside 
dropped by about 150 million, while in the cities it 
grew by about 50 million. The fastest increase was 
observed in urban slums.183
These findings explain why there is a growing 
feeling of urban insecurity, chiefly attributed to the 
influx of rural immigrants seeking new life chances 
in the cities, whether legitimate or not. This influx 
leads to increasing intra-city inequality, manifest-
ed in stark residential segregation, multiplying vio-
lence impacting disproportionately on women and 
the poor themselves.184
It is in this most recent urban-focus context that 
a UN-Habitat estimate may best be understood: in 
2001-2006 on the average about 60% of urban resi-
dents in Africa and 70% of urban residents in South 
America were victims of crime.185
It now remains to be seen whether urban se-
curity as a common global criminal policy idea is a 
precursor to forming a transnational urban system 
which together, and more autonomously from the 
State, will react to common threats and challenges. 
This possibility was doubted even a few years ago.186 
It seems that the outlines of the emerging new form 
of the transnational response to urban crime was es-
tablished in 1996 in the UN-Habitat Safer Cities Pro-
gramme/Programme Villes Plus Sûres, a programme 
which has now become global. Its objective is to fa-
cilitate the efforts of urban authorities to develop a 
more effective response to crime in the world. 
The recognition of the global threat that urban 
crime poses to development allows us to reconcep-
tualize the question of the criminogenic function of 
inequality and bring it down from the State to the 
urban level. It is at the urban level that more than 
50% of the GDP is produced globally, and 80% in the 
cities of developed world, i.e. in Northern America, 
Europe and Asia.187 Moreover, this new criminogenic 
situation of inequality (i.e., the urbanization of pov-
erty and the urbanization of State wealth) implies a 
broader process: haphazard urbanization and other 
concomitant processes can challenge if not indeed 
undermine the feeling of security, which is an impor-
tant component of the quality of life. Thus urban se-
curity can also be interpreted from the perspective of 
the idea of ”freedom from fear”. 
But in the literature and criminal policy the no-
tion of “security” seems to be rather narrowly under-
stood, as a notion restricting human rights through 
State control. This traditional connotation gives rise 
to one more observation. At least from the United 
Nations perspective that policy has involved more 
control than preventive elements, as if the monop-
oly for it rested exclusively in the hands of the cen-
tral law enforcement and criminal justice apparatus. 
182  UNDP 2007:9, 26.
183  World Bank 2004: 24; http://www.sustainable-design.com/sustain/UN-Habitat_2003WorldSlumsReport.pdf , p. 12. 
184  World Bank 2004: 24.
185  UN-Habitat 2007:11&55.
186  Sassen 1995.
187  UN-Habitat 2007:11&55.
Picture 18. The United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Network: At the operations room the 
author with Marie Teresa Polom
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This indeed has been quite clearly visible in the 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice Programme. Member States, originally through 
the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Geneva, 
Switzerland, 1955), adopted in 1957 at the Economic 
and Social Council the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners – the first legal control in-
strument in a long series, including for example the 
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979), 
and Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Fire-
arms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990). Thirty five 
years later, the General Assembly adopted its very first 
crime prevention instrument – the United Nations 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquen-
cy (the Riyadh Guidelines).188 This happened six years 
after two PNIs held in Riyadh the first joint interna-
tional conference on crime prevention research189 – 
evidence of how academic criminological ideas even-
tually influence United Nations criminal policy. 
Five years after the adoption of the Riyadh Guide-
lines by the General Assembly, the Council adopted 
the Guidelines for Cooperation and Technical Assis-
tance in the Field of Urban Crime Prevention,190 and 
in 1996 the General Assembly adopted the United 
Nations Declaration on Crime and Public Security.191 
However, it was not until 2002 that the Council adopt-
ed general Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime.192 In 
sum, out of some 60 legal instruments of customary 
international law (1955-2010), only four deal with pre-
vention. The rest deal with the control of crime.
The above seems to be a reflection of the “cul-
ture of control”193 that has so far been dominant in 
the world. A focus on the individual responsibility 
of offenders and on social control is preferred over 
social reform and the resocialization of offenders.194 
This inscribes into a broader problem, recognized 
in the United Nations, namely that of scepticism re-
garding the effectiveness of preventing conflicts in 
general. Although that objective is clearly stated in 
the preamble of the UN Charter (“to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war”), it was inter-
preted literally and declaratively and in a diversion-
ary manner. This flaw can be seen in two 1990s doc-
uments by the Secretary-General (Agenda for Peace 
and Supplement). In them prevention was a periph-
eral problematic,195 since both documents only em-
phasized the role of preventive diplomacy in coun-
tering military conflicts, but entirely neglected crime 
prevention, both international and local. 
It is true that, already in the 1970s, in another 
part of the United Nations Secretariat, the United 
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Sec-
tion, there had been research work on internation-
al crime prevention.196 However, if we examine the 
substance dealt with, this work could be described as 
placing national work in the ”blue covers” of a UN pe-
riodical. Not only at that time but, indeed, since the 
time of the inception of the United Nations crime 
programme mandate (1946), the idea of the practical 
internationalization of crime prevention could not 
have ripened and had not been a part of the global 
security picture. 
That systemic impotence has started to gradual-
ly lessen since 2000. This process may now be seen 
as prompting the political will of Member States to 
strengthen crime prevention action in the United 
Nations. After 2000 several documents emerged in 
the United Nations which dealt with the “culture of 
prevention”. Among them is a document on Preven-
tion of Armed Conflict.197 In it for the first time ever 
in the United Nations there was mention of “struc-
tural prevention”, prompted by one United States 
publication, rather than only of “operational preven-
tion” (§8). 
In this context, one political scientist observed 
that advocating preventive programmes suffers from 
a methodological dilemma: it is difficult to draw cas-
ual links between preventive action and the absence 
of conflict,198 because conflicts that were prevented 
cannot be proven. This is a part of a “donors’ dilem-
ma”. This dilemma may imply that the political com-
mitment to support crime prevention is weak be-
cause decision-makers prefer to respond to crime 
through repression rather than prevention. Repres-
sion is measurable, prevention is much less so.
188  GA resolution 45/112 (Annex), 14 December 1994.
189  UNICRI 1984.
190  ECOSOC resolution 1995/9, Annex, 24 July 1995.
191  GA resolution 51/60, Annex, 12 December 1996.
192 ECOSOC resolution 2002/13, Annex, 24 July 2002.
193 Garland 2001.
194 Hastings 2005:213.
195 A/47/277-S/2411,§55; A/50/60S/1995/1, §§13-14 & 97.
196 IRCP 1972.
197 A/55-985-S/2001/574.
198 Bellamy 2008:143-4.
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Introduction 
Probably in every language there is an equivalent of 
the English saying “An ounce of prevention is worth 
a pound of cure”. In the United Nations “language”, 
prevention originally emerged in its Charter as an im-
perative of the jus post bellum. But, although “crime 
prevention” or its functional equivalents have often 
been invoked in the United Nations records (almost 
since its inception),1 the practice and science of crime 
prevention have been relatively new. Even newer is 
promoting the “culture of prevention” in the entire 
United Nations, which only in 2000 started to address 
it comprehensively.2
Presently, crime prevention has gained an incred-
ible hold. This is because it is seen to be offering an 
approach designed to prevent victimization and crime 
that is widely recognized to be more humane and 
cost-effective than responding after the fact. Indeed, 
in many instances preventive action may be the only 
viable option due to problems such as non-reporting, 
access to justice and other such issues. It is a remark-
able achievement that prevention is now recognized 
in policy as a key pillar of an effective criminal justice 
system alongside law enforcement, courts and cor-
rections, notwithstanding that its support in terms of 
funding, institutionalization and professional devel-
opment remains very modest. This contribution will 
briefly outline the impact, present and potential, of 
crime prevention on an effective criminal justice sys-
tem and on safety and security in general. It will set 
out big picture challenges that need to be faced and 
propose compelling reasons for accelerating the pace 
of progress for a greater commitment to crime pre-
vention principles. 
A. Embedding of prevention
Crime prevention has been embedded in international 
and national laws, standards, policy and programmes 
both in its own right, and as a key component to jus-
tice, health and developmental goals: 
• In 1990, United Nations Guidelines for the Preven-
tion of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines) 
emphasized for the first time crime prevention, this 
being associated with one specific population (GA 
resolution 45/112, Annex). 
• In 1995, the United Nations adopted an additional 
legal instrument to address urban crime (ECOSOC 
resolution 1995/9, Annex). By 2002, “there was 
clear evidence that well-planned crime prevention 
strategies not only prevent crime and victimization 
but promote community safety and contribute to 
the sustainable development of countries“, this 
forming Art. 1 of the United Nations Guidelines for 
the Prevention of Crime, and the remaining articles 
setting out the principles, approaches and method-
ologies for effective crime prevention. These Guide-
lines address strategies for populations vulnerable 
to victimization or offending, and prevention in the 
context of space - urban crime more generally and 
specific disadvantaged neighbourhoods (ECOSOC 
resolution 2002/13, Annex). 
• Various international standards and norms in rela-
tion to victims incorporate prevention. The United 
Nations Guidelines on Justice in Matters Involving 
Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (ECOSOC 
resolution 2005/20, Annex) set out the right to 
special preventative measures for child victims 
and witnesses who are particularly vulnerable to 
recurring child victimization or offending, and call 
for comprehensive and specially tailored strategies 
depending on the nature of the victimization. Simi-
larly, various international standards on violence 
against women call for prevention strategies, in-
cluding ones to prevent re-victimization. 
• The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Human Beings, especially Women and 
Children, which supplements the United Nations 
Peter Homel
Mary-Anne Kirvan
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BOX 4
1 The work of the United Nations in the field of the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders. Note prepared by the Secretariat, 
International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 1, January 1952, pp. 3-23.
2 Alex J. Bellamy, Conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect, Global Governance, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), p. 136-137; Ross Hastings, 
Perspectives on crime prevention: Issues and challenges, Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 2005), p. 
213; Peter Homel, Lessons for Canadian crime prevention from recent international experience, Institute for the Prevention of Crime (IPC) 
Review, Vol. 3 (2009), p. 13-43.
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Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(2000), established prevention as one of three main 
pillars. 
In short, prevention has been well accepted in policy 
at an international level and by individual States. Ex-
pectations are high that it can bring something new 
to the efforts of States in the justice and human rights 
domains, and in a manner that is more inclusive and 
participatory than the other pillars allow. Notwith-
standing consensus about prevention’s place, the 
following big picture challenges need to be reckoned 
with for its promise to be realized. 
B. This much we know 
The populations and places most vulnerable to victim-
ization and/or to offending experience multiple risk 
factors at an individual, family and community level 
that are not the exclusive domain of any one sector. 
They require integrated, evidence-based responses. 
Preventing adverse outcomes for these popula-
tions and for high crime urban centres, communi-
ties and neighbourhoods is complex work requiring 
a range of professional skills and tools comparable 
to those that govern conduct, ethics, standards of 
evidence and rules of engagement for the principal 
professions associated with policing, courts and cor-
rections. The required professional competencies 
need to be articulated, and this must reflect the com-
plexities of the populations and issues intended to be 
served by preventive action, and the complexity of 
designing and implementing effective and appropriate 
responses in the context of sustainable development. 
For many countries the task of scaling up their profes-
sional prevention capacity is considerable.
Good governance of prevention is another big 
picture challenge. Basically, governance is the pro-
cess whereby societies or organisations make their 
important decisions, determine who they involve in 
the process and how they are accountable for the 
actions arising from the decisions taken. While good 
governance for crime prevention has many facets and 
the responsibilities of governments at all levels have 
been articulated in the Guidelines for the Prevention 
of Crime, this paper will highlight three that plague 
many countries.  
First, at the national and local level, the overall 
prevention strategy needs to be designed, managed 
and delivered in a systematic and integrated manner. 
Within a strategy, a programme that is targeting a 
specific crime issue will typically be built on the use 
of multiple interventions in order to address linked 
problems. The specific activities that make up each of 
these interventions will frequently be implemented at 
the same time or in some very tightly organized logical 
sequence. To prevent violence and other crime related 
to alcohol, for example, it would be typical for a pub-
lic education component of any alcohol and violence 
initiative to be simultaneously supported by changes 
to policing practice and physical changes to drinking 
venues and immediate surrounding areas. Managing 
such a process effectively and efficiently represents 
a complex management task in order to ensure that 
the right people in the right places apply the right re-
sources and skills at the right time. 
A second governance challenge arises where 
there is not an institutional crime prevention presence 
at the local level capable of collaborative, multi-secto-
ral action to properly assess and act upon the priority 
crime, victimization and security issues. As stated in 
the Guidelines, a rigorous planning process that in-
cludes a “systematic analysis of crime problems, their 
causes, risk factors and consequences, particularly at 
the local level” is key. The intent in institutionalizing 
prevention at the local level is not to create bureaucra-
cy but rather to ensure that those sectors with respon-
sibilities for contributing to safety come together and 
do their part.3 This approach also allows for genuine 
engagement of civil society and affected communities 
in particular. The very presence of policing and courts 
in a given community would suggest a commensurate 
need for funding in support of local level prevention 
planning with all pillars being subject to appropriate 
accountability standards. 
A third aspect of good governance for crime pre-
vention warrants inclusion as a big picture challenge. 
It concerns which government departments, within 
each order of government, are contributing to preven-
tion and whether there is a coherent overall strategy 
that reflects the types of crime and victimization occur-
ring and that is based on the best available evidence 
as to effective ways to respond. This strategy should 
be transparent and distinguish between substantial 
3 Guidance on Local Safety Audits – A Compendium of International Practice, European Forum for Urban Safety, 2007; Peter Homel, 
Sandra Nutley, Nick Tilley and Barry Webb, Investing to deliver; reviewing the implementation of the UK Crime Reduction Program, Home 
Office Research Study 281 (2004).
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In fact, there is less doubt about success in pre-
venting crime than in preventing conflict. The 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime adopted in 
2002 are explicitly based on evidence that crime pre-
vention clearly works (art. I.1). This shows that (a) 
crime prevention is ahead of conflict prevention, al-
though any policy of responding to crime is usually at 
the tail end of socio-economic and legal policies pur-
sued, at least in the United Nations, and (b) in the 
culture of prevention there has not yet been enough 
crime prevention. Crime prevention is somehow dis-
persed, despite meaningful criminological evidence 
on the after-effects of war, evidence that should be 
better appreciated by politicians, political scientists 
and providers and recipients of technical assistance. 
Returning, however, to the argument that there 
is evidence of successful crime prevention, Irwin 
Waller, a leading international authority in this ar-
programmes of prevention and specific projects, and 
their respective reaches and duration. It also concerns 
how crime prevention and intervention get properly 
managed in order to avoid some of the structural de-
ficiencies that continue to repeatedly expose certain 
populations and places to adverse outcomes. These 
include disproportionate victimization and/or involve-
ment in the justice system of indigenous populations 
and of children leaving child protection and/or youth 
justice custodial placements; and a disproportionate 
number of mental health cases in youth and adult cor-
rections systems. While these issues may be shaped by 
a State’s division of powers between orders of govern-
ment and their resolution complicated by such divi-
sion, a coherent prevention strategy must clearly take 
these realities into account in order to realize progress 
for the vulnerable populations identified above. 
C. Accelerating prevention’s progress
Compelling reasons exist for accelerating progress in 
crime prevention. Foremost, there is clear evidence 
that prevention can significantly reduce crime and vic-
timization and this should be used to increase individ-
ual and collective security. Good governance, includ-
ing appropriate allocation of limited resources, also 
calls for evidence-based prevention to be supported 
systematically. The limits of responding to crime after 
the fact are clear, including: much crime goes unre-
ported; low conviction rates for some crimes; high 
recidivism rates for youth and adults with multiple 
challenges, frequently including health and education 
related issues; and where ”justice has been served”, 
victims of violence nevertheless carry a heavy burden 
that manifests itself in numerous ways throughout 
their lives. Prevention is a further means to meet the 
concerns of victims that the criminal justice system 
is too focused on offenders: internationally, vari-
ous instruments reflect the vulnerability of specific 
populations to victimization; reference the evidence 
that prevention works and call for strategies targeting 
these at risk populations, including specific strategies 
to prevent re-victimization. Prevention strategies pro-
vide States with an opportunity to engage civil society 
and affected groups in collaborative work in order to 
increase safety, holding out the promise that such en-
gagement may serve to break down barriers of distrust 
between law enforcement and civil society in some 
States. Finally, the manner in which crimes are being 
committed has changed dramatically with technology 
and the spread of organized crime, and prevention is 
a lever that must be better deployed to keep pace. 
While the history of crime prevention science is short, 
it quickly needs to adapt to do better with ‘traditional’ 
crimes, address various new forms of crime and enlist 
the cooperation of new disciplines and constituencies 
(e.g., “digital communities”) in counteracting the ever 
changing local and global crime patterns. ¢
ea, concludes that for an effective response to crime 
“limiting our response to the ‘standard’ use of police, 
courts, and corrections is not the way to prevent and 
reduce crimes”.199
In both cases (i.e., UN and academic crime pre-
vention), this is not an argument for a parity of pre-
vention and repression. In line with the adage that an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure there is 
rather a need to include that little or that much de-
pending on the form and dynamics of crime. 
To attain such a kind of proportion is quite a call: 
politically, socially and economically, if sustaina-
ble development can show that it works. Taking in-
to account that concept’s explanatory and modifying 
values, the figure in the internal back cover of this 
publication outlines the evolution of criminologi-
cal thought globally since the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, and in the United Nations since its inception. 
199  Waller 2007:xv.
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A. Crime prevention lessons learnt about 
institutional and State capacity-building
1. Capacity has been built where modest, incremen-
tal reforms have been pursued in politically sup-
portive environments;
2. State reform is overwhelmingly a governance 
challenge, not an organizational challenge. And 
the governance challenge is: to align the formal 
and informal incentives embedded within a coun-
try’s broader institutional framework in a support-
ive manner so that individual and specific organi-
zational capacity deficits can be remedied;
3. The role of the State must be matched by its over-
all capacity;
4. Incremental approaches are more likely to work 
than grand strategies and wholesale reform;
5. Goals should be set that are politically feasible 
rather than technically optimum.
B. Some implications for capacity-building
1. Understand precisely the nature and the mission 
of the agency whose capacity is being built;
2. Choose those organizations whose activities are 
of greatest priority;
3. Understand the structure and pattern of an or-
ganization’s interests and incentives;
4. The more specific, monitorable and limited the 
task to be performed, the easier it will be to de-
velop organizational capacity to do so. And con-
versely: be very careful about organizations with 
many unspecified objectives;
5. Be sure what capacity-building activities will be;
6. If an organization has competent political and tech-
nical leadership it has more chance of success;
7. Design solutions that fit the circumstances and 
the context;
8. Understand the informal institutional structure;
9. Start small;
10. The greater the demand for responsive and effec-
tive organizations delivering things that people 
actually want, the greater the chances for sustain-
able change.
A more insightful criminological retrospection is 
still called for. However, whether or not this will hap-
pen, the concept of sustainable development is im-
portant for our common future.
Surely, calibrating it to the size of the concept of 
urban security is the way to go, but not for a long 
time. Both concepts will need to be revisited and re-
defined in light of the ongoing changes in the pat-
terns and dynamics of crime in the world. No doubt, 
the current focus on street crime will need to be 
broadened in order to include not only urban com-
munity crime prevention but also digital communi-
ty crime prevention. Perhaps it was overly optimis-
tic to foresee in the mid-1990s that “street crime will 
nearly disappear in large urban communities”,200 but 
certainly it is not too early to foresee that cybercrime 
will outgrow urban and other crime and that preven-
tion will have to move into cyberspace much faster 
than has so far been the case. 
In line with Wolfgang’s forecast in which he 
sees new “Gemeinschaft ... through telecommunica-
tions”,201 one of the more recent UNODC reports on 
the prevention of urban gang violence alludes to this 
emerging development, reminding readers that “As 
hubs in a web of global communication and trans-
port, cities are focal points for both internal and in-
ternational migration, transport, communications 
and economic activities”.202
The ABCs of Urban Crime Prevention1
BOX 5
1  Abridged from: Handbook on Planning and Action for Crime Pre-
vention in Southern Africa and the Caribbean, Criminal Justice 
Handbook Series, UNODC, New York 2008. 
200  Wolfgang 1994:287.
201  Ibid..
202  E/CN.15/2007/CRP.3, §32.
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C. From capacity-building to action for 
sustainable change
1. In all countries which react positively to the need 
to implement crime prevention programmes, 
a programme team should be put together.
2. Meetings should be organized with the key donors 
and NGOs within the target countries to find the 
level of support they will give for the programme. 
They could be shown that crime is not just a seri-
ous problem in its own right but that it also hin-
ders the reduction of poverty.
3. A decision must be taken at this point in each 
country as to which group is going to take the lead 
on the crime prevention programme and who is 
going to be the programme champion.
4. Make sure the leaders and members of the team 
really want to prevent or reduce crime. If people 
are in it for other personal or political ends, it will 
not work. 
5. In each country there should be an assessment 
of the crime situation using available local data. 
Then, there should be put in place:
(a) A programme to examine and, if necessary, 
improve the collection and analysis of police 
recorded crime statistics;
(b) A programme to carry out comparable crime 
surveys using ICVS; and
(c) An examination of the possibility of introduc-
ing a coordinated computerized justice infor-
mation system.
6. At the same time, stakeholders for the programme 
should be identified and involved in the process:
(a) The group would include the police, trusted 
community members or groups, members 
of traditional structures (e.g. Chiefs in many 
parts of Africa), people who can evaluate pro-
grammes, crime prevention experts;
(b) It is very important at this stage to involve the 
community and citizens.
7. Crime prevention needs-assessments should be 
produced in all participating countries by2
(a) Targeting community concerns; and
(b) Understanding the problems.
8. The infrastructure and resources needed for the 
prevention programme should be discussed and 
agreed at this point.
(a) A decision must be taken as to how ambitious 
the programme is going to be. Will the aim be 
to tackle major issues such as the reduction of 
the propensity to commit crime or will it have 
more limited but more immediate goals?
(b) It should be recognized that the more ambi-
tious the initial programme is, the greater 
the chance of failure. If at all in doubt — start 
small. Try just to change a few things. Build on 
success.
9. Participating countries should very seriously con-
sider creating a Crime Prevention Institute.
10. All these countries should exchange needs-as-
sessments and the documents coming out of the 
infrastructure and resource need discussions.
11. When the goals have been agreed, it must be en-
sured that everyone has bought-in to them.
12. Adjustments to the Stakeholder group should be 
made at this point to make absolutely sure that 
there is the right group of stakeholders for the 
goals. For example, a school-based programme 
will need educationalists while a programme to 
improve parenting skills will need social workers, 
health workers and educationalists.
13. A strategic plan should be produced — i.e. an 
overall plan that you hope will get you to your 
goals.
14. Using the strategy detailed, plans should be 
drawn up, consistent with available resources, 
which will:
(a) Prioritize prevention targets;
(b) Describe the methods to be used; and
(c) Produce a logic model. 
15. It would probably be useful to get the help of re-
search and development experts at this point.
16. The level of evaluation which is needed must be 
agreed and arrangements made to collect the 
necessary data. Above all, data must be collected 
in order to establish a baseline against which to 
measure change.
17. Plans must include ways to build capacity and im-
plement and sustain the programmes effectively.
18. Make sure everyone has agreed with all stages of 
the planning process.
19. Projects should begin with the knowledge that 
crime can be reduced or prevented if based on 
sound evidence and carried out with programme 
integrity.
20. The local media should be involved, particularly 
after step 5. ¢
2  See further: Crime Prevention Assessment Tool, Criminal Justice Handbook Series, UNODC & UN-Habitat, New York 2009. 
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In conclusion, urban security and urban crime 
prevention are certainly the area of UN and other in-
ternational work where practical and progressive re-
sults are demonstrable and can be achieved, espe-
cially in countries in which the security situation is 
stable enough, thus allowing us to go beyond rudi-
mentary law enforcement (“control”). 
There have been other successful security out-
comes, albeit with a very limited prevention compo-
nent. They have been even more crosscutting than 
“urban security”, and have been achieved in the name 
of “justice and security sector reform” (JSSR) or “se-
curity sector reform” (SSR). They emerged at the end 
of the 1990s. In 2000, the United Nations Millenni-
um Declaration203 articulated the essence of security 
sector reform by stating that men and women have 
the right to live their lives and raise their children 
in dignity, free from hunger and the fear of violence, 
oppression or injustice.
This new concept of “security” bridges the ide-
as of ensuring freedom from fear and freedom from 
want, and the idea of security of States. These ideas 
are inextricably linked. ”These cross-sectoral char-
acteristics make the SSR approach innovative and 
promising while simultaneously rendering it more 
demanding in terms of conceptualization and par-
ticularly implementation”.204
“Security sector” is “a broad term often used to 
describe the structures, institutions and person-
nel responsible for the management, provision and 
oversight of security in a country. It is generally ac-
cepted that the security sector includes defence, law 
enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and 
institutions responsible for border management, 
customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the ju-
dicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cas-
es of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force 
are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, 
the security sector includes actors that play a role in 
managing and overseeing the design and implemen-
tation of security, such as ministries, legislative bod-
ies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors 
that could be considered part of the security sector 
include customary or informal authorities and pri-
vate security services”.205 Finally, “security sector re-
form” describes “a process of assessment, review and 
implementation as well as monitoring and evalua-
tion led by national authorities that has as its goal 
the enhancement of effective and accountable secu-
rity for the State and its peoples without discrimina-
tion and with full respect for human rights and the 
rule of law ... Security sector reform should be a na-
tionally owned process that is rooted in the partic-
ular needs and conditions of the country in ques-
tion”.206
SSR, first defined in 2002 by the UNDP and in 
2008 by the United Nations Secretary-General, con-
siderably modifies the UNDP’s earlier “human secu-
rity” concept (1994). It has lost much of its currency. 
SSR reorients the international security agenda even 
more progressively and practically than “urban secu-
rity” by spelling out the “action part”, that is “reform”, 
while also being more holistic and open to accom-
modate new security threats, for example those from 
the development of cybercrime. This “mindset shift“ 
focuses on the implementation of laws, norms and 
values particularly through training, assistance and 
mentoring programmes in post-conflict situations, 
but also in other developing countries. Developed 
countries, such as Canada, Norway, the United King-
dom and the United States, pursue the SSR on their 
own. In principle, the SSR involves the strengthen-
ing of institutions, for instance, armed forces, police, 
intelligence services, border guards and the judici-
ary, as well as the strengthening of governance and 
management of the security structures, as a critical 
component in ensuring sustainable peace – often the 
unstated objective of the reform process.207 With the 
two underlying it jointly ideas of freedom from fear 
and freedom from want, it is a contributive part of 
the sustainable development concept. 
In the life cycle of United Nations ideas, the shift 
from “urban security” to SSR is not merely a change 
of accent in its language of justice. It is a major con-
ceptual advance: moving from a static, analytical ap-
proach to dynamic implementation and result-based 
work. In this way much crime can be better con-
trolled through technical assistance in criminal jus-
tice reform (legislative assistance; good practices in 
the humane treatment of offenders and victims). An 
effective response can be made to much more, par-
ticularly youth urban crime, through technical assis-
tance in crime prevention (primary and secondary 
prevention, especially through socialization; tertiary 
prevention, especially through the reintegration of 
offenders).
203  GA resolution 55/2 of 1 September 2000.
204  Hanggi 2008.
205  A/62/659-S/2008/39, § 14.
206  Ibid., § 17.
207  Mobekk 2006:4.
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The UNODC mandate fits in well in the above 
framework. The UNODC contributed to and benefit-
ed from the growing interest in SSR issues, covering 
traditional and organized crime, as well as terrorism. 
In spite of the prevalence of SSR processes ini-
tiated in post-conflict settings, SSR may apply also 
to fragile, failed, post-authoritarian, and less devel-
oped countries,208 where the UNODC is engaged and 
208  Hrach 2010.
active through different types of assistance (norma-
tive, analytical, technical). This has been the case for 
example in Guinea Bissau and Somaliland, where its 
interventions triggered subsequent concerted ac-
tions to reform the security sector; or in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, where the UNODC is one of the main 
players in carrying forward sectoral activities within 
the ongoing overall framework of SSR.
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209 As explained below, the adjective “progressive” is used in line with art 13.1. (a) of the United Nations Charter. A progressive response to crime 
does not imply its elimination, but reduction by humane and effective control and preventive measures. As Durkheim reminds us, crime is a social 
construct, and hence the goal of its elimination is nonsensical (“Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes 
properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary of-
fence does in ordinary consciousness. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat 
them as such” (Durkheim 1966: 68-69)). This functionalist argument is certainly valid in academic and practical analysis of the factors associated 
with the emergence and further development of various forms of crime. The question of humane and effective crime prevention and control may 
look different in these two analyses. As if it was a counterpoint to the social justice orientation of penal and criminological developments that is 
promoted here, Nils Christie in his historical analysis of the question of the progressive treatment of offenders, as an academic, cautions us that 
it may be futile to establish broadly what, comparatively speaking, is more humane punishment. This is because such conclusions may be drawn 
from overly ambigous comparisons or because of periodically reversing penal values in sentencing policy that undermine the popular pressump-
tions implying a steady progress. Those values do not progress linearly. Their matrix is more complex (Christie 1968:161-162).
210 Siegel 2008.
211 The format of this visual presentation with a specific time-line invites a simplistic and linear examination of recorded penal and criminological 
developments. Those developments move ahead as a part of socio-economic progress in the world between 1764 and 2010 (from the Enlight-
enment to Globalization). Taking partly into account the reservations expressed in the above footnote on the artificiality of such a presentation 
of penal values as a linear progression of ideas and events, Figure 1 still remains an ideograph and not a historiograph. Therefore also within 
its infographic limits of a contemporary visual convention, Figure 1 cannot show either the gist of chaos theory in postmodern criminology or 
the connections involved in the path analysis pursued in this study. Regarding chaos theory, this can technically be noted, but chaos cannot be 
ideographed, due to its nonlinear characteristics. Regarding this study’s path analysis, due to its diversionary characteristics and outcomes, it 
can hardly be ideographed, and even then only in another format that is beyond the technical limits of this study. Moreover, the United Na-
tions has its own vision and concept of time and of the related political developments, the showing of which may perhaps be attempted but 
which are clearly beyond the scope of this study. The vision of time and developments may remain linear, but the United Nations nevertheless 
interculturally reinterprets time. For it, time is a secular and ecumenical matter. In 1999, the United Nations Secretary-General emphasized that 
the United Nations has adopted the linear Christian calendar (BC/AD), but noted that it should really be understood as a secular “Common Era” 
(CE) time, starting off the period of Globalization (Kofi F. Annan, Common values for a common era: Even as we cherish our diversity, we need 
to discover our shared values, Civilization: The Magazine of the Library of Congress, 28 June 1999, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/
articleFull.asp?TID=37). Accordingly, since its inception the United Nations has been developing its own calendar (see Box 12). To return to the 
topic of the linearity of time, the positivists (beginning during the Enlightment with Beccaria’s “rationality”) and others differ not only on the 
question of its end, but also on how the event-based “cycle time” cuts into its understanding (see Figure 6 as an example of an ideographic 
presentation of “spiral cycle time”). Figure 1 leaves this out. But it addresses also developments that were counter-positivistic (e.g., Marxism), 
regressive (e.g., eugenics), rational but regressive (e.g., the “get tough” criminal policy promoted by the book by Ernest van den Haag (Punishing 
Criminals, 1975)), and irrational and regressive (e.g., the IPPC’s support of the Nazi Governments before and during the Second World War, support 
which almost thwarted the inheritance of its mandate by the United Nations) - developments which neither contributed to social progress and/or 
to the advancement of human rights stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations. There is no doubt, therefore, that this is a value-laden United 
Nations interpretation of such criminological developments, but there is no better one. For a more incisive presentation of the cultural concept of 
time see: Vyvyan Evans, The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning, and Temporal Cognition, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam 2006.
212 Bates 1958:247.
Part II – The United Nations  
       Crime Prevention and  
       Criminal Justice Mandate
V	 Combining	the	United	Nations	
and academic criminological 
ideas	into	one	global	picture	
of	the	progressive209	response	
to crime 
A combination of the above United Nations and ac-
ademic criminological ideas into one global picture 
of the response to crime may be depicted visually 
(see the front inlay with the outline of development 
of criminological thought in the world and since the 
inception of the United Nations). 
Figure 1 consists of 14 horizontal rows. They vis-
ually support the text contained in parts I through 
III of this book. The top nine rows and the lowest 
row (14) of Figure 1 is by and large an adaptation of 
a similar figure contained in “Criminology” by Larry 
J. Siegel.210 Basically, Figure 1 reflects Siegel’s figure 
in the way it treats the thematic scope of the de-
velopment of criminological thought. For this rea-
son, the authors’ name and his/her major work have 
been factored into the Figure.211
The original figure largely covers works written 
and/or known in the United States of America. This 
kind of narrowness, originally observed by American 
sociologists212 when reviewing UNESCO’s book on 
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criminology,213 seems to remain its dominant feature. 
To a lesser extent this is the case of the modified Fig-
ure 1 in the present book. It includes Asian, South 
American and Nordic work, some of which are also 
referred to in the text below. 
In the intermediate rows (10-13), Figure 1 outlines 
entirely new developments in academic and practi-
cal criminological thought. These four additional 
rows illustrate how this division is, in fact, artificial, 
taking into account that penal reform had begun 
with the Italian lawyer Cesare Beccaria (Dei delitti e 
della pene, 1764), who was also a politician. 
The United Nations embraced the ideas of this 
farsighted legal reformer and the founder of modern 
criminal law, which coincided with the lofty prin-
ciples enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights – as may be recalled – once underlined 
by Margaret J. Anstee, UN Under Secretary-General 
and Director-General of the UNOV.214 Figure 1 starts 
with the year 1764 and ends in 2010, the date of the 
Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice.
With a few exceptions (like the one above in res-
pect of Beccaria), the limits of this study do not fore-
see direct cross-referencing between Figure 1 and 
the present text, especially regarding the names, 
works and other pre-Second World War criminolo-
gical facts. Figure 1 lists not only the works original-
ly noted in Siegel’s “Criminology”, but also, as much 
as this was technically possible, new works discus-
sed by the author of this study. In sum, the revised 
Figure 1 covers more than the text. Figure 1 is also 
more global, cross-disciplinary and panoramic than 
the original. Therefore it is also more comprehensive 
than the present text. 
This study assumes that the balance of facts be-
tween Figure 1 and the narrative text may be easily 
explained on the basis of Siegel’s book and/or other 
books and articles on the historical development of 
criminological thought. The range of this mono-
graphic study is not sufficient to tally fully with all 
fourteen rows in greater detail than above and below. 
More than anything else, the major purpose of hav-
ing such an extensive horizon in this book, as given 
now by Figure 1, is the interest to show the reader 
how United Nations criminological ideas can be seen 
against this larger global picture. In redesigning the 
original figure my call was to find a blue colour in a 
new Figure. 
Last but not least, as already noted, Figure 1 does 
not purport to document a progressive development 
of criminological ideas, even though it is so tempt-
ing to argue to the contrary.215 For this development 
indeed could coincide with the United Nations Char-
ter. It stipulates that the ”General Assembly shall ini-
tiate studies and make recommendations for the pur-
pose of: promoting international co-operation in the 
political field and encouraging the progressive de-
velopment of international law and its codification” 
(art. 13.1(a)), and in some international and domestic 
criminal law and in criminology such progress ap-
pears to be evident.216
But if indeed this were the case, then mostly 
this progress is in the field of criminal law. Owing 
to Beccaria’s “classicist” views, contemporary crimi-
nal law observes the principle of nullum crimen si-
ne lege, lex retro non agit and nullum poena sine le-
ge. Owing also to him, criminal law instituted the 
prohibition of torture and the death penalty, the 
independence of the judiciary and the primacy of 
prevention over repression. These principles have 
gradually been introduced in Europe and beyond. 
As recalled by G.O.W. Mueller,217 globally their 
introduction began only in 1955, with the adoption 
of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners by the First Congress. In 1966 the prin-
ciple of the humanitarian treatment of prisoners 
was adopted and broadened by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 10§3), 
which contains classicist principles of criminal law 
(art. 14), and the goal of eventually abolishing the 
death penalty (art. 6§6). 
213 Carroll 1957.
214 Anstee 1988:10.
215 In Western culture “progressive development” implies linear progression as the model for modernization. This is only one way of looking at 
development as time progresses, according to one concept of time. In fact, there are different cultural conceptualizations of time. As Durk-
heim notes, in every culture time is a social construct that enables its members to coordinate their activities in their own way, and hence look 
at the past, present and future in other than linear terms (see further Katovich 2005: 367-385). Consequently, Western technical assistance 
planners tend to simply reject any implications that this might have for development in other cultures (Fisher 1997:130). 
216 In Western culture for “most people ... when they think of law reform, it ... is for them an instrument of development, not merely a response 
to it. Such a view of law reform obviously derives support from the idea of progress; one must envision the possibility of achieving a better 
society in order to propose specific measures for attaining it – to lead the way to progress through law reform ... It is plausible to characterize 
Western societies as engaged in continuous, extensive, some might say hyperactive law reform” (Merryman 1969:3-4). )
217 G.O.W. Mueller 1988.
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Later, the Fifth Congress (Geneva, 1975) adopted 
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment218 and in 1984 
the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention 
against Torture. The Seventh Congress (1985) cre-
ated the blueprint for the independence of the ju-
diciary, by adopting the Basic Principles on the In-
dependence of the Judiciary, which in 2006 were 
strengthened by the Principles of Judicial Conduct.219 
The Eighth Congress (Havana, 1990) opened the 
way to international crime prevention by adopting 
the afore-mentioned Riyadh Guidelines, another Ge-
neral Assembly resolution with the United Nations 
Declaration on Crime and Public Security,220 and two 
ECOSOC resolutions,221 further built that way by giv-
ing crime prevention primacy over repression, as so 
much emphasized by Beccaria and like-minded pe-
nologists. 
There are more examples of such interweaving 
of progressive academic and practical ideas. In this 
broader context, one can see how obviously artificial 
the division is between theoretical and practical le-
gal and criminological thought. 
But this should not imply that social progress, 
progressive development of public international law 
and legal thought are cast in stone. For example, 
the “Salvador Declaration” of the Twelfth Congress 
sought to open the way to revision of the United Na-
tions standards and norms in crime prevention and 
criminal justice (§ 4). At the subsequent session of 
the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice (2010) this prompted fears that the process 
of updating them may involve retrograde steps. This 
shows that the international criminal justice com-
munity has quickly and well realized the in tricacies 
of social and legal progress. Consequently, the Gene-
ral Assembly cautiously agreed to “exchange informa-
tion on best practices, as well as national legislation 
and existing international law,” allowing only the re-
vision of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners, and only on the premise that this 
will “reflect recent advances in correctional science 
and best practices.”222
In conclusion, the path analysis in this study 
should not lead to the conclusion that from one idea 
to another, from theory to practice, the social and le-
gal fields have witnessed mutually supporting incre-
ments. Such an interpretation may only occasionally 
be true. But in most cases it is impossible to prove, as 
was argued by one comparative legal thinker (Gross-
feld) mentioned above.
It may be somewhat different in the field of 
economic development. Recalling Mumford’s esti-
mate, since 1820 there has indeed been considerab-
le improvement in the quality of life worldwide. In 
1820, the proportion of those living on the equiva-
lent of less than US$1 a day was approximately 7:1 
and now it is approximately 1:6. Thus there has been 
economic progress. Consequently, the lowest row 
(14) shows how socio-economic and humanistic 
thought has advanced before and after 1945, and in 
1987 culminated in the concept of sustainable deve-
lopment. The same row also lists in the mainstream 
of other global events and guiding ideas the spear-
heading developments that lead to the genesis of 
the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme and to the forming of UN poli-
cy on responding to crime through repression and 
prevention.
218 GA resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975.
219 Bangalore Principles, ECOSOC resolution 2006/23 (Annex) of 27 July 2006.
220 GA resolution 51/60, Annex of 12 Deecember 1996.
221 ECOSOC resolutions 1995/9 (Annex) of 24 July 1995, and 2002/13 (Annex) of 24 July 2002.
222 GA resolution 65/230 of 21 December 2010.
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VI The birth and rebirth of 
the	United	Nations	crime	
prevention	and	criminal	
justice	mandate
Higher up, Figure 1 shows the beginning and insti-
tutional development of the United Nations crime 
programme as a part of the United Nations Secretar-
iat. Its genesis dates to the International Congress of 
Penitentiary Sciences (Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 
1846),223 the initial phase of the birth of criminology. 
That Congress had indeed been the first in the great 
series of some 240 international penitentiary, phil-
anthropic, pacifist, statistical, meteorological, etc. 
congresses which took place (mostly in Western Eu-
rope) up to the end of the nineteenth century.224 The 
pioneering Frankfurt Congress, probably held in the 
Town Hall’s Emperor’s Hall,225 had been the first one 
to have on its agenda the social welfare of children 
and minors in the context of their solitary confine-
ment, then still regarded as something to be recom-
mended.226
It should be recalled that between 1830 and 1850, 
solitary confinement was used to reduce the danger 
of further individual moral degradation of children 
in conflict with the law. In the absence of a corol-
lary social welfare policy, that danger could not be 
averted.227 Realizing the need for it by prohibiting so-
litary confinement was one of the ideas of the afore-
mentioned Édouard Ducpétiaux. He was the Belgian 
general inspector of prisons and public welfare insti-
tutions, taking care of children. In that dual capacity, 
he and Lord John Russell (1792-1878), British prison 
inspector and later Home Secretary, together with 
several like-minded German idealists (among them 
two physicians, Nicolas Heinrich Julius and Georg 
Varrentrapp; one lawyer, Friedriech Noellner; and 
Karl Joseph Anton von Mittermaier, a prominent law 
professor at the University of Heidelberg), took the 
initiative to host that congress in Frankfurt and to 
deal with the issue of children in danger. In addi tion 
to lawyers and physicians, the participants at the 
Congress included prison chaplains, wardens and 
heads of correctional administrations. The Congress 
was attended by 75 participants from 12 European 
countries and from the United States.228
That was also the period of the first International 
Congress of Peace (London, 1843) and of the Pacifist 
Congress (Brussels, 1848). Idealism and the interna-
tional exchange of ideas were then a new and hope-
ful development. Thus it is clear why the framers of 
the UN crime mandate, who were from the outset in-
terested in juvenile justice matters, had referred to 
the Frankfurt Congress in their own document, and 
why since its beginning the UN in general has paid 
considerable attention to the welfare of children. 
The early European history of the internation-
alization of the child welfare movement (1840-1914) 
points to the considerable humanistic contributions 
of prison reformers. During that period, they either 
included that topic on the agenda of their own in-
ternational congresses or addressed it at the inter-
national philanthropic congresses.229 No wonder that 
Ducpétiaux in his two functions was a three-time 
executive secretary of such congresses.230
The Spring of Nations (1848) had dashed hopes 
for continuing international cooperation in peniten-
tiary matters. It was resumed in 1867 when the In-
ternational League of Peace and Liberty Congress 
(Geneva, Switzerland) was held.231 That was the era 
of emerging social justice. In 1872, after the Franco-
Prussian war,232 the First International Congress on 
Crime Prevention and the Suppression of Crime was 
held in London’s Middle Temple Hall. As its result, a 
non-governmental International Penitentiary Com-
mission (1878) was established. Its first Chairman 
was Enoch Cobb Wines (1806-1879, USA). In 1929, 
it became the International Penal and Penitentiary 
Commission (the addition of the word “penal” meant 
that the Commission was intended to be active in the 
entire field of criminal policy). 
223 E/CN 5/30, Rev.1:2.
224 Dupont-Bouchat 2002:542.
225 Riemer 2004:91 ftn 63.
226 Leonards 2004:131.
227 Dupont-Bouchat & Pierre 2001:427.
228 Among them was also the Polish prison reformer Fryderyk Skarbek.
229 Attended by Giuseppe Garibaldi and Victor Hugo - the author of this study’s motto of 1852. 
230 This accomplishment must be appreciated, also because it well contextualizes the importance of a similar function the chiefs of the United 
Nations crime programme had performed as the executive secretaries for the majority of the United Nations congresses. (See their bio-
graphies in the back of this book.) Such a position is not merely an administrative one, but a position for the visionaries who can project 
criminological ideas and chart the United Nations mandate into the future. 
231 Dupont-Bouchat 2002:533-563.
232 Nota bene which prompted Durkheim to study the effects of war on crime. In France he became the secretary of the Committee for the Pub-
lication of Studies and Documents on the War.
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The last chairman of the Commission was 
Thorsten Sellin, author of the theory of the conflict 
of cultures and an opponent of the death penalty, 
who wrote on this topic in the United Nations News-
letter. It should be likewise noted that Sellin’s chair-
manship (1949-1951) had not been so coincidental. As 
an American, and in a way as a ”liquidator”, he mere-
ly oversaw the demise of the ICPC, realizing that al-
ready since 1935 (the date of the International Penal 
and Penitentiary Congress in Berlin) it had gradually 
come under Nazi influence. This continued in 1939-
1945 when the ICPC received funds from the Axis 
States and publicly supported the Fascist theories on 
the biological roots of crime as well as the repressive 
acts and regulations promulgated by the regimes of 
occupied France (Vichy), Germany, Italy, Japan and 
Spain. That is why, for quite some time, the United 
Nations strongly hesitated in coming to new terms 
with the IPPC, as reported, inter alia, by one U.S. ne-
gotiator.233 In 1951, after the ICPC’s dissolution, it be-
came the International Penal and Penitentiary Foun-
dation (IPPF). 
With the exception of the penultimate (war) 
phase of the Commission’s existence, when it went 
against the spirit of what it had been preaching be-
fore, its contribution to the internationaliza tion 
of humane and effective treatment of prisoners 
has been constructive. Between 1929 and 1939, to-
gether with other technical organizations (as they 
were called before the establishment of the United 
Nations), such as the Howard League for Penal Re-
form, these organizations assisted the League of 
Nations in developing recommendations for a mini-
mum prison code, an inquiry on prison popula tion, 
and the publication of a set of rules for the treat-
ment of witnesses and accused persons. It was the 
time when special consideration was given by the 
League to child welfare issues. These were brought 
to its attention via the International Association for 
the Protection of Children and the aforementioned 
Commission.234
Judging by contemporary standards of inter-
nationalization, that did not go far. The League of 
Nations was reluctant to take on board and forma-
lize those recommendations, despite the heritage 
of and advancements in the field of international 
criminal conventions, mentioned earlier. That re-
luctance had its roots in the strongly entrenched 
traditional doctrine of national sovereignty over 
penal matters.235 In other words, “States natural-
ly move with caution ... and it is only when a need 
has become imperative and when means and me-
thods have been worked out and shown to be safe 
and practical, that public authorities feel justified 
in entering into international administrative ar-
rangements.”236
Limited therefore in its mandate as the League 
of Nation’s programme was, it nevertheless incorpo-
rated juvenile delinquency issues that had been 
raised the last time in 1913 before the outbreak of the 
First World War at the international Congress on the 
Care and Protection of the Child.237 That congress 
was convened in Brussels during the third phase of 
the juvenile justice reform movement, i.e. the phase 
of State philanthropy.238
It may be useful to re-emphasize this three-phase 
development. In the third phase of reform the culmi-
nating contribution of the 1913 Brussels congress had 
provided a bridge from the 1846 Frankfurt congress, 
which had dealt with delinquent children in solitary 
confinement (first phase). That last congress before 
the First World War, and also the last one of seven 
such congresses held since 1890, when the interest of 
State in family matters had grown strongly over time, 
eventually projected its State philantrophic outcome 
into the intergovernmental juvenile justice agenda of 
the League of Nations.239 
That momentum culminating in 1913, plus 75 
years of the work of the Commission, and the ac-
complishments of a number of other technical 
organ izations, including the already mentioned Ho-
ward League for Penal Reform as well as the Inter-
national Association of Penal Law, all contributed to 
the initial “crime” mandate of the United Nations. 
Between 1946 and 1950 it had been formalized by two 
resolutions. In 1947, the Economic and Social Coun-
cil240 declared its intention to assume international 
leadership in responding to crime. In 1950, the Gene-
ral Assembly decided to transfer the programme fun-
ctions from the International Penal and Penitentiary 
233 Bates 1948:569-571.
234 Alper & Boren 1972:56-58.
235 Radzinowicz 1945:488-491.
236 Reinsch 1911, sn 46 at 148-149.
237 Alper & Boren 1972:55-56.
238 Pierre & Dupont-Bouchat 2001:428.
239 This interest is further confirmed by three more international congresses on the welfare and protection of children that were held sin-
ce 1896 in Western Europe. A total of thirteen such congresses, mostly hosted in Brussels - the capital of such international conferences 
- dealt also with various other aspects of child welfare (Fuchs 2004:765).
240 ECOSOC resolution 155 C (VIII) of 13 August 1947.
110
Commission.241 The latter mandate also provided the 
basis for convening the First United Nations Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders (1955) as well as subsequent congresses. 
Against that formal mandate, a new substan-
tive programme mandate was recommended by the 
intergovernmental Temporary Social Commission 
(1946-1948). At the outset it contained responsibili-
ties on such questions as trafficking in women and 
children and child welfare, and the advisory func-
tion on transferring the question of the treatment 
Picture 19. Urban security architecture in Salvador da 
Bahia (Brazil), the venue of the Twelfth United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (in 
front of the hotel in which most of the UN staff stayed)
of offenders from the ICCPC to the UN.242 There was 
no responsibility over the control of narcotic drugs, 
which was entrusted exclusively to the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs.
The Soviet Union and a number of other social-
ist countries voted against the UNGA resolution of 
1950.243 They argued that countering crime is an in-
ternal matter of Member States,244 as per article 55 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, when the 
UN draft Charter had been negotiated in San Fran-
cisco and its article 55 was discussed (from which the 
UN crime programme draws its origin), there was 
unanimity on its formulation:245 crime was regarded 
as an internal affair of each Member State. 
Retrospectively, one may now have the impres-
sion that the negative voting of those five Member 
States (out of 60 – two other Member States ab-
stained) on the draft resolution had taken place as if 
the criminogenic consequences of the recently end-
ed Second World War had faded away. Moreover, it 
was as if the outbreak of the war had had not been fa-
cilitated by the limited capacity of the League of Na-
tions to contribute to preserving international order, 
and, especially, to maintaining peace and security – 
the objective which gave birth to the United Nations. 
The 1991 resolution, nominally creating the United 
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Pro-
gramme, was adopted unanimously by all 166 Mem-
ber States. 
The changes in the voting pattern between 1950 
and 1991 signal a more fundamental shift in the glo-
bal perception of penal matters, as defined up to the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Namely, it seems 
that the dominant view of those matters had changed 
between the adoption of the former resolution and 
1991. The Soviet Union (Russia until 1924) between 
the October Revolution and the collapse of that 
country in 1991, had regarded penal matters, especi-
ally imprisonment, as a form of slave labour (gulags). 
Since 1945 until the time of Russian perestroika re-
forms under Soviet President Gorbachev (1987-1991), 
the Soviet Union and other like-minded countries, 
especially during the early post-Second World War 
period, had been practicing that form of slave labour 
– an instrument helping ideological and economic 
competition with the West, pursued by force for the 
sake of modernization. 
241 GA resolution 415 (V) of 1 December 1950.
242 UN Yearbook 1946-1947:514.
243 López-Rey 1984:1.
244 A/1547, §§117-122.
245 WD 65 CO/31, Documents: 397.
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During that period, the United States and West-
ern European countries (which historically formed 
the International Penal and Penitentiary Commis-
sion) – had looked away from that problem. They 
did so notwithstanding the fact that there was abun-
dant evidence246 of non-compliance with human 
rights arts. 1, 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, and with 
the Declaration of Human Rights, in particular arts. 
4 and 5, which protected the rights of prisoners. At 
that time, Western diplomacy, which did not want to 
see the problem, and Western political science, which 
was appalled by it, were distant from one another. 
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms ideas existed on paper 
only.
In these adverse conditions, the Social Commis-
sion authorized the establishment of the ad-hoc In-
ternational Group of Experts on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (1949-1950), 
later reconstituted as the Ad-Hoc Committee of Ex-
perts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders (1950-1964). That committee was sub-
sequently transformed into a regular Advisory Com-
mittee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (1965-1969), and then into 
the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control 
(1971-1991). Since 1992 its successor has been the in-
tergovernmental Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice. 
The period 1949-1992 had been a time of increas-
ing importance of the substantive and political role of 
those expert bodies, with two turning points. In 1983, 
the Committee had started reporting to the Econo-
mic and Social Council: not indirectly – through the 
Commission on Social Development – but directly. 
In 1991 the Committee dissolved itself.247 
The establishment of the Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice by ECOSOC in 1992 
has, in fact, signalled the emergence of a new sub-
stantive quality. From the original mandate of the 
UN crime programme quoted above, derived from 
the United Nations Charter and operational ized 
through various follow-up ECOSOC and GA resolu-
tions (1948-1991), ECOSOC has projected some of 
the social elements of those original provisions into 
the new bureaucratic realm of the United Nations. 
It constituted them in their own right through the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice. At that time Member States still had proposals 
to develop the UN crime programme as an indepen-
dent specialized agency (Clark 1994:20-21), but, in 
fact, the furthest development culminated in estab-
lishing a ”Centre” within the United Nations Secre-
tariat.
By and large, the drug part of the UNODC man-
date still maintains its own distinct profile, as de-
fined through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 
The UNODC name that captures this two-part man-
date shows quite well how bureaucracy responds to 
the policies of Member States which at this point defy 
the need for streamlining it, thus allowing the crime 
part to expand. 
One positive aspect in the bureaucratic process 
is the fact that in changing the legal status from an 
expert Committee to an intergovernmental Com-
mission, the UN crime programme has already been 
streamlined. Two developments contributed to this. 
First, the latter body allows the legalizing of relevant 
substantive recommendations with the ECOSOC 
and the GA much more easily than before. Second, 
it is currently a peer-to-peer process.248 Earlier and at 
the time of the transfer of mandates from the Com-
mittee to the Commission because of the absence of 
that process, there had been quite a debate249 on the 
legality of previously adopted United Nations cri-
minal justice standards and norms, including those 
which had originated from the quinquennial United 
Nations congresses on crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice (1955-1990). 
246 Swianiewicz 1965; Conquest 1968.
247 These two actions involved a very considerable lobbying effort. The senior management of the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian 
Affairs (CSDHA, the current UNODC), especially the Head of its Social Development Division, was in favour of retaining the original reporting 
procedure, fearing the loss of the importance of his Division and of the Commission on Social Development which it serviced. For the staff 
of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch which reported through that Division, making the expert committee independent of the 
Commission had been a top priority, and they proved to be the winner in the internal bureaucratic struggle. The expert Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control surrendered its own independence and existence in 1991 when through the Council it, de facto, requested the General 
Assembly to authorize the establishment of a new intergovernmental (functional) commission. 
248 However, as noted earlier, since the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice adopts its resolutions by consensus only, the inter-
governmental legalization process of certain drafts still remains very complex. For example, the nineteenth session of the Commission (2010) 
had difficulties in legalizing (that is, considering the text legally binding) preambular paragraph 9 of its resolution on “Strengthening crime 
prevention and criminal justice responses to violence against women” which invoked two Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 
(2008) on women and peace and security, because those two international legal instruments, although adopted by an intergovernmental 
(Security Council) mechanism, did not involve the G77 representation in the permanent membership of the Security Council. Eventually, the 
reservation intended by G77 to exclude the Security Council resolutions was not included in the report on the nineteenth session of the Com-
mission, and the text of paragraph 9 remained intact (E/2010/30). 
249 E/1993/32, p. 86, §3.
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Those congresses have always been composed 
of governmental delegates and individual experts, 
among other participants. While, in either case and 
with time, more and more States and individual ex-
perts have participated in the Congresses,250 in no 
case had the attendance of States been as representa-
tive as it was in the General Assembly. Member Sta-
tes that did not attend a congress had the chance to 
react to its outcome at the General Assembly. 
The relative non-representativeness of the con-
gresses and their hybrid nature had been gradual-
ly brought under scrutiny by Member States. At the 
First Congress (1955) the right to vote on its draft re-
solutions belonged to Member States,251 but parti-
cipants attending in a personal capacity and repre-
sentatives of non-governmental organizations could 
vote for “consultative purposes” (art. 21). Since the 
Sixth Congress (1980) onwards, the right to vote has 
been confined to Member States only.
With these changing rules of procedure, there 
were doubts regarding the legalization process of the 
resolutions of the congresses.252 They partly originat-
ed from expert bodies, such as the aforementioned 
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control or the 
expert groups preparing the congresses (1970-1980). 
The reason for questioning the legality of such an in-
Figure 3. Dynamics of governmental and individual participation at the United Nations 
congresses on crime prevention and criminal justice (1955-2010)
250 The number of Member States sending delegations to the congresses had continuously increased between the first and eleventh congress 
(1955-2005), and dropped at the Twelfth Congress (2010). This is probably because of the relatively remote location of the Congress, in Salva-
dor de Bahia and not in any other larger Brazilian city. That Congress had, however, the greatest number of individual participants, partly due 
to the very large number of individual Brazilian expert participants. 
251 Arts 18 and 19, doc. A/CONF.6/L.1.
252 Consequently, the General Assembly (but not for this reason only) has occasionally dropped from its resolutions some originally annexed reso-
lutions of Congresses (submitted by them to the GA until 1990), for its action or has merely “taken note” of them. In its decision 55/488 of 7 
September 2001, the General Assembly stated that its ”taking note” or ”noting” of a matter did not constitute either approval or disapproval, 
but rather was a neutral term. This decision and interpretation have been reiterated by the General Assembly on many occasions since then. 
Regarding other phrases, such as”adopts”, “approves”, “endorses” and “welcomes”, with different degrees of legal softness, see Clark 1994, 
ch. XI. 
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ternational law-generating process could be found in 
article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. In the first place the Statute recognizes, in 
international law disputes, the role of States as trea-
ty-makers, and only in the fourth place does it recog-
nize the ”teachings” of individual experts, but only 
those who are ”most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations.”253 
In any case, the transformative power of the 
congresses has been eventually qualified and re-
stricted after the assumption by the Commission of 
the role of a preparatory body for the United Nations 
crime prevention and criminal justice programme. 
Although in the rhetoric heard at the nineteenth 
session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice (2010) the congresses continued to 
be lauded as the “United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice General Assembly”, they have in 
fact lost that power ever since 1990, when they began 
to report to the General Assembly via the Commis-
sion. 
The debate over the legality of some “expert-ge-
nerated” recommendations contributing to the bo-
dy of United Nations standards and norms has then 
entered a new phase. First, at the recommendation 
of the Commission, ECOSOC reaffirmed the legali-
ty of all the standards and norms that had been ela-
borated so far.254 Nonetheless, some of the substan-
tive resolutions that had been adopted only by the 
Congresses (but not also by the General Assembly) 
remain as evidence of how nuanced the softness of 
law sourced by the UN crime programme can be. Se-
cond, after an expert group meeting on the use and 
application of the UN crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice standards and norms (Stadtschlaining, 
Burgenland, Austria, 2003), the Commission having 
considered its report,255 requested the holding of an 
intergovernmental expert group meeting. It was on-
ly after this meeting was held that the Commission 
acted on the recommendations originally proposed 
by individual experts.256 
This shows how individual expert ideas are fil-
tered through an intergovernmental mechanism, 
and how they may and can enter United Nations cri-
minal policy. Certainly, the United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme has be-
come less permeable to those individual ideas than 
before. But now and then it nonetheless remains re-
ceptive, especially through the non-governmental 
organizations that are in consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council. Moreover, the rules of 
the procedure of the United Nations congresses on 
crime prevention and criminal justice not only allow 
for individual and non-governmental participation, 
but also allow the submission to the congress of in-
dividual expert papers on their agendas. Permitting 
such expert contributions is rather rare for UN con-
ferences of that rank. 
The contributions of individual experts grew al-
so through their participation at the official congress 
workshops. At these occasions of combined diplo-
matic and academic interaction, concerns surface 
concerning the mutual appreciation of the accom-
plishments. Since workshop agendas focus less on 
the academic picture of the crime situation and more 
on practical recommendations for action, the usual 
academic mantra that “more research is needed”, of-
ten repeated by members of the scientific world, has 
not received much recognition by Member States. 
Notwithstanding this issue, since the introduc-
tion of the workshops in the official agenda of the 
United Nations congresses, they have gained con-
siderable relevance to both types of participants, 
projecting some practical actions. For example, 
the Twelfth Congress workshops on “Internation al 
criminal justice education for the rule of law” and 
“Practical approaches to preventing urban crime” 
 had for the first time opened an avenue for the 
operationalization of United Nations crime pre-
vention and criminal justice standards and norms 
in terms of their teaching and training. This hap-
pened not only by charting the respective way for-
253 Among individual expert participants at the congresses there have been such highly qualified experts. But their quality aside, another fact is 
that in their increasingly growing number there have only been a few who have left their trace in writing through their individual submissions, 
allowed by the rules of procedure of the congresses, and even fewer ones who have made really quality submissions. Still another fact is that 
the increasingly growing number of congress participants has been largely due to the inclusion by the host governments of such individuals 
in the membership of their delegations. Throughout the history of the UN congresses, such governments continuously outdid one another in 
this area, responding more and more to their domestic priorities rather than contributing individual expert knowledge to the congresses that 
can really be tapped. UN congresses, when held away from the UN headquarters, have been especially convenient venues for settling ”my 
country” priorities instead of enhancing their genuine international and transformative powers. But this in its own way helps spread the UN 
message.
254 ECOSOC resolution 1994/18 of 24 July 1994, §1.
255 E/CN.15/2003/10 and Add.1.
256 ECOSOC resolution 2004/28 of 21 July 2004, §6.
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ward for Member States and the UNODC (even-
tually through the Congress declaration), but also 
because both topics prompted a parallel ancillary 
meeting on “Crime prevention in urban areas and 
the role of universities in crime prevention pro-
grammes”. That latter meeting provided practical 
insights into how this has been done in Brazil and 
elsewhere. In conclusion, the transformative power 
of the United Nations congresses is still very pro-
nounced, although qualified to some extent. 
The need for that qualification was already felt 
at the Eighth Congress (Havana, Cuba, 1990), which 
had been opposed by the United States. It had felt 
uncomfortable not only with the venue, but, first of 
all, with the legislative power of the Congress. 
The year after the Havana Congress was a de-
fining and remarkable time. In 1991, the diplomacy 
and societies of both West and East Europe had even-
tually come closer to one another. Notwithstand ing 
lingering legal challenges to the role of the UN con-
gresses, East and West agreed with others (includ-
ing, however, some who were perfunctory in their 
agreement) to regard “penal matters” as genuinely 
international, and requiring global humane and ef-
fective approaches to dealing with them. Two great 
minds in the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control, the Soviet expert Vasyli P. Ignatov, and the 
U.S. expert Ronald L. Gainer should be commended 
for their respective and mutually reinforcing contri-
butions to that effect.
One can now connect the above convergen-
ce of views with Tocqueville’s counterintuitive (but 
surpris ingly prophetic in its own terms) observa-
tion on Russia and the United States in his book ”De-
mocracy in America”. If re-read as a part of the above 
bigger picture, the following quotation from that book 
shows the extent of the relationship between crime 
prevention and criminal justice and democracy:
”There are now two great nations in the world 
which, starting from different points, seem to be ad-
vancing toward the same goal: the Russians and the 
Anglo-Americans. Both have grown in obscurity, 
and while the world’s attention was occupied else-
where, they have suddenly taken their place among 
the leading nations, making the world take note 
of their birth and of their greatness almost at the 
same instant. All other peoples seem to have near-
ly reached their natural limits and to need nothing 
but to preserve them; but these two are growing … 
The American fights against natural obstacles; the 
Russian is at grips with men. The former combats 
the wilderness and barbarism; the latter, civiliza tion 
with all its arms. America’s conquests are made with 
the ploughshare, Russia’s with the sword. To attain 
their aims, the former relies on personal interest 
and gives free scope to the unguided strength and 
common sense of individuals. The latter in a sense 
concentrates the whole power of society in one man. 
One has freedom as the principal means of action; 
the other has servitude. Their point of departure is 
different and their paths diverse; nevertheless, each 
seems called by some secret desire of Providence 
one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the 
world.”257 
Since 1991 these two worlds have started to come 
together.
At about that time, the first meeting of the di-
rectors of central prison administrations took place 
in Messina (Italy), organized by the Programme 
Network’s now dormant International Centre for So-
ciological, Penal and Penitentiary Studies. At this 
meeting, for example the chiefs of the Russian and 
U.S. prison administrations met.
The year 1991 was a cut-off date also in another 
sense. Two years after renaming the United Nations 
Social Defence Research Institute the United Na-
tions Interregional Crime and Justice Research In-
stitute (1989), the UN crime programme had finally 
been ideologically disconnected from the social de-
fence movement with no nominal barriers. Since 1991 
the UN crime programme has plainly incorporat ed, 
alongside the social defence movement, all other hu-
manistic and progressive ideas to respond to crime 
under the newly constituted name. 
This can be regarded as the end of the history of 
the UN crime programme. But in no way does this 
complete its overview. In a very broad sense it only 
shows various directions in which it has developed 
since 1946, at the core of all of which there has been 
a strong social welfare orientation. 
In 2003, with the disbanding of the Centre 
for International Crime Prevention, it ceased to 
exist in the UN Secretariat, as a separate entity in 
its own terms. At its own will since 1992, the UN 
crime programme had changed its character by as-
suming new features through the United Nations 
intergovernmental machinery. These features made 
it more “diplomatic” and less “expert”, as if it had 
257 de Tocqueville 2008, Vol. I, ch. XVIII:351-352. For a more extensive, albeit Cold War, interpretation of the above quote see: Lerner 1957:938-
950.
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Picture 20. The United Nations General Assembly (1950) at its fifth session in Flushing Meadows (Queens, New York, 
USA), now the building of the Museum of Art
Picture 21. Perez de Cuelliar, Secretary-General, at a talk with members of the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control: Prof. Roger S. Clark (first to the left), General Vasyli P. Ignatov (first to the right, with his interpreter), Dusan 
Cotic (top right), accompanied by Dame Margaret J. Anstee, Under Secretary-General, UNOV, and Eduardo Vetere, 
Chief of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch
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lost much of the criminological substance, if not al-
so its heart and soul.258 
Delegations attending the intergovernment-
al Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice are more often than not composed of diplo-
mats, rarely of criminal justice experts, law enforce-
ment officials, criminologists or international crimi-
nal lawyers. The attending delegates, who are often 
from the permanent missions of their countries to 
the United Nations Office at Vienna participating in 
the Commission’s sessions, concentrate mostly on 
diplomatic aspects of the items at hand. The highly 
technical crime problems of a practical nature can 
rarely be addressed by the Commission in an expert 
manner. The exception is the one-day thematic de-
bates, which are debates by expert panellists on the 
criminological theme chosen by the Commission.
With the above exception, the substantive dis-
cussions at the Commission are, therefore, rather 
shallow. Quite often the Commission is satisfied 
with general exchanges. The flow of ideas between 
academia and praxis is weaker than before. But this 
flow of ideas does exist. The introduction of United 
Nations Basic principles on restorative justice is a 
case in point. The eighteenth session of the Commis-
sion (2009), which lasted seven rather than the usual 
five days, had been a breakthrough, perhaps even fa-
cilitating the return of the heart and soul of the UN 
crime programme. 
It seems that history has now truly made a full 
circle. In the newly created UNODC organogramme, 
which communicates the emergence of branches 
dealing with transnational organized crime, corrup-
tion and economic crime, health and sustainable 
live lihood (thus strongly reflecting its func tion as the 
custodian of two international conventions against 
transnational organized crime and corruption and 
three drug control conventions), there is also a small 
and weak section on crime prevention and criminal 
justice (Justice Section) – the reincarnation of the 
Social Defence Section, perhaps, but with some 60 
international soft law instruments at its disposal for 
implementation. In line with its central mandate it 
worked out for itself a mission statement, Bring just-
ice to the people and projected Justice at the heart of 
UNODC’s work. 
Figure 4 shows the above developments (the 
birth and rebirth of the United Nations Crime Pre-
vention and Criminal Justice Programme) on a spe-
cial timeline.
As of 2010, the UNODC has clearly amalgam ated 
the crime and drugs mandate into various intern-
al programme pillars in which, apparently, the word 
”drug” has vanished, whereas, but only nominally (i.e., 
in the UNODC’s name) it has remained as a signpost 
to its substantive mandates and to the budgetary pre-
ponderance of drugs over crime”259 The original UN 
crime mandate’s (1946-2002) criminological ingredi-
ents are now located within those pillars. 
From the UNODC operational perspective the 
substantive merger of the mandates is going quite well. 
From the criminological perspective, dealing with de-
viance and crime together has not really been any-
thing new. However, academic and practical crimino-
logical thinking may and does develop independently 
of one another, and therefore in this case, academia 
and bureaucracy are two autonomous processes.
In early 2010 an historic event took place for the 
UNODC, when the Security Council for the first time 
ever engaged in an in-depth discussion, at the glo-
bal level, of the threats to peace and security posed 
by drug trafficking and other organized criminal ac-
tivities. The Council invited the Secretary-General 
to regard these threats as a factor in conflict preven-
tion strategies, conflict analysis and the assessment 
and planning of integrated mission, and invited the 
UNODC Executive Director to give further regular 
briefings.260 Soon thereafter (around the time of the 
2010 General Assembly session on transnational or-
ganized crime), the UNODC launched its first report 
258 The Centre’s former staff members (several of whom contributed to this study by writing on specific issues that are dealt with in the text 
boxes) have moved on to other assignments. The disbanded Centre could no longer be an institutional nucleus for criminological thought. 
That thought dispersed. Traces of it can be found across the entire United Nations Secretariat and beyond. That capacity of the Centre can-
not be replaced. Inevitable as this might have been, what is now called in diplomacy the sentiment of the house nevertheless continues to 
exists, probably not only in the memory of some of its still active old staff members who had given their ”heart and soul” to the UN crime 
programme mandate, but also through the continuing work of the newcomers on various crime prevention and criminal justice ideas that 
earlier originated from it. However, the absence of the expert type of contributions to the UN crime programme is a strongly felt deficit. And 
some of the results of this are clearly visible. It is striking to note that the lack of institutional memory resulted in a situation where, when in 
2005 the programme published the ”Compendium of International Legal Instruments on Corruption” containing 21 of these instruments, the 
publication overlooked the 1979 United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the instrument from which the history of the 
anti-corruption efforts of the programme actually originated.
259 De lege ferenda its name should be “United Nations Office on Crime, Drugs and Justice”.
260 SC 9867. The invitation was expressed in the statement of the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2010/4). Such statements, read by the 
President at a public Security Council meeting, are actually consensus resolutions of the entire SC (which may vote on its other resolutions). 
Although closely resembling those SC resolutions in content, force and effect, they are generally considered as “less compelling” politically 
and legally, but are generally more difficult to achieve (Woodward 2010:255).
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Figure 4. 165 years of an international and United Nations response to crime
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entitled The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment. It shows that il-
licit trafficking in various commodities involves all 
major nations: the G8 and the BRIC countries (the 
fastest growing and largest emerging markets econ-
omies of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and 
the People’s Republic of China) alike, as well as re-
gional powers. It also shows how the criminal market 
spans the planet, and has turned into a global secu-
rity threat.
That earlier historic event, followed by the 
report’s launch, would probably not have taken place, 
had Member States not accepted the proposal of Po-
land made in 1996 to the General Assembly261 to start 
working on the United Nations convention against 
transnational organized crime, and had there not 
been the Naples Interministerial Meeting (1994), at 
the request of which the General Assembly adopted 
the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action 
Plan against Organized Transnational Crime.262 Of 
course, there had been several other meetings else-
where (Buenos Aires, Cairo, Chicago, Palermo), all of 
which contributed to the convention. 
Reworked and finalized by Member States, the 
draft was adopted by the General Assembly263 in 
2000.264 In 2003 the General Assembly adopted the 
Convention against Corruption.265
No doubt a crucial role in this process had been 
played by Eduardo Vetere, the Centre’s last Director, 
and a three-time Executive Secretary of the United 
Nations congresses on crime prevention and criminal 
justice (1990, 1995 and 2005). During his te nure the 
idea of a United Nations convention against crime 
was resuscitated. In 1991 it was proposed by the Rus-
sian member of the Committee on Crime Prevention 
and Control, Vasyli P. Ignatov.266 In the same year, at 
the afore-mentioned Versailles Ministerial Meeting 
on the Structure and Programme of Work of the Uni-
ted Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Programme, Costa Rica submitted a draft conventi-
on on international cooperation in crime prevention 
and criminal justice.267
Picture 22. General Vasyli P. Ignatov (Soviet 
Union) and Ronald Gainer (USA), both 
members of the United Nations Commit-
tee on Crime Prevention and Control
Picture 23. At the World Ministerial Conference on Transnational 
Organized Crime (Naples, 1994), chaired by Silvio Berlusconi, Prime 
Minister of Italy (in the middle). On his far right Giorgio Giacomel-
li, Under Secretary-General, Director General of UNOV; on the Chair-
man’s left Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (Deputy Chairman of the Confer-
ence, Minister of Justice, Poland) and to his left the author
261 A/C.3/51/7. That is why, originally, the later United Nations convention against Transnational Organized Crime was to be called ”The Warsaw 
convention”. When the General Assembly decided in 1999 to accept the invitation of Italy to hold the signing ceremony of that convention in 
Palermo (Italy), the convention came to be called the “Palermo convention”. The proposal to hold that conference in Warsaw was eventually 
not made by Poland for financial reasons.
262 A/49/159.
263 GA resolution 55/25, op. cit.
264 Vlassis 2001:356-362.
265 GA resolution 58/4 of 21 November 2003.
266 Clark 1994:49.
267 A/CONF. 156/CRP.1.
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VII The Programme Network 
of	Institutes	and	Non-
Governmental	Organizations
Figure 4 shows that in the United Nations, crime pre-
vention and criminal justice institutes have also been 
involved in the United Nations criminal justice re-
form process. UNAFEI and UNICRI deserve special 
mention. The idea of introducing institutes into the 
Programme had been in the offing since 1954, but 
had only started materializing since 1962 with the es-
tablishment of UNAFEI. Its first director (1962-1964) 
was Norval Morris (1923-2004), a renowned Austral-
ian and international criminologist, who had been 
unable at the time to institutionalize international 
criminological research in his own country where 
originally he had wanted it, with Sir John V. Barry as 
his mentor. 
After a visit to UNAFEI, Barry was so “taken up 
with an account of his UNAFEI experience” that ”he 
had determined to review the 1960 proposal for a like 
institute in Australia.”268 The Institute (AIC) was fi-
nally established in 1975 and affiliated with the Uni-
ted Nations in 1994. This painstakingly long process 
of institutionalization of international criminology 
in Australia is an indicator of “blue blood” coagula-
tion, beginning with Barry’s early very dismissive view 
of the United Nations (see BOX 9). But the eventu-
ally successful AIC affiliation process shows retro-
spectively not only the metamorphosis of his own in-
ternationality which had eventually received a true, 
genuine and lasting institutional expression. It al-
so shows a more constructive Australian general at-
titude to the United Nations, keeping in mind that 
it was the afore-mentioned Gareth Evans who first 
proposed to the world the Australian idea of ”good 
international citizenship”, followed by another idea, 
that of a United Nations ”blue book” (about which 
more below). 
UNICRI (formerly UNSDRI), established in 
1968, is the first global and truly United Nations en-
tity (i.e., it is a part of the United Nations Secretari-
at). In its earlier days, as indicated by the name of the 
United Nations Social Defence Research Institute, it 
was mandated to be the Secretariat’s research arm in 
promoting the social defence movement via the Uni-
ted Nations. There are now seventeen institutes and 
one specialized center in the Programme Network.
While each of the institutes has its own history, 
what is common for all of them are their changing 
fortunes that may depend not only on to what ex-
tent their directors and staff prioritize the work of 
the United Nations but, first of all, on the Govern-
ments which fund their international projects. This 
is connected with the changing sentiments vis-à-
vis the United Nations in general. The Australian 
example referred to above is by no means unique. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the UNODC enjoyed 
much stronger direct support from the Government 
of Canada between 1981 and 2002 than is currently 
the case (although note should be made of the fact 
that the Canadian Govermment continues to pro vide 
partial support to two institutes in Canada that are 
members of the Programme Network of Insti tutes). 
Also U.S. support, during the Bush administration, 
had been lukewarm. In conclusion, in the larger in-
ternational picture the Programme Network of In-
stitutes and the UN Secretariat share the same lot, 
where the sentiments of the major stakeholders 
change over time. 
The United Nations Crime Prevention and Cri-
minal Justice Programme also includes numerous 
non-governmental organizations. Their work pro-
gramme is even broader and entirely independent 
of that of the Programme. Solely at their own initia-
tive, the non-governmental organizations contribute 
their expertise to the Programme through various 
meetings, other advice, and, last but not least, finan-
cial contributions to the UNODC. 
268 Finnane 2007:242-243.
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Introduction
The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice Programme Network of Institutes (often referred 
to as the “Programme Network”, or the PNI) consists 
of 17 institutes (and one specialized centre) that have 
agreed to assist the United Nations Secretariat in is-
sues related to crime prevention and criminal justice. 
A. Four	waves	of	development
The Programme Network originally consisted of the 
Secretariat, one interregional research institute that 
was (and is) a full-fledged United Nations entity (the 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Re-
search Institute, established in 1968 and located in 
Italy), and four regional institutes that were (and are) 
affiliated with the United Nations (established in Ja-
pan in 1962, Costa Rica in 1975, Finland in 1981 and 
Uganda in 1987, and serving, respectively, Asia and 
the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, 
and Africa). Already on establishment, these institutes 
were specifically mandated to cooperate with the 
Secretariat on crime prevention and criminal justice 
issues.1
This original concept of a Programme Network 
sought to supplement the global and regional reach of 
the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice Programme in two ways. First, the institutes could 
provide the Secretariat with a regional perspective on 
the various issues at hand. Second, the institutes could 
augment the very limited capacity that the Secretariat 
(located as it is in Vienna) has for technical assistance 
and other activity requested by the Member States. 
During a second wave of Programme Network 
expansion (roughly the 1980s and 1990s), the inter-
regional UN institute and the regional institutes were 
joined by a regional institute covering the Arab world 
(located in Saudi Arabia), an Australian government 
research institute (AIC) serving also the Pacific, a 
scientific institute in Italy focusing largely on human 
rights and criminal law, and two international centres 
located in Canada, one focusing on crime prevention, 
and the second on criminal law reform and criminal 
justice policy. In addition, the International Scientific 
and Professional Advisory Council (ISPAC) joined the 
Programme Network.
This second wave thus enhanced the regional 
perspective (by bringing in institutes focusing on the 
Arab and the Pacific regions), and also brought in in-
stitutes with expertise in specific issues. ISPAC, in turn, 
provide a structure for cooperation between the Sec-
retariat and those non-governmental organizations 
and academic institutions that are involved in crime 
prevention and criminal justice issues.
During a third wave of expansion, three national 
criminological research institutes (in the United States, 
the Republic of Korea and South Africa; this last insti-
tute seeks to serve also the broader southern African 
region) and a Swedish institute focusing on human 
rights and humanitarian law joined the Programme 
Network.
A fourth wave of expansion started in 2007 with 
the inclusion in the PNI of the Basel Institute on Gov-
ernance/the International Centre for Asset Recovery, 
and in 2011 the College for Criminal Law Science at 
the Beijing Normal University (PRC). The contributions 
of the Basel Institute enhance international assistance 
for the recovery of stolen assets (as per chapter V of 
the UNCAC). The contributions of the College contrib-
ute to the internationalization of domestic criminal 
justice reform through increasingly practical exchang-
es and engagements, according to UN criminal policy 
recommendations.
Matti Joutsen
The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice  
Programme Network of Institutes
BOX	6
1  The first wave of PNIs development (UNAFEI, UNDSRI) is described in: B. Alper, B & F. Boren, with a foreword by William Clifford, Crime: 
International Agenda. Concern and Action in the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, 1846-1972, D.C. Heath and Company/
Lexington, Mass. – Toronto – London 1972:103-109, and M. Finnane (with the assistance of John Myrtle), JV Barry: A Life, University of 
New South Wales Press 2007: 235-245; 249-250. It shows quite a complex picture of political circumstances in which UNAFEI (rather than 
AIC) has first emerged as a forerunner of the regional institutionalization of international criminology. As for UNICRI, it is one of five re-
search institutes in the United Nations Secretariat. There are also two training institutes (UN Staff Training College and the United Nations 
University). 

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B. The	PNIs	and	the	Commission	on	Crime	
Prevention	and	Criminal	Justice
The institutes report annually on their programme of 
work and its implementation to the United Nations 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. 
One of the functions of the Commission is to facilitate 
and to help coordinate the activities of the institutes. 
The Commission may request the institutes, subject to 
the availability of resources, to implement selected el-
ements of the programme and suggest areas for inter-
institute activities. 
Indeed, ideally, the Programme Network should 
significantly enhance the resources available to the 
Secretariat to carry out the policy laid down by the 
Commission. In theory, for example, the specialized 
institutes could contribute to the preparation of prior-
ity issues for discussion at the Commission or the Con-
gresses, and contribute world-wide to technical assis-
tance activities in their fields of expertise. The regional 
institutes, in turn, could ensure that Secretariat docu-
ments going to the Commission and the Congresses 
properly reflect the different priorities and concerns 
of the regions, and they can also provide research, 
training and other technical assistance services to the 
member states.
C. The	PNIs	and	the	United	Nations	
Secretariat
This ideal scheme of cooperation between the Sec-
retariat and the institutes, however, is significantly 
hampered by a number of factors, in particular the 
differences in the mandates, priorities, orientation, 
capacities, and funding bases of the institutes. As 
noted, only the interregional and the regional insti-
tutes have been specifically established to work with 
the Secretariat and more broadly to contribute to the 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Programme. The other institutes must remain mind-
ful of their original mandate, which for example in 
the case of the national institutes in Australia, South 
Africa, South Korea and the United States is under-
standably focused on national priorities in crime and 
justice. Quite simply, their management structure may 
not allow the institutes to carry out UN-related activi-
ties, unless these at the same time contribute to the 
basic mission of the institute in question.
Even when and if the respective institutes are 
prepared to assist the Secretariat, there are inherent 
limits in respect of their orientation, capacities and 
funding. Some of the institutes focus on research, 
others on training. Some of the institutes (such as 
the national institutes as well as the regional insti-
tutes for Asia and the Pacific and for Europe, which 
are funded primarily by their host government) have 
a relatively stable funding base, allowing them some 
flexibility when deciding whether or not to assist the 
Secretariat. Others, in turn, rely on voluntary contribu-
tions, and in many cases these voluntary contributions 
have been fairly meagre. Although these institutes 
would be prepared to provide assistance, they simply 
do not have the resources to do so. And in all of the 
institutes, the regular staff may not have the time or 
the background necessary to respond to a Secretariat 
request for assistance.
Such factors may explain why the discussions at 
the Commission on coordination of the work of the 
institutes have usually been quite limited. The Com-
mission often finds that the institutes are unable to 
respond to requests and, therefore, will understand-
ably not bother to ask.
The above limits notwithstanding, a significant 
amount of cooperation takes place between the Sec-
retariat and the institutes, and among the institutes 
themselves. This cooperation has been fostered by 
regular coordination meetings, a tradition dating back 
to 1984 (at the initiative of the institute in Saudi Ara-
bia). The coordination has been most evident in the 
organization, since 1985, of one or more workshops at 
each of the quinquennial United Nations Congresses. 
This role of the institutes was formally recognized by 
the United Nations Commission in 2001. Also since 
2001, the institutes in the Programme Network have 
cooperated in organizing practical workshops and 
other events during the annual sessions of the United 
Nations Commission. Generally, these workshops 
have focused on the theme of the annual session in 
question, thus in principle enriching the Commission’s 
discussion on the matter.
In addition to the cooperation with and among 
the institutes, individual institutes have given their 
own contributions to the Programme. This has often 
taken the form of comments on, or actual first drafts 
of, Secretariat papers on their area of expertise, or the 
organization of expert meetings and training activities 
related to United Nations priorities. The interregional 
and the regional institutes have assisted in develop-
ing the UN surveys on crime and criminal justice, on 
victimization, and on violence against women. They as 
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well as several of the specialized institutes have also 
contributed for example to work on the implementa-
tion of UN standards and norms.
Individual institutes carry out cooperation and 
projects with one or more sister institutes on an ad 
hoc basis.
Further information on the institutes, their activities 
and publication can be obtained via their home page 
on the Internet:
Australian Institute of Criminology  
(Canberra, Australia): www.aic.gov.au
European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 
affiliated with the United Nations (Helsinki, Finland): 
http://www.heuni.fi
Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa): 
www.iss.org.za
International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and 
Criminal Justice Policy (Vancouver, Canada):  
www.icclr.law.ubc.ca
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 
(Montreal, Canada): www.crime-prevention-intl.org 
International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal 
Sciences (Siracusa, Italy): www.isisc.org
International Scientific and Professional Advisory 
Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention  
and Criminal Justice Programme (Milan, Italy):  
www.ispac-italy.org
Korean Institute of Criminology (Seoul, The Republic 
of Korea): www.kic.re.kr/english/index.asp
Naif Arab University for Security Sciences (Riyadh, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia): www.nauss.edu.sa
National Institute of Justice (Washington, D.C., USA) 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and  
Humanitarian Law (Lund, Sweden): www.rwi.lu.se
United Nations African Institute for the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Kampala, 
Uganda): www.unafri.or.ug
United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(Tokyo, Japan): www.unafei.or.jp/english/index.htm
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice  
Research Institute (Turin, Italy): http://www.unicri.it
United Nations Latin American Institute for the  
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(San José, Costa Rica): www.ilanud.or.cr
The Basel Institute on Governance  
www.baselgovernance.org .
College for Criminal Law Science, Beijing Normal2 
University (Beijing, Peoples’ Republic of China),  
www.criminallawbnu.cn
D.	Conclusion
The above network of institutes has emerged to pro-
vide the UN Secretariat with a needed regional per-
spective as well as added expertise in specific areas. 
In addition, by supplementing the limited resources 
of the Secretariat, the institutes enhance the ability 
of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Pro-
gramme to respond to the needs of Member States 
through research, training and other technical assis-
tance. ¢
2 The term “normal school” originated in the early 19th century from the French école normale. The French concept of an “école normale” was 
to provide a model school with model classrooms to teach model teaching practices to its student teachers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Normal_school ).
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Picture 24. The President of Po-
land Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
addressing the United Nations 
General Assembly (1996) while 
submitting for its consideration 
the draft framework conven-
tion against transnational or-
ganized crime
Picture 25. Giorgio Giaco-
melli, Under Secretary-Gener-
al, Director General of UNOV 
with Göran Mellander, Direc-
tor of the Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute (Lund, Sweden), Mi-
kael Johansson (RWI), Henrik 
Ander sen and the author (both 
CSDHA/UNOV) at the ceremo-
ny affiliating RWI with the Unit-
ed Nations (1996)
Picture 26. Signing ceremony 
of the Memorandum of Under-
standing between the Korean 
Institute of Criminology and 
the UNODC (Prof. Jae Sang 
Lee, Director of the KIC and the 
author)
124
Picture 29. During the twentieth session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
(2011), the meeting of the Executive Director of the UNODC, MR. Yuri Fedotov, with the representa-
tives of non-governmental organizations
Picture 27. Collage: Signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the College for Criminal Law 
Science/CCLS (Beijing Normal University, PRC) and the UNODC (among those sitting behind the table from the left: 
Prof. Zhao Bingzhi, Dean, CCLS; Mr. Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the UNODC and John Sandage, UNODC Direc-
tor of the Division for Treaty Affairs. Across the same desk, facing them from left to right are the representatives of 
UNAFEI, UNICRI, ISISC, ISPAC, HEUNI, KIC, NAUSS and RWI (2011) 
Picture 28. Staff of the Programme 
Network Institutes at a meeting in 
the Vienna International Centre 
(2001). From right to left: Miki-
nao Kitada (UNAFEI), Kauko Aro-
maa and Terhi Viljanen (HEUNI), 
Mohsen Ahmed (NAUSS), Brian 
Tkachuk, Yvon Dandurand and 
Daniel Prefontaine (ICCLR & CJP), 
and Anna Alvazzi del Frate (UNIC-
RI), in company with Gary Hill (IS-
PAC) 
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Introduction
When after more than twenty years after the es-
tablishment of the International Prison Commission 
(later the International Penal and Penitentiary Com-
mission - IPPC), the United States and United King-
dom officially and without any reservations joined it 
in 1895,1 the hybrid (semi-official) nature of such an 
international non-governmental organization (NGO) 
and the international congresses convened by it 
became a fact of life. Individual experts and govern-
ments cooperated with one another organizationally 
in various forms. Hybrid organizations such as the 
IPPC have since their inception (the first international 
NGOs were founded around 1850)2 remained at the 
forefront of the goal of universalism in world polity. 
The intergovernmental League of Nations and the 
United Nations have enabled and accepted the NGO 
contributions, confirming that the world polity is in-
deed one, albeit developed by mutually reinforcing 
tensions between the States and NGOs. Especially 
around the time of the First and Second World Wars, 
these tensions resulted in a decline in the establish-
ment of international NGOs.3
A.	What	are	the	NGOs?
The phrase “non-governmental organization” only 
came into popular use with the establishment of the 
United Nations in 1945 (art. 71 of its Charter). The 
definition of “international NGO” is given in ECOSOC 
resolution 288 (X) of 27 February 1950. It is “any in-
ternational organization that is not founded by an 
international treaty”. The exponential growth of such 
NGOs has started in 1946-1947 and continues until 
the present time. 
Among the international NGOs (the total number 
of which in the United Nations amounts to 3,500) that 
may attend various official conferences of the United 
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Pro-
gramme, there are those with “general”, “special” and 
“roster” consultative ECOSOC status. Those in gen-
eral consultative status, “broadly representative” and 
“concerned with most of the activities of the Council” 
must document that their programme outreach and 
delivery is cross-sectoral. Those in special consultative 
status, i.e. “organizations with special competence” in 
a few ECOSOC fields, should make contributions to the 
development of the United Nations Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Programme. Those on the roster 
“can make occasional and useful contributions”. 
B.	Which	NGOs	are	active	in	the	 
UN	Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	 
Justice	programme?
The International Association of Penal Law (1924), 
the International Society for Criminology (1938), the 
International Society for Social Defence (1949), and 
the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation 
(1951) are traditionally considered to be the “Big 
Four” group of NGOs because of their founding roles 
in the United Nations Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice Programme. In addition to the “Big Four”, 
special mention should also be made of the Howard 
League for Penal Reform (1921). Further, this big-
ger group now includes such important NGOs as the 
American Correctional Association (1870), the Inter-
national Law Association (1873), Pax Romana (1921), 
Soroptimist International (1921), Friends World Com-
mittee for Consultation (Quakers, 1937), the American 
Society of Criminology (1941), the International Police 
Association (1950), the International Commission for 
Catholic Prison Pastoral Care (1950), Amnesty Interna-
tional (1961), the Academy of Criminal Justice Scienc-
es (1963), Prison Fellowship International (1976), the 
Jolanta Redo
Non-Governmental Organizations in the United Nations  
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme
BOX	7
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1 N. K. Teeters, Deliberations of the International Penal and Penitentiary Congresses. Questions and Answers 1872-1935, Temple University 
Book Store, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1949:26.
2 Ch. Chatfield, Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Associations to 1945, (in) J. Smith, Ch. Chatfield & R. Pagnucco (eds.), 
Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997: 19; 
Bill Seary, The early history: From the Congress in Vienna to the San Francisco Conference (in:) P. Willets (ed.), The conscience of the world: 
The influence of non-governmental organizations in the UN System, London, Hurst 1996: 15-30.
3 J. Boli, G. M. Thomas, World culture in the world polity: a century of international non-governmental organization, American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 62, April 1997: 171-190.
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World Society of Victimology (1979), the Asia Crime 
Prevention Foundation (1982), the Internati onal Soci-
ety for Traumatic Stress Studies (1985), the Academic 
Council on the United Nations System (1987), Penal 
Reform International (1989), the Open Society Insti-
tute (1993), and the International Police Executive 
Symposium (1994).
NGOs with consultative and associated status be-
long to the two United Nations crime prevention and 
criminal justice alliances, the first established in 1972 
in New York (USA) and the second in 1983 in Vienna 
(Austria). From there they interact with the relevant 
United Nations policy-making bodies (General As-
sembly, Economic and Social Council, Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice). 
Some of the NGO members of the two NGO al-
liances are also members of the NGO Committee on 
Peace in Vienna. The members of the latter commit-
tee promote peace, culture and education through 
personal change and social contribution, thus contrib-
uting to the prevention of a culture of violence and 
nuclear abolition. That process has been historically 
ignited by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
at the end of the Second World War. Various NGOs, 
including especially Soka Gakkai International (1975), 
a worldwide lay Buddhist association of twelve million 
members, since 1983 has been active with others in 
the United Nations in public education for peace and 
disarmament, human rights and sustainable develop-
ment.
C.	NGOs	in	the	world
There are also numerous NGOs associated with the 
UN system that do not hold consultative status. They 
represent a large range of vital interests, in areas such 
as social justice, human rights, governance, gender, 
peace and disarmament, environment and sustain-
able development. 
Cross-sectorally these NGOs collaborate with 
their larger community through the United Nations 
Committee of Non-governmental Organizations, with 
its standing committees which follow issues that are 
of key substantive interest relative to their mandates 
and objectives.
The total number of internationally operating 
NGOs is estimated to be 35,000. Their budget appar-
ently exceeds that of the United Nations (without the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).4 
The numbers of other NGOs are far greater. For ex-
ample5, Russia has 277,000 NGOs. India is estimated 
to have between one million and two million NGOs. 
Just as they often are in their nascent stage, NGOs 
may today still be purely “technical”, but in developing 
countries they may also fulfil human rights watchdog 
functions. 
Unlike States, NGOs can neither make nor enforce 
law, but NGOs have successfully worked in and around 
the UN system by advocating new crime prevention 
and criminal justice standards and norm and devel-
oping new UNODC programmes. They are becoming 
increasingly integrated by networks of exchange, com-
petition, and cooperation. 
Separately or together, thus overcoming their 
own “universalization of particularism”,6 but re-
ally acting worldwide, the international NGOs of the 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice Programme make joint recommendations to the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
and/or individually contribute to the implementation 
of the work programme of the United Nations Office 
on Drugs, financially or in-kind. Rules of procedure 
permitting, these NGOs participate also in other inter-
governmental conferences of the Programme. Further 
extension of the ECOSOC consultative arrangements 
has been debated since the mid-1990s. In the mean-
time, the General Assembly and its main committees 
have increasingly involved NGOs in their deliberations, 
both informally, through round-table meetings and 
panel discussions, and formally, through invitations to 
the special sessions and conferences convened under 
its auspices, and, more recently, through the biennial 
high-level dialogue. The Security Council can organize 
individual consultations with the NGOs.
In 2004, in response7 to the Report of the Panel 
of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society 
Relations which proposed to formally open the GA to 
NGO participation, the Secretary-General proposed 
to standardize these practices, so that they become 
a regular component of the General Assembly’s work. 

4 J. Keane, A new cosmology (in:) H. K. Anheier, M. Glasius, M. Kaldor (eds.), Global Civil Society 2001,  Oxford University Press, 2001: 26.
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization
6 R. Robertson, Globalization or Glocalization, Journal of International Communication, 1 (1) 1994: 33-52.
7 A/59/354 (13 September 2004), Report of the Secretary-General in response to the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United 
Nations-Civil Society Relations, § 10.
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VIII Commission	on	Crime	 
  Prevention	and	Criminal	 
  Justice
One positive aspect of the bureaucratic process has 
been the fact that in changing the legal status of the 
expert Committee to that of the intergovernmental 
Commission, the UN crime programme has already 
been streamlined, since the latter body makes it pos-
sible to legalize the relevant substantive recommen-
dations with the ECOSOC and the GA much more 
easily than before, and also since it is a peer-to-peer 
process.269
The change in the legal status of the UN crime 
mandate programming body strengthened its posi-
tion vis-à-vis other ECOSOC functional commissi-
ons and vis-à-vis Member States.270 The United Na-
tions’ new crime prevention and criminal justice 
programme is being resurrected. Presently it is still 
overshadowed by the drug control work programme. 
The resurrection of the programme is best rep-
resented by a variety of documents, including UNO-
DC research publications, which gradually came to 
match the standard and outreach of the UN “Global 
Report on Crime and Justice” (1999) and may surpass 
that level soon. 
For example, prior to major events, the Assembly 
could institute the practice of holding interactive hear-
ings between Member States and NGO representa-
tives that have the necessary expertise on the issues 
on the agenda.
A survey of programme activities of some 6,000 
international NGOs (1875-1988) found that power re-
mains in the hands of States, but the impact of the 
NGOs on the world socio-economic and cultural devel-
opments is substantial.8
D.	Conclusion
Along with the global demographic and labour mar-
ket changes, the work of NGOs is no longer regarded 
as the privilege of older people. First, the world has 
now a very high proportion of youth. They are more 
idle but better educated, at least formally, in an over-
supplied insecurity-conscious job market.9 This 300 
million unemployed “youth bulge” (approximately 
25% of the entire youth world population) live be-
low the US $ 2 per day poverty line.10 Those better 
educated can be members of NGOs, while those less 
privileged form their target groups. That is the only 
arena that can absorb all the people who are not 
needed in the market or the government. Social skills 
are the only ones the computer cannot take over. The 
alternative is having more candidates for jobs offered 
by organized criminals and then putting more peo-
ple in prisons. Without a serious debate and action 
on this, there is going to be more crime and more 
violence. People forced out of the marketplace will 
seek to earn illegitimately what they cannot earn le-
gitimately.11 For the NGOs in crime prevention and 
criminal justice this may be an odd chance for further 
growth. ¢
8 J. Boli, G. M. Thomas, op. cit. 
9 See further; U.S. Population Reference Bureau, The World’s Youth Population Data Sheet 2006. 6,  http://www.prb.org/pdf06/WorldsYouth-
2006DataSheet.pdf.
10 P. Lock, Crime and violence: Global economic parameters (2006) http://www.libertysecurity.org/article940.html.
11 J. Rifkin, The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era. Putnam Publishing Group 1995.
269 Earlier and at the time of the transfer of mandates from the Committee to the Commission, there had been quite a debate (E/1993/32:86, 
§3) on the legality of previously adopted United Nations criminal justice standards and norms, including those which had originated from the 
quinquennial United Nations congresses on crime prevention and criminal justice (1955-1990).
270 E/1990/31/Add.1, §§ 43-45; A/46/703, §57.
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Introduction
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice (Crime Commission) was established in 1992 to 
address concerns that had been expressed about the 
pre-existing Committee on Crime Prevention and Con-
trol in a series of meetings beginning with the Seventh 
United Nations Congress (1985). Many reasons for the 
1992 changes are discussed in the various documents, 
but the major concerns appear to have been the fact 
that Member States felt that the pre-existing Pro-
gramme lacked the profile and resources it needed to 
address the concerns of governments about domestic 
and transnational crime problems, and that the exist-
ing arrangements did not ensure sufficient govern-
mental participation or oversight. 
A.	Political	and	substantive	functions	of	 
the	Commission
The Commission, which was established in 1991 and 
first convened in April of 1992, is intended to be the 
principal UN policy-making body with respect to crime 
prevention and criminal justice1 and to have a compre-
hensive competence over such matters. This includes 
both proactive and reactive aspects and crime which 
is both transnational nature, or which occurs within 
individual Member States.2 In essence, its substantive 
mandate is to consider any issues which may be re-
ferred to it as crime prevention and criminal justice 
subject-matter by the Member States, subject to oth-
er bodies with more specific mandates, including the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the Conferences 
of States Parties to the 2000 and 2003 conventions 
against transnational organized crime and corruption. 
Even where another body has a more specific, over-
lapping mandate, the competence of the Commission 
over crime matter remains: the Commission is merely 
directed to consider the need to avoid such overlaps. 
This ensures that there is comprehensive coverage of 
the subject matter, which is essential because crime 
issues are inherently difficult to classify, frequently 
overlap with other areas and can change substantially 
as crime and the reactions of Member States to it 
evolve over time. 
The open-ended nature of its jurisdiction sup-
ports one of the most critical functions of the Com-
mission, that of simply delineating the subjective and 
objective scope of global crime. It serves to identify 
at an early stage any new or emerging crime prob-
lem encountered by one State in objective factual 
terms, and disseminate information to all. In sub-
jective terms, “crime” includes any sort of harmful 
conduct the Member States choose to label as crime 
and respond to with crime prevention and criminal 
justice measures, and the Commission provides 
the primary forum in which Member States can ex-
press and respond to views about whether various 
subject matter warrants a crime prevention and/or 
criminal justice response or should be dealt with as 
a non-criminal issue. As the twentieth session (2011) 
passes, this poses one of the most serious challenges 
to the Commission. It faces issues of much greater 
scope and diversity than was originally envisaged, 
with much less time and resources than were origi-
nally allocated. While the extrabudgetary resources 
allocated for crime prevention, criminal justice, and 
terrorism-prevention projects has increased substan-
tially since the Commission was first convened, the 
resources available for the Commission itself have 
actually been reduced. Since 2005, its annual ses-
sions have been reduced from eight sitting days to 
five, and at the twentieth session, dramatic reduc-
tions in the capacity to produce documents in all lan-
guages were announced.
At the same time as its capacity has been eroded, 
the demands on the Commission and on national del-
egations to its sessions, has increased. The criminal 
law aspects of issues such as the protection of the 
environment and cultural heritage property are now 
coming before the Crime Commission with increasing 
frequency. Given the functions of the Commission and 
the positions of many Member States that these war-
rant a crime prevention and criminal justice response, 
Christopher Ram
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice:  
A Search for Complimentarity Between Politics and Criminology
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1 ECOSOC resolution 1992/22, Part IV, op. § 4.
2 See, for example, A/46/152, p. § 7, and op. § 3. 
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this is entirely appropriate, but also unsustainable 
from the standpoint of the management of Commis-
sion sessions and the production of documents. It also 
poses a major challenge to delegations, which must 
be expanded to include expertise in what for some 
Member States are nor crime prevention and criminal 
justice issues.  
As with other functional commissions of the 
ECOSOC, the Crime Commission is intended as a 
forum for considering expert assessments of crime 
problems. Substantive experts bring actual knowl-
edge on how crime works, how it affects Member 
States and their populations, and how to gain further 
knowledge, an especially critical function as crime 
itself globalises and factors such as technological 
change produce an ever-accelerating evolution of 
crime, and as a place where States in need of techni-
cal assistance could be brought together with States 
willing and able to provide it. One of its founding 
documents states that: 
“Each Member State shall make every effort to en-
sure that its delegation includes experts and sen-
ior officials with special training and practical ex-
perience in crime prevention and criminal justice, 
preferably with policy responsibility in the field”.3
It is also clear, however, that political functions, 
generally brought before it by the Member States’ 
foreign ministries and diplomatic representatives, are 
also central to the work of the Commission. These in-
clude marshalling and contributing financial resourc-
es and holding UNODC and other UN bodies account-
able for how they are spent, general oversight of the 
work of the Secretariat, and coordinating the work 
of the Commission with other bodies, especially in 
areas such as rule of law, narcotics and human rights, 
where overlapping or dual-aspect subject matter is 
often encountered. At its most fundamental level, 
however, the work of diplomatic representatives in 
the Commission consists of articulating the political 
will of the various Member States. Diplomatic ex-
perts serve as channels of communication, bringing 
the political views of their governments into the 
Commission, taking back their assessments of the 
political views of other States, both individually and 
collectively, and ultimately conveying the consent of 
each Member State to join consensus on outcomes. 
They are the means whereby governments seek to 
influence the Commission, and whereby the Com-
mission itself seeks to influence the views of their 
governments in return.
Without the former, diplomatic discourse would 
be sterile and devoid of underlying substance, and 
without the latter there would be substance, but little 
or no meaningful discourse or transfer of substantive 
knowledge from one State to another. A balance of the 
two gives the Commission a function similar to that of 
domestic legislatures in establishing legitimacy. Unlike 
legislatures, the outputs of the Commission are not 
usually legislative or prescriptive in nature, but they 
are seen by the Member States and their populations 
as valid and legitimate because they are the output of 
open and transparent deliberations, first in establish-
ing criminological validity, and second in establishing 
political consensus.
B.	The	Commission’s	responsibilities	before	
other	UN	policy-making	bodies
The Commission can also be seen as a boundary body 
in both a vertical and horizontal sense. From a verti-
cal perspective, most of the subordinate bodies the 
Commission creates consist primarily of substance 
experts mandated to conduct research and produce 
analytical reports, and much of its Secretariat per-
forms a similar function. The bodies to which the 
Commission itself reports, on the other hand, the 
ECOSOC and General Assembly, are primarily diplo-
matic bodies set up to take substantive input from 
functional expert bodies and integrate these into the 
larger global framework. From a horizontal perspec-
tive, proposals to use crime prevention and criminal 
justice measures frequently entail subject-matter 
that may not necessarily be seen as criminal in itself, 
but rather a policy decision on the part of Member 
States to use the criminal law as a means of imple-
menting or enforcing non-criminal policies in areas 
such as human rights, good governance, rule of law, 
or environmental law. This is reflected in the fact that 
the Commission and its delegations must frequently 
coordinate with the work of other bodies, and in 
the fact that UNODC has, under the oversight of the 
Commission, a key role as the source of criminal jus-
tice expertise for the rest of the UN secretariat, who 
have need of it on an issue-by-issue basis.

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Both the diplomatic/political and criminologi-
cal elements are essential, but they can be difficult 
to reconcile, and a balance is needed to ensure that 
what is produced is valid in substantive terms, while 
at the same time being viable in political terms. 
The tension between politics and criminology is not 
unique to the Commission. It is mirrored in debates 
that regularly arise in most if not all Member States, 
and with which all criminologists are familiar. Indeed, 
the Commission`s proceedings often parallel domestic 
debates in which one side of the political spectrum 
advocates reactive and retributive policies seen as 
providing “just desserts” punishments and strong, 
effective deterrence, while the other side advocates 
social reforms, proactive measures and restorative 
justice sentencing. What is different in the Commis-
sion is that, while individual States (or at least those 
with regular democratic changes in government) tend 
to oscillate back and forth between these policies, the 
Commission tends to try to articulate all policies all 
the time, reflecting the fact that its Members tend to 
collectively reflect a full range of political philosophies 
as individual countries shift back and forth. In a global 
crime environment, this has value both in disseminat-
ing information among the Member States and stabi-
lising the policy oscillation by intermingling the various 
political and ideological positions in play, injecting an 
element of pragmatism and bringing some degree of 
consistency and continuity over the longer time-scales 
that govern international policy-making.
C.	Capacity	and	resources
Since its inception, the Commission and its secre-
tariat have faced a steadily-increasing workload with 
steadily-diminishing capacity in terms of duration and 
documentation and other resources, which has in-
creased pressure to do more with less. The duration of 
annual sessions was reduced from eight days to five in 
2005, which has limited time for discussions, made it 
difficult to produce translated versions of texts under 
negotiation, and forced more parallel meetings which 
smaller delegations cannot attend. The regular budget 
allocation for the Commission and its work have been 
subject to a de facto freeze since the late 1980s, with 
the result that an annually increasing shortfall in the 
amount of any inflation plus any actual increase in 
mandated workload has been created. This has been 
made up by the voluntary contribution of extra-budg-
etary resources, which have risen from about 75% to 
over 90% of UNODC’s overall budget since the Com-
mission was established. One consequence has been 
some degree of shift of control or influence over the 
policy agenda and controversy between recipient 
States, who want policy priorities set in the Commis-
sion, and the donors, who often articulate priorities by 
“earmarking” their contributions to specific projects 
that reflect their priorities. This debate, along with the 
need for joint oversight by the Crime and Drug Com-
missions, led to the establishment of an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group on finance and gov-
ernance in 2009. The debate has become more acute 
in the context of the recent global financial crisis and 
the erosion of both voluntary contributions and dues 
assessments (some of which depend on economic or 
development indicators). One consequence of this has 
been a dramatic reduction in the resources available 
to produce written documents submitted to the Com-
mission, and the Report of the Commission itself, in 
the six official languages of the U.N. 
At the twentieth session, these pressures re-invig-
orated efforts to make the sessions of the Commission 
itself more efficient, including decisions to require the 
early submission of draft resolutions to ensure avail-
ability in languages at the beginning of each session 
and to allow the Member States to prepare and select 
appropriate expert delegates beforehand. These and 
other reforms may well succeed in making the Com-
mission more efficient than it already is, and one must 
always be optimistic, but they do nothing to address 
the underlying fact that chronic underfunding of the 
capacity of the Commission to do its work has severely 
limited what the Commission can accomplish. As with 
any intergovernmental body, the work is expensive, 
but the increasing importance with which the Member 
States regard transnational crime problems is clearly 
evident in the extrabudgetary resources they have al-
located, the perception of States that it is not just a 
social issue but a matter of regional security and eco-
nomic globalisation, and the increasing politicisation 
of the Commission itself and the vigour with which 
many recent resolutions have been negotiated. Given 
the importance of these issues to Member States, 
the Commission represents substantial value as the 
primary forum for developing international responses 
and supporting domestic responses, but it falls far 
short of its potential and will continue to do so until 
Member States take the funding of responses to crime 
as seriously as they take the problem of crime itself.

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D.	The	search	for	balance
The search for balance is also made difficult by the fact 
that the political and diplomatic side of the equation 
tends to have most of the influence: diplomats are the 
channel of communication to political governments, 
they tend to control financial resources, and they are 
resident in Vienna. Assembling a group of substantive 
experts on subjects such as juvenile justice or eco-
nomic crime is expensive, difficult, and may encoun-
ter active opposition from States who prefer to avoid 
subject matter that might be embarrassing to them, 
or who seek to allocate the resources to other subject 
matter that their governments see as a greater prior-
ity. Assembling a group of diplomatic representatives 
is much easier and less expensive, but also far more 
limited in what they can achieve. Such groups can be 
very effective in financial and management discus-
sions on which they themselves are experts, but any 
substantive discussion about crime is either devoid of 
substance or reduced to a time-consuming exercise 
in which they articulate the views of experts at home 
based on instructions but are not able to conduct any 
form of substantive discourse on a real-time basis. Per-
haps the best recent examples of this have been Com-
mission intersessional meetings, which have produced 
useful management texts, but which have consistently 
failed to reach agreement on substantive and themat-
ic Commission agenda items which can support coher-
ent debate in the Commission, and which are usually 
not agreed sufficiently far in advance to permit expert 
participants to be identified, coordinated and properly 
prepared for the discussions. This disconnect also be-
comes a factor in the search for adequate resources 
for the work, when there is no consensus between 
crime experts, who seek mandates and resources to 
develop factual information about crime; legal, policy 
and practical responses to crime; and to deliver assis-
tance to Member States which seek it; and diplomatic 
experts who generally articulate the desire of the 
Member States to minimise costs. While it is clearly 
important to have both inputs in order to ensure ac-
countability in budgetary matters, the record so far is 
not very encouraging as the Commission commences 
its third decade.
E.	Conclusion
However difficult the search, a balance must be found 
which meets criminological, diplomatic and budget-
ary requirements. The reality of global crime is that 
the true agenda is neither set nor controlled by the 
diplomats or the criminologists. It is set by the crimi-
nals, whose evolving and expanding grasp poses a se-
rious threat to all Member States and their peoples. 
To meet the requirements of both substantive valid-
ity and political viability, it is essential that substance 
experts be provided with a forum in which views can 
be expressed and knowledge exchanged freely and in-
dependently of the political constraints often imposed 
by Member States, but it is also essential that this fo-
rum be supported by diplomatic expertise to facilitate 
communications and negotiations, and it is essential 
that substantive outputs be politically considered and 
filtered. To accomplish this, there must be sufficient 
expertise in the sessions, and there must be sufficient 
time to exchange views on the issues and where nec-
essary to obtain instructions from capitals to ensure 
that consensus, when it emerges, actually reflects 
the informed will and consent of the Member States. 
There must also be sufficient documentation of inputs 
and outputs to permit the Member States to actually 
put to use the information they have gathered and 
the decisions they have made. The task of the crimi-
nologists is to tell the diplomats what is necessary, and 
the task of the diplomats is to tell the criminologists 
what is possible. The task of both is to collaborate 
effectively to produce crime prevention and criminal 
justice measures that will be effective against crime 
and which Member States are willing and able to im-
plement. ¢
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IX	 Guiding	and	specific	themes	
of	the	United	Nations	
congresses
In the context of Figure 1, but separately because of 
its technical limitations, Table 1 provides informa-
tion on the overall programmatic development of 
the twelve congresses, showing their guiding and 
specific themes.271 
The guiding themes of the United Nations con-
gresses are not always clear cut (the guiding theme of 
the Twelfth Congress is the best example). But when 
they are clear cut, as was the case with “Crime and de-
velopment” at the Fourth Congress (1970), one may 
wonder not only about the life cycle of certain crimi-
nological ideas (especially those which become quite 
pertinent to the world), but also about the meandering 
way in which such ideas surface at the global level.
Other substantive agenda items of the twelve 
congresses may perhaps be more straightforward 
and informative. To some extent they help to identi-
fy the evolving critical focal points. One can see that 
the focus moved from penitentiary matters to non-
custodial measures; from questions of repression 
discussed in a clearly legal and dogmatic framework, 
to questions more broadly related to socioeconomic 
development, including technical assistance in res-
ponding to crime; from domestic to transnational 
organized crime; from common crime to organized 
crime and terrorism; from retributive to restorative 
justice and, finally, from repression to prevention. 
A candid assessment of the focus of the first four 
congresses (1955-1970) was made by William Clifford, 
Chief of the United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Section, and the Executive Secretary 
of the Fourth Congress (Kyoto, Japan, 1970). Having 
analyzed the thematics of those congresses in order 
to discern the development of criminological thought 
in the world, he quite reasonably concluded that up to 
1970 these thematics had circled around penitentia-
ry matters, as if that thought had caught up itself in 
a vicious circle.272 What had originally been residing 
in the minds of the participants of the first congress 
seized with the aftermath of “the Second World War, 
as well as the treatment and conditions to which priso-
ners were subjected, a significant post-war problem,”273 
had, in fact, lasted much longer.274 The formal change 
happened only at the Eleventh Congress (2005) in the 
title of which the treatment of offenders was replaced 
by criminal justice”
Still more insightful would have been a listing of 
the titles of the numerous position papers and work-
ing papers prepared under the various agenda items 
by the Secretariat for all the congresses. For the pur-
poses of this study, it must suffice to note that already 
at the Second Congress (1960) the theme of ”Effective 
 measures to combat transnational organized crime” 
was inconclusively discussed,275 and at the Fourth 
Congress (1970) the evolving congress focus cap tured 
the need to adopt an international convention on 
the treatment of offenders.276 That idea resurfaced in 
1975 at the Fifth Congress,277 again before 1980 dur-
ing the preparations for the Eighth Congress,278 and, 
next, in 1995, at the Ninth Congress.279 The proposals 
oscillated between the idea of consolidating the 
United Nations legal instruments on responding to 
crime and the idea of a framework convention defining 
the principles of international cooperation against 
crime. Since 1995 the focus became even clearer – on 
the fight against transnational organized crime. 
That theme started to live a life of its own when, 
after the recommendations of the UN Congresses 
and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Cri-
minal Justice, and, after the entry into force of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, the Conference of the States Parties 
to that convention was established. The same hap-
pened with the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. 
Since that time, both, the congresses and the 
Commission have lost some of their respective legal 
relevance. What has been largely left in their purview 
involves the prevention and control of other forms of 
crime – those covered by ”soft law” instruments be-
longing to the United Nations standards and norms. 
271 The first and second Congress did not have guiding themes.
272 Clifford 1972:xv.
273 UN Newsletter 1990:4.
274 The only change that affected the cast of mind of the participants involved the venue of that congress: For the first time in the history of the 
UN crime programme, a Congress was held outside Europe, and for the first time ever in the entire history of international penitentiary and 
penal congresses, a congress was held outside Europe and the United States.
275 GEN/5/Corr.1.
276 A/CONF. 43/5, §§ 21-22, 31-34.
277 A/CONF. 56/10, §§ 9-18.
278 Clark 1994:48.
279 A/CONF. 169/16.
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Standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners; Selection, recruitment, training and status of prison personnel; Open 
penal and correctional institutions; Prison labour; Prevention of juvenile delinquency.
New forms of juvenile delinquency: their origin, prevention and treatment; Special police services for the prevention of juvenile 
delinquency; Prevention of types of criminality resulting from social changes and accompanying economic development in 
less developed countries; Short-term imprisonment; The integration of prison labour with the national economy, including the 
remuneration of prisoners; Pre-release treatment and after-care, as well as assistance to dependants of prisoners. 
Prevention of criminality
Social change and criminality; Social forces and the prevention of criminality; Community preventive action; Measures to combat 
recidivism; Probation and other non-institutional measures; Special preventive and treatment measures for young adults.
Crime and development
Social defence policies and national development planning; Organization of research for policy development in social defence; 
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in the light of recent developments in the correctional field; Technical 
assistance in social defence in the region; Participation of the public in the prevention and control of crime and delinquency.
Crime prevention and crime control: the challenge of the last quarter of the century
Changes in forms and dimensions of criminality-transnational and national; Criminal legislation, judicial procedures and other 
forms of social control in the prevention of crime; The emerging roles of the police and other law enforcement agencies, with 
special reference to changing expectations and minimum standards of performance; The treatment of offenders, in custody or 
in the community with special reference to the implementation of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
adopted by the United Nations; Economic and social consequences of crime: new challenges for research and planning. 
Crime prevention and the quality of life
Crime trends and crime prevention strategies; United Nations norms and guidelines in criminal justice: from standard-setting to 
implementation; and capital punishment; New perspectives in crime prevention and criminal justice and development: the role of 
international cooperation; Juvenile justice: before and after the onset of delinquency; Crime and the abuse of power: offences and 
offenders beyond the reach of the law; Deinstitutionalization of corrections and its implications for the residual prisoner. 
Crime prevention for freedom, justice, peace and development 
New dimensions of criminality and crime prevention in the context of development: challenges for the future; Criminal justice 
processes and perspectives in a changing world; Victims of crime; Youth, crime and justice; Formulation and application of 
United Nations standards and norms in criminal justice.
 
International crime prevention and criminal justice in the twenty-first century
Crime prevention and criminal justice in the context of development: realities and perspectives of international co-operation; 
Criminal justice policies in relation to problems of imprisonment, other penal sanctions and alternative measures; Prevention 
of delinquency, juvenile justice and the protection of the young: policy approaches and directions; Effective national and 
international action against: Organized crime; (b) Terrorist criminal activities; United Nations norms and guidelines in crime 
prevention and criminal justice: implementation and priorities for further standard setting.
Less crime, more justice: security for all
International cooperation and practical technical; Assistance for strengthening the rule of law; Promoting the United Nations 
crime prevention and criminal justice programme; Action against national and transnational economic and organized crime 
and the role of criminal law in the protection of the environment: national experiences and international cooperation; Criminal 
justice and police systems: management and improvement of police and other law enforcement agencies, prosecution, courts 
and corrections, and the role of lawyers; Crime prevention strategies, in particular as related to crime in urban areas and juvenile 
and violent criminality, including the question of victims: assessment and new perspectives; Plenary discussion on corruption.
TABLE 1 GUIDING AND SPECIFIC THEMES
OF THE  UNITED NATIONS CONGRESSES (PLENARY AND WORKSHOPS)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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Neither the Commission (which is the preparatory 
body for the United Nations congresses on crime 
prevention and criminal justice) nor the congresses 
themselves have managed to come to terms with this 
new reality which calls for their modification. The 
guiding theme of the Twelfth Congress had been the 
first manifestation of the need for the reorientation 
of the work of the congresses. But this was not fully 
appreciated by Member States. They confined their 
recommendations into one general congress decla-
ration with a garden variety of global criminological 
issues addressed in a cursory fashion.280 
Member States were bound to adopt a single 
Congress declaration by General Assembly resolution 
54/125 of 17 December 1999. Within that form one 
can still note, however, that the Salvador Declaration 
of the Twefth Congress substantively differed from 
the Bangkok Declaration of the Eleventh Congress. 
The Salvador Declaration had given – in nine ope-
rative paragraphs – a much stronger emphasis to the 
prevention of urban crime. The Bangkok Declaration 
had only one such paragraph. Similarly, much more 
is said in the Salvador Declaration about the re sponse 
to cybercrime than in the Bangkok Declaration. 
Last but not least, for the first time at the United Na-
tions congresses, there is a one-paragraph mention 
in the Salvador Declaration of the importance of in-
ternational criminal justice education for the rule of 
law. A few years from now that topic may be trea-
ted in a much more elaborated fashion, as was the 
case with urban crime prevention. But more incisive 
and forward looking-mandate changes are needed, 
if the congresses and the Commission would like 
to paint further the global picture of the response 
to crime, and if they want to be the major painters. 
With that picture rearranged at their own original 
request, both bodies are short of that capacity and 
of various instrumentalities that would bridge their 
parliament ary-level function with more practical 
orientation and outreach. 
The Commission needs to do its homework in 
order to rearrange that picture.281 As a preparatory 
body for the United Nations congresses, it has not 
yet responded to the expert-group recommend-
ations calling for various modifications in its and 
their functioning.282 Consequently, it is no wonder 
that the external perception of the Commission and 
the congresses as relatively unimportant UN policy 
bodies is still dominant. If and when their “justice” 
contributions – now too limited and restrained (as 
we recall, “justice” is much broader than that man-
dated by the UN crime programme) – are to become 
more influential, then this may primarily happen via 
support for technical assistance programmes and 
projects, especially in fields other than those covered 
by the mechanisms of the UN conventions against 
transnational organized crime and corruption. 
Regarding the congresses, such support may be 
offered via re-profiled position papers and back-
ground papers which more than before should con-
centrate on “how” practically certain crime and jus-
tice objectives can be achieved rather than primarily 
analysing “what” global crime and justice call for. 
Right after the adoption of the Salvador Declara tion 
by the Twelfth Congress, a few countries (such as Al-
geria and Argentina) stated their interest in modi-
fying the formula of the Thirteenth Congress in 2015, 
planned for Doha (Qatar). No doubt, the Commis-
sion, as a preparatory body for the congresses, will 
hear more about their future format and role, before 
it decides on the draft agenda and format of the next 
congress.
The Commission, in turn, should authorize the 
establishment of ”independent experts” / ”special 
rapporteurs” (as is the case at the Human Rights 
Council), but with a technical assistance mandate. 
For example, an independent expert on the preven-
tion of urban crime may help to elevate and consoli-
date the international response to urban crime, by re-
porting to the Commission on the concerns of State 
and municipal authorities in this area and providing 
high-level guidance to the UNODC for its technical 
assistance follow-up work. There also should be per-
manent working groups established by the Commis-
sion to consider other emerging global security issues, 
for instance relating to cybercrime. In conclusion and 
broadly speaking, the future of the Commission rests 
in supporting criminal justice reform world wide, 
in line with the United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice standards and norms.
280 As self-admittedly iterated in the first follow-up report on the Twelfth Congress (see section V and VI. A., § 41, doc. E/CN.15/2011/15).
281 It will likely do so in the preparations for the Thirteenth Congress. The Commission began these preparations at its twentieth session (2011). 
That very early start may be credited to two developments. First, at the nineteenth session (2010), the Commission realized that the format of 
the Twelfth Congress has to be reviewed, in order to accommodate more functionally the plenary and workshop-level legislative-, advocacy- 
and operational-level programmatic issues and actions. Second, and consequently, the Commission found it to be difficult to deal with the 
only outcome of the Twelfth Congress – its Salvador Declaration. Its eventually consensually adopted text, widely regarded as a patchwork 
of various international crime and justice issues, hastily negotiated before and at the Twelfth Congress, has given very many Member States 
second thoughts about the utility of such an undertaking.
282 E/CN. 15/2007/6 & E/CN. 15/2007/CRP.1
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X	 International	criminal	justice	
reforms	and	reformers
It should be noted that up to 1945, the word reform 
had a simpler connotation than it does today. During 
the initial phase (roughly, from the 1770s until 1914, 
the outbreak of the First World War), criminal just-
ice reformers acted very much on their own. They 
were driven by the classical school of criminal law 
thought with emerging social considerations, which 
broadened the agenda of criminal law. They have 
rarely been inspired by international (intergovern-
mental) recommendations, even though since the 
1840s such recommendations started to build a body 
of knowledge that should not be underestimated. 
By and large, criminal justice reforms originated 
internally and remained internal and were inspired 
by individuals and by scientific or non-governmental 
circles which began to be more pronounced at the 
turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Al-
though during the pre-Second World War period 
there were no transitional justice283 initiatives, only 
after the Nuremberg trial has international criminal 
justice reform in fact taken a practical shape, owing 
to the involvement of governments. Since that time, 
one could identify at least four phases of criminal 
justice reform, starting with an early post-Second 
World War phase (up to 1950), the Cold War phase 
(until 1989), the later international phase (up to 
2000), and now a global phase.284
In brief, the foundation for post-Second World 
War criminal justice reform was first laid down by the 
Nuremberg trial. It had started the phase of retribu-
tive justice for Nazi war crimes, reaching out to the 
individual accountability of the offenders for these at-
rocities and universalizing the rule of law. During the 
Cold War phase, the reform superficially ran on the 
international legislative plane and the reception of fo-
reign legal solutions (the theory of modernization). 
Based on these, that reform served more to preserve 
the status quo than to change it (preservative justice). 
After that second phase, the reform went deeper 
into the essence of the rule of law and international 
accountability (the third phase), starting the process 
of bringing persons to justice on the basis of indivi-
dual criminal responsibility (international justice). 
It moved into different criminal policy directions, re-
vising occasionally the principles of accountability 
(through amnesties) in order to resolve conflicts and 
achieve social peace, even though not always with po-
sitive effect. This third phase saw for example commis-
sions of reconciliation, truth commissions and the like, 
which met with variable success. The third phase 
also saw a dictotomy between justice and peace, the 
process of vetting (“lustration”) aiming at a fuller 
accountability with possible retribution, and an 
emphasis on governance, the essence of which is de-
mocratization through deepening accountability and 
transparency. In comparison with the third phase of 
transitional justice, which had an impact on the con-
tents and practice of international humanitarian law, 
the present (fourth) phase of international criminal 
justice reform promulgates selected standards and 
norms within the entire justice concept in places where 
these have been found to work (global justice).285 
From the UNODC perspective, global justice at 
its current phase of development does not consist of 
more than incorporating within justice various Uni-
ted Nations standards and norms and their imple-
mention in the course of domestic criminal justice 
reform. Even though much justice becomes more 
global through this process, it nevertheless stops 
short of being justice delivered by supranational 
courts. In the absence of the competence of the ICC 
to preside over international drug trafficking cases 
(or any other transnational organized crime cases), 
that phase of global justice truly shows the prima-
cy of the jurisdictional sovereignty of national courts 
over international courts. 
Table 2 seeks to capture the above legal develop-
ments in international criminal justice reform pro-
cess from 1945 to the present, especially focusing on 
its current global justice phase in which the UNODC 
plays an active role. 
This three-part table includes, first, the core 
criminal justice reform developments described 
above (left part). Further to the right, its second and 
third parts show the ensuing United Nations crimi-
nal policy strategic objectives, in terms, respectively, 
of generic and specific approaches to implement the 
mandated items in the UNODC action fields. 
283 The current broader meaning of this term differs from the one used in those early days, which was restricted to changes in the formal criminal 
justice system.
284 Teitel 2003.
285 For a more in-depth analysis, reviewing normative and practical developments influencing justice and security reform and providing examples 
of these, particularly in post-conflict countries entering or in the process of “transitional justice”, see Mobekk 2006. This study focuses only 
on those ones which have either originated within the UN crime programme mandate or which have been found relevant to it (within the 
author’s purview).
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TABLE 2
(Cont.)
AREA/AGENCY
 
LAW
ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 
PROSECUTION 
 
 
COURTS 
 
 
 
 
 
PRISONS 
 
 
 
 
 
CRIME
PREVENTION 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL
LAW
 
 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
EDUCATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND COUNTRIES WITH ECONOMIES IN
TRANSITION. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT ORIENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME: SPECIFIC CRIMINAL POLICY OBJECTIVES 2000 – 2015
Capacity-building for law enforcement cooperation against crime, organized crime, including drug trafficking, diversion of 
precursors and sea piracy (ship riders agreements); corruption, terrorism § Capacity-building to respond effectively utilizing 
special investigative techniques in the detection, investigation of crime, organized crime, including drug trafficking; corruption 
§ Capacity-building to protect witnesses § Improve border management–measures to include strengthening inter-agency 
cooperation, information exchange and agency operational inter-action § Enhance the forensic capacity through promoting best 
practices at scenes of crime and in laboratories.
Capacity-building to respond effectively utilizing special investigative techniques in the investigation and prosecution of crime, organized 
crime, including drug trafficking; corruption § Capacity-building to protect witnesses § Develop and revise domestic standards of 
professional conduct based on the “professional standards for prosecutors”, and related tools for their effective implementation.
Capacity-building for judicial practitioners and central authorities to request and grant international cooperation in criminal 
matters, including extradition, mutual legal assistance and confiscation § Enhance capacity of Member States to apply 
international standards § Increased partnerships between UNODC and relevant civil society entities that advance Member States’ 
capacities to apply international programme to exchange good practices in the prevention of crime and justice for children and 
youth (as offenders and victims), penal reform and alternatives to imprisonment § Design monitoring system that will enable the 
judicial leadership to assess the compliance of judges and other judicial staff with the rules and principles of professional units 
conduct, including overall assessment of indicators of judicial integrity through surveys and qualitative expert assessments, the 
establishment and capacity building of court inspection, as well as the development of IT based public complaints system. 
Upgrade prison infrustructure and corrections operational capacity § Wide application of international standards and norms on the 
treatment of prisoners/operation of prisons § Assist in the preparation of laws on prisons § Increased capacity to apply international 
standards and norms on diversions, restorative justice and non-custodial sanctions, where appropriate capacities to apply 
international standards and norms in accordance with the relevant international conventions and within the established mandates 
of UNODC § Increase capacity to help Member States to apply international standards on the professional management § Increase 
partnerships with relevant civil society entities that advance Member States’ capacities to apply the alternatives to imprisonment.
Strengthen national capacities for the prevention of crime through diagnostic audits, benchmarking, monitoring and evaluation § 
Support cooperation mechanisms with civil society organizations and crime prevention actions in schools, and help to strengthen 
national and local capacities for the prevention of violence and crime against women, including domestic violence § Support 
community and problem-oriented policing, facilitating the international exchange of experience and good practices in building up 
police integrity programmes.
Apply computer-based training methods in training law enforcement officers on issues not related to drugs, such as human 
trafficking, anti-money laundering, intelligence led enforcement and crime scene investigation, in order to increase the regional 
capacity to deal with various forms of trafficking § Training on specialised law enforcement techniques such as controlled delivery, 
surveillance; support for operational exercises applying new skills § Training, on-site mentoring and practical tools to national 
law enforcement agencies (such as police, customs or coastguards) and forensic science § Training manual and the guide for 
strengthening judicial integrity and capacity to train police, prosecutors and judges on how to deal with vulnerable victims and 
witnesses of crime and provide technical assistance for the reintegration of victim § Comprehensive victim assistance that will 
provide legal assistance to countries in revising or drafting national legislation.
Promote effective responses to crime, drugs and terrorism by facilitating the implementation of relevant international legal 
instruments § Promote effective, fair and humane criminal justice systems through the use and application of United Nations 
standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice § Provide legal assistance in support of the ratification and 
implementation of international legal instruments to counter drug trafficking and organized crime (and related instruments 
on human trafficking, migrant smuggling and firearms control) as well as of relevant United Nations standards and norms in 
crime prevention and criminal justice, including advice on the accession process, assessing the domestic legal and institutional 
framework, assisting with the drafting of amendments to domestic legislation and developing and disseminating technical tools, 
guidelines and model legislation to assist countries in implementing the international instruments.
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM AND THE UNODC MANDATE (1945-2015)
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Nominally, the idea of an holistic approach to 
the criminal justice system against the background 
of the increasingly comprehensive socio-economic 
framework, indeed gradually emerging as sustain-
able development, is very revealing. Various capaci-
ty-building specific objectives inform this well. It is 
less revealing that this idealistic progressive strategy 
is fragmented by de facto piecemeal programmatic 
contributions with quite an unbalance between law 
enforcement (especially police and border control 
staff) and the staff of the criminal justice system (es-
pecially prosecution and judiciary), between control 
and prevention, between drugs and crime, and last 
but not least, between alternative development and 
more embracing sustainable development. There is 
a second wave of various law enforcement (control) 
projects, which involve container control (to streng-
then measures against illicit drug trafficking) and 
assistance in strengthening forensic laboratories, ex-
tended from drug to crime detection in general.
This fragmentation has been the result of the 
extra-budgetary influence on the UNODC mandate, 
while the lack of balance in the above four equations 
also reflects the global criminal policy approach that 
has been evolving since 1945. 
Against the backdrop of these four phases in the 
process of criminal justice reform during the post-Se-
cond World War period, one can better understand 
its entire historical background, form, contents and 
scope. The United Nations crime programme, start-
ing with its first post-war study on the effect of that 
war on homicide rates, has contributed to all of them 
from the very beginning. Since the third phase, the 
mandated contribution of the UN crime programme 
has gradually been more pronounced. Formally, this 
happened through ECOSOC resolution 1997/30 on 
the administration of juvenile justice – the question 
with which, historically, the UN crime programme 
has always started its important international en-
gagement, either by inheriting this from its prede-
cessor and/or by pursing its own. Programmatically, 
this has always been the most viable entry point for 
the UN mandate into crime prevention and criminal 
justice, appreciated internationally. 
The above-mentioned ECOSOC resolution 
emphasized that ”Close cooperation should be main-
tained between the Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Division and the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations of the Secretariat in view of the relevance 
of the protection of children’s rights in peacekeeping 
operations, […] in peace-building and post-conflict or 
other emerging situations”. But there were also other 
related developments during the 1990s, about which 
more below. In the current (fourth) phase, at least 
two ECOSOC resolutions286 and one General As-
sembly resolution287 clearly define the UNODC man-
date as complementary to the mandate of the United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 
In the light of Table 2, one may now better see 
how the individual criminal justice reformers shown 
on pages 261-263 (“Criminologists, criminal justice 
thinkers and reformers (1764-2010): international 
and United Nations perspectives”) “fit” the post-Se-
cond World War criminal justice developments (Fi-
gure 7). That figure incorporates also the photos with 
short information on the ten chiefs of the United Na-
tions crime programme.
Regardless how big they had been or are as in-
dividuals, against this background they can now be 
appreciated in the global intergovernmental context, 
driven since 1945 by the similarly increasingly global 
peace and security concerns. This was less visible, if 
at all, before 1945. Especially at that early time, those 
reformers had probably been ”expounders of their 
inner logic”288 more than anything else. The first 
stronger manifestations of governmentally-influ-
enced criminal policy ideas and external logic seem 
to emerge during the pre-First World War period. 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, that is 
since the beginning of the theory of modernization 
originating from Emilé Durkheim’s theory of ano-
mie,289 most reformers acted under the former’s in-
fluence. Sometimes they acted on the behest of their 
governments which, however, did not join in any in-
ternationally agreed concert. In contrast, the post-
Second World War transitional justice or the NIEO 
have been more or less successful adaptations of the 
theory of modernization, first of all orchestrated by 
governments through various and evolving interna-
tional configurations. 
Despite the fact that the terms in the row (Figure 
1) differ from those in Table 2, they complement one 
another more than they are different. For example, in 
Figure 1, retributive and preservative justice are partly 
duplicative. In turn, in Table 2, transitional justice, 
at least up to the present, does not include a culture 
286 ESOCOC resolutions 2004/25 of 21 July 2004, and 2006/25 of 27 July 2006.
287 GA resolution 62/175 of 18 December 2007.
288 Kennedy 2003a:654.
289 Lawrence & Berger 1988:281-313; Burke 2009:114.
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of prevention, although in its entire scope from 1945 
up to the present, this part of the criminal justice re-
form movement has been global, albeit not compre-
hensive. 
These primarily academic terms happen to be 
quite hermetic. Trying to align their meaning with 
the policy relevant terms in this study, even if with 
academic ambitions, may lead to overly theoretical 
discussions. Instead, it should be recalled that some 
of these terms depend on the concept and method, 
while others depend on the mandate and authori-
ty. Hence they are not identical and may have partly 
overlapping meanings. 
Table 2 does not list all ideas or inform about 
all criminal law tendencies that are visible with the 
“naked eye” outside the UN rather than inside. For 
example, between 2000 and the present, there has 
been an international tendency toward introducing 
international humanitarian law solutions which 
deep en the individualization of criminal responsi-
bility in domestic criminal law for a crime committed 
on behalf of a State (subjective responsibility based 
on the concept of guilt in human rights, as a part of 
ordinary criminal law, and not only of military law), 
which has been a process coexisting with the modifi-
cation of the principles of objective responsibility (a 
kind of ”civilianization” of criminal law), but in the 
sense of diagnosing the social dangerousness of the 
potential crime perpetrator and relevant preventive 
measures.290 
This tendency could not be found in United Na-
tions law. However, the recommended United Nations 
crime prevention and reintegration policy for some 
time advocates the diagnostic of risk factors amongst 
youth who may enter into conflict with criminal law 
and among adult prisoners eligible for parole. 
The above review could be the topic of another 
study, because the UNODC is only one of several in-
ternational regulatory agencies which carry out this 
sort of work. The UNDP, UNESCO and the World 
Bank, among many others, have similarly been in-
volved in international criminal justice reform. Thus 
the picture presented here is incomplete and the con-
clusions that may be drawn from it are very limited. 
On the basis of the present study, one can, how-
ever, offer another type of conclusion, namely that the 
academic and United Nations criminological ideas 
differ in their theoretical base. The Four Freedoms of 
Roosevelt and the three generations of human rights 
by Vasak (shown in Figure 1) may carry the same ide-
ological weight, but the latter offers a better theoreti-
cal base. Human security has a quite weak theoretical 
base, and, surely, it is less viable than the Four Free-
doms. This should be kept in mind, since against the 
guiding ideas of certain periods, one may better un-
derstand the ideological climate in which certain cri-
minal justice reforms had started. This does not mean 
that all criminal justice reforms were prompted by 
such ideas, nor that these ideas implemented them. 
The autonomy of a single criminal justice reformer 
and academic is also a factor which should be taken 
into account when studying who and why this some-
one went with or against the ”external logic”. 
Moreover, the role of some academics and prac-
titioners was greater than that of others, and some of 
them really acted in a double capacity. In that broad-
er perspective, listed in row no. 3 in Figure 1 is the 
academic contribution of Enrico Ferri. His scuola 
positiva, advocating the primacy of crime preven tion 
over repression, must also be seen in the context of 
the considerable practical influence he had as an Ita-
lian parliamentarian, editor of a newspaper and, last 
but not least, author of the Argentinean penal code 
of 1921. 
Certainly he was also a criminal justice reformer, as 
much as Manuel López-Rey. Both were legal reform-
ers engaged in introducing a new world order (po-
sitivism / social defence / NIEO), and perhaps (and 
above all) great experts acting on the border of sci-
ence and international criminal justice reform, to-
gether with several others whose interest in it was 
even more practical. 
Above row no. 11 there is one more row showing 
the development of Polish criminological (positi-
vist) thought since 1886 (row no. 10). It lists first and 
major criminological publications, some of which 
as co-edited works. Among the first ones listed is 
January Wacław Dawid’s (1859-1914) experimental 
pedagogy book, “About Moral Infection”, written in 
line with the then-popular imitation theory of Gab-
riel Tarde, the French sociologist, and the precursor 
of Sutherland’s differential association theory. This 
was followed by the academic theoretical and volum - 
inous philosophy-of-law works of Leon Petrażycki 
(1889-1931), the sociological works of the Polish-
American Florian Znaniecki (1919-1954), and the first 
book on the theory of criminal policy291 by Rabino-
wicz/Radzinowicz,292 and works by Stanisław Bata-
290 Slobogin 2005.
291 Wróblewski 1922.
292 Rabinowicz 1933.
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wia (1898-1980) who had charted the development 
of Polish clinical criminology. 
Row no. 10 also shows Polish periodicals issued 
after the Second World War which either through 
their spearheading articles or through the organi-
zation of competitions for the best academic legal 
dissertations, facilitated the growth of criminology. 
In this context, the work of Dr. Krzysztof Poklewski-
Koziełł (1915-2006), a long-time Secretary of the 
most prominent Polish scientific journal, “State and 
Law” (published by the Polish Academy of Sciences), 
a great lawyer, criminologist and anti-death penalty 
advocate, should be acknowledged.
Separately and surely, international criminolo-
gical articles, books and journals either written or 
edited by Brunon Hołyst, and others written by Jerzy 
Jasiński, should also be acknowledged here, followed 
by those by Emil Pływaczewski. 
Despite its domestic and international accom-
plishments, Polish positivist criminology since the 
beginning of 1990s has started to be politically mar-
ginalized. It has not been able to convey successful-
ly its criminal policy recommendations to the poli-
ticians. Thus it “joined the club” of British,293 US294 
and other liberal criminologies,295 in that it is disre-
garded by the conservative politicians who prefer to 
cater to demands for “law and order” than to scien-
tific recommendations on the humane and effective 
response to crime.296 
In the context of the outstanding Polish person-
alities, widely known in criminal science, it is rare 
to mention the criminological contribution, per-
sonal heroism and martyrdom of the Polish juvenile 
justice reformer Janusz Korczak (1877-1942), a phy-
sician by profession, called the “Polish Gandhi”.297 
Shortly after the First World War, Korczak was a 
member of the U.S.-Polish Committee for the Res-
cue of Children, engaged in humanitarian assist - 
ance. During the Second World War he was murdered, 
together with the 200 orphaned Jewish children he 
took care of in the Nazi concentration camp Ausch-
witz. 
Korczak’s pedagogical thought, which origina-
ted before the First World War, had first been pub-
lished in Poland in 1920 in his book, “How to love 
children?” (Jak kochać dzieci?). His contributions 
developed under the influence of Polish, British and 
German works.298 He drew his polemics from the 
German works on eugenics,299 its proponents and 
other bio-social criminologists (e.g., Cesare Lombro-
so, 1835-1909 L’uomo delinquente), whose names are 
listed in row no. 2 in Figure 1.
Mention is made even less frequently of the 
contribution of the Tunisian Ahmed Othmani (1943-
2004). This tortured Arab socialist and human rights 
activist worked against the death penalty in the 
world, and managed from London the non-govern-
mental organization Prison Reform International 
(since 1989 Penal Reform International). This orga-
nization has been advocating the humane treatment 
of prisoners in developing countries and countries in 
transition. The United Nations has honoured both 
in a special movie about international criminal jus-
tice reformers shown at the Eleventh United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
(2005). 
One person who is remembered more often, also 
for his criminal justice reform work, is George Soros 
(1930~), a U.S. billionaire of Hungarian descent who 
finances this work through his Open Society Insti tute, 
a non-governmental organization in consultative 
status with the ECOSOC. Its work focuses on broad-
ening the access to justice in developing countries 
and countries in transition. Among the issues is the 
overcrowding of prisons, an issue that is quite well 
popularized in criminal policy and media circles. 
The name that is most often remembered in 
connection with criminal reform is the Briton John 
Howard (1726-1790), author of The State of the Pri-
sons in England and Wales with Preliminary Obser-
vations (1777). His observations, based on his visits 
to British and other European prisons, have earned 
him and his many followers the qualification of ”pe-
nitentiary tourists” whose work preceded the phase 
of international penitentiary congresses.300 He had a 
considerable positive influence over the British pri-
son system, later extended to the system of a number 
of other European countries. 
Although this study does not describe the histo-
ry of the evolution of systems for the enforcement of 
293 Radzinowicz 1999.
294 Garland 2000. 
295 Kury & Shea 2011.
296 Tyszkiewicz 1970; Kossowska et al. 2001.
297 Wołoszyn 1978. See further Kohlberg (1981:401-408), who devoted a special article to the memory of Korczak.
298 Falkowska 1983:342-343.
299 Jörger 1905:494-500.
300 Dupont-Bouchat 2002.
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the deprivation of liberty, it should be briefly noted 
that this started with no classification of prisoners at 
all. The evolution then moved on to a system of to-
tal solitary confinement (the Pennsylvania system), 
and later to a system in which uniformed prisoners 
worked during the day in groups and were kept in 
solitary confinement at night, with enforced silence 
at all times (the Auburn system). Finally, it changed 
into the progressive system of a gradual mitigation 
of the conditions of imprisonment, nowadays most 
popular across the world. It must suffice to say here 
that practical prison reforms on the above conti-
nuum of progressive developments have started with 
the separation of prisoners from one another on the 
basis of their gender, age, classification of committed 
offences and degree of their social degeneration (re-
cidivism), then on the respective improvements in 
their treatment, including hygiene. 
The above developments owe nothing to the the-
ory of penitentiarism (penology). By and large they 
have materialized thanks to the reformers who at the 
various penal and penitentiary congresses worked on 
practical issues for the promotion of the humane tre-
atment of prisoners. The involvement of academics 
was negligible.301
A philosophical eye on the origins and evolving 
rationale behind these systems was cast in “Surveil-
ler et punir: Naissance de la Prison” (Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1977) by the French-
man Michel Foucault. He argues that progressive tre-
atment regimes represented the first step away from 
the excessive force of the sovereign, and towards mo-
re generalized and controlled means of punishment.
Foucault’s book was prompted by the post-Ho-
ward contributions to prison reform of another 
Briton, the architect and lawyer Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832).302 Bentham developed the idea of a pa-
nopticon-built type of prison facilitating visual cont-
rol of inmates and the theory of a utilitarian punish-
ment calculus which can deter potential offenders. 
About the time when Bentham made his contri-
butions to prison reform, two Frenchmen noted ear-
lier, Tocqueville and Beaumont, aware of the deplo-
rable prison conditions in their country, reported on 
the results of their mission to the United States in the 
aforementioned “The Penitentiary System in the Uni-
ted States and Its Application in France”. They sought 
inspiration from the United States for prison reform 
in France, which, even though it had been initiated 
earlier than in Great Britain, had not been as suc-
cessful as there. Both authors scrutinized, inter alia, 
the development of the American prison system, 
i.e. the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems. However, 
since their real interest was to pursue a plan much clo-
ser to their hearts, namely a study on the spot of the 
social and political institutions of the young repub-
lic, that report did not really influence criminal just-
ice reform, let alone in France.303 It should there fore 
be recalled that for Tocqueville and his co-author, 
their visits to US prisons had taught them little about 
that nation or about the administration of prisons in 
democracies. 
This missing linkage was brought to light 
through the works of Enoch C. Wines (1806-1879), a 
truly internationally-oriented U.S. prison reformer. 
First, he postulated the internationalization of the 
penitentiary movement through the establishment 
of an international academy. Impressed by this idea, 
Franz Von Holtzensdorff, professor of international 
law and criminal law at the Royal University in Mu-
nich (Germany), wrote to Wines304 in the following 
superlative language:
“My Dear Dr. Wines, 
Considering … your idea to found an international 
academy for the study of prison discipline and prison 
reform, I am struck with the greatness of your scheme, 
and the difficulty you will have to meet in carrying it 
out. It is a truly American conception, no European 
Government would venture to give it a fair support. Is 
there among your countrymen any individual noble 
enough to appropriate a considerable sum to the ob-
ject you have in view? If so, his name would belong to 
the Pantheon of humanity. Your country is just now 
celebrating the centenarian glory of her Independ-
ence. The memory of that time could in no better way 
become sanctified than by setting an example of how 
you are anxious to keep your position in prison re-
form. Is it not strange that the first impulse towards 
political freedom has been associated by Americans 
with the first serious trial in prison reform, belong-
ing to Pennsylvania? Before the war of Independence, 
the prison might have been said to be the final destiny 
of all the antagonists opposing tyrants. The modern 
idea is, Liberty even for the prisoners! Such are the 
ways of Providence: first, in the beginning of mankind 
301 Dupont-Bouchat 2002.
302 Inventor of the term “international law” (1786-1789), see further Janis 1984.
303 Sellin 1979:xv.
304 Wines 1880:706-707.
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the prison allotted to the martyrs of liberty; and now 
liberty as the end of prison reform! All countries have 
received their particular task in the common work of 
human civilization. Your country should remain the 
foremost in the continuance of her glory won in the 
practical inauguration of prison reform. The founda-
tion of such an academy as you are undertaking to 
call into life would form a wonderful machinery in 
promoting steady progress. I need not say how deeply 
European statesmen and politicians would be inter-
ested in the final triumph of your efforts.
Believe me, my dear Dr. Wines, 
very faithfully yours,
Fr. Von Holtzensdorff.”
Second, at his initiative, the first international rules 
on the treatment of prisoners had been elaborated. 
Initially proposed and developed by earlier individu-
al prison reformers in Europe and the United States, 
these rules were first adopted in 1870 by the Amer-
ican Penitentiary Association (now the American 
Correctional Association, a non-governmental or-
ganization in consultative status with the ECOSOC). 
They were distributed at the already-mentioned First 
Congress in London (1872), went as a draft through 
the League of Nations and were eventually adopted, 
but not until at the First United Nations Congress in 
London (1955). 
As we recall, Tocqueville had chosen to concen-
trate on governance merely as the secret of Provi-
dence, and had not made any connections between 
governance and penal matters. But was he really so 
disconnected from his own report and stupefied, as 
alleged? Or, unlike Franz von Holtzensdorff, had he 
simply been overwhelmed by what has perhaps un-
til this day been a dominant international paradigm, 
that prison reform cannot be central to democracy, 
and that similarly as today, crime is still regarded as 
an internal affair of a State rather than as a problem 
of peace and security and global governance? 
Depending on the answer to the above questions, 
one can accordingly contextualize the assessment of 
international prison reform. In the opinion of some 
experts, the International Penal and Penitentiary 
Commission ”realized that it should be something 
more than a co-coordinating centre for internation-
al penal discussion. It was felt that the Commission 
should also explore the possibilities of an internation-
al juridical order and to expedite the improvement of 
penal administration in its member States … but their 
practical importance should not be exaggerated”.305 
This limited view of the role of criminal justice 
globally fits in well with the traditional paradigm, 
one that can even be found in an authoritative French 
two-volume commentary on the UN Charter. In that 
text306 there is not a single direct reference to the UN 
crime programme mandate, let alone to General As-
sembly resolution 46/152 (Annex) of 18 December 
1991 on the Creation of an Effective United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, 
developed in 1990 at the ministerial meeting held in 
Versailles (France)! This may suggest that the afore-
mentioned academic conceptualization of transi-
tional justice developments since the Second World 
War up to the present – the phase of global just ice307 
– has been ahead of the bureaucratic realities of in-
ternational crime prevention and criminal justice 
cooperation and the perception of crime as an inter-
nal affair of a State. No wonder, therefore, that old 
school United Nations diplomats have difficulties in 
juxtaposing criminal justice, sometimes saying: ”I 
understand what ’justice’ means, but ’criminal’?”. 
Perhaps as a result of this dominant traditional 
paradigm on crime prevention and criminal justice, 
no international penitentiary academy was estab-
lished before the Second World War. However, the 
criminal justice reformers – foremost among them 
Wines – had done quite a lot for the humanization of 
penal and criminal policy. 
Among these criminal justice reformers, the de-
veloper of probation, John Augustus (1785-1859), 
should be mentioned. His work suggested that if the 
offender’s degree of demoralization is not deep, he 
or she could be resocialized in freedom, controlled 
through community orders and supervision, both 
imposed at the sentencing stage. Since 1841 Augus-
tus practically implemented the policy of release of 
prisoners on bail and for supervision. Since 1910 this 
policy has been widely accepted in the United States. 
Other countries followed suit.308 
At about the same time, similar measures were 
developed in Australia, Ireland and Spain: the condi-
tional release (parole) of prisoners, who could not be 
eligible for probation. This system was initially deve-
305 Radzinowicz 1945:487.
306 Commentaire 2005.
307 Teitel 2003.
308 Binder et al. 1997; Klein 1997.
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1871
Far from looking upon those great assemblies as whol-
ly useless, I must acknowledge that the meeting of so 
many men, so distinguished for their learning and vir-
tuous purposes, and the mutual interchange of ideas, 
of practical views and projects, cannot fail to give a 
powerful impulse to the advancement of science, and 
widen the individual horizon beyond the sphere of 
each individuality. But this must not be the only ob-
ject we aim at. The compact, united forces of eminent 
men, led by such lofty desires, must necessarily and 
ultimately attain the most advantageous results.1
1950
From the optimism of Enoch Wines in 1872 to the 
pessimism of 1935, Professor Teeters has given us a 
generous and solid example of the views, opinions, 
and philosophies delineated by world-renowned ex-
perts in attendance at the eleven International Penal 
and Penitentiary Congresses that have thus far been 
held. These deliberations, for the first time collected 
and published in English, are of uneven value. Many 
of the discussions in the light of modern knowledge 
appear to have only archaeological interest and many 
appear completely irrelevant to any understanding of 
the basic purposes of penal policy and practice. One 
gets the impression that whatever may be transacted 
at such stratospheric levels remains highly academic. 
International exchange of information is certainly de-
sirable and worthwhile, but this reviewer could find 
very little definite information that would be signifi-
cant or pertinent for the American penal system with 
the possible exception of the discussion on the dispo-
sition of juvenile offenders and the justification of the 
indeterminate sentence.2
1955
The phoniness of the UN, the substantial incompe-
tence of its secretariats, and the rootlessness of an in-
ternational organization were strikingly brought home 
to me3. 
2000 
The United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders have generally 
been regarded as the most successful, the least po-
liticized, United Nations efforts to shape global policy. 
They have served as a free-enterprise-zone market of 
global ideas on what to do about crime, and on how 
to humanize crime prevention efforts. One repre-
sentative at the 36th session (in 1981–added) of the 
General Assembly, in commenting on the Sixth UN 
Congress, yet metaphorically speaking for all of the 
UN Congresses, and for all of the delegations at these 
congresses, summed it up admirably:
“The Congress was a resounding success and 
an example of the United Nations at its very best. It 
brought together experts from all regions of the world 
to exchange information and experience on a wide 
and complex range of criminal justice issues … As a 
result of their committed and highly professional par-
ticipation in discussions, important resolutions and 
conclusions were arrived at by consensus”.
“Recent scientific evaluations have documented 
the immense global benefit which the UN Congresses 
have yielded.”
…
“[C]onferences, both large and small, including 
the United Nations quinquennial congresses, have, 
International Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Congresses 
(1871-2010): Reflections by Commentators over the Years
BOX	9
1 Martini Bertrani-Scalia, Historical Sketch of National and International Congresses in Europe and America (in:) Transactions of the 
National Congresses on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline, Cincinnati, Ohio, Oct. 12-18, 1870, ed. By E.C. Wines, Albany, N.Y.: Weed, 
Parsons and Co., Printers, 1871:275.
2 J. P. Shalloo, Review of the book by Negley K. Teeters, Deliberations of the International Penal and Penitentiary Congresses: Questions and 
Answers, 1872-1935, Philadelphia, Temple University Book Store 1949, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May – 
June 1950): 82. 
3 Sir John V. Barry (1963-1969), Australian justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and an expert in criminology, quoted by Finnane (2006: 
415). 
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over time, formed a social system of their own. These 
social systems have their own distinct culture and 
their unique elaborate rituals. The word “culture” is 
used here in its sociological and socio-anthropological 
sense. It refers to a set of norms in the wide sense 
and to forms of behaviour that are related to these 
norms ... [C]ulture is not “discovered” or created at 
conferences, since the participants bring their cultural 
patterns with them. However, it is at the conference 
that these patterns are refined and blended together.”
…
“[C]ongresses are not limited to official govern-
mental delegations of States, as participation is ex-
tended to a great number on NGO representatives 
and members of relevant professional organizations, 
as well as individual experts (i.e., university profes-
sors, criminologists, penologists, and criminal justice 
educators, as well as judges, prosecutors, police and 
probation officers, and prison administrators).”
…
“The unique character of the Congresses, in 
which participants combine political leverage with 
highly professional and technical skills and expertise, 
in which political debates that take place in the Ple-
nary and the Committees are blended with the prac-
tical discussions held during the workshop and the 
ancillary meetings organized in co-operation with the 
NGOs, all this makes the Congresses a very special 
forum for the world-wide sharing of knowledge, ex-
change of experience and transfer of know-how, with 
the clear demonstration that crime and delinquency 
are universal concerns that bridge cultural and gov-
ernmental differences.”
...
“Finally, as our friend Sir Leon Radzinowicz has so 
clearly stated in his ... book (“Adventures in Criminol-
ogy”, Routledge, 1999), you can become a partner 
of the great “adventures of criminology” ... Much 
has been achieved, in spite of the limited resources 
available, when one compares the budget of such 
congresses with those of other major United Nations 
conferences. However, much more can be achieved if, 
within the limits of the culture of the UN congresses, 
we are able to ensure the practical follow-up of their 
recommendations, in terms of their application by the 
various countries of the world, as well as of their im-
plementation by the United Nations itself.”4
2010
There was extensive discussion on the issues related 
to the organization of the Twelfth Congress and ways 
to improve the organization of and preparations for 
future congresses, including further consideration of 
the relationship between the Congress and the Com-
mission. Some speakers referred to the need to better 
organize the work of the Congress and to select fewer 
topics for consideration and noted that the agenda 
could be structured differently to allow for more fo-
cused and interactive discussions. Ways to improve 
the organization of the high-level segment and its tim-
ing with a view to optimizing the participation of high-
level officials and the process of drafting the outcome 
declaration were also discussed. It was recommended 
that the preparations for the Thirteenth Congress 
should commence as early as the twentieth session of 
the Commission, with a view to ensuring an optimal 
outcome of the Congress.5  ¢
4 Excerpted from G.O.W. Mueller and Eduardo Vetere, The UN’s Global Gatherings on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Some Basic 
Maxims, HEUNI Newsletter. Special Supplement (January 2000), including the related English-language translation of an article by Prof. 
Thomas Mathiesen in Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskap (Vol. 73, No. 2, April 1988:157-160), translated by Dr Matti Joutsen.
5 E/2010/30, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Report on the nineteenth session (4 December 2009 and 17-21 
May 2010), ch. V, § 8.
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loped in Australia by Alexander Maconochie (1787-
1860), in Ireland by Sir Walter Crofton (1815-1897) 
and in Spain by Manuel Montesinos (1796-1862). 
Ten years after the death of Montesinos, Crofton ho-
noured him at the First International Penitentiary 
Congress in London by calling him “the inventor of 
the progressive system” in prisons. The term parole 
entered into international use at the Eighth Con-
gress in Washington (1910). 
Since 1995, the date of the adoption of the UN 
Standard Minimum Rules on Non-Custodial Measu-
res (the Tokyo Rules), which include alternatives to 
imprisonment (such as probation and parole), pro-
bation and parole have been promoted and imple-
mented across the world, in part thanks to these 
rules. In 1997 the first UN book appeared on the pro-
motion of probation internationally.309 
Amongst female criminal justice reformers, 
mention should be made of the Briton Elizabeth 
Fry (1780-1845), known for her work with female 
prisoners. Concerned about the very adverse prison 
conditions in which they served their sentences, in 
1827-1845 she made recommendations to the Go-
vernments of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, 
Canada, Prussia and Russia aimed at improving their 
treatment. A few years before the first Congress of 
Penitentiary Sciences she submitted to the king of 
France, where prisons were in extremely bad con-
dition, the following recommendation: “When thee 
builds a prison, thee had better build with the thought 
ever in thy mind that thee and thy children may occu-
py the cells”.310 In 2010 the Twelfth UN Congress (and 
subsequently the General Assembly) adopted The 
Standard Minimum Rules for Women Prisoners and 
Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the 
Bangkok Rules), the development of which started in 
2008 at the initiative of Thailand, the host in 2005 of 
the Eleventh Congress.311 
Also another United Nations legal instrument, 
the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials 
(1979), may trace its origins to a British genesis, this 
time by Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850), who is regarded 
as the author of the modern model of policing in the 
world. In 1822-1827 he started reforming the police 
by facilitating amendments to the British criminal 
law, and by establishing the State police force (1829). 
In its code of conduct he formulated the principle of 
the ability of the police to perform their duties de-
pendent upon the public approval of police actions. 
The police must secure the willing co-operation of 
the public in the voluntary observation of the law, in 
order to be able to secure and maintain the respect 
of the public. The degree of the co-operation of the 
public that can be secured diminishes proportion-
ately to the necessity of the use of physical force. 
The UN code accepted this in its articles 1 and 
3. In this connection, in art. 5 it prohibited the in-
fliction, instigation or tolerance of any act of tor-
ture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, separately postulated since 1764 by 
Beccaria.
The League of Nations, and, later, the United 
Nations have both further internationalized this 
idea. The difference between the two is, however, 
that the United Nations has not limited itself to nor-
mative work on the police code of conduct, but has 
been dealing also with its practical implementation. 
This may be a sign of the times rather than a superi-
or approach, since technical assistance seems to be a 
type of work invented after the Second World War, in 
the period of decolonization. 
XI	 Technical	assistance	activities
In the United Nations crime programme, technical 
assistance activities began in 1947 in the Secretariat’s 
programme in the fields of child welfare and welfare 
administration. At the end of 1948 technical assist-
ance was extended to all other fields mandated by 
the Social Commission. This happened even before 
the General Assembly resolutions instituting tech-
nical assistance for economic development,312 pub-
lic administration313 and social welfare.314 Thus one 
may say that the UN crime programme has not only 
spearheaded technical assistance generally, but has 
also been a forerunner of the concept of sustainable 
development, for what better than child welfare can 
serve future generations in preserving and expand-
ing their developmental rights?
309 UNICRI 1997.
310 Johnson 1976:61.
311 A/65/229 of 21 December 2010. The Twelfth Congress also discussed the viability of a new United Nations convention on the treatment of 
prisoners, but eventually the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2010) mandated the starting of work in 2012 on the 
updating of the Standard Minimum Rules. 
312 General Assembly resolution 200 (III) of 4 December 1948.
313 General Assembly resolution 246 (III) of 4 December 1948.
314 General Assembly resolution 418 (V) of 1 December 1950.
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Introduction
Direct advisory services to Governments in the pre-
vention and control of crime have been a distinctive 
aspect of the work of the United Nations in this field 
from the earliest days of the Organization. Indeed, un-
der the system of advisory services instituted in 1946, 
direct technical assistance to Member States in the 
advancement of policy and practice in what was then 
known as social defence antedated the much larger 
and better-known programmes of technical assistance 
in economic development.
Under the programme … provision is made for 
fellowships and scholarships, advisory expert consult-
ants or missions, seminars and training programmes, 
experimental and demonstration projects, the making 
available of technical publications and films. During 
1947 and 1948 services under this programme were 
provided principally in the fields of child welfare and 
social welfare administration, but since the end of 
1948 such services have been extended to all fields of 
interest …, including the prevention of crime and the 
treatment of offenders.
A.	General	technical	assistance	principles
The general working principles underlying the vari-
ous parts of the United Nations technical assistance 
programme are essentially similar in broad outlines. 
These include the principle that technical assistance is 
rendered only on the basis of requests received from 
Governments. Technical assistance is furnished only 
to or through Governments, and the kind of services 
to be rendered to each country is decided by the Gov-
ernment concerned. Technical assistance may not be a 
means of foreign economic and political interference 
in the internal affairs of the country concerned. Coun-
tries desiring assistance are expected to perform, in 
advance, as much of the work as possible in order to 
define the nature and the scope of the problem in-
volved.
Any request from, for example, a ministry of 
justice must pass through a single national office of 
that country (increasingly often the ministry of plan-
ning) and be fitted into a national plan for requests in 
accordance with the whole gamut of governmental 
activity. Whether a request is made for assistance 
in crime control depends, then, on the choice of na-
tional priorities. If a minister cannot be adequately 
persuasive — or, more precisely, if a Ministry cannot 
be convincing as to the importance of the request, 
especially as it relates to national development – its 
request for crime control assistance will ultimately 
be dropped at the national level and never reach the 
United Nations.
While the system of supplying relatively long-term 
expertise (one to two years) continued to be part of 
the United Nations technical assistance programme, 
The system-wide application of technical assist-
ance continued through the 1950s and 1960s. Its 
focus had remained on economic technical assist-
ance, rather peripherally addressing criminal, let 
alone social justice. Looking back at its programme 
and method of those years, experts called that as-
sistance ”paternalistic”, involving transfer ”from the 
knowledgeable West to the rest of the world”.315 Dur-
ing the 1970s the more “equitable” term of techni-
cal cooperation was used.316 Although the original 
term has regained its currency, its meaning now on-
ly implies that the leadership in and the ownership 
of reforms belongs to the country requesting assist-
ance. 
315 Weiss et al. 2005:60.
316 Ibid. 2005:201-3.
Early Years of United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Technical Assistance1
BOX	10
1  Excerpted and combined from: ”The work of the United Nations In the field of the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders”, 
International Review of Criminal Policy,  No. 1 (1952):15-16; Edward Galway, United Nations technical assistance in crime prevention and 
control, International Review of Criminal Policy, No. 34 (1978):22-25.
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in 1970 the United Nations created two posts (one 
supported by a special grant from the Swedish Gov-
ernment) for individuals to be made quickly available 
for brief (not more than one month) high-level consul-
tation with Governments on issues then facing them 
in the field of the administration of criminal justice. 
From 1970 to 1974, these two individuals (known as 
inter-regional advisers) responded to requests from 
over 40 countries. A most encouraging aspect of these 
requests was the high number that focused on evalu-
ation, research and planning.
Under the original enabling legislation, United Na-
tions technical assistance in the criminal justice field 
was available to all member countries; a remarkable 
feature of the early years was the extent to which eco-
nomically advanced, industrialized countries availed 
themselves of the Programme. 
B.	Lessons	learned
On the basis of experience hitherto gained, the United 
Nations fully recognizes that, as a matter of general 
policy, technical assistance in the field of the preven-
tion of crime and the treatment of offenders should 
not be undertaken in an uncoordinated or piecemeal 
fashion, but should be planned on a comprehensive 
scale, or at least with due recognition of the total 
problem. A total view of the goals and of the main 
directions of future planning and development con-
stitutes a prerequisite to the realistic planning of any 
particular segment of an existing system of treatment 
of offenders. It follows that technical assistance with 
respect to specific problems in the field of the pre-
vention of crime and the treatment of offenders is 
more appropriate in the case of countries in which 
long-range objectives have already been defined, and 
where technical assistance is required primarily with a 
view to the detailed planning of specific parts of a pro-
gramme which has already been formulated in broad 
outline. In the case of the lesser developed countries, 
on the other hand, it would seem to be particularly 
appropriate for technical assistance in this field to be 
based on the work of survey missions for the purpose 
of assisting governments in defining long-range poli-
cies and programmes.
In many countries, ministries of justice, or their 
equivalent, wished to set up research and planning bu-
reaux. In the establishment of such facilities, the crime 
control field had lagged greatly behind other units of 
government — especially behind those involved in 
economic development but even behind those in such 
social fields as health and education. Why this should 
have been the case is too complex to analyse satisfac-
torily in a brief article on technical assistance. One fac-
tor, it can be said, is that since the crime control field 
had been viewed as being outside the “productive” 
sphere of government, it had not been drawn within 
the guidelines for the national developmental process 
— a process that requires evaluation and planning. It 
can also be said that administrators and profession-
als in the field had not been adequately sensitive to 
the implication of the existence of alternatives and 
options; many persons and units were functioning 
with very little communication or collaboration and 
often at cross-purposes. Then in its turn the incapac-
ity — the lack even of motivation — for research and 
planning had held back the crime control field from 
participation in the long-range national developmen-
tal process — to crime control’s great detriment, if for 
no other reason than that, increasingly, the great bulk 
of national resources were being directed to those ac-
tivities carried out under national development plans. 
Fortunately, in many countries this gap is being over-
come (sometimes, perhaps remarkably, at the prod-
ding of the planning ministries) and in the technical 
aspects of this development the interregional advisers 
have had a significant role to play.
C.	Conclusion
This is believed to have come about through a greater 
realization of the interrelatedness of all the efforts of 
Governments in the prevention and control of crime 
and, perhaps especially, the acceptance that crime 
and society’s approach to it and its perpetrators are 
intimately bound to the socio-economic fabric of the 
country.
Perhaps the most important factor — and a dif-
ficult and subtle one — is the status, authority, rel-
evance and credibility of the crime control field itself, 
nationally and internationally. ¢
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The breakthrough happened in 1970 when two 
special posts of United Nations interregional techni-
cal advisers on crime prevention and criminal justi-
ce were established. In 1978 the work of the techni-
cal advisers was incorporated into the newly created 
Department of Technical Cooperation for Develop-
ment (DTCD), to be known later as the Department 
for Development Support and Management Servi-
ces, and presently the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (DESA). However, already at the time 
of the existence of the DTCD, at the end of the 1980s, 
the technical cooperation mandate was transfer-
red from it to the United Nations Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch. Presently, United Na-
tions crime prevention and criminal justice technical 
cooperation is a full-fledged programme backstop-
ped by several units within the UNODC, originally 
involved in the development of technical coopera-
tion against drugs. 
Between 1970 and 1974, technical advisory ser-
vices were delivered by Edward Galway (Ireland/U.S.) 
and Torsten Eriksson (Sweden), earlier Director-Ge-
neral of the Swedish prison administration, author 
of a book on penal reformers (1976) and previous-
ly expert on the UN Committee on Crime Preventi-
on and Control. Both operated out of UNSDRI (now 
UNICRI) in Rome. After an interval of seven yea-
rs, the next advisors were Pedro David (Argentina; 
1981-1992), Matti Joutsen (Finland; 1993), Vincent 
del Buono (Canada; 1994-1998), Jean-Paul Laborde 
(France; 1999-2001), Fausto Zucarelli (Italy; 2002), 
Mark Shaw (South Africa; 2002-2005) and Sandra 
Valle (Brazil; 2002-2011). 
Picture 30. At the expert group meeting on ”Mass Media and Crime Prevention” hosted by the Naif Arab University 
for Security Sciences (NAUSS, Riyadh, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1994). Among the participants are Matti Joutsen 
and Terhi Viljanen (HEUNI; second row on the left) and Mohsen Ahmed (NAUSS)
150
XII	Chiefs	and	their	Office
It is not entirely clear who first headed the UN crime 
programme (originally called the “Social Defence 
Unit”): it was either Sir Leon Radzinowicz, a Bri-
tish criminologist of Polish origin,317 or the American 
criminologist Benedict S. Alper.318 Alper’s original in-
cumbency appears to be confirmed in the biographi-
cal information about him.319 The third Chief was 
Paul Amor (France; 1950-1952). His successor 
was Don Manuel López-Rey (Spain; 1952-1961). The 
fifth Chief was the aforementioned Edward Galway 
(1961-1966). He was succeeded by Georges Kahale 
(Syria; 1966-1968). The seventh Chief was William 
Clifford (British/Australia; 1968-1974). His successor 
was G.O.W. Mueller (United States; 1974-1981), who 
was succeeded by Minoru Shikita (Japan; 1982-1986). 
The last, tenth chief, was Eduardo Vetere (Italy; 1987-
2005). 
Photos of the ten programme heads, with short 
descriptions of their UN background, are provided 
on pages 261-263 of this book. Their biographies are 
contained in a separate section at the end of this 
book. Some of them served in the “Chief” capacity 
briefly, but all of them had related United Nations 
involvement (whether as officers of United Nations 
congresses, experts/consultants or UNSDRI/UNIC-
RI staff members). Their combined United Nations 
accomplishments are impressive. Their academic re-
cords vary from very modest (e.g., Amor and Kahale) 
to eminent (Radzinowicz, López-Rey and Mueller). 
Conversely, their practical criminological experience 
(e.g. that of Amor, Alper and Kahale) has been im-
mensely relevant to the United Nations.320 
Those chiefs whom I have known personally were 
more often than not, personalities (role models) in 
their own right, and hardly fitting what Kretchmer-
Sheldon and Eysenck321 have meant in their theories. 
For example, an obituary reflecting on Radzi-
nowicz notes that “He was not always good at hu-
man relations but there was, in his retirement, a mel-
lowness about him. Some thought it stemmed from 
guilt, long overdue, for the appalling way in which he 
had treated junior colleagues ... It was not in his na-
ture to be a tyrant, for he had too much humanity; he 
was just uncommonly ill-tempered, especially when 
he thought that he had been thwarted, when his be-
haviour degenerated to the level of any departmental 
bully. He despised weakness in others and respected 
those with the courage to stand up to his tantrums”.322 
Regarding the fourth Chief (López-Rey), as a re-
sult of his management style of the Section of Social 
Defence, there were “clashes between the persons at 
the top level”.323 Consequently, a plan was developed 
to “offload”324 him, by sending him to head UNAFEI, 
rather than allowing him to continue heading the 
Section. 
Comments on other chiefs were no less dishea-
rtening. For example, Radzinowicz commented on 
Clifford that “He was not a criminological star”,325 and 
Shikita commented about another Chief that he was 
“lazy”.326
From these examples, one can see that the Uni-
ted Nations Secretariat has neither been a “society 
of saints” nor a ”perfect cloister” (Durkheim), but 
ra ther a volatile melting pot of good and bad ideas, 
visions, ambitions, characters, vested interests and 
personal skills. Another truth is that one does not 
need to be a ”criminological star” to become a good 
United Nations manager. What matters more in the 
latter function is the work ethic, the ability to dele-
gate authority and network, the ability to sell the re-
sults of one’s own work, and honesty – probably the 
hardest feature in the world so heavily and dynami-
cally influenced by politicking and the competition 
for resources and favours. 
The chiefs had different work habits. The chiefs 
could be day or night persons, or neither a day or 
night person, coming as they did from various cul-
tures where, in some cases, time was not of the es-
sence in an organization working on a 24/7 basis. In 
other cases, such as with Radzinowicz, Mueller, Shi-
kita and Vetere, they shared to a considerable extent 
the same hard work ethic, despite different Western 
317 Hood 2001:652.
318 ASA Footnotes 1994:13.
319 Alper & Boren 1972:221.
320 Alongside every chief’s biography there are also alternate ones by the very many contenders who did not make it to that post. Some of them 
were experts of the UN body advising on crime prevention and criminal justice matters, others were recommended by their Governments. 
321 Regarding a few criminologists who studied personalities, see Figure 1.
322 Morris 2000.
323 Ibid.:240.
324 Finnane 2007:39.
325 Radzinowicz 1999:407.
326 Shikita 2004:113.
Blue Criminology
151
Pa
rt
 II
and Eastern mind sets. Interestingly enough, those 
who wrote their memoirs327 or some shorter ac-
counts of their stint with the United Nations328 still 
display stunning differences in Western and Eastern 
perspectives at the United Nations, and how tenuous 
it is to bridge these perspectives in the period of glo-
balization. 
One should remember that until the end of the 
1990s, preceding a major United Nations internal re-
form, the UN staff could have benefited only from 
a very limited number of rudimentary management 
and enculturation training courses. Until that time, 
the United Nations had been the Organization with 
a collectivistic culture. It required extensive consul-
tations among the staff and the delegations of Mem-
ber States, but the Organization’s universalistic ideas 
and management practices had not been systemical-
ly and systematically developed and pursued. Colla-
borative negotiation training has been introduced in 
the United Nations during the mid-1990s, and the 
very concept of it had started to be implemented in 
the Western academic and business world only a few 
years earlier. The UN staff learnt the hard way how to 
interact among themselves with different ethnic, re-
ligious and cultural background. Consequently, one 
has to take a note of the compliment paid to Amor, 
that he was ”intellectually free of prejudice”,329 in a si-
tuation where otherwise human chemistry worked 
to a limited extent between the (incumbent) chiefs 
and the other United Nations staff. 
In addition to the history of strong rivalries 
among the chiefs, there is also a history of other 
world views. Perhaps the most glaring example of 
the latter is Alper’s removal from the UN during the 
McCarthy era in the USA.330 Other contentious ca-
ses carried lesser political weight (López-Rey and the 
NIEO), perhaps because the United Nations Secreta-
riat became more independent from Member States 
than it had been in its nascent time. But this study 
is really and mostly about the other side of the work 
of the essential staff members of the United Nations. 
Their biographies document just that.
Their professional and political background 
serves as evidence of the time in which the United Na-
tions called for their service. Radzinowicz’s adverse 
experience in Poland with teaching positivist crimi-
nology led him to emigrate to the United Kingdom. 
There he became a prominent and prolific acade-
mic with very considerable influence on penal policy 
both in the United Kingdom and abroad. The experi-
ence of Alper and Amor during and after the Second 
World War made both keen protagonists of the hu-
mane treatment of prisoners around the world. The 
respective academic record of López-Rey and Muel-
ler, comparable only to that of Radzinowicz, has 
exerted a considerable influence on the international 
development of the social defence movement. These 
five together shared strong anti-Nazi sentiments 
(Mueller was a U.S.-naturalized German citizen). 
Shikita’s prosecutorial career and his drive to 
internationalize Asian crime prevention perspec - 
tives has been a landmark in bridging other regions 
of the world. Vetere’s distinguished and long United 
Nations service, involving several field postings, sig-
nalled the evolving competencies in United Nations 
crime prevention and criminal justice technical as-
sistance in the context of global peace and security. 
Whereas the Congo peacekeeping experience of Ka-
hale and Clifford (1961-1963 and 1964-1966, respec-
tively) might have been a coincidental background 
to their heading of the United Nations crime pro-
gramme, in the case of Vetere (1992-2001) it had been 
at the foreground (Cambodia, Iraq and Western 
Saha ra). While this may have been a coincidental 
career development path, nonetheless it is quite tel-
ling how the United Nations looks now at the global 
peace and security picture. Crime prevention and cri-
minal justice have eventually entered it. With their 
different professional experience all ten heads had 
input their expertise into the United Nations crime 
prevention and criminal justice programme, as a re-
sult of which the programme has developed consi-
derably and produced impressive accomplishments.
These names (whether of criminal justice reform-
ers / technical advisors or heads of the UN crime pro-
gramme, etc.) alone matter more in the context of 
the machineries supporting them (and the UNODC 
is one such “machinery”). Among those people were 
some who may be called ”moral entrepreneurs”. But 
there were and are also rank-and-file individuals for 
327 Radzinowicz 1999; Shikita 2004.
328 Mueller & Adler 1995.
329 Arpainalage 1985:165.
330 He was known for his pro-Soviet sentiments. His wife was working for the Council of American-Soviet Friendship. For her and him it was ”very 
important to have the Soviet Union on the side of democracy” (Wallach Scott 1992:x). ”The United States was exercising strict control over the 
political opinions of its own staff members ... [D]uring the McCarthy period it even succeeded in introducing the FBI into the UN Building, and 
in extracting from Secretary-General Trygve Lie the dismissal of employees suspected of communist sympathies ... [T]he independence of the 
international civil service became a constant refrain of the Western countries” (Bertrand 1996:91). 
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whom this or another stint could have been no more 
than a career opportunity. However, if we expand the 
retrospective to the post-Second World War institu-
tionalization of the international development aid 
mechanism in which United Nations criminal justi-
ce reforms can be inscribed, one may conclude that 
this institutionalization created a context in which 
individuals and reforms have become better known. 
This institutional context, that is, the programmatic 
and financial support mechanism consisting of do-
zens if not hundreds of staff and a long-term incre-
mental involvement in reform, has made those na-
mes and accomplishments not only a contribution to 
the history of criminology, but also a contribution to 
the emerging science of technical cooperation and 
to United Nations Criminal Justice Studies (about 
which more below).
Information on the institutional development of 
the UN crime programme and the names of all its 
technical advisors is shown on pages 261-263 of this 
book, together with the names of other internation - 
al and United Nations criminal justice reformers, 
whose accomplishments are mentioned in the text 
of this study.
The institutional growth of the UN crime pro-
gramme, to which all of its chiefs contributed, has 
been accompanied by changes in administrative sta-
tus and configuration. Originally established as the 
Social Defence Unit in 1946, two years later it became 
a Section. Located at the New York Headquarters, it 
was part of the Social Development Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). 
Between 1960 and 1967 some of its staff were moved 
to the United Nations Office at Geneva as the Social 
Defence Unit, while the rest of the staff remained at 
Headquarters, headed by officers-in-charge. In 1971, 
and as a follow-up to the recommendations of the 
Fourth Congress, it was renamed the Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Section, until it was upgrad-
ed to the status of a Branch in 1974. As rightly noted 
by G.O.W. Mueller, its Chief until 1982, that upgrade 
was thanks to its ”benevolent leader” – Ms Helvi Sipi-
lä (1915-2009) a Finnish lawyer and politician. As the 
first-ever female Assistant-Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, and as the person in charge of the 
CSDHA from 1972 to her retirement from the post in 
1980, she ”granted the Branch every courtesy as long 
as the Branch delivered”.331 
In 1980, soon after the holding of the Sixth Con - 
gress, the Branch was relocated to the United Nations 
Office at Vienna (Austria), as part of the transfer from 
New York to Vienna of the CSDHA/DIESA. Further 
to the decision in 1992 to re-transfer the CSDHA to 
New York, while retaining the crime programme in 
Vienna as “a Branch without a tree”, at the end of 
1996 it was upgraded to be the Crime Prevention and 
Picture 31. Pedro David, former Interregional Adviser, 1981-1992 (first on the right) with Minoru Shikita, former 
Chief of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, with Eduardo Vetere (Executive Secretary of the Eleventh 
United Nations Congress), the late Vincent del Buono (former Interregional Adviser, 1994-1998) and Irene Melup 
(former UN staff member, 1946-1990)
331 Mueller & Adler 1995:9.
Blue Criminology
153
Pa
rt
 II
Criminal Justice Division (CPCJD). The following 
year, that upgrading, combined with the existence 
in Vienna of the recently established United Nations 
Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), prompted Kofi 
Annan, then the United Nations Secretary-General, 
to designate Vienna as the centre of the United Na-
tions fight against uncivil society, i.e. those elements 
which take advantage of the benefits of globaliza- 
 tion by trafficking in human beings and illegal drugs, 
laundering money and engaging in terrorism. Accord-
ingly, the CPCJD was elevated to become the Centre 
for International Crime Prevention, to be further re-
absorbed after more than five years in the three exis-
ting Divisions of the UNODC as a result of a further 
restructuring which took place in 2003. 
In Vienna the programme had various other 
masters above its chiefs. Right after its relocation 
from New York, it was under Moffak Alaf (Syria), 
Director-General of the United Nations Office at 
Vienna, and later under Assistant Secretary-General 
Leticia Ramos Shahani (The Philippines). She was 
replaced by another ASG, Tamar Oppenheimer (died 
in 2010), the first-ever Canadian woman of that UN 
rank. She was followed (1987-1992) by Under-Sec-
retary General Margaret Anstee (United Kingdom). 
From 1992 until 2010 it was under the care of three 
successive Italian Under-Secretary Generals: Giorgio 
Giacomelli (1992-1997), Pino Arlacchi (1997-2002),332 
and Antonio Mario Costa (2002-2010). Costa even-
tually formed a new entity under its current name 
of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). In 2010 Yuri Fedotov (Russian Federa - 
tion; 2010~) was appointed by the Secretary-General 
as the new USG. 
332 The institutional development of the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme has had its ”ups” and ”downs”, see 
further: A/56/83:2. It was during a “down” period that the Secretary-General chose not to appoint any Executive Secretary for the Tenth 
United Nations Congress.
A.	Identity
Research publications on large multinational organi-
zations are equivocal on what constitutes their cor-
porate identity, and on how best to develop it and 
strengthen. Political scientists discuss whether trust, 
high or low, is at the core of that identity. What is 
certain is that trust is a necessary component of all 
human organizations, and certainly organizations with 
high trust outperform those with low trust. Trust is 
essential for sustaining the relationships, whether 
among friends or internationally. 
Results of opinion polls asking whether the Unit-
ed Nations enjoys the trust of the world vary from 
country to country and from year to year. Critical as 
the respondents may be, the United Nations since 
its inception produces its own corporate identity and 
makes its own distinct and genuine contribution to 
humankind. Metaphorically, the United Nations “al-
chemy” transforms in its own right global ideas into a 
new worldwide order. 
B.	Ingredients
There are several ingredients to this. First, the United 
Nations Charter. Second, it is indeed the trust that 
should be instilled by implementing the Charter in the 
world and inside of the United Nations Secretariat. 
Third, it is its staff whose performance should meet 
“the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and 
integrity” (art. 101.3 of the Charter).
Trust should be measurable in some more objec-
tive way than perceptions shown by opinion polls. 
Researchers point to the number of civil society or-
ganizations as a proxy variable for “trust”. According 
to United Nations data, between 1946 and 2011 there 
has been an exponential growth of non-governmental 
organizations in consultative status with the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council. There are now 
more than 3,500. Currently, roughly one-tenth of all 
world international non-governmental organizations 
belong in one way or another to the United Nations 
family. 
The “Alchemy” of the United Nations
BOX	11
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C.	Chronology
Faithful to its mandate, the United Nations in its an-
nual calendar has its own hymn and official holidays. 
They have been gradually introduced by the General 
Assembly since 1947, first by establishing the United 
Nations Day (24 October) to commemorate the entry 
of the UN Charter into force two years earlier. How-
ever, particularly after the Economic and Social Coun-
cil in 1956 adjourned its debate on the United Nations 
calendar reform sine die (without fixing a day for fu-
ture action or meeting), several more days became of-
ficial holidays in the UN Secretariat, including “Easter 
Monday” and “Christmas Day”, “Eid-al-Fitr” and 
“Eid-al-Adha”. But in every country where the United 
Nations has its offices, all its staff celebrate also that 
country’s National Day. 
D.	Celebrating	criminal	justice	by	the	
United	Nations
In the United Nations work-day calendar there is also 
the International Day of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Day of Non-Violence, the International Day 
against Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking, the 
International Anti-Corruption Day, the International 
Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, 
the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 
the International Day of Remembrance of the Victims 
of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade, the Inter-
national Mother Language Day, the Time of Remem-
brance and Reconciliation for Those Who Lost Their 
Lives during the Second World War, and - last but not 
least - the World Day of Social Justice and the Interna-
tional Justice Day. 
E.	Sociology	and	theology	of	the	United	
Nations
The United Nations is complex and unique. There is no 
other multinational organization in the world which 
thanks to its 193 Member States can give staff mem-
bers a job of no less (but often more) than eight hours 
a day, as well as the possibility of interacting on a daily 
basis in such as multinational, multicultural and multi-
lingual context. These every-day interactions on their 
own create the “chemistry” which contains every in-
gredient of this human organization, whether internal 
or external. 
Whether in Addis-Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, Ge-
neva, New York, Santiago, Nairobi, Vienna or away 
from these major locations, in dozens of field locations 
throughout the world in which the United Nations 
staff serve, there are various such ingredients. On this 
basis, many political analysts, journalists or memoir 
writers have provided and will provide their own ac-
counts of the United Nations, but only a very few soci-
ologists have analyzed the Organization’s “chemistry”. 
Consequently, the conventional sociological terms for 
assessing the nature of that institution hardly fit it. 
In its own “religious” drive the United Nations 
treats not only dependency on drugs as social devi-
ance, but also in its own premises, dependency on 
the smoking of tobacco likewise. Tobacco smoking has 
been banned. Prompted by the World Health Organi-
zation, it considered a ban on the sale of tobacco in its 
premises, so far unsuccessfully. On its own, the United 
Nations campaigns to withdraw the provision of plas-
tic shopping bags used by commissary patrons to carry 
home the foodstuff that they have purchased. This 
was done as a part of an environment-friendly policy 
(“Greening the United Nations”), as a contribution of 
the United Nations to the World Environment Day.
Notwithstanding such anecdotal (if not also anec-
dotic, but seemingly only) campaigns and regulations, 
the United Nations is working for more common un-
derstanding about what the world’s habitat should be. 
In a way, the United Nations is a whole new “religious” 
world with its own progressive precepts, strengths, 
weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Above all, it is a truly 
global, cosmopolitan organization.
F.	United	Nations	victims
Between 1945 and 2011 hundreds of persons work-
ing under the United Nations umbrella had lost their 
lives in various missions. Mr Sergio de Veira, the Spe-
cial Representative of the United Nations Secretary-
General, tragically lost his life on a peace-keeping 
mission in Iraq in 2003. Ms Maria M. Wiewiórska 
from the International Drug Control Programme (now 
the UNODC), lost her life in 1998 when serving the 
peace-keeping operation in Georgia (Caucasus). And 
in Vienna in 1984, so did Mr Evner Ergun, Director of 
the Social Development Division of the Department 
of International Economic and Social Affairs (a precur-
sor part of what is now the UNODC). All of them are 
commemorated with memorial plates at the United 
Nations Office at Vienna. But there are also scarcely 
accountable numbers of “nameless” other civilians - 
victims, human rights defenders, rank-and-file staff, 
progressive reformers. They have been detained, im-

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prisoned, tortured or harassed for their faith in the 
United Nations ideals, and in breach of the United Na-
tions standards and norms. 
G.	Globalization	at	the	United	Nations
The United Nations is not hostile to patriotism. But its 
enemy is xenophobia, poverty and wars. In 2001, the 
United Nations and its Secretary-General, Kofi Annan 
received the Nobel Peace Prize for “their work for a 
better organized and more peaceful world” - the year 
which marked the 100th anniversary of this venerated 
award.
In 2006, Ban Ki-Moon, his successor, on accepting his 
position said: 
“The surge in demand for UN services attests 
not only to the UN’s abiding relevance but also to its 
central place in advancing human dignity. The UN is 
needed now more than ever before. The UN’s core 
mission in the previous century was to keep countries 
from fighting each other. In the new century, the de-
fining mandate is to strengthen the inter-state system 
so that humanity may be better served amidst new 
challenges … Let us remember that we reform not 
to please others, but because we value what this Or-
ganization stands for. We reform because we believe 
in its future. To revitalize our common endeavour is 
to renew our faith not only in the UN’s programs and 
purposes but also in each other. We should demand 
more of ourselves as well as of our Organization ... 
Indeed, our Organization is modest in its means, but 
not in its values. We should be more modest in our 
words, but not in our performance. The true measure 
of success for the UN is not how much we promise, 
but how much we deliver for those who need us most. 
Given the enduring purposes and inspiring principles 
of our Organization, we need not shout its praises or 
preach its virtues. We simply need to live them every 
day: step by step, program by program, mandate by 
mandate.1
H.	Toward	United	Nations	citizenship	
The United Nations blue-cover travel document Lais-
sez-Passer belongs to those very rare passports in the 
world that do not feature the nationality of its holder, 
thus showing that no matter from which Member 
State its holder comes, everyone is equal. Although 
currently there is no “UN citizenship”, there is evi-
dence that through its legal instruments on civil, po-
litical and social rights, the Organization is moving to-
wards that concept.2 This is because “the very values 
of an enlightened and civilized society demand that 
privilege be replaced by universal entitlement – if not 
ultimately by world citizenship then by citizens’ rights 
for all human beings of the world”.3 
I.	From	theology	to	praxis
Professor Manuel López Rey, one of the ten top offi-
cials implementing the United Nations crime preven-
tion and criminal justice mandate (1952-1961), be-
lieved in and pursued until his death the utopian idea 
of the New International Economic Order. Professor 
Gerhard O. W. Mueller, the chief (1974-1981) of the 
then United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Branch, wrote in his personal account of his 
United Nations work that it has been a tradition that 
one cannot really ever retire from the United Nations, 
just as priests can’t stop believing in God after retire-
ment.4 Minoru Shikita, his successor (1982-1986), 
expressed yet another idealistic conviction, that of 
“Striving for prosperity without crime”.5
While in academic criminology and in Realpolitik 
such idealistic convictions cannot be fulfilled, their en-
durance in the United Nations clearly communicates 
that the “United Nations peoples” should treat them-
selves more humanely, and that the United Nations 
should continue making progress in the humanization 
of the treatment of victims and offenders, according 
to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter 
and other legal instruments.  ¢
1 Acceptance speech by H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon on his appointment as the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations, http://www.
un.org/News/dh/infocus/sg_elect/ban_speech.htm
2 See further: É. Auvachez, Supranational citizenship building and the United Nations; Is the UN engaged in a “citizenship” process, Global 
Governance. A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 15, No. 1, Jan.-Mar. 2009:43-68. 
3 R. Dahrendorf, A precarious balance: economic opportunity, civil society, and political liberty, (in:) A. Etzioni (ed.) The Essential Commu-
nitarian Reader, Rowman and Littilfield Publishers, Inc., Oxford 1984:77. 
4 G.O.W. Mueller, F. Adler, A very personal and family history of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch (in:) M. 
Cherif Bassiouni, The Contributions of Specialized Institutes and Non-Governmental Organizations to the United Nations Criminal Justice 
Programme in honour of Adolfo Beria di Argentine, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995, p. 7.
5 M. Shikita, Striving for Prosperity without Crime – 50 years of Internationally Oriented Prosecutor, Delhi, GPD Books 2004. 
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Introduction
Highly sophisticated personalities, diplomats, crimi-
nologists, and others often express great surprise 
when learning that the United Nations is concerned 
with problems of crime and criminal justice. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, especially in develop-
ing countries, there is an almost mystic belief in the 
power of the United Nations to come to grips with all 
social and economic problems, including the problem 
of crime. The former reaction calls for propagation, 
the latter for demystification. Neither has been done 
well by the United Nations or its past and current of-
ficials.
A. The Secretariat 
There is human drama and comedy in the United Na-
tions, there are human triumphs and defeats, jealous-
ies and ambitions, life and death. Yet the international 
civil service is not permitted to indulge in human emo-
tions, or even the mention of names. 
During its first quarter century, the work of the 
Social Defence Section — as that of the entire Sec-
retariat – suffered greatly from the world political 
climate. Political blocks were opposing each other 
during these cold war years, yet the Secretariat had to 
maintain effective working relations with all countries. 
On principle, the Secretariat had to remain a coher-
ent organization, on the basis of equality. Yet some 
governments introduced a certain amount of disunity 
by introducing politically reliable officers to the inter-
national civil service. The reporting procedures of the 
Secretariat became somewhat bizarre, with a system 
of document approvals and editing required so that if 
any block’s interests were threatened, passages could 
be removed from documents at any one or more of 
many levels. 
This routine has not changed much over the years. 
But while the demands have significantly increased in 
number and complexity, staff increases have not kept 
pace with the demands. Past Secretaries - General or 
Under Secretaries - have generally been unaware of 
the incredible workload handled by the section, or 
of the enormity of the task. For as long as the Social 
Defence Section was seen as an appendage of social 
welfare, the chances for increased support, material 
or otherwise, from Member States, legislative bodies, 
or superior officers remained slim.
B.	The	Fifth	United	Nations	Congress	 
on	the	Prevention	of	Crime	and	 
the	Treatment	of	Offenders
[In 1975], preparations for the Fifth Congress were 
intensified. Despite some initial doubts, all documen-
tation (by now thousands of pages in six languages) 
was ready on time. The congress facilities and hotels 
in Toronto were ready and waiting. Delegations had 
booked their group flights. But dark clouds began 
forming. Pressure groups in Canada besieged the gov-
ernment to exclude the delegation of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (“PLO”). Yet the Canadian 
government had joined in granting the P.L.O. govern-
mental status in the UN. While the debate in Canada 
raged, the Branch made discrete inquiries in Geneva 
about the availability of the Palais des Nations, about 
the number of available hotel rooms and about the 
conference staff needed to service the meeting in 
Geneva just in case. Four weeks before the scheduled 
Fifth Congress, the Canadian ambassador addressed 
the General Assembly, requesting postponement 
of the meeting. That being found unacceptable, the 
Executive-Secretary (Chief) was requested to make a 
statement on an alternative solution. To everybody’s 
relief, he could report that Geneva was ready to re-
ceive the Congress. The Congress placed problems of 
crime and criminal justice clearly within the context 
of socio-economic development. It emphasized trans-
national and international criminality. There was an 
Gerhard O. W. Mueller and F. Adler1
Demistifying the United Nations
BOX	12

1  Abridged from: G.O.W. Mueller, F. Adler, A very personal and family history of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Branch (in:) M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Contributions of Specialized Institutes and Non-Governmental Organizations to the United Nations 
Criminal Justice Programme in Honour of Adolfo Beria di Argentine, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995:3-13.
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extra-ordinary solidarity among all delegations. The 
much-dreaded (by Canada) P.L.O. was represented by 
a local Geneva attorney and never made a statement. 
The non-governmental organizations, for the first 
time, were given their own forum, and, also as a first, 
the issue of the role of women in crime and criminal 
justice was given full attention. Never before had we 
seen the staff as beaming, efficient and happy.
But this happiness was to last only two years. 
By 1977, the Government of Austria had just about 
completed construction of a proposed United Nations 
headquarters building on the left hank of the Danube, 
across from the old city of Vienna. Anti-United Nations 
feelings in America in general, and in New York in par-
ticular, were so strong that it would not have taken 
much to move the entire Secretariat to Vienna. 
C.	The	Sixth	United	Nations	Congress	 
on	the	Prevention	of	Crime	and	 
the	Treatment	of	Offenders
The Branch was in the middle of preparations for the 
Sixth Congress, scheduled for Sydney, Australia, 1980. 
At an unexpected moment, in 1979, in the General As-
sembly, Australia withdrew its invitation and Austria 
offered its hospitality. Yet when Venezuela took the 
floor and invited the Congress to Caracas (for the first 
in a developing country) the Venezuelan offer was 
unanimously accepted. Caracas became a great Unit-
ed Nations success. Not even death threats against 
the head of the Italian delegation and the Chief, the 
disarming of the U.N. body guards, and the protective 
placement of heavily armed Venezuelan commandos 
around the Congress building could mar the event. 
Prophetically and appropriately, the Caracas Congress 
examined crime in its relation to power. Power may 
corrupt and, thus, lead to crime. A new emphasis was 
given to crime committed by powerful figures as it 
is perhaps more detrimental to human welfare than 
the traditional crimes committed by others. Among 
the resolutions adopted by the Sixth Congress, none 
is historically more significant than the “Caracas 
Declaration”, the world’s first comprehensive docu-
ment to relate the concern for crime prevention to all 
other human concerns and efforts. In its first opera-
tive paragraph, the Member States declared that “the 
success of criminal justice systems and strategies for 
crime prevention, especially in the light of the growth 
of new and sophisticated forms of crime and the dif-
ficulties encountered in the administration of criminal 
justice, depends above all on the progress achieved 
throughout the world in improving social conditions 
and enhancing the quality of life ... On that, All Gov-
ernments of the world were in agreement, despite 
their often fundamental disagreements of an ideologi-
cal, economic or political nature.
D.	The	Chiefs	and	their	staff
By early 1981, all but one had moved to Vienna. None 
of the staff regarded Vienna as any kind of a hardship 
post. All appreciated the ambiance of this great and 
historic cultural centre. But then there came that in-
evitable day. In March 1982, Minoru Shikita (agreed 
upon by the entire staff and accordingly recommend-
ed) took over the office. Gradually improving condi-
tions of Vienna, he motivated his staff toward great 
cordiality and effectiveness in preparing the Seventh 
United Nations Congress at Milan, Italy, in 1985. There 
was, of course, Adolfo Beria di Argentine who had ar-
ranged for the Italian government to provide superb 
hospitality, and his own staff of the Centro Nazion-
ale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale worked tirelessly 
toward the success of the Congress. The climate of 
the congress itself had changed considerably. The old 
antagonism between East and West had eased with 
the advent of Gorbachev in Russia. The administra-
tion of the Congress had been largely taken over by 
the Secretariat’s professional conference services. The 
Chief of the Branch, as always serving as the Execu-
tive Secretary, had lost some of the aura of omnipo-
tence, being eclipsed by political representatives of 
the Secretary-General. Minoru Shikita returned to his 
government, and Eduardo Vetere of Italy was a very 
good appointment. 
Many colleagues have come and gone. There is, 
and was, not one among them who was not totally de-
voted to the ideals of the United Nations. All worked 
harder than colleagues in most other departments of 
the UN, often burning the midnight oil. There is one 
among them who deserves special recognition, a staff 
member who has been with the Branch since its in-
ception and who, to this day and beyond retirement, 
serves the Branch on a voluntary basis; Irene Melup, 
the walking archives and conscience of the Crime Pre-
vention and Criminal Justice Branch.

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XIII  The	current	constellation	 
  and	integrity	issues
There is an incoherent vision of the UNODC work 
programme, despite its smooth slogan of “Making 
the world safer from drugs, crime and terrorism”. 
The development of the programme is first of all 
dependent on the regular budget of the United Na-
tions. Extra-budgetary contributions to the UNO-
DC work programme modify, almost in real time, 
its objectives and influence its personnel policy. 
The theory and practice of countering crime by 
the United Nations blends every day together into 
a conglomerate of issues which create considerable 
challenges. For example, countering the problem 
of sea piracy along the coast of Somalia, or crimes 
against protected species of wild flora and fauna, 
have been made recent UNODC programme priori-
ties, after the necessary extra-budgetary funds have 
been given to it by concerned Governments. New 
staff have been recruited and projects instituted. 
In comparison, for years regularly budgeted crime 
prevention activities that are “the first imperative 
of justice” (in the words of the Secretary-General), 
in fact have always been behind any such ex prompt 
priorities.
Successfully meeting such challenges and imple-
menting programmatic priorities (extra-budgetary/
budgetary) require versatile staff competencies and 
integrity – values that are quite a challenge in them-
selves. The United Nations Charter stipulates that 
”The paramount consideration in the employment of 
the staff and in the determination of the conditions of 
service shall be the necessity of securing the highest 
standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity” 
(art. 101.3). The new recruitment and promotion pol-
icy that started in 2002 focuses on ”fresh blood” – the 
young generation, and those with political influ ence 
in their Governments. In that year the traditional 
seniority-based promotion system had been aban-
doned, and gradually replaced, at least in theory, by 
the performance-based system, that is employment 
orientated towards measurable, accountable, career-
rewarded results.333
Radical as this change is, its first weakness is 
that it ceased to be supported by the remuneration 
principle proposed by Noblemaire, the French par-
liamentarian, chairman of the Committee of Experts 
of the League of Nations. In 1921 that Committee 
(called later the “Noblemaire Committee”) stated 
that ”It would be most unfortunate if the scale of sa-
laries were fixed at a rate which made it impossible 
to obtain first-class talent from those countries where 
the ordinary rate of remuneration is above the general 
average”.334
In effect, this principle holds that an interna-
tional organization must remunerate its professional 
staff equally for work of equal value, irrespective of 
differences in pay levels in the various countries from 
which they are drawn. It must also be able to recruit 
and retain staff from all its Member States. Conse-
quently, the uniform level of pay it provides must be 
sufficient to attract staff from the country or coun-
E.	Conclusion
Looking back at the accomplishments in the UN’s 
crime prevention and criminal justice efforts during 
the past half century, what is it that the Branch has 
accomplished? During the first third of this era, the 
Section created a solidarity among the world com-
munity, which is the cornerstone of all international 
efforts to deal with the global crime problem, wheth-
er or not associated with socio-economic develop-
ment. During the second third of this era, the Branch 
created the scientific bases for all crime prevention 
and criminal justice efforts, including the statistical 
infrastructure in the world surveys of crime and crim-
inal justice. In the final third of the era, the Branch 
excelled in the production of the norms, guidelines, 
and standards. These documents contain what the 
world regards as minimum requirements with re-
spect to all crime prevention efforts, regardless of 
divergences in culture. The standards they set out 
apply to all cultures because all of these efforts deal 
with human beings, who are equally protected by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ¢
333 To understand the scope of change one should add that between these two extremes, there are at least two other systems, one which is 
seniority-based with some performance indicators, and another one which is performance-based with some seniority factors.
334 ACC/1993/PER/R/11/Add.1:4.
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tries where national pay levels are highest. The prin-
ciple has been applied in practice since the establish-
ment of the United Nations system by taking, as the 
single point of reference for setting the level of Uni-
ted Nations remuneration, the pay of the home civil 
service of the United States of America, which is still 
officially considered to be the highest paid at pre-
sent. Indeed, for a long time (until the mid-1980s), 
that was the case. Currently, however, these salaries 
are about 30% lower than in the US private sector, 
and are lower than in for example the German civil 
service. 
Presently, an entry-level lawyer after appren-
ticeship in a respectable international law firm, in 
the third year of his/her work, earns as much as does 
a United Nations professional staff member at the 
P-4 level after 25 years of service. The conditions of 
employment in the United Nations are no longer 
competitive.335 
Against this decline, the Secretary-General sub-
mitted to the General Assembly a report, “Investing 
in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization 
worldwide”.336 In this report he proposed a personnel 
recruitment policy seeking quality candidate staff in 
“the broadest pools of talent”.337 This personnel pro-
posal was seconded by the academics critical of the 
old recruitment policy: now, “bright” / ”younger and 
hungry” candidates for the UN jobs are needed ra-
ther than ”the deadwood” / ”old-timers”.338 
This reinvigorating but mostly theoretically pro-
posal is, in fact, narrowed to the “second-best-pool” 
talented candidates, i.e., as mentioned above, only 
to those who have not entered into better paid jobs 
in the private sector. They are ”younger and hungry” 
as are others who took up jobs in the private sector, 
but are they so talented, as has been called for since 
the time that the Noblemaire principle was formula-
ted?339 This is not merely a question of the weakening 
of the interstate ethos. This is rather a broader ques-
tion of the fledging State ethos with undersalaried 
officials who may be prone to corruption, hence of 
undermining the statehood process in general. This 
is contrary to what Noblemaire and his supporters 
intended by their first -class talent. 
A very extensive literature has emerged on the 
selection, appointment and performance of interna-
tional civil servants.340 Many issues raised there can, 
in fact, be traced back to the time of the League of 
Nations, and have continued to re-emerge in the re-
cent years of the United Nations. New United Na-
tions employees are usually more susceptible to the 
instructions of Member States, even though receiv-
ing or giving such instructions is prohibited by the 
United Nations Charter.341
Since it is impermissible to issue staff regula-
tions that reduce the rights of international civil 
servants and apply them retroactively, the emer-
ging contractual system must honour the rights of 
the permanent appointees. However, no permanent 
appointments will be granted when the new sys-
tem becomes fully operational. They are replaced 
by continuing appointments, i.e., an open-ended 
appointment without an expiration date specified 
in the letter of appointment, unless terminated by 
the Organization or a staff member for reasons not 
related to contractual reform. In accordance with 
the new UN Staff Regulations and Rules and ap-
plicable UN policies, this means that such a staff 
member may be fired on three months’ notice. Once 
the last holder of a permanent contract departs, 
the transient remaining permanent staff, already an 
endangered species, will become an extinct species. 
Consequently, the conclusion that ”genuine identi-
fication with the goals of the Organization and de-
tachment from national interests is almost impos-
sible in situations of this kind” – the conclusion of 
commentators on the United Nations Charter, from 
which the General Assembly’s normative power is 
drawn to authorize the Secretary-General through 
his staff rules to phase out permanent appointments 
335 A/C. 5/52/28.
336 A/60/692 and Corr.1.
337 A/60/692 and Corr. 1, § 25.
338 Weiss 2009:205-206.
339 With the expansion of the global private sector since the 1990s, broadening the United Nations ”pools” could not be successful. Unfortunately, 
it cannot be successful today, either. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, which, first of all, started to affect the private sector, the United 
Nations would have had a chance to improve the quality of recruited staff, had the Organization itself not already begun to experience the 
impact of this financial crisis on the project budget (i.e., through a decrease in the non-regular voluntary contributions budget). As the case of 
the UNODC shows, its project budget expenditures from 1992 to 2010 have not only led in 2008-2010 to a drastic fall in voluntary funding of 
general purpose staff posts (the holders of which are likely to entertain common United Nations ideas) in comparison with earmarked posts, 
but also to the reduction of the former in number. This implies an absolute and proportional decrease in general purpose staff posts, in effect 
a smaller contribution in genuine blue blood to the United Nations chartered mandate. The second weakness is making the United Nations 
work as if it were a private sector company. The United Nations work has principally a political value. The assessment of deliverables cannot 
be measurable as is the case in private business. 
340 Reviewed, inter alia, by Lemoine (1994).
341 Mathiason 2008:128-130.
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– has been even more pertinent now than at the time 
of its writing.342 
After very vexing United Nations General As-
sembly debates (1946-2009) on the meaning of the 
independence and integrity of its international ci-
vil servants, the sentiment of the house has changed. 
The United Nations, which preaches the indepen-
dence of judiciary as a virtue for all Member Sta-
tes, has itself not lived up to that high standard of 
professionalism in its Secretariat by the very same 
Member States. Although ”the standard bearer must 
abide by the standards that it has set for the rest of 
the globe”,343 in 2009 the idea of supranational inde-
pendence and integrity of the Secretariat was put to 
rest. Since then, the Secretariat has started official-
ly (through D-2 post appointments) to consult with 
Member States on them, even though such appoint-
ments are its sole prerogative. Roosevelt, who not 
only gave life to the Four Freedoms idea, but was al-
so the man who proposed the name of the ”United 
Nations”, would probably turn in his grave, had he 
learnt how Member States eventually disjointed the 
most important supranational ingredient of the Or-
ganization. 
By doing away with some of its essential staff, the 
example of whom could show to the changing per-
sonnel environment the permanent integrated va-
lues that lie above national interest, as of 2010 the 
United Nations has become a fully client-dependent 
international organization, especially for those who 
pay most to its budget, whether regular or not. De-
pending on the type of voluntary contributions – 
earmarked for a particular purpose or general – the 
political influence of Member States in the former 
case is targeted, and in the latter case is less obvious. 
In 2010, at the time of the nineteenth session of the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice, major UNODC donors (altogether 20 countries 
plus the European Commission), have jointly con-
tributed less than 10 % to the general purpose fund, 
while more than 90 % went for the earmarked crime 
prevention and criminal justice projects.344 
Reading this situation in yet another way: in the 
former case, funds are given because of the trust a 
country has in particular staff members, while in the 
latter case this trust is rather perfunctory, especially 
when the proportion of the earmarked funds increa-
ses and general-purpose funds decreases. Occasion-
ally, it happens that new posts are created for a very 
specific extra-budgetary purpose. 
Metaphorically speaking, while it would be ideal 
that United Nations “fresh blood” would have ap-
propriate ingredients, consistency and a blue colour 
– that of the United Nations Charter345 – in prac tice 
its implementation has become even more proble-
matic than before. The blood is diluted: while no 
more than 10 % of the entire budget of the UN crime 
programme before 2003 consisted of extra budgeta-
ry funds, the entire UNODC budget for 2010 was the 
reverse: no more than 10% of it consisted of regular 
budget funds. In the entire United Nations budget 
for 2010-2011 the regular budget amounted to 36%.346 
These proportions speak for themselves. Conse-
quently, “He who pays the piper calls the tune”, but 
will this really be the ”UN tune” and ”blue blood”? 
United Nations staff will become more depend-
ent on Member States, and the States’ influen-
ce within the Secretariat will be felt more than be - 
fore. Non-compliance with external influential poli-
cy instructions may lead to abusive practices inside 
the Secretariat. UN top officials have overly sensitive 
ears and tend to be extremely politically correct in 
terms of what major or even minor sovereign Mem-
ber States find acceptable, which is a critical weak-
ness,347 especially for the career staff with continuing 
appointments that carry the expectation of contract 
renewal. Can they be honest brokers? The institu-
tional and personal memory of the ”old times” may 
sound somewhat irrelevant for the new generation of 
United Nations career appointees. They will project 
their new values into the Charter, in which its origi-
nal critical idea of the independence of the Organi-
zation is almost a foregone conclusion. Programmed 
to deliver in this way, new staff members will change 
the colour of the United Nations Charter into the co-
lour of the donor’s card. They will ”sing and dance” 
according to the new tunes. 
The way to reverse this trend is to realize that 
the independence and integrity of the UN Secreta-
riat are essential to performing its core functions, 
among which, for example, is the implementation of 
United Nations treaty law. This implementation will 
be compromised by the lack of objectivity invited by 
the extra-budgetary staffing of the Secretariat or, let 
342 Commentary 2002:1244.
343 Weiss 2008:119.
344 Another effect of fund-driven programming is establishing UNODC field offices in countries where major donors have their own field offices. 
345 Hochschild 2006:293-294.
346 A/64/6:28.
347 Weiss 2008:122.
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alone, financing for it the field projects, in case either 
of the above involves the implementation of treaty 
law.348 
The diminishing independence and integrity of 
the Secretariat can be seen already now in a matter 
even less sensitive than treaty law – that of the imple-
mentation of the United Nations soft law instruments. 
These soft law instruments weakened the Covenant’s 
objective of the eventual abolition of the death penal-
ty, not shared by the staff from retentionist Member 
States. Between 1973 and 2005 this objective had been 
jointly pursued by the Human Rights Council (for-
merly the Commission on Human Rights) and the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice,349 in line with Economic and Social Council re-
solution 1745(LIV) of 16 May 1973. 
Before the fourteenth session of the Commission 
(2005), to which the seventh report350 was submitted, 
the UNODC secretariat that administratively han-
dled that submission had to address its own internal 
problem, created by the initial insistence of a newly 
appointed influential staff member from a retention-
ist country, who thought that the report could be 
taken off the Commission’s agenda and the quin-
quennial reporting discontinued. Notwithstanding 
that internal opposition, since the Commission did 
not want to vote over the question of the death pe-
nalty, it eventually “decided” on its own (there was 
no ECOSOC resolution) to continue with the sub-
mission to itself of the quinquennial reports351. 
The above example does not mean that only 
such staff members interact with Member States, 
and those who are more integrated into the Secre-
tariat do not. Idealistic as the rules requiring inde-
pendence and integrity of the staff by not accepting 
or giving advice to Member States (lobbying) are, 
in reality frequent informal interactions of any UN 
staff member with Member States are the order of 
the day. However, this does not mean that indepen-
dence and integrity are legally fictitious concepts, 
because the difference between one and the other 
situation rests with valuing the interest of the Or-
ganization above any single Member State’s inter-
est, and negotiating the former in the spirit of the 
United Nations Charter. 
Independence and integrity issues project in-
to the perception of who owns what in the United 
Nations Secretariat (as shown by, e.g., the case men-
tioned above of handling the death penalty ques-
tion) and in Member States. In the latter case, the 
best example is the question of ownership of techni-
cal assistance projects. It has been now taken for 
granted that crime prevention and criminal justice 
must ensure national and local ownership and build 
national/local support for it. Often, in the past, in-
ternational crime prevention and criminal justice ef-
forts did not focus on assisting in genuinely building 
broad public participation in the design and imple-
mentation of the reform itself. Too often foreign le-
gal models have been imposed on diverse political 
and cultural settings and consequently had a negli-
gible impact, if not a negative one. Truly effective 
crime prevention and criminal justice work must 
therefore avoid the one-size-fits-all approach and 
should build on local needs, politics and legal, social 
and cultural traditions, while retaining the centrality 
of universal human rights principles. 
However, it is also now recognized that, paradox-
ically, although national ownership is a central and 
key principle to be observed and respected, caution 
should be exercised lest over-reliance on such a prin-
ciple result in the consequence that where there is 
no demand from governments for criminal justice re-
form, this may not occur.352 In such cases it might al-
so be worth considering options for UN leadership 
at the field level to help to build a demand for crimi-
nal justice reform among civil society and the gene-
ral public, by fostering the necessary political space. 
But who will build the demand for criminal justice 
reform in a client-orientated Organization, in which 
the transactions do not go through an honest broker, 
but a donor and recipient? Which progressive crimi-
nal justice ideas will be promoted: those of a donor 
mostly or those which the United Nations Secretariat 
considers in line with the Organization’s crime pre-
vention and criminal justice standards and norms? 
348 Independent implementation of treaty law by a full-fledged Secretariat may include financing such activity through a “statement of financial 
implications” made by it at the request of a programming body, e.g., by a functional commission of ECOSOC. A Member State interested in 
meeting the implications provides the amount stated by the Secretariat, but does not exercise any direct control over the expenditure of 
funds, as is also the case with the regular biennial budget of the United Nations. That external control and/or audit is exercised by relevant UN 
collective bodies consisting of representatives of Member States, including the Joint Inspection Unit. 
349 Formerly the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control.
350 E/CN.15/2005/16.
351 That staff member left the UNODC in 2009. In 2010, the Commission, which had before it the eighth quinquennial ECOSOC report, took no 
action whatsoever on it. Retentionist/abolitionist debate aside, the ninth quinquennial report (2015) will be submitted to the twenty-fourth 
session of the Commission, on the strength of its 2005 decision. 
352 Open Society Report 2008:6.
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The risk of programmatic reductionism is im-
minent. In this connection, the success of techni-
cal assistance in crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice reform will be put to a new test, because most 
of the UN project staff will be employed on a short-
term basis, while reforms usually take time, because 
they are in-depth and long-term. Quick fixes do not 
work. How the UNODC will account for this increas-
ingly pronounced contradiction of terms remains to 
be seen. 
Therefore, as can already be seen, implicit in the 
above personnel questions (as they are termed in the 
United Nations language), are very intricate pro-
grammatic issues. United Nations analysts may start 
asking whether it risks shallowness, as if it could no 
longer reach a certain objective, but only can pursue 
it (cynically, ”It is not so important to catch the rabbit 
as it is to go after it”).
The risk of shallowness is indeed considerable. 
Also geographic and occupational mobility – ano-
ther new feature of United Nations personnel poli-
cy – contribute to this risk. No single professional 
staff member can occupy the same position for 
more than five years. He or she must be rotated af-
ter that time. 
But rotation is a double-edged sword: while it 
prevents the staff member from learning well the 
substantive tools of trade, it is a good instrument 
for capacity-building. Japan, a country with a well-
established rotation policy provides a good example 
of its benefits. Prosecutors and other civil servants in 
Japan can stay in a specific position for only a fixed 
term, and are then transferred to another position. 
The position of the Director of UNAFEI is occupied 
by career prosecutors who after three years must 
move on. They take with themselves international 
experience which can be projected into domestic af-
fairs, thus strengthening the statehood and the role 
of their country in the world.
The United Nations rotation policy has a simi-
lar aim. It allows the world body to project internally 
and externally (once the staff member leaves the Or-
ganization) its global programmatic objectives. There 
is a trade-off between merit and capacity-building. 
Further information about the current UNODC 
work programme may be found in the annual reports 
of the Executive Director of the UNODC, submitted 
to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 
These reports provide information about the level of 
voluntary contributions and the evolving United Na-
tions policy context. 
XIV	 Comparative	assessment	
of	forms	and	dynamics	of	
crime	and	the	convergence	
of	criminal	law	systems	in	a	
changing world
A more incisive and reflective analysis of the United 
Nations crime prevention and criminal justice can be 
drawn from three studies353 and two other publica-
tions.354 Three of these four publications are listed in 
the front inlay of this book (Figure 1, row no. 11). 
The front inlay also contains basic information 
on the development of international criminal statis-
tics, including references to the General Statistical 
Congress (Brussels, 1853) held in the Royal Acade-
my of Fine Arts. The convening of the Congress was 
the success of Adolphe Quételet (1796-1864), one of 
the first criminal statisticians, who since 1825 had 
started publishing analyses of the dynamics and pat-
terns of crime. That Congress called for the intro-
duction of “unity in official statistics, so that the re-
sults may be compared”, something which was to be 
addressed with the development of comparative pri-
son statistics.355
Figure 1 (row no. 11) also lists the publications of 
Veli Verkko (Finland), a member of the Committee 
on Crime Prevention and Control (1950), who con-
ducted comparative homicide studies (1931, 1937 and 
1950).356 
Against this larger picture, one can more fully 
understand the attempts of criminologists to design 
statistically comparable measures of crime around 
the world, and the troubles with which they grap-
pled.
353 Alper & Boren 1972; López-Rey 1985; Clark 1994.
354 Walters 2001 & 2003.
355 Beltrani Scalia 1871:275. The comparative method quickly spread 
elsewhere in criminology: from Quételet, Alphonse Bertillon 
(France; 1853-1914), the first anthropologist and a person who 
also had served as a police officer, had learnt and introduced it 
into criminal anthropology. Between 1885, when the first Interna-
tional Congress on Criminal Anthropology was held in Rome (also 
the Third International Penal and Penitentiary Congress was held 
in 1885 in Rome; at this latter Congress the biometric method of 
Bertillon was discussed) and 1911, seven such anthropological 
congresses were organized.
356 His expertise channelled into the United Nations (E/CN.5/AC.4/L.6) 
inter alia lessons from the history of international criminal statis-
tics since 1874, when Georg von Mayr, a German statistician, pub-
lished his famous figure showing the correlation between the price 
of rye and the level of reported theft in Bavaria (see also Alvazzi del 
Frate 2006:5-6).
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A. Introduction 
The international community has long perceived the 
need for reliable and comparable indicators of crime 
as a necessary element for policy making. Attempts at 
the collection of comparable crime statistics started 
during the mid-1880s. The 1846 International Con-
gress of Penitentiary Sciences (Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany) represents the first documented occasion 
in which delegates from different countries agreed to 
start the international exchange of criminal justice in-
formation. A few years later, at the 1853 International 
Congress of Statistics organized in Brussels (Belgium) 
by Adolphe Quetelet, a major topic of discussion was 
how to make national statistics comparable across 
countries. After him, many European and American 
statisticians continued promoting international cooper-
ation in the collection of statistical data. A “Mixed Com-
mittee for the comparative study of criminal statistics 
in the various countries” was established in 1930 by the 
International Statistical Institute and the International 
Penal and Penitentiary Commission.1 The collection of 
data for this purpose lasted for seven years. In 1939 the 
work of the Committee concluded with the production 
of guidelines for “a gradual harmonization of criminal 
statistics”. The Committee, after looking at crime statis-
tics from 40 different countries, reported that “a ma-
terial comparison of these statistics has been judged 
impossible from the very beginning because of the 
diversity of penal law and of the statistico-technical 
methods in the various countries”.2
Most of the current limitations in comparing ad-
ministrative statistics across countries were already 
known at that time. It was clear that political and/or 
judicial data were not suitable for the assessment of 
the extent of crime. It was known that a “dark figure” 
existed. In 1931, debating the possible development of 
a “crime index”, Thorsten Sellin established that, among 
the available administrative data, police statistics were 
those that could best reflect the crime situation since 
they were closest to the actual occurrence of the crime 
(“the value of a crime rate for index purposes decreases 
as the distance from the crime itself in terms of proce-
dure increases”3). Indeed the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police started developing a plan for a na-
tional system of police statistics, including known of-
fences and arrests, as long ago as 1927. The plan includ-
ed data on a series of offences, which were consistently 
collected across countries and represented the basis of 
the Interpol collection of international crime statistics, 
continued until 2004.4
B.	The	United	Nations	and	international	
crime	statistics
Immediately after its establishment in 1946, the Eco-
nomic and Social Council adopted a resolution enti-
tled “Questionnaire on the prevention of crime and 
the treatment of offenders”, promoted by the Section 
of Social Defence, Department of Social Affairs, of 
the United Nations.5 In 1947, at the Second Session 
of the Social Commission, a Preliminary Report on the 
Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders was 
presented. 
Many important events marked the history of 
crime prevention at that time. In 1948 an International 
Group, consisting of seven internationally recognized 
experts, was established to act as an advisory body to 
the Secretary-General and the Social Commission, to 
assist in devising and formulating programmes and 
policies for international action in the prevention of 
crime and the treatment of offenders.6 The study of 
the problem of crime at the international level rep-
resented the basic mandate of the Group. It decided 
to launch a broad survey of crime statistics to inform 
Anna Alvazzi del Frate
Statistical Analysis and the United Nations  
Crime Trends Surveys as Capacity-Bulding
BOX	13

1 See: The Rules for Drawing up Criminal Statistics, 1937, Bulletin of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, XII, 3-4, 
March 1947:253-270.
2 Ibid: 254.
3 Thorsten Sellin, The Basis of a Crime Index, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Sep., 1931) : 337.
4 In 2006, the General Assembly of Interpol decided to discontinue the collection of international crime statistics (AG-2006-RES-19).
5 See E/CN.5/30/Rev.1.
6 E/1065, Resolution of the Economic and Social Council, 1948:33.
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its work.7 The “Statistical Report on the State of Crime 
1937-1946”, presented to the Social Commission in 
1950, revealed more gaps and problems than expect-
ed and resulted more in an analysis of the difficulties 
of collecting international crime statistics rather than 
in a real assessment.8 “It became apparent that na-
tional criminal statistics were so lacking in uniformity 
that meaningful comparisons among countries were 
virtually impossible”.9
On 1 December 1950, by its resolution 415(V), 
the General Assembly mandated the establishment of 
an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of Experts, which first 
nucleus was represented by the International Group 
of Experts. At its meeting in December 1950, the Inter-
national Group of Experts adopted a recommendation 
on crime statistics, focusing on three main areas:10
1. Criminal statistics to be published by the United 
Nations;
2. Standard classification of offences;
3. Survey of national statistics and preparation of  
a Manual.
It was felt urgent to continue work towards the com-
parability of crime statistics, and for this purpose it 
was necessary to ensure the full involvement of the 
Statistical Commission. The outcome of the discussion 
on crime statistics at the sixth session of the Social 
Commission in 1950 resulted in a Memorandum on 
“Suggestions for development of criminal statistics”11 
and - after an extensive exchange of notes and memo-
randums between the Social and the Statistical Com-
missions - a Recommendation of the Secretary-Gener-
al. The S-G commented that “the topic in its evolution 
has changed from a social study employing statistical 
procedures to a question of establishing improved sta-
tistical standards and services in the area of the social 
problems of crime”, and recommended coordinated 
work between the two Commissions.12
In 1951, the Economic and Social Council adopted 
two resolutions on Criminal Statistics as part of the 
respective reports of the Social and Statistical Com-
mission.13 Within the area of competence of the So-
cial Commission, the Council requested the Secretary 
General:
“a) To undertake a survey and analysis of national 
statistics on crime with a view to the preparation of a 
Manual which would suggest minimum standards for 
the collection, analysis and presentation of criminal 
statistics, to assist governments in the improvement 
of their national statistics (…);
b) To explore the possibility of achieving an agreed 
definition of the three following offences, in order to 
determine the practicability of an ultimate compila-
tion of comparable international statistics:
i) criminal homicide,
ii) aggravated assault,
iii) robbery and burglary”. 
Within the framework of the Statistical Commission, 
the resolution asserted the willingness of the Statis-
tical Commission to assist the Social Commission “in 
the discharge of the task it has undertaken in the field 
of criminal statistics”. It was agreed that the Statistical 
Commission would take care of part (a), while the So-
cial Commission would deal with part (b). Indeed the 
crime prevention environment speedily proceeded to 
work on part (b) of the resolution. A working paper 
on “Standard classification of offences” was presented 
in 1957.14 The paper elaborated on the definition and 
classification of the three offences (homicide, assault 
and robbery – burglary), on the basis of an in-depth 
study of the criminal codes of 65 countries and ter-
ritories. 
Work on (a), in turn, did not produce the expected 
results. After the fifth session of the Statistical Com-
mission (1951), further sessions did not deal with 
7 E/CN.5/30/Rev.1 – Annex A, “Questionnaire on the prevention of crime and treatment of offenders”. Part I of the questionnaire requested 
Member States to provide annual police and court figures for the period 1937-46 on five types of offences: against the person, against prop-
erty, against the family, against public health and against the State.
8 E/CN.5/204, United Nations Social Commission, Economic and Social Council, Statistical Report on the State of Crime 1937-46.
9 E/CN.5/AC.4/L.3, Note by the Secretariat on “Crime statistics” for the 1950 meeting of the International Group of Experts on the Preven-
tion of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.
10 E/CN.5/231, Report of the International Group of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 15 December 1950.
11 E/CN.3/102, 17 April 1950.
12 E/CN.5/233, Recommendation of the Secretary General on “Criminal Statistics”, Social Commission, Seventh Session, 8 January 1951. 
13 See E/2152, Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Resolutions 30 July – 21 September 1951, Supplement No. 1. Resolutions 
380(XIII), Report of the Statistical Commission, 30 August 1951 and 390 (XIII), Report of the Social Commission, 9 August 1951.
14 Criminal Statistics - Standard classification of offences. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. Social Defence Section, Bureau of 
Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, July 1957.
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crime statistics until (marginally) 1960,15 probably be-
cause the emerging broader social statistics area was 
a priority of the Commission. However, the 1960 short 
reference to crime statistics was just to highlight the 
inherent problems (“Statistics on crime might also be 
included in future issues [of a Compendium of Social 
Statistics], although difficult problems of comparabil-
ity were involved”, § 93) and to indicate that the Com-
mission was taking a distance from the issue which 
would not be dealt with for many years. Finally in 
1993, the topic of crime statistics reappeared within 
the framework of the Siena Group for Social Statistics, 
the mandate of which was to function “as an inde-
pendent, focused and flexible think tank for the de-
velopment of social statistics at the local, national and 
international levels by filling gaps not being addressed 
through international organizations and by identify-
ing frontier issues not currently receiving enough 
attention”.16 Among other tasks, the Siena Group 
considered the concept and measurement of crime, 
justice and safety. In the meantime, the Manual for 
the Development of Criminal Justice Statistics17 finally 
appeared in 1986, solicited by a resolution of the Sixth 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders (1980).18
The ad hoc expert group continued working to-
wards the regular exchange of information on crime 
statistics. In 1971, in response to the Fourth UN Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Of-
fenders (1970), the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts was 
transformed into the Committee on Crime Prevention 
and Control. Its mandate was broader and it decided 
to give new impetus to the collection of international 
crime statistics. 
Further to a 1972 request from the General As-
sembly,19 Member States agreed to share general in-
formation on the situation concerning crime preven-
tion and control, and measures taken. The first “Ques-
tionnaire on crime prevention and control”, consisting 
of 16 pages, was sent to Member States in 1976 and 
covered the period 1970-75 (inclusive). Subsequently, 
a detailed questionnaire for data collection was devel-
oped and the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS) 
started in 1983. Initially, it was carried out at five-year 
intervals. Over the years, several ECOSOC resolutions20 
dealt with various aspects of the Survey, including 
its content and periodicity. The Survey started as a 
quinquennial exercise,21, then it was felt that more 
frequent surveys would be more beneficial to the 
international community, and so ECOSOC resolution 
1990/18 on “United Nations surveys of criminal jus-
tice” at point 1 recommended that “…subsequent sur-
veys should be carried out at two-year and ultimately 
one-year intervals”. The two-year periodicity was reit-
erated by ECOSOC resolution 1992/22 that at § f) re-
quested the GA to commit the necessary human and 
financial resources to (inter alia) “carry out the surveys 
at two-year intervals”. However, despite the previous 
indications and probably in order to take into account 
accumulated delays, ECOSOC resolution 1997/27 
recommended that “… subsequent core surveys be 
conducted every three or four years …”. In the period 
1999-2009 it was repeated every two years, and has 
become an annual exercise since 2010. Twelve surveys 
have been concluded so far, representing data for the 
period 1976-2009.22 The CTS collects police and judi-
cial statistics, virtually from all member States. Replies 
to the Survey were received from a variable number 
of countries over the years (see Figure 1). The rate of 
response, however, is low and predominantly from 
developed countries. In developing countries, the lack 
of information is not only an obstacle to the develop-
ment of evidence-based policies and crime prevention 
strategies, but also represents a limit to the possibility 
of accessing international development aid. 
Extensive discussion on the content, format and 
analysis of the results of the CTS was the object of a 

15 E/3375 – E/CN.3/282, Statistical Commission, Report of the Eleventh Session (1960).
16 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/citygroup/sienna.htm 
17 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/pubs/gesgrid.asp?id=36
18 Sixth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, resolution 2 on the development of crime and criminal justice 
statistics, 1980. UN Manual for Development of Criminal Justice Statistics, Series: F, No. 43, Sales number: 86.XVII.16 (out of print). An 
updated Manual for the Development of a System of Criminal Justice Statistics was finalized in 2003 (Series: F, No. 89, Sales number: 03.
XVII.6 - http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_89E.pdf). Two expert group meetings for updating the Manual took place 
in Buenos Aires under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice of Argentina (1999 and 2001). 
19 GA resolution 3021, XXVII, 1972.
20 Namely 1984/48, 1990/18, 1992/22, 1996/11 and 1997/27.
21 As mandated by ECOSOC resolution 1984/48 on Crime prevention and criminal justice in the context of development.
22 Data are available on the UNODC website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-
and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html
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series of meetings of experts.23 The current format of 
the Survey questionnaire was revised in 2010, on the 
basis of a set of questions agreed upon by a group of 
experts who met for the purposes of the Sixth Survey. It 
requests information, primarily statistical, on the main 
components of the criminal justice system for the ref-
erence period. It is composed of four sections, dealing 
respectively with the police, prosecution, courts, and 
prisons / penal institutions. Each section can be filled 
in separately by the responsible agency. 
Results from the CTS have been regularly pre-
sented on the occasion of the United Nations con-
gresses on crime prevention and criminal justice and 
in many scientific publications. Data from the Fifth 
Survey provided the basis for the first-ever Global 
Report on Crime and Justice (1999).24 Analysis of 
European and North American data from the Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth and Ninth CTS has been carried out 
by HEUNI, and resulted in a series of publications on 
Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and 
North America.25 Further analysis has been published 
in articles appeared in issues of the journal Forum 
on Crime and Society.26 In 2010 UNODC and HEUNI 
published the volume International Crime and Crimi-
nal Justice Statistics227 containing an analysis of the 
Tenth CTS and trend data at the global level. Despite 
the relatively low response rate, the CTS database is 
the most comprehensive collection of available inter-
national criminal justice statistics.
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Figure 1 – Number of States responding to the United Nations Survey of Crime 
Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1977-2010)
23 Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Second UN Survey of World Crime Trends and Crime Prevention Strategies, Rut-
gers University, NJ, 1981 (mandated by the Sixth Congress); The UN Expert Group Meeting on the Second UN Survey of Crime Trends, Op-
erations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime Prevention Strategies, Huntsville, 1983 (mandated by the Sixth Congress); The Feasibility of 
a European Information System on Trends in Crime and Criminal Justice - Ad Hoc Expert Group on a cross-national study on trends in crime 
and information sources on criminal justice and crime prevention in Europe, Helsinki, 1983; Ad Hoc Expert Group on a cross-national study 
on trends in crime and information sources on criminal justice and crime prevention in Europe, Helsinki, 1990; United Nations Surveys of 
Crime Trends – Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting, Rome, 1991 (UNICRI - mandated by ECOSOC resolution 1990/18); Expert Group Meeting 
on Criminal Justice Management and Information Projects: Improving National and International Data Collection and Exchange, Buenos 
Aires, 1997 (mandated by ECOSOC resolution 1997/27); Expert Group Meeting on the Analysis of the United Nations Data Set on Crime 
and Criminal Justice Systems, Washington, DC, 1997; Expert Group Meeting on National Capacities for the Collection of Criminal Justice 
Information and Statistics, Veldhoven, 1998 (mandated by ECOSOC resolution 1997/27); International Conference on Surveying Crime: 
A Global Perspective, Rome, 1998 (UNICRI); Expert Group Meeting on Crime Statistics, Vienna, 2006 and follow-up, Vienna, 2009 (man-
dated by ECOSOC resolution 2005/23); Expert Group Meeting on Crime Statistics, Buenos Aires, 2010 (mandated by ECOSOC resolution 
2009/25).
24 http://www.uncjin.org/Special/GlobalReport.html .
25 Kauko Aromaa, Seppo Leppä, Sami Nevala and Natalia Ollus (eds., 2003), Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America 
1995-97, Helsinki, HEUNI Publication No. 40. 
26 Forum on Crime and Society (2001-ongoing) is the successor to the International Review on Criminal Policy (1952-1999). Articles on the 
CTS appeared in issues 3:1,2 (2003) and 5:1 (2006).
27 Stefan Harrendorf, Markku Heiskanen, Steven Malby (eds., 2010), International Statistics on Crime and Justice, Helsinki, HEUNI Publica-
tion No. 64. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crime-statistics/International_Statistics_on_Crime_and_Justice.pdf
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C.	Towards	comparable	crime	statistics
Many attempts at “harmonizing” data and developing 
international statistics of crime have been undertaken, 
until some agreement was reached that comparabil-
ity rather than harmonization should be pursued as a 
goal. The international community, almost two centu-
ries after Quetelet’s initial efforts, is still struggling to 
achieve internationally comparable data on crime. 
D.	Building	capacity	for	the	collection	of	
international	crime	and	criminal	justice	
statistics
The collection of crime and criminal justice statistics 
has historically rested with the relevant law enforce-
ment and criminal justice agencies. Although this can 
be considered a core function of any of such agencies, 
statistical capacity is generally scarce, especially in 
developing countries, and UN attempts at enhancing 
it have been a challenging objective for many years. 
In 1986 a Manual on criminal justice statistics was 
developed (which was subsequently developed and 
published in 2003 as the UN Manual on the Develop-
ment of a System of Criminal Justice Statistics).28 The 
Manual was used as a guide for the compilation of the 
UN Survey of Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Sys-
tems. Some training (workshops and meetings) were 
carried out, targeting police officers and personnel of 
ministries of justice and interior. In some countries, it 
was decided to create dedicated statistical units, com-
posed of trained statisticians, to ensure that data were 
collected, disseminated, maintained and analysed in 
the most accurate way. In some other countries, data 
collected by law enforcement and criminal justice 
agencies were transferred to the national statistical 
institution to be processed and disseminated. As of 
today, there is no prevailing model for dealing with 
crime and criminal justice statistics at the national 
level.
Sharing data at the international level represents 
a further challenge. Individual countries may have es-
tablished practices for measuring crime and criminal 
justice issues which may not be consistent with the 
information requested for sharing through the ques-
tionnaire of the UN-CTS. The need for building capac-
ity in this respect was first identified during the 1950s, 
when the Social Commission mandated the develop-
ment of a Classification of Offences and the standard 
definition of three types of offences for the purpose 
of the collection of statistics comparable across coun-
tries.
In 1997, resolution 27 requested the establish-
ment of an advisory steering group and the develop-
ment of an operational plan aimed at ensuring that 
requesting countries could access relevant capacity 
and obtain training if needed. The plan should have 
included:
i) The provision of assistance to Member States in 
the strengthening of their national capacities to 
produce, process and disseminate criminal justice 
statistics (derived both from official and non-
official sources, including victimization surveys) 
within the framework of an integrated informa-
tion system. Where appropriate, modern technol-
ogy should be used;
ii) The provision of assistance to Member States in 
connecting regionally and globally with systems 
of modern technology, and support to the United 
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Programme in the design, implementation and 
analysis of the United Nations surveys of crime 
trends and operations of criminal justice systems, 
including the proposed supplemental surveys, as 
well as the issue of transnational crime.
Although the group as such was never established, 
some initiatives took place at the regional level. For 
example, UNAFRI convened a group of experts from 
African countries, all responsible for responding to the 
UN-CTS, to provide them with training in how to fill in 
the questionnaire. In the years 2000-, more emphasis 
on building capacity was placed through the alloca-
tion of UN Development Account funds to a project 
targeting African countries.29 Finally, in 2008 a statisti-
cal section was established at UNODC, which regularly 
responds to requests for capacity-building assistance 
from Member States. ¢
28 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/pubs/gesgrid.asp?id=293
29 Collection and analysis of data and trends in drugs, crime and victimization, http://www.un.org/esa/devaccount/projects/2006/0607R.html
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After the Second World War, the idea of com-
parative crime statistics was resurrected. A call 
was made to the UN international group of experts 
(1949/1950) for “the international standardization of 
criminal law itself”, hopefully but idealistically ex-
pressed in a memorandum on ”International Com-
parison of Criminal Statistics” by Mark Ancel (1952), 
then the United Nations consultant on this subject. 
Following that call, in 1957 Albert G. Hess, another 
UN consultant, attempted the material comparison 
of statistics on reported/recorded crimes (homicide, 
heavy bodily injury, robbery, burglary) by proposing 
in a draft questionnaire that Member States provide 
data according to tailored definitions of crimes, i.e. 
in accordance with a limited number of their ele-
ments to be agreed cross-nationally.357 This attempt 
failed. Member States, in a Montesquieu-like fash-
ion (regarding his credo, see below), criticized that 
draft severely as an inappropriate way to align their 
legislation. Indeed, that critique could have been 
fore seen if and when the study by Hess would have 
followed the pre-war recommendation. 
Thus, scientific methodology met with criminal 
policy resistance emphasizing the specificity of laws. 
This should not have come as a surprise, not only be-
cause of the neglect of the pre-war recommendation 
referred to above, but also because of much strong-
er national reservations eloquently expressed in the 
Report by Her British Majesty’s Commissioners on 
Criminal Law (1839). There the material compari-
son vs. national diversity argument came out fullest. 
Looking from the inside out, the Commissioners ob-
served that criminal law comparisons had not been 
of any interest two centuries earlier. At the time of 
the Commissioners’ Report they had become of in-
terest, but only to the extent that they catered to the 
specificity of English law rather than tailoring it to 
other foreign laws. 
Accordingly, the Report initially reminds its readers 
that: 
”Writers on English law have seldom compared 
the provisions of foreign systems of criminal juris-
prudence with our own; and it has been a commonly 
received opinion that the laws of England are founded 
upon principles so peculiar and characteristic, that 
no advantage could be derived from the comparison. 
Thus Lord Hale [1609-1696 – added] after alluding to 
certain subtle distinctions respect in homicide con-
tained in the laws of the civilians and canonists, says, 
’But as the laws of several nations, in relation to crimes 
and punishments, differ, and yet may be excellent-
ly fitted to the exigencies and conveniences of every 
several state, so the laws of England are excellently 
fitted, in this and most other matters, to the conveni-
ences of the English Government, and full of excellent 
reason; and therefore I shall not trouble myself about 
other laws than those of England”. 
The Report adds, however, that: 
”In composing a mere treatise of English Law, in-
tended for practical instruction, it would no doubt be 
impertinent and useless to allude to the laws of ot-
her countries and the opinions of foreign jurists; but 
where the existing laws of England are discussed, with 
a view to defining and improving them, their compari-
son with those of other nations will often be of mate-
rial advantage. It is true, as Lord Hale observes, that 
the criminal laws of different nations vary; but at the 
same time, among many differences, many points of 
resemblance will always be found, because the object 
to which they are directed, being the prevention of 
crimes resulting from the common passions and ten-
dencies of human nature, must be universally the same. 
The forms of procedure differ in different countries, 
but the characteristics of crimes are remarkably si-
milar in all. Besides, the difficulties of definition and 
classification are, to a certain extent, common to all 
attempts to digest or codify criminal laws, though the 
laws themselves may vary; it must always therefore be 
useful to those engaged in undertakings of this kind 
to observe and consider the means used by others 
to overcome such difficulties. With this in view we 
have thought it right to consult most of the nume-
rous codes which have appeared in Europe and Ame-
rica in modern times, as well as the writings of fo-
reign jurists, and we are bound to acknowledge that 
in some instances they have furnished us with useful 
suggestions for the improvement of our law, while in 
others they have illustrated and confirmed our own 
previously conceived opinions”.358 
In order to provide an ideological assessment of the 
negative experience of the United Nations with at-
tempts to unify criminal law provisions, the above 
can be summed up by stating that while there still 
remains a narrow margin for such attempts, the pre-
vailing view is that reception of law from foreign 
legal systems is useful only insofar as this benefits 
one’s own legal system, rather than others. How ever, 
357 E/CN.5/337.
358 Quoted after Radzinowicz 1945:467-468.
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observers such as the United Nations, with its con-
cept of multilateral and supranational criminal law 
work359 – observers which are at a greater distance 
and whose perspective is that of looking from the 
outside into the internal legal system (as Hess did) – 
have had an even narrower margin of tolerance than 
does a country desiring to benefit on its own from 
outside comparisons. 
This prevailing view can be traced to the conti-
nuation of the strength of the principle vis-à-vis the 
United Nations. Furthermore, up to the present con-
siderable stress has been laid on the unique spirit or 
culture of a people, which is reflected in a country’s 
normative order. This is best summarized in the fol-
lowing statement: “Obviously the more one stresses 
the inner character of a culture, the more difficult it 
is to move on to comparison and generalization”.360 
This is quite a debilitating argument, one that 
is also articulated by Montesquieu (1689-1755) and 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), the founder 
of the legal historical school. He wanted to jettison 
all elements of Roman law from Germanic law on the 
grounds that they did not reflect the German mind-
set.
But such an argument in favour of “purification” 
is based on a misreading,361 at least as far as Mon-
tesquieu is concerned. In his De l’Esprit des Lois,362 
he wrote that the laws of different countries “should 
be so specific to the people for whom they are made, 
that it a great coincidence if those of one nation 
can suit another”.363 Still troubled by the master’s 
credo,364 which underlies the relativity/specificity of 
laws, contemporary comparativists seem to stretch 
his view emphasizing that laws should be adapted to 
the people for whom they are made. In other words, 
laws are made from the general to the specific, ra-
ther than only from what one sees locally.365 But per-
haps the most conclusive and synthetic vision of 
Montesqueiu’s work is advocated in the following 
statement: “Montesquieu … attempted, through 
comparison, to penetrate the spirit of laws and there - 
by establish common principles of good govern-
ment”.366
Since the time when the United Nations started 
making its international comparisons, there have 
been many discouraging misunderstandings and 
encounters of that sort with Member States, re-
straining what would otherwise be a great and promi - 
sing potential for comparisons. Diversity or specifi-
city seemed to be the least of the ”problem”. At its 
core seemed to be the reluctance of many States to 
share crime statistics at all, because of the principle 
of non-interference in internal affairs. Some Mem-
ber States even argued held that ”there is no crime 
problem” in their jurisdictions. As a result of this re-
luctance, since the beginning of the 1970s the United 
Nations has no longer sought to be as incisive and 
intrusive materially in its ongoing work on compa-
rative surveys. 
Starting with the first United Nations survey of 
crime trends (1970-1975), the United Nations has 
been developing and gradually recommending more 
refined technical definitions of offences, merely to 
provide a general guide to what is meant by a particu-
lar type of crime regarding which statistical data are 
being requested. Since that same time, the official 
publications and reports of the United Nations 
have avoided supranational ratings or rankings of 
crime indicators, unless these can be recalculated and 
grouped as sub-regional, regional or global averages. 
On its own terms, Interpol has pursued compara-
tive homicide statistics (1975-2009). Those statistics 
have solely rested on the national definitions of that 
crime. Comparisons between the UNODC, Interpol 
and other international crime statistics have shown 
a number of discrepancies between them.367 Certain-
ly, the path taken by the UNODC of adhering to its 
technical definitions has been the least problematic 
in that comparison. 
However, the UN’s parallel interest in more so-
phisticated research projects of substantive interest 
to its work programme had eventually to be discon-
359 E/CN.5/337.
360 Kuper 1983:194.
361 But not for some of his interpreters. For them “The Montesquiean approach emerged as a perfect model also for the nationalists and ethno-
logical comparative law of the 19th century. It had all the qualities of a persuasive socio-historical analysis. The claim regarding the autonomy 
of the nation suited many purposes perfectly” (Kiikeri 2001:16).
362 Graziadei 2003:119.
363 De l’Esprit des Lois 1748, ch. 3.
364 As translated by Robert Lunay (2001:23).
365 This critical passage then continues: “They should be relative to the physical qualities of the country: to its frozen, burning or temperate climate: 
to the quality, location, and size of the territory; to the mode of livelihood of the people. Farmers, hunters, or pastoralists; they should relate 
to the degree of liberty which the constitution can admit, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, to their wealth, to their numbers, 
to their commerce, to their mores, to their manners ...” (Lunay 2001:23).
366 Graziadei 2003:119.
367 David & Brieley 1978:2.
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tinued, for example the comparative work by Marvin 
Wolfgang (1967), a student of Thorsten Sellin, and 
a colleague of G.O.W. Mueller. Wolfgang, prompted 
by his Second World War military experience with 
violence in Italy,368 focused on elaborating a stan-
dardized index of the seriousness of crime. Such 
an index ascribed to different offences their de fac-
to weight and not their nominal definition. This 
would have been a qualitative improvement over 
the legal material work of Hess. However, that work 
failed as well because the seriousness of offences has 
a different weight in the criminal law of Occidental 
and Oriental countries. For example, while in Occi-
dental countries homicide is perceived as the most 
serious crime, in many Oriental countries the most 
serious crime is apostasy, in accordance with Islamic 
Shari’a.369 
However, even if this argument was unscienti-
fic, its rejection could not change the grouping of the 
Occidental index of offences nor could it change the 
perception of the severity of crime by Muslims. In Is-
lamic law the gravity of offences is confirmed by their 
sanction. Accordingly, apostasy is punished uncon-
ditionally by death, but an offender guilty of homi-
cide may be pardoned by the victim’s family. Con-
sequently, one really needs to apply an internal law 
comparative methodology in order to develop a stan-
dardized index of the seriousness of offences: not the 
one derived from the Occidental “law of the land”, 
but the Oriental “law of the land”, that is of Shari’a 
itself, where their comparative classification may dif-
fer among Islamic countries, hence also their compa-
rative gravity.
Another comparative approach was started on a 
criminological basis during the 1970s by Clinard & 
Abott (1973). This approach has been continued dur-
ing the 1980s, inter alia, by Shelley (1981) and Freda 
Adler (1983). Their studies were read by the United 
Nations circle of experts. Their authors had in one or 
another capacity been involved in the implementa-
tion of the United Nations crime mandate. 
The comparative method pursued by Adler in 
her book “Nations Not Obsessed with Crime” (1983) 
involved the selection of ten developing and devel-
oped countries known for their low level of reported 
crime, and seeking among them a common denomi-
nator according to which, in each country separately, 
that level of crime was conditioned. The author ar-
gued that countries with a low level of reported 
crime owe this to strong social cohesion, more 
precisely to the sharing of norms and customs in the 
frame work of an undisturbed social control system 
able to ascertain such a sharing.370 For this she coin-
ed the term “synomie” – the opposite of Durkheim’s 
anomie, that is the process of normlessness, the de-
composition of social norms. The reviewers of the 
book doubted the utility of this new term.371 A new 
book is under preparation by another author which 
seeks to verify the thesis of synomie. 
A broader thesis, that a common denominator in 
comparative criminological research is the theory of 
modernization, has been less critically reviewed. As 
a result of the component elements of moderniza-
tion (industrialization, urbanization, the breakdown 
of family ties, socio-economic development, and 
pop ulation growth), there is an increase in crime. 
This comparative thesis emerged on the basis of 
the theory of anomie. Its popularity started when in 
1963 William Clifford – later to be a UN staff mem-
ber – published an article in the United Nations In-
ternational Review of Criminal Policy on the moder-
nization thesis in criminology. Since then there have 
been numerous publications in the academic world 
on modernization theory. Among them is the book 
by Shelley (1981). This book was criticized for what 
some argued was its overly lax concept of moderni-
zation. Moreover, substantiating the growth of crime 
that resulted from modernization, the author had 
based the argument on official definitions of violent 
and property crime, and not on the behavioural defi-
nition of such crimes.372 
This is a typical academic critique by an armchair 
criminologist, especially as far as the lack of beha-
vioural definitions of crime is concerned, that is the 
lack of criminal victimization statistics. Such statis-
tics, which were scarcely available during the 1970s in 
developed countries, were completely absent in de-
veloping countries. Even the presence of official cri-
minal justice statistics was limited, as evidenced by 
research by G.O.W. Mueller (1994), based on the re-
plies of Member States to the United Nations surveys 
of crime trends (1974-1985).
The first United Nations handbook for develop-
ing countries on criminal statistics, including con-
368 A/CONF. 144/6, §6 (g).
369 Kaufman 1998.
370 Al-Takheb & Scott 1981.
371 Adler 1983:157; Adler 1995:272-275.
372 Beirne 1985:286; Philips 1984:1432-33.
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victions, was not published until 1986,373 and the first 
United Nations international questionnaires on cri-
minal victimization were not distributed until 1989. 
Since 2007, the UNODC has been implementing a 
project called “Data for Africa”, designed to improve 
the capacity of developing countries of that region to 
collect official criminal and victimization statistics.374 
Notwithstanding the above, the conclusions 
from Shelley’s book have been quoted in United Na-
tions documentation up to 2007.375 There they have 
been offered as solid evidence of some stable differ-
ence between the patterns and dynamics of crime in 
developing and developed countries. 
Thanks to her book, there has been a growing 
awareness that despite the common denominator of 
modernization, the level of reported property crime 
in cities in developed countries was higher than in 
cities of developing countries, apparently because 
there was more to steal in those cities as a result of 
the higher standard of living. The reverse was true 
regarding the proportion of violent crimes in the 
two types of the cities. As she noted later on in a UN 
publication: “Once it was possible to speak of dis tinct 
features of crime in the developed and developing 
nations”.376
For a long time similarly iron evidence had been 
suggested by an even more general modernization 
thesis, that an increase in crime is roughly correlated 
with modernization. So argued, for example, Cli nard 
& Abbot,377 following the experience with growing 
crime rates in nineteenth century Europe. Clifford, 
who shared this thesis, wrote in his “An Introduction 
to African Criminology”378 that this is an inevitable 
process. 
An increase in crime appears to be corre lated 
with urbanization. An increase in property crime 
and a decrease in violent crime were reported in 
the cities of England, France, Germany and Russia. 
Stockholm (Sweden) was the exception. That excep-
tion was apparently due to extensive emigration to 
the United States, and many potential offenders 
were among the émigrés.379
The reverse trend, according to which urbaniza-
tion is correlated with more reported crimes against 
the person than property, had been found in the ci-
ties of developing countries. This could be explained 
by a relatively early phase of urbanization with a fast 
growing rate of new inhabitants.380 
Now that some 40 years have passed since these 
findings were first made, it would be difficult to con-
firm if the above proportions still hold. One may 
draw the conclusion from the fragmentary United 
Nations data (1998-2003) that a negative correlation 
(r = -0.85) between the degree of development and 
the level of reported crime was found only in cities 
in developing countries. In other words, fewer bur-
glaries were reported in cities in richer countries 
than there were in cities of poorer countries.381 This 
contradicts dominant criminological wisdom. But 
not only that, since this mechanical thesis on the 
criminogenic role of modernization had been popu-
lar also in political science, at least since the time of 
Clifford. Political scientists argue that the moderni-
zation theory cannot be interpreted linearly, as if de-
veloping countries would have to follow the path of 
developed countries. 
It is false to assume that developing countries 
will inevitably assume the respective features and 
attributes of statehood (as had been the case, e.g., 
among the European countries). Such an assump-
tion follows from uncritically accepted legitimacy 
of the centrally-introduced New International Eco-
nomic Order (which in political science is regarded 
as the quintessence of the theory of modernization). 
However, the modernization process is conditioned 
locally, through structural and social factors rather 
than from imported attributes of statehood.382 Con-
sequently, developed and developing countries can-
not share the same socio-economic problems, such 
as the same structure and dynamics of crime. East 
and West are different from one another. Basically, 
as far as crime is concerned, one knows what (what 
forms of crime), but is not sure how many (the histo-
rical dynamics of criminality). 
Generalizing this problematic further, there 
is still one more conclusion to make for academic 
and United Nations criminology: in a long histo-
rical perspective (from 1200 until the present), the 
373 Jones 1984:1118.
374 Manual 1986.
375 Together with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the UNODC published in 2010 the “Manual on Victimization Surveys”.
376 E/CN.15/2007/CRP.3,§28.
377 Shelley 1990:119.
378 Clifford 1973.
379 Clifford 1974:viii.
380 Shelley 1981.
381 Clinard & Abbot 1973.
382 Handbook 2008:92-109.
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dynamics of crime (especially violent crime, such as 
homicide) has been declining in the Western world 
(Europe), if one accepts the various methodological 
limitations that qualify this conclusion. This gene-
rally decreasing trend has been found in compara-
tive homicide statistical studies.383 Their authors 
draw from them conclusions about the civilizing and 
pacifying function of the rule of law in Europe. This 
must have increased respect for the right to life, per-
haps even a greater degree of “individual synomie”, 
but in any case individual cooperativism and social 
inclusion.384
This decreasing trend in homicides does not 
contradict the thesis of the criminogenic function of 
modernization. That thesis covers only the last 150 
years of socio-economic development. 
Those who promoted it in criminology, such as 
Clinard and Abbot (1973), may be recognized for a 
far greater and less contentious contribution to it. 
Two of their valuable accomplishments should be re-
viewed.
First, they formulated a new thesis on the prin-
ciple of comparative studies. Since that time the still 
dominant criminological view has been formed that 
“The goal of a comparative criminology should be to 
develop concepts and generalizations at a level that 
distinguishes between universals applicable to all so-
cieties and unique characteristics representative of 
one or a small set of societies ... should proceed ... 
first in a single culture at one point in time ... second 
in societies generally alike ... and third in completely 
dissimilar societies”.385 
This is a static principle of comparisons, surpris-
ingly short of any further refinement called for by the 
modernization theory that they otherwise develop. 
It was justified up to the 1990s, when with the ex-
ception of the two world wars and regional conflicts 
(which had an international criminogenic impact), 
the comparisons of dynamics and the structure of 
crime had not been done on the principle of inter-
connected vessels, when the similarities or the ab-
sence of them were not so evident. 
In those earlier times, most comparisons were 
purely academic, and there was little evidence of any 
practical connectivity.
Other comparativists have developed transfor-
mative principles, in line with the modernization 
theory, which calls for overcoming the peculiarity of 
the comparative perspective. Originally academic as 
static comparativists tend to be, they separately set 
out to investigate the content of law; next, they com-
pared this content with modern law; finally they re-
constructed the former along scientific lines. Within 
those lines there may be committee work, missions, 
evaluations, and, ultimately, the production of do-
cuments.386 
If engaged in practical legal reform projects, 
those early modernists were, first of all and at best, 
only “independent bureaucrats” involved with the de-
velopment of universal common law for transnational 
business. Far from envisioning the Four Freedoms, 
and even farther away from sustainable development, 
and more often than not Euro-Anglo-centred, tho-
se bureaucrats acted at the request of their Govern-
ments to pursue their colonial or anti-colonial, but 
mostly imperialist, economic interests.387 Those 
comparativists hardly realized that the way to 
make business is first by making peace – an objective 
that is contrary to the world of colonial conquest and 
domination. They hardly realized that humanitari-
an law, let alone criminal law (domestic or interna-
tional), is a concomitant instrument for the develop-
ment of that universal common law, and is a part of 
the greater picture of global peace and security.
In the United Nations, a post-colonial inde-
pendence-inspired bureaucracy, and compara tive 
practical legal and criminological work with its com-
mitment to universals, goes further than mere pro-
duction of documents. It aims at elaborating model 
and other soft laws with State practices and con-
ventions. Moreover, it aims at institutional crime 
prevention and criminal justice reform that should 
make those legal instruments work in local circum-
stances. This is the furthest one can get from the as-
sertion that the law suitable for one people is pro-
bably not suitable for another (Hale, Montesquieu, 
Savigny). It is also the furthest one can get in estab-
lishing the rule of law with genuinely and globally 
democratic objectives.
From the United Nations observatory, the com-
parative reference point for this study is therefore 
different: crime as a universal and global phenome-
non may be studied from the standpoint of gene-
ral principles that have already been worked out, in 
line with the principle think globally, act locally and 
seeing the world as a global village. This approach, 
383 Ginther 1995:153.
384 Eisner 2003; Ellis & Walsh 2005:171; Thome 2007.
385 Thome 2007:186.
386 Clinard & Abbot 1973:2.
387 Riles 2001:16-17.
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that of moving from the macro- to the micro-level, 
may be compared to the contemporary technolo-
gy instrument offered by Google mapping. First, 
we find a satellite view of the world. From there, by 
gradual approximations, we can zoom in on concrete 
localities and individual topographic elements. And 
we can continue to look for commonalities. If they 
are not found, we may suspect that the failure lies in 
the heuristic apparatus rather than in the real unique- 
ness of situations. And if the unique situations are 
beyond reasonable doubt, we can still wonder if sever - 
al of them together could have a common denomina-
tor. In the same way as idealistic Ancel, I myself 
would like to be counted among those who believe 
that people are all the same. 
The second valuable feature of the book by Cli-
nard and Abbot is that it draws attention to the cri-
minogenic function of migration, another common 
element in the genesis of crime. Since the 1990s, that 
thesis, already well documented at the time, has be-
come quite prominent along with the transnation-
alization of crime, enabling the comparison of crime 
on the principle of interconnected vessels. 
During the 1990s it was fully clear that the trans-
nationalization of crime will determine its forms 
and dynamics. The first signal was the publication 
in 1995, in a new journal called Transnational Orga-
nized Crime, of an article by McDonald, announcing 
the globalization of criminology. Interestingly, this 
article mentions the establishment of the electronic 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice Network, mandated by United Nations Econo-
mic and Social Council resolution 1986/11 (and thus 
at the very early, pre-internet, stage of computeriza-
tion), and created with the assistance of the Institute 
of Applied Computer Science and Information Sys-
tems at the University of Vienna (Austria). This elec-
tronic clearing-house, now incorporated into a much 
larger and comprehensive multi-media web-based 
UNODC communication network, represented the 
culmination of several years of incremental efforts. 
They were originated by the Centre for International 
Crime Prevention, prompted by already then-retired 
Irene Melup, one of its former staff members, and for 
whom relentless advocacy of connecting academic 
research with the UN crime programme has been a 
driving motif. 
One of the first global criminological books that 
devoted an entire chapter to the transnationaliza tion 
of crime was published in 1999 as the first United 
Nations Global Report on Crime and Justice.388 This 
was preceded by a series of United Nations reports 
on various aspects of crime trends and operations 
of criminal justice systems in the world, initiated 
by G.O.W. Mueller. Mueller also rendered assist-
ance to academic researchers interested in compara-
tive crime studies. Since the end of the 1970s, more 
and more studies of this type emerged, initially in 
the western world, and later in Central and Eastern 
Europe, as documented by two Polish members of 
the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, 
Jerzy Jasiński (1973 – 1992) and Jacek R. Kubiak (1986 
– 1990). Both published impressive articles on that 
subject, quoted in the UN documentation.389 
From amongst more recent publications which 
quote United Nations crime survey data, reference 
can be made to a Russian book by Luneev390 and a 
book by van Dijk (the Netherlands; 2008), a former 
UNODC staff member. In the United States, compa-
rative criminology textbooks began to appear. One 
of them391 has been a valuable source in the United 
Nations Crime programme on evidence-based com-
parative crime research.392 Other textbooks were, in 
turn, informative about the UN crime program man-
date within a broader architecture of international 
cooperation in the response to crime,393 the ana-
lysis of the structure and dynamics of crime from 
the academic perspective,394 or from more practical 
perspectives.395 
In parallel, legal comparative work and praxis has 
developed. Marc Ancel, who had been a United Na-
tions consultant on international criminal statistics, 
published in 1971 in France a book on international 
comparative law. In this he formulated a thought-
provoking opinion: “Let’s not forget that the com-
parative method should play in social science broad-
ly a role which experiment has in natural science”.396 
One of those who kept this advice in mind was 
G.O.W. Mueller. Before joining the United Nations, 
he was an editor-in-chief of a unique series of na-
388 Ibid.:13-15.
389 Vetere & Newman 1977:251.
390 A/CONF.144/6, § 23 & 36.
391 Luneev 1997.
392 Ellis & Walsh 2005.
393 UNODC 2005.
394 Natarajan 2010.
395 Winslow & Zhang 2008.
396 Reichel 2005.
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tional criminal codes. Under his editorship, twenty 
English translations of such codes appeared between 
1960 and 1973. About twenty years after that remark-
able accomplishment, a further step in comparative 
method was made in the U.S. Model Penal Code,397 
elaborated originally from 1951 to 1962, at the request 
of Roosevelt.398 
This model penal code has been the basis of 
the unification of criminal law in two thirds of 
the U.S. states. For a long time it has been, for the 
internation al community, an example of how to 
model unification efforts, even if in some count-
ries such efforts had begun much earlier than in the 
U.S. Those had their beginning when Carl Stooss 
conducted in the 1880s a vast comparative study of 
criminal legislation in all the Swiss cantons, which 
then had different criminal codes. By methodologi-
cally arranging the entire material which then be-
came a model for others, in 1890-1893 he published 
a one-volume federated analysis, meaningfully tit-
led Die Schweizerischen Strafgeszetzbuch zur Verg-
leichung zuzammengestellt (The Swiss Criminal 
Code for Comparison), followed by two volumes 
that dealt with, respectively, the general and special 
part of the Swiss criminal codes. 
Drawing on the comparative method develop-
ed by Stooss, Franz von Liszt (Austria; 1851-1919), 
professor of German criminal law, the founder of 
the sociological school of criminal law (”not an act 
but its perpetrator is subject to punishment”), influ-
enced by the ideas of Beccaria and Bentham, en-
listed the contributions of 48 other criminal law-
yers for a two-volume work. Von Liszt was the first 
person who applied that method to a cross-national 
study. In its starting phase (1894-1899), he publis-
hed the two-volume Die Strafgezetzgebung der Ge-
genwart in Rechtsvergleichender Darstellung (The 
Contemporary Criminal Code in a Comparative Le-
gal Presentation). In the first volume he dealt with 
the criminal law of European States. In the second 
volume he dealt with non-European States. In the 
following phase (1905-1908), he published a fifteen-
volume comparative study of general and special 
parts of criminal legislation as well as the methods 
of criminal policy. 
The major outcome of this monumental effort 
was the finding that it was possible, and even highly 
desirable, to establish general principles of criminal 
law of international applicability and to arrive at uni-
fied criminal legislation. Although von Liszt was not 
successful in operationalizing his idea of establish-
ing institutes of criminological research in German 
universities,399 he was successful in internationali-
zing it otherwise. Apparently inspired by the work 
of Stooss,400 and together with Adolphe Prins (Bel-
gium) and Gerard Anton van Hamel (The Nether-
lands), von Liszt managed to establish in Vienna the 
Internationale Kriminalistische Vereinigung (IKV, 
1888-1937). IKV was a private organization which 
promoted the systematic and scholarly compara tive 
study of the major branches of criminal science, in-
cluding the publication of German translations of 
foreign codes and statutes. 
But the European comparativists of that pre-
First World War time were so much out of touch with 
the global realities that they blamed the lack of pro-
gress in the unification of law on the local wars and 
other conflicts of the nineteenth century. They could 
not know that the wars on which they could really lay 
the blame had yet to come in the twentieth century, 
for, really, the two “world wars have weakened, if not 
destroyed, faith in world law”.401 And when the First 
World War came, it really made further cooperati-
on impossible, since various comparativists whose 
States were in conflict with one another found them-
selves on opposite sides. As noted in the above context 
by Marc Ancel,402 comparative work is an “insepar able 
element of peace”. And yet the result was the opposite 
of what was expected. 
The growth of the unification movement conti-
nued after the First World War. That work was re-
sumed in 1924 in Paris, where a new Association In-
ternationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP, the International 
Association of Penal Law) was established. (The IKV 
still existed but had no major role.) In 1927 the AI-
DP held its first congress, in Warsaw, Poland, on the 
unification of criminal law. That was one year after 
another congress in Brussels, Belgium (1926), which 
had adopted a resolution urging the establishment 
of an international criminal tribunal, as agreed in 
the Treaty of Versailles ending the First World War, 
and for which the first proceedings were to have been 
brought in order to assign individual responsibility to 
the German Emperor Wilhelm II. Since he obtained 
397 Ancel 1979:133.
398 Gainer 1988.
399 Kuhn 1934:541.
400 Grassberger 1957:60.
401 Radzinowicz 1991:77.
402 Ancel 1979:42.
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political asylum in the Netherlands, that internation-
al criminal tribunal idea did not materialize. But 
there was also no material or procedural criminal law 
according to which he could have been assigned re-
sponsibility, since there was neither an agreed body 
of law nor a statute for the tribunal. 
It was evident that the idea of a tribunal had been 
premature, but its enthusiasts, such as the French 
lawyer Donnedieu de Vabres, later a member of the 
United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control (1949), denied that it was utopian. On the 
contrary, they argued that it is a ”powerful desidera-
tum of the contemporary judicial conscience”.403 
As said by Ancel,404 the early enthusiasts of the 
unification of penal law had gradually realized that 
the objective is more complex than originally per-
ceived. While, until about 1900, comparative work 
mostly involved two continental civil law traditions, 
the “Roman” (exemplified by the French Napoleonic 
code) and the German (exemplified by the Bürger-
liches Gesetzbuch), since 1920 comparativists had 
gradually realized that the common law tradition 
differs so much in legal concepts and terms from the 
civil law tradition, that simple dualistic French-Ger-
man law comparisons were overly limited. English 
law was a case in point (UK lawyers did not parti-
cipate in the work of IKV). But so was also the case 
with U.S. common law, against the ”Anglican” back-
ground of which American John Henry Wigmore pub-
lished in 1928-1936 a three-volume study entitled ”A 
Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems”, historically 
covering a total of sixteen legal systems. After review-
ing these systems, he claimed that the survival of ten 
of them until his time had been due to the crea tion 
and persistence of a body of technical legal ideas 
which regardless of the changing socio-political con-
ditions and addressees that they served, had been in-
tergenerationally transmitted by an ever-vibrant pro-
fessional class of legal thinkers and practitioners.405 
It is impossible to say whether it was the inter-
nal dynamics of common law work – which is less 
governed by criminal law as an indicator for torts as 
is the case for delicts in the civil law system406- and/
or its autonomous system logic that held common 
law lawyers back from the interest of their Europe-
an continental law colleagues in comparative law. It 
may perhaps even be that the civil law system was re-
sented as being “out of line”, because since the 1850s 
the U.S. common law system had become too heavily 
”Romanized”407 – an argument familiar already in Eu-
rope from the work of Hale, Montesquieu and Savig-
ny. Consequently, it was claimed that U.S. common 
law lost its own “organic” ingredients that would have 
made it work in the twentieth century phase of social 
interdependence.408 
In any case, the Anglican system ideas of that 
time had still been confined to themselves. These 
ideas had not permeated into the global criminal law 
unification agenda pursued by civil lawyers. More-
over, for the English lawyers at least, the need to re-
spond to the call for their own criminal law reform409 
apparently must had been more compelling than the 
feeble call for global unification of criminal law ad-
vocated in continental Europe. 
Nonetheless, the separate emergence in the Uni-
ted States of its own perspectives on the unification 
of law must still have given the European compara-
tists new vigour in seeking to attain a broader ob-
jective of unification, that of “global law of the twen-
tieth century”.410 “This ambitious universalistic path 
which was a peculiar combination of scientific soul, 
nobleness and naivety [should have – added] led to gi-
ving the nations one unified law which will be the sign 
of mutual understanding, the guarantee of peaceful 
agreement between them”. When one sees411 how, in 
fact, fragmentarily and autonomously all branches 
of law have been moving toward this universalis-
tic objective, no one should wonder why it had ulti-
mately remained out of bounds.
Particularly during the Belle Époque412 inspired 
by French legal thinkers, spanning, roughly, from 
1900 to 1950 (with the two intermittent World Wars 
which reset the basic parameters of comparative le-
gal thought and action), this idealistic universalism 
had found new ways of expression. In 1928, short-
ly after the Second International Congress on the 
Unification of Penal Law, at the initiative of Italy 
and prompted by Enrico Ferri and Rafaelle Garofalo 
403 Bassiouni 1980:viii.
404 Ancel 1979:34-42.
405 Wigmore 1936, Vol. III:1129.
406 Wagner 2008:1010.
407 Pound 1917:218-221.
408 Kennedy 2003a:660.
409 Radzinowicz 1991:78.
410 Ancel 1979:39.
411 Reimann & Zimmermann 2008.
412 Fauvarque-Cosson 2008:3.
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(1851-1934), the League of Nations opened in Rome 
the International Bureau for the Unification of Penal 
Law. In 1932, the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations received a resolution, signed by the Bu reau, 
IKV, AIDP, the Howard League of Penal Reform, the 
International Law Commission, the International 
Criminal Police Organization and the International 
Penal and Penitentiary Commission. It, inter alia, 
called for the standardization of criminal laws across 
member states. It further called for the setting up of 
“ad hoc committees of experts for the ongoing pro-
vision of research”, and reconstituting the Bureau, a 
hybrid entity with expert individuals and State offi-
cials, into still a hybrid entity but with more inter-
governmental involvement, through ex-officio repre-
sentation of the League of Nations.413 
The reception of this call was mixed. While 
a number of States414 were sympathetic to the idea, 
other countries were less so or not at all. For instan-
ce, South Africa felt that involving the League of 
Nations in answering that call would yield limited 
results. Hungary was troubled by the difficulty of re-
conciling Anglo-American law and the laws of Eu-
ropean countries with regard to criminal acts com-
mitted abroad. Therefore it advocated that the 
League of Nations only start working on the punish-
ment of crimes and offences committed in a foreign 
country. The United Kingdom, echoing the 1839 re-
port of its law reform commissioners, felt that cri-
minal law was rooted too deeply in the history and 
customs of peoples to submit to unification, with the 
exception of certain nations whose law was based on 
“similar juridical principles derived from a common 
source and which posses the same social outlook and 
customs”. In the view of the United Kingdom, the 
League of Nations should rather limit itself to speci-
fic topics, such as the traffic in women and children, 
the traffic in dangerous drugs, and the counterfeiting 
of currency.415 In the text of the replies one can find 
resounding doubts whether the proposed new arrange - 
ment would produce the practical unification goal 
that it sought.
In 1933 Germany and Japan withdrew from the 
League of Nations. The advent of Nazism was immi-
nent. Governments were not ready to take on board 
unification, let alone, standardization work.
Nonetheless, the AIDP continued its own work 
on the first draft of an international criminal code, 
which was written by its member, the eminent Ro-
manian lawyer Vespasian V. Pella (1897-1952), the 
Secretary-General of the Bureau.416 The idea of the 
creation of the international criminal court had re-
ceived material legal backing. However, the threat to 
peace dashed hopes for its further advancement. In-
ter arma silent leges. 
In addition, codification work was not really a 
kind of global law, but rather regional, at best in the 
sense of continental Europe. It was to a much less er 
degree unifying than is currently the case with Euro-
pean Union law. The more so, this inseparable ele-
ment of peace could not be advanced further, becau-
se of the growing threat of the Second World War. 
Shorty after it, the new idea emerged of drafting a 
code of offences against peace and mankind, sub-
mitted to the United Nations by the same author, 
Vespasian V. Pella.417 
Between 1954 and 1979 it had been considered by 
the General Assembly, and in 1975 it was presented at 
the Fifth United Nations Congress.418 In 1980, Che-
rif M. Bassiouni proposed a Draft International Cri-
minal Code. The first introductory sentences to the 
draft read, ”Universal peace has been one of the great 
historical dreams of humankind. Unfortunately, it re-
mains a dream whose realization eludes the desperate 
needs of man”.419 
Starting with the early post-Second World War 
years and continuing until 1980, against the back-
ground of the intergovernmental discussion on the 
definition of State aggression, there had been more 
and more governmental initiatives, so passion - 
ately pursued for example by Bassiouni. They had a 
sympathetic ear with governments, as did Pella’s pro-
posal, which in 1954 was adopted as a draft by the 
International Law Commission. 
The work of Bassiouni and like-minded experts 
appears to be unique not only in respect of its breadth 
and impact, but also because post-war comparati-
vism had adhered to a certain ideological agnos-
ticism. Unlike the pre-war comparativists, their 
post-war successors have been careful to stay away 
413 League of Nations, 1933.
414 Belgium, Bulgaria, Colombia, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
415 League of Nations, 1933.
416 Bureau 1938:6.
417 A/CN.4/39.
418 Bassiouni 1980:ix.
419 Ibid.:vii.
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from the question of governance, obeying the credo 
that ”comparative law today is about knowing, not 
doing”.420
As documented above, the UN crime program-
me had been only marginally involved in this codi-
fication idea, and originally only in so far as the tre-
atment of prisoners is concerned. But even within 
that narrow margin it was doing what it could on the 
question of governance. Therefore, the Fifth Uni-
ted Nations Congress took on board the idea of the 
prohibition of torture. It defined such a prohibition 
and adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, subsequently adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975. Even-
tually, this became the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment adopted by the General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 – originally, 
an item from the 1954 Draft code of offences against 
peace and mankind. 
The criminal codification question has again be-
come important since the adoption of the United Na-
tions Convention against Genocide (1948), right after 
the inception of the UN crime programme. The Con-
vention foresees the establishment of an internation-
al tribunal to try individual alleged perpetrators of 
genocide, and obliges its State Parties to ensure the 
responsibility of individuals under criminal law. At 
that time, the programme had not been involved 
in any way in implementing this humanitarian law 
priority. Only after the Security Council had estab-
lished the two ad-hoc criminal tribunals mandated to 
bring to individual responsibility the perpetrators of 
violations of international humanitarian law in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (1993/1994),421 it was 
hoped that the UN crime programme could re-en-
ter the criminal law unification agenda. At that time 
Barbados, Dominica, India, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, and 
Trinidad and Tobago422 proposed to the Preparatory 
ICC Committee the inclusion in the ICC’s statutory 
jurisdiction of crimes involving illicit trafficking in 
drugs and psychotropic substances. This proposal 
was rejected by the Diplomatic Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries on the Establishment of an Internation-
al Criminal Court423 (Rome, Italy), and such cases so 
far can only be tried by domestic courts.
Nonetheless, the ICC Statute made very consi-
derable advances in the unification of criminal law. 
It sets out the principles of individual criminal re-
sponsibility for a number of other crimes from the 
humanitarian law field, including the definition of the 
subjective elements of guilt (mens rea) of the perpe-
trator. They are different, but key, from the perspec-
tive of common law, continental law and Shari’a law. 
God’s law, the law of Islam, which operates, in most 
countries alongside other legal traditions, in altoge-
ther 53 Member States,424 including India and Nigeria 
(the second and tenth most populous countries in the 
world), only recently has been included into the tru-
ly global comparative perspective, earlier anchored in 
the nineteenth century vision of the “civilized world”, 
especially Western. In article 30 of the Statute of the 
ICC, the contemporary international law comparatists 
(Oriental and Occidental) have finally agreed on a 
psychological definition of guilt (the mental element) 
as a general requirement for individual criminal re-
sponsibility. Moreover, article 30 seeks to set a uniform 
standard — intent and knowledge — for the mental 
element, applicable to all crimes under international 
criminal law. According to it ”a person shall be cri-
minally responsible and liable for punishment for a 
crime … (a) In relation to conduct, that person means 
to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to a conse-
quence, that person means to cause that consequen-
ce or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course 
of events … For the purposes of this article, ’knowledge’ 
means awareness that a circumstance exists or a conse-
quence will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
’Know’ and ’knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly”. 
This quite widely accepted definition of guilt will influ-
ence domestic legislation, also through the Statute.425 
This agreement, even if tenuous,426 is a colossal unifi-
cation success, one that shows that mankind under-
stands one sense of guilt. 
420 Kennedy 2003b:346. This academic detachment from the question of “law and development” is, however, countered by more practically-
oriented comparativists. They argue that “the understanding of, respect for and engagement of foreign legal systems rather than their mere 
tolerance will not only facilitate discussions with foreign counsel or clients but will also allow us to respect cultural gender-based, religious 
and legal differences at home to a great extent. In that respect, comparative law could live up to its promise of providing a domestic as much 
as foreign perspective” (Demleitner 1998:665).
421 That is, at the time of work on a draft statute by the International Law Commission (1994), and the Preparatory Committee for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (1998/1999).
422 A/CONF.183/Cl/L.27/Rev. l.
423 A/CONF. 183/13/Vol. I: 71.
424 Esmaeli & Gans 2003:148.
425 Fletcher 2007:309 & 340.
426 See further Kelly 2010.
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Introduction
The United Nations standards and norms in crime pre-
vention and criminal justice, starting with the Stand-
ard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(1955), have had a profound and lasting impact on 
both the international and national scenarios of crime 
prevention and judicial processes.1
Fifty-five years after the First United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, some 60 UN crime prevention 
and criminal justice instruments are now in opera-
tion. A few will be examined here briefly in terms of 
their relevance to the structure and functions of the 
international penal tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and for Rwanda.
A.	The	tribunals	
The late Professor G.O.W. Mueller, former Chief of the 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Branch, wrote in 1991 in Criminal Justice (which he co-
authored) that the United Nations does not have a po-
lice precinct to which one can report a crime. But he 
added that the closest resemblance to such a precinct 
would be the United Nations Security Council.2 In 1992 
in Criminology, another book co-authored by him, he 
further added that likewise the International Court 
of Justice did not have any jurisdiction over criminal 
cases.3
When in 1993 and 1994 the Security Council 
created, respectively, the International Tribunals for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) 
it opened the avenue for the internationalization of 
criminal justice, starting from prosecution and going 
all the way to sentencing of certain criminal cases. But 
with this breakthrough the Security Council embarked 
upon uncharted waters. 
Apart from the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
following the Second World War, which functioned 
in a totally different environment and under dramati-
cally different circumstances, no international criminal 
established in connection with conflicts such as those 
in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, or in Rwanda dur-
ing 1994, had ever existed. To be sure, much thought 
had been devoted after the Second World War to the 
subject of an international criminal court by organs of 
the United Nations and others, which contributed to 
shaping the contours of the ICTY and ICTR statutes. 
The International Court of Justice had no jurisdic-
tion in criminal matters. But, as will be seen, without 
(and, perhaps, even with) the benefit of actual prac-
tical experience, the creation by the United Nations 
under its Charter of prosecutorial and judicial organs 
almost inevitably presented issues either unforeseen 
or not fully appreciated, issues that would unfold only 
through the often costly process of trial and error.
Both statutes were adopted by the Security Coun-
cil, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations. ICTY’s competence encompasses “the 
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991, in accordance with the provisions of [its] Stat-
ute”.4 ICTR’s competence encompasses “the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the 
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsi-
ble for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of 
[its] Statute.5 Since their creations, the two tribunals 
Pedro David
Making the United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime 
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1 Pedro R. David, Globalizacion, Prevencion del Delito y Justicia Penal, Zavalia Editor, Buenos Aires 1999, ch. 14. 
2 Freda Adler, G.O.W. Mueller, William S. Laufer, Criminal Justice. An Introduction, McGraw-Hill, Inc New York 1991:356.
3 Freda Adler, G.O.W. Mueller, William S. Laufer, Criminology, McGraw-Hill, Inc. New York 1992:448.
4 Article 1 of the ICTY Statute (S/25704, annex, as revised by Security Council resolution 1166 (1988) of 13 May 1998.
5 Article 1 of the ICTR Statute (Security Council resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994), as revised by Security Council Resolution 
116 (1998) of 13 May 1998.
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have functioned under their respective statutes and 
have experienced substantial growth in personnel and 
budgetary requirements.6
In establishing and supporting ICTY and ICTR, the 
United Nations has taken measures both noble and 
far-sighted. Although events in Kosovo and elsewhere 
have shown the continuing gulf between such aspira-
tions and realities, history will record that the interna-
tional community, through these ad hoc tribunals, has 
sought to defend humanitarian values and has striven 
to restore and maintain peace in parts of the world 
that have been beset with unspeakable violence. 
B.	The	UN	Declaration	of	Basic	Principles	 
of	Justice	for	Victims	of	Crime	and	 
Abuse	of	Power	
On the eve of the creation of the ICTY by the UN Se-
curity Council, Amnesty International had submitted 
a paper noting, inter alia, that guarantees for the 
independence of the Tribunal will depend, partly, on 
factors already established in the Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power.7
In fact, many articles of the Statute of the ICTY ar-
ticulate provisions established in the UN Declaration. 
For instance articles 20-21 of the Statute of the ICTY 
stipulate the right to a public hearing subject to the 
protection of victim and witnesses.
Rule 75 of the ICTY establishes that a Judge or a 
Chamber may order appropriate measures for the pri-
vacy and protection of victim and witnesses provided 
that the measures are consistent with the rights of the 
accused.
These measures include, among others, closed 
and private session, voice and face distortion or testi-
mony via video-link. 
Rule 69(a) provides for the disclosure of the iden-
tity of the victim in sufficient time prior to the trial. 
However, this provision was interpreted by the Ap-
peal Chamber as being subject to Article 75. The UN 
ad-hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) have so far consist-
ently achieved a fair balance between the rights of the 
victims, their dignity and safety while maintaining full 
protection of the rights of the accused.
C.	Fair	trial	and	provisional	release
The ICTY has consistently confirmed the application of 
fair trial requirements in the ECHR and the ICCPR to 
both substantive and procedural regulations.
The report of the Secretary General which was at-
tached to the Statute of the Tribunal, adopted in 1993, 
envisages that the Tribunal must fully respect inter-
nationally recognized standards with respect to the 
rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings, 
observing that these rights are in particular sustained 
in Article 14 of the ICCPR.
An issue of great relevance, inspired by the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial 
Measures (The Tokyo Rules), was the evolution of the 
rules on provisional release of the accused in the juris-
prudence of the ICTY.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
originally mandated that release may be ordered by 
a Chamber only in exceptional circumstances. It was 
then a system based on mandatory pre-trial deten-
tion. 
The provision was modified in 1999, in order to 
avoid the contradiction between customary interna-
tional law, which supports the use of pre-trial deten-
tion, and the view of the European Court of Human 
Rights that pre-trial detention constitutes “an excep-
tional departure from the right to liberty”.
Let us recall that the Tokyo Rules established that 
pre-trial detention shall be a measure of last resort.
D.	Standard	Minimum	Rules	for	the	
Treatment	of	Prisoners,	the	pre-trial	
detention	and	the	presumption	 
of innocence
In relation to the conditions of detention of the ac-
cused, both the ICTY and the ICTR are regulated by 
the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners (1955), subsequently expanded to cover 
those in remand (1957). Detention facilities exist both 
in Arusha and in the Hague. Both detention units are 
highly secure, modern and well-designed facilities. But 
the operation of the rules in those facilities had been 
6 In 1999 ICTY’s annual budget reached US$ 94,103,800; its total number of personnel was 838 (assessed budget) and 10 (extra-budgetary). 
ICTR’s 1999 budget was US$ 68,531,900 and its personnel numbered 779 (assessed budget) and 41 (extra-budgetary).
7 See: Morris Virginia and Michael P. Scharf, Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Transnational Publishers 
Inc. New York 1994:417-18.
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another matter, because of uncertainty over whether 
the warden is in a position to cooperate with the pros-
ecution which conducts criminal investigation. 
In 1999, the UN Secretary General, aware of sev-
eral matters requiring such a clarification, appointed 
the Expert Group (before joining the ICTY, I was one of 
its members), to review the functioning and structure 
of both Tribunals. The group listed 46 recommenda-
tions, many of which were adopted by the tribunals, 
as we have said in the report (A/54/634, § 198):
“[T]here has been minor tension between the 
ICTY Detention Unit and the Office of the Prosecutor 
under rule 66 of the ICTY Detention Rules. The latter 
provides for certain types of cooperative assistance 
when the Prosecutor has reason to believe that con-
duct by one or more detainees could prejudice or 
affect ICTY proceedings or investigations. When the 
Prosecutor has sought the assistance of the Detention 
Unit with respect to electronic interception of such 
conduct, which the Prosecutor had reason to believe 
was authorized by rule 66, the Detention Unit and the 
Registry were reluctant to cooperate.
In the view of the Expert Group, the presumption 
of innocence in judicial proceedings does not conflict 
with the legitimate interests of law-enforcement au-
thorities as they affect detainees. This point appears to 
have been embodied in the language of rule 66 of the 
ICTY Detention Unit Rules (rule 64 of the ICTR Deten-
tion Rules). The Expert Group concludes that once the 
Prosecutor shows reasonable grounds for cooperative 
assistance by the Detention Unit under this rule, such 
assistance should be forthcoming from the Registrar 
without delay in accordance with the decision of the 
President ..., or the matter should immediately be re-
ferred either to the President or to the Trial Chamber 
as provided in that decision. Communications between 
detainees and outsiders, other than their counsel, are 
not privileged. Once sufficient grounds for detention ex-
ist, the presumption of innocence, while fully applicable 
in court proceedings, does not insulate detainees from 
investigation of potentially unlawful conduct while they 
are in detention. Nor does it provide detainees with any 
expectation that unprivileged communications will not 
be intercepted. Accordingly, in matters arising under 
rule 66 of the ICTY Detention Rules, or rule 64 of the 
ICTR Detention Rules, it appears to the Expert Group 
that the focus of the Detention Unit and the Registry 
should be on the legitimate law-enforcement require-
ments of the Prosecutor rather than on the presump-
tion of innocence which can safely be confided to the 
protection of the court should the Prosecutor stray be-
yond proper bounds.
The commander of the ICTY Detention Unit has 
invited the attention of the Expert Group to an ad-
ditional issue: the need, apparently for speedier 
procedures under rule 65, in short-term provisional 
release of detainees. The Expert Group concurs in 
the Commander’s view that such procedures could 
be studied to provide for emergencies such as funeral 
arrangements or the terminal illness of a close rela-
tive under conditions of adequate guarantees from 
the detainee’s country governing removal and return 
to detention. The Expert Group understands that such 
arrangements have been made”.
E. Post scriptum:	Technical	cooperation	 
and	the	UN	Inter-regional	Adviser	in	 
Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	Justice	
(1982-1993)	
In 1979, the ECOSOC had expressed its concern over 
the negative impact of crime on the efforts of mem-
ber Governments, mainly those in serious situations 
of economic and social disadvantages, to improve the 
well-being of their population. The ECOSOC requested 
the Secretary General to appoint, through UNDP, the 
services of an Inter-regional and Regional Adviser in 
the area of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. 
The Caracas Declaration was approved by the 
General Assembly in its resolution 35/171 of 15 De-
cember 1980. In that resolution, the General Assem-
bly requested the Secretary General to reinforce the 
activities of technical and international cooperation at 
the regional, sub-regional and inter-regional levels.
The Secretary General in his report (A/36/442) 
announced the establishment of the post of Inter-
regional Adviser in the field of crime orevention and 
criminal justice.
By resolution 36/21 of 9 November 1981, the 
General Assembly requested the Department of Tech-
nical Cooperation for Development, and UNDP, to 
increase the level of assistance to programs of techni-
cal cooperation in the area of crime prevention and 
criminal justice and to implement, in its totality, the 
Caracas Declaration with a view to the preparation of 
the Seventh Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders.
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In July of 1982, the post of Inter-regional Adviser 
in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice was estab-
lished and I was invited to submit my CV for the re-
cently created post.
In the same month, with the support of the Of-
fice of the Director General, the Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch, and the ASG of the UN 
Office in Vienna, Ms Leticia Shahani, I was appointed 
to that important function. During my tenure as Inter-
regional Adviser (1982–1993), a post that was vacant 
after the departure of Don Manuel López Rey and Ed-
ward Galway, I visited more than 120 countries in all 
regions, upon their request. 
At the invitation of Professor Gerhard Mueller, I 
have prepared as an expert consultant, together with 
Edward Galway the Sixth Congress paper on “New 
perspectives in crime prevention and criminal justice 
and development: the role of international co-oper-
ation” (A/CONF. 87/10). Working with Galway was a 
great pleasure. His criminological competence, rein-
forced by field expertise, showed that through their 
joint combination, the recommendations on the new 
perspectives in international cooperation on crime 
prevention and criminal justice in developing world 
have been practical and viable. That Secretariat paper 
had received enthusiastic support at the Sixth Con-
gress (Caracas, 1980). In that paper, we, with Galway, 
tried to restore the important role of customary legal 
systems to bring solutions to legal conflicts through 
the role of probation, mediation and arbitration. We 
recall also the important dimension of technical and 
international cooperation to bring, into reality, all over 
the world, the UN crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice standards and norms.
Not by coincidence therefore, I would like to note 
that in another Sixth Congress paper on “United Na-
tions norms and guidelines in criminal justice. From 
standard-setting to implementation, and capital pun-
ishment” (A/CONF. 87/9, § 67) there was one remark-
able quotation from the works of Samuel Romilly, 
British penal reformer (1757-1818). It showed how 
much the present criminological research has ad-
vanced from his time when “Penal legislation hitherto 
has resembled what the science of physics must have 
been when physicians did not know the properties of 
the medicines they administered”. Looking back from 
the first-decade perspective of the twenty-first cen-
tury with its Twelfth United Nations Congress (2010), 
penal and other criminological progress is even more 
pronounced than in 1980.8
F.	Conclusion
In 1993, after more than 10 years of my appoint-
ment, the seeds of an enlarged programme of tech-
nical cooperation in crime prevention and criminal 
justice had been successfully planted and the fruits 
of those efforts, with the support of all my colleagues 
are quite visible today inter alia with the UN Conven-
tion against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
UN Convention against Corruption being adopted and 
implemented. However, the creation of the ad-hoc 
tribunals has been yet further evidence that the UN 
crime prevention and criminal justice standards and 
norms have played a useful substantive role in their 
work. Making them work at this supranational level is 
a great success by everybody concerned with justice 
in the world. ¢
8 At that time and later, I had received the invaluable support of Irene Melup, a renowned official of the UN Programme, and the most de-
cided and learned advocate of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. I have to acknowledge 
also the collegial support of Eduardo Vetere, Gerhard Mueller, Lamin Sesay, Sławomir Redo and other officers and the Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch. 
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After that agreement, and the agreement on the 
criminal responsibility of commanders and other supe-
riors (art. 28), it was relatively easy for Member States 
at the next conference in Palermo (Italy) to agree to 
relax the provision concerning the responsibility of 
members of a transnational organized crime group, 
including its superior. In article 5 of the UNTOC they 
introduced the principle of enterprise responsibility, 
i.e., responsibility not only for the commission of a par-
ticular crime with the above precise subjective “mental 
element”, but also of other crimes, if ”committed inten-
tionally ... by a person who, with knowledge of either 
the aim and general criminal activity of an organized 
criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in 
question, takes an active part in: a. Criminal activities 
of the organized criminal group; b. Other activities of 
the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his 
or her participation will contribute to the achievement 
of the above-described criminal aim”. The article conti-
nues, that ”knowledge, intent, aim, purpose or agree-
ment referred to in paragraph 1 of this article may be in-
ferred from objective factual circumstances” (art. 5.2). 
Moreover, in the spirit of connecting common law 
and continental law principles, UNTOC managed to 
extend the concept of enterprise responsibility. It did 
so in art. 5 by adding to the above continental law form 
(German Komplott, French association de malfaiteurs) 
of a transnational organized crime a common law form 
of ”conspiracy” which, in principle, may require only 
”Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit 
a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indi-
rectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material 
benefit” (art. 5.1.(a)(i)). This example shows that rather 
than talking of “unification” or “harmonization” of cri-
minal law systems, surely one can talk of their conver-
gence through the bridging of the two partly different 
concepts by one legally binding provision.427 
Less spectacular but still very symptomatic legal 
results have been achieved by the UN crime pro gramme 
after the first peace-keeping mission in Cambo - 
dia (UNTAC, 1992-1993), the first country under direct 
UN transitional authority. Cambodia had no written 
laws. To prevent corresponding situations from hap-
pening again, Gareth Evans, then the Foreign Minis-
ter of Australia, and, earlier, Attorney-General (1983-
1984), proposed in his book Cooperating for Peace: 
The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, also 
known as the Blue Book,428 the idea of developing a 
“justice package” containing a set of basic transition 
laws for a country, including ”a body of criminal law 
and procedures, drawing on universal principles”.429 
Its development started in the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch. In 
1994 the Branch published the handbook United Na-
tions Criminal Justice Standards for Peace-keeping 
Police (also dubbed the Blue Book to commemorate 
Evan’s idea). The handbook provided a compact over-
view of relevant international standards and norms, 
readily accessible to those with monitoring functions 
in the field of criminal justice. It synthesized from 20 
international criminal and humanitarian law instru-
ments the principles of law enforcement with regard 
to crime perpetrators and victims. In a way, this was a 
concise code of criminal law and criminal proce dure, 
which went beyond traditional United Nations cri-
minal justice reform work. The handbook, which was 
published in the six official languages of the United 
Nations, has been successfully used in several training 
courses for civilian components of United Nations 
missions, such as the ones in Mozambique and in the 
Former Yugoslavia. UNODC, in cooperation with the 
Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, revised and updated the handbook so as 
to include new areas not covered in the 1994 edition, 
such as the issues of integrity, sexual misconduct, and 
assistance to child victims and witnesses. 
The update was also motivated by the fact that over 
the preceding twelve years new criminal justice stand-
ards and norms had been developed and they would 
need to be taken into consideration. Altogether 47 le-
gal instruments setting out such standards and norms 
have been incorporated in the new edition of the Blue 
Book. The revised version of the handbook is accom-
panied by a set of commentaries that could be the ba-
sis for developing a training module for police officers 
who are to be deployed in peacekeeping missions. The 
new Blue Book430 serves as a handy concise model law.
The work on more elaborate model criminal laws 
started after a review of the 1990s mission experi ences. 
In 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations,431 otherwise known as the Brahimi 
Report, postulated that “it would have been much easier 
if a common United Nations justice package had allowed 
... to apply an interim legal code to which mission person-
427 See further Almir Maljević, ‘Participation in a Criminal Organisation‘ and ‘Conspiracy‘. Different Models against Crime Collectives, Band S 124, 
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, Freiburg i. Br. 2010.
428 Leaver 1995:89; Charlsworth 1995:133.
429 Evans 1993:56.
430 United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police, New York 2009.
431 A/55/305-S/2000/809, §§ 81-82.
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nel could have been pre-trained while the final answer to 
the ’applicable law’ question was being worked out”. The 
Report noted that although no work is currently under 
way within Secretariat legal offices on this issue, inter-
views with researchers indicate that some headway to-
ward dealing with the problem has been made outside 
the United Nations system, emphasizing the principles, 
guidelines, codes and procedures contained in several 
dozen international conventions and declarations relat-
ing to human rights, humanitarian law, and guidelines 
for police, prosecutors and penal systems. 
The Report further noted that such research aims 
at a code that contains the basics of both law and pro-
cedure to enable an operation to apply due process 
using international jurists and internationally agreed 
standards in the case of such crimes as murder, rape, 
arson, kidnapping and aggravated assault. Property 
law would probably remain beyond the reach of such 
a model code, but at least an operation would be able 
to prosecute effectively those who committed arson 
on their neighbours’ homes while the property law is-
sue was being addressed. In fact, a number of United 
Nations organs have already made progress in the field 
of practical criminal procedures, notably the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention of the United Nations 
Office at Vienna, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, UNDP and UNICEF 
(in the area of juvenile justice), and the Office of the 
Special Adviser on Gender Issues / Division for the Ad-
vancement of Women in the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs’. Finally, the Brahimi Report recom-
mended ”to conduct a needs assessment of the areas in 
which it would be feasible and useful to draft a simple, 
common set of interim procedures (referred to in legal 
parlance more precisely as interim ’rules’ of criminal law 
and criminal procedure)”.
The new report of the Secretary General on 
the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies reiterated this press-
ing need.432 The need has also been echoed by the 
multitude of practitioners involved in law reform in 
post-conflict states, clearly aware of the difficulties 
they faced in the reform process.
Four such epoch Model Codes for Post-Conflict 
Criminal Justice were published in 2007-2009 by the 
United States Institute of Peace and the Irish Centre 
for Human Rights, in cooperation with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Their 
drafting involved some 250 leading experts from all 
around the world and from a variety of backgrounds, 
including international and national judges, prose-
cutors, defence lawyers, police, prison officials, hu-
man rights advocates, military lawyers and interna-
tional, comparative and criminal law scholars.
The Model Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice 
consist of a set of four integrated codes: the Model Cri-
minal Code, the Model Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
Model Detention Act and the Model Police Powers Act. 
The Model Criminal Code is a criminal code (or ”penal 
code”), similar to those found in many states, and focu-
ses on substantive criminal law. Substantive criminal 
law regulates what conduct is deemed to be criminal, 
the conditions under which a person may be held crimi-
nally responsible and the relevant penalties that apply 
to a person convicted of a criminal offence. The Model 
Code of Criminal Procedure focuses on procedural cri-
minal law, which is a body of rules and procedures that 
governs how a criminal case will be investigated and ad-
judicated. The Model Detention Act governs the laws 
and procedures to be applied by the criminal justice sys-
tem to persons who are detained prior to and during a 
criminal trial and also to persons who are convicted of 
a criminal offence. Finally, the Model Police Powers Act 
sets out relevant powers and duties of the police in the 
sphere of criminal investigations, in addition to relevant 
procedures to be followed in investigating criminal of-
fences. Moreover, the Model Police Powers Act contains 
provisions on additional police powers and duties and 
the relevant procedures to be followed by the police in 
the maintenance of public order.
These codes have been drafted on the basis of 
some 80 international and United Nations treaty 
and soft law crime prevention and criminal justice 
instruments. The reason why the codes are generic 
was that any code designed to be enforced would 
imply imposing from the top certain legal solutions 
which may fail in local practice. Clearly, the drafters 
drew lessons from the earlier applications of the mo-
dernization theory in countering crime, thus limit-
ing possible negative criminal policy side-effects. 
One can appreciate the epoch difference between the 
Blue Book and the model codes. 
The earlier failures in the application of the mod-
ernization theory changed its design. It has been 
renamed in political science433 as a theory of “tran-
sitions to democracy”, colloquially termed as ”tran-
sitology”. A flagship example of countering crime in 
societies in transition to democracy has been the 
above-described model criminal codes.
432 S/2004/616, §§ 30 & 57.
433 Pye 2006:803.
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XV	United	Nations	standards	for	
responding	to	crime
Row no. 12 in Figure 1 shows the development of 
United Nations standards and norms in crime pre-
vention and criminal justice. As may be recalled, the 
concept originated at the First Penal and Penitentia-
ry Congress (London, 1872). A draft for what eventu-
ally emerged as the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners was submitted to the League 
of Nations (1934), adopted by the First United Nations 
Congress on Crime Preven tion and Criminal Justice 
(1955) and, eventually, the Economic and Social Coun-
cil (1957). In 1990, at the Eighth United Nations Con-
gress in Havana a community-based equivalent in 
the form of the United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules on Non-Custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) 
was adopted, subsequently also by the United Nations 
General Assembly. The most progressive piece of soft 
legislation has been adopted by the Economic and 
Social Council in 2002: the Basic Principles on the 
use of restorative justice programmes in criminal 
matters.434 
The utility of such legislation has been enor mous. 
It has made a significant contribution to promo ting 
more effective and fair criminal justice structures in 
three dimensions. First, it can be utilized at the na-
tional level by fostering in Member States in-depth 
assessments leading to the adoption of necessary 
criminal justice reforms, including improving their 
practices in line with internationally recommended 
standards. Second, it can help them to develop sub-
regional and regional strategies for re sponding to 
crime together. Third, it can be pursued by the ICC, 
to enhance its sentencing policies that should in-
clude restorative justice outcomes.435
434 ECOSOC resolution 2002/12, Annex, of 21 July 2002. See also BOX 3.
435 Findlay & Henham 2010. This idea has been first advanced by Nils Christie. He argued for the transformation of international criminal courts 
from “institutions of pain delivery to institutions for mediation” (Christie 2009:203).
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436 Walters 2003:28-29.
437	 http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=3247&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
438 White, 1949.
439 Gerra et al. 2008:2.
Part	III	–	Back	to	the	Future
XVI The biosocial school  
in academic and United 
Nations criminological 
thought and action
The remaining nine rows in Figure 1 show the strict­
ly academic development of criminological thought 
around the world before and after the Second World 
War. In addition to what has been written above, one 
more development should be noted: the renewed in­
terest in the biosocial genesis of crime and deviance, 
which for a long time was considered as secondary 
to the social genesis of crime. That earlier interest 
led the League of Nations to include it in its research 
agenda criminal biology, and eventually to the con­
clusion that it had “medicalized the causes and pre-
vention of criminal conduct”.436
The United Nations is far from having reach­
ed such a conclusion. In 1986, UNESCO in its Se­
ville Statement on Violence, drafted and adopted 
by anthropologists, biologists, ethnologists, neuro­
psychologists, psychiatrists, psychologists and socio­
logists, declared that:
“it is scientifically incorrect to say that war or any 
other violent behaviour is genetically programmed 
into our human nature. While genes are involved at 
all levels of nervous system function, they provide a 
developmental potential that can be actualized on­
ly in conjunction with the ecological and social en­
vironment. While individuals vary in their predis­
positions to be affected by their experience, it is the 
interaction between their genetic endowment and 
conditions of nurturance that determines their per­
sonalities. Except for rare pathologies, the genes do 
not produce individuals necessarily predisposed to 
violence. Neither do they determine the opposite. 
While genes are co­involved in establishing our be­
havioural capacities, they do not by themselves spe­
cify the outcome”.437 
This Statement sums up and assesses post­Se­
cond World War political, economic and scienti­
fic developments. In their course, social justice and 
human rights movements demoted innateness as an 
important feature of human nature.438 And yet, it can 
no longer be denied that inheritance plays a role in 
the learning of deviant and criminal behaviour. Sub­
sequent to the 1968 Statement, this has been docu­
mented by the works of Moffit (1990/2005) for which 
in 2007 she earned the “criminological Nobel Prize,” 
the Stockholm Prize in Criminology. 
This had its impact on United Nations crimino­
logical thought. A number of United Nations staff 
members published on the neurobiological condi­
tioning of drug abuse attributed to childhood neg­
lect and deficiencies in the parental care of children 
who were brought up in an ”affectionless control” 
rearing style. In comparison with the control groups, 
those children were found not only to be more prone 
to disorders related to substance use, but also to 
be more prone to perpetrating various types of de­
linquent acts and crime than those who enjoyed 
emotional parental support.439 In the Organization 
which treats social problems extremely broadly, of­
ten considering them in terms of megatrends, me­
ta­analyses and on a macro scale, the resurgence of 
the “miniscule” interest in biosocial aspects of crime 
and deviance is noteworthy. This adds to the already 
acknowledged trends toward the individualization 
of criminal responsibility a deeper context of socio-
economic sustainable development and translates it 
into practical recommendations for the optimization 
of the returns on crime prevention. 
It may be added in respect of this reinvigorated 
interest that biosocial criminological ideas may be 
interpreted in the context of sustainable develop­
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ment. Unbalanced sustainable development leads to 
pauperization which implies ecologically hazardous 
living conditions. Some studies argue that those con­
ditions contribute to the over­representation of con­
victed violent offenders diagnosed with damage of the 
central nervous system, which in turn is attributed to 
an excessive level of lead in blood.440 Doubts remain 
if indeed this is true, since lead levels in the blood of 
people of different races vary. Tests of control groups 
would verify this. Such an argument has often been 
repeated ever since it was first made in 1893, when the 
opponents of Cesare Lombroso’s theory questioned 
its validity due to the lack of a control group.441 
Since the beginning of criminology such doubts 
have always existed – and they have figured promi­
nently in connection with the research reported and 
discussed at the international anthropological con­
gresses. At the peak of their popularity (from 1885 
until the 1910s), with positivists such as Lombroso 
and his pupil Ferri at the helm, these congresses had 
the same importance as the concurrent international 
penal and penitentiary congresses. They “universa­
lised the study of criminal behaviour”.442 Indeed both 
of them had been started by Quételet, the founder of 
the sociological school.443 
After Lombroso’s death, his daughter, Dr. Gina 
Lombroso Ferri, attributed to his school of thought 
the broader application of probation measures and 
the introduction of diagnostic methods for offend-
ers with epilepsy. This launched encephalography 
and other methods of diagnosis of the brain,444 un­
doubtedly a controversial approach, but one which 
was a clearly practical demonstration of the influ-
ence of anthropology on criminology. 
Lombroso Ferri also credited her father’s school 
of thought with the launching of the global juvenile 
justice court movement, which started in 1899 with 
the establishment of the first such court in the Uni­
ted States. It seems, however, that this process had 
probably been initiated independently of criminal 
anthropologists, as an expression of the transition of 
criminal law from the classical to the social phase, 
mentioned above. 
What remains less contentious is the broadening 
of the prospects for new methods for diagnosing im­
pairment of the central nervous system, something 
which was prognostically relevant for better preven­
tion of drug abuse and violent crime.
The question of methodology will be addressed 
below. What has been discussed and is shown in Fi­
gure 1 has many other clear limits, which restrict our 
capacity to demonstrate in this study the breadth of 
criminological thought. Further, not everything that 
is useful in matters related to criminological thought 
can be reinterpreted in terms of sustain able develop­
ment. Moreover, sustainable development is a topic 
on which very little has been published in crimino­
logy.
XVII The sociology of knowledge  
 in respect of academic and  
 bureaucratic knowledge
The above attempt to contextualize newer crimino­
logical ideas in light of the concept of sustainable de­
velopment prompts us to consider the fluid relations 
between academic and practical intellectualism, the 
latter of which is manifested in the United Nations. 
One should recall in this context the work of Robert 
Merton (1910-2003), U.S. sociologist and criminolo­
gist.445 He was the author of an article about the in­
compatibility of bureaucratic and academic intellec­
tualism, and a pioneer in exploring the impact of the 
former on the latter, an approach that was continued 
much later by others.446
Merton wrote that there are two types of intel­
lectual creativity: theoretical, which is orientated to­
wards meeting general social needs, and practical, 
which is orientated towards meeting State needs. The 
intellectual who becomes an integral part of the bur­
eaucratic structure experiences various frustrations. 
He or she becomes dependent on it and also enters 
into conflicts with it, since the results of his or her in­
440	 Stretsky	&	Lynch	2004;	Niven	2007.
441	Mannheim	1965,	Vol.	I:130.
442	 Knepper	2010:191.	Another	author	notes	that	at	the	end	of	the	period	1886-1914	during	which	altogether	seven	international	criminal	
anthropological	congresses	were	held,	on	the	balance	they	had	been	well	regarded	by	various	participants	(physicians,	jurists,	social	reformers)	
as	fora	for	jointly	advancing	progressive	ideas	(Kaluszynski	2006:	301-316).	
443	 Campion	1949.
444	 Alper	&	Boren	1972:48-50.
445	 As	is	widely	known,	he	was	the	author	of	the	structural	theory	of	“means and ends”	(“strain theory”).	He	argued	that	crime	is	the	effect	of	
imbalances	in	the	functioning	of	the	society	(once	more	an	example	of	how	sustainable	development	can	be	disturbed),	when	the	goals	are	
overly	emphasized,	in	comparison	to	the	means	(See	the	row	“sociological	theory/theory	of	social	structure”).
446	 Cohen	1988;	Foucault	1991;	Walters	2003.
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tellectual work can not only be impoverished, but can 
also be deformed and even depreciated. His or her bur­
eaucratic supervisors usually value practical know­
ledge more than academic knowledge. In their opin­
ion, an academic theory is irrelevant in bureaucracy, 
which tests the facts against the knowledge of life. 
Merton is basically right, but not entirely. Life 
experience is, of course, a very important signpost 
showing where, how and when one can apply aca­
demic knowledge in order to solve a practical prob­
lem. For many years, such academic knowledge for 
me could be verified only during short field visits in­
volving various technical assistance issues in crime 
prevention and criminal justice.
There is only one measure of this success, which 
is that of the successful application of knowledge in 
science and practice. This thought was probably cap­
tured best by Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), one of 
the most prominent thinkers and political activists, 
the precursor of the concept of sustainable develop­
ment and the propagator of the global antiviolence 
movement. His name has been enshrined by the Ge­
neral Assembly resolution which in 2007 declared 2 
October of every year to be the “International Day of 
Non-Violence”.447 In his words:
“Whenever you are in doubt or when the self be-
comes too much with you, apply the following test: Re-
call the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom 
you may have seen and ask yourself if the step you con-
template is going to be of any use to him. Will he gain 
anything by it? Will it restore him to a control over his 
own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to swaraj 
for the hungry and spiritually starving millions? Then 
you will find your doubts and yourself melting away”. 
In this famous quotation, Gandhi (nominated 
shortly before his tragic death to receive the Nobel 
Prize) made two basic recommendations. Combined, 
they both well address the relationships between 
academic and bureaucratic intellectualism, includ­
ing criminology and practical responses to crime. 
These are: the usefulness of a crime prevention / cri­
minal justice project for a disadvantaged person (be 
it a potential victim, prisoner etc.), verified by the 
evidence that it worked. 
In academic criminology evidence-based preven-
tion, that is prevention supported by the objective 
evidence, is something that is in the order of the day. 
As recalled by academics,448 this catchphrase made 
headway into crime prevention and criminal justice 
policy when Donald Campbell advised the “govern-
ment science policy makers” to ”give up the notion of 
a single new evaluation designed to support a sin gle 
administrative decision regarding expanding or cur-
tailing a program and substitute for this the develop-
ment of a disputatious mutual monitoring, applied 
scientific community that will advise governmental 
decisions on specific programs from its general wis-
dom about research in the problem areas. ”449
This is hardly the case in United Nations crimi-
nology. Since its inception, the deliverables of the 
United Nations crime mandate have not been eva­
luated thoroughly enough. Among several expla­
nations for this is the fact that evaluation of crime 
prevention and criminal justice projects has been a 
relatively recent practice, perhaps dating to the ear­
ly 1980s. In the United Nations crime mandate, this 
has been even more recent, perhaps because of its 
international character which is greater than in any 
other place, and hence to the greater number of factors 
which cannot be controlled through more refined 
evaluation methods available in the academic world. 
That job is technically very demanding in experi­
mental criminology. But it would be even more de­
manding within the United Nations framework, due 
to its developmental focus. In the former, the crite­
ria are more rigid and outcome­oriented, in the lat­
ter they are less rigid and process­oriented. The for­
mer are also base­line data­oriented, while the latter 
are oriented towards capacity­building, including 
base­line data. The control group method in the for­
mer differs in part from the latter, and hence the con­
cept of randomization partly means different things 
in those two types of projects.
The rigorous requirement of randomized cont­
rol trials, which is recommended in academic cri­
minology, is impossible because of the far greater 
multitude of factors in United Nations criminology 
that interplay with the implementation of the pro­
ject. Thus, tongue­in­cheek, United Nations crimi­
nology has earned a qualifier: could/would crimi-
nology. This not only emphasizes its much greater 
relativity,450 but also its complexity and interdiscip­
linary character, which is far greater than in the aca­
demic world. Both qualify the academic findings to 
the extent that specificity is the rule, and the princip­
le is an exception. This has best been shown by the 
447	 General	Assembly	resolution	61/271	of	27	June	2007.
448	 Knutsson	&	Tilley	2009:5.
449	 Campbell	1999:169.
450	 Indeed	implied	by	so	many	“mays”	in	this	text,	as	per	the	reader-responsible	narration	that	involves	using	qualifiers.
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Sixth United Nations Congress, which elevated speci-
ficity to the level of the Caracas Declaration by af­
firming that ”crime prevention and criminal justice 
should be considered in the context of economic de-
velopment, political, social and cultural systems and 
social values and changes, as well as in the context of 
a new international economic order”.451 Recently, but 
certainly not lastly in the United Nations, the Gene­
ral Assembly that endorsed the Salvador Declara tion 
of the Twelfth Congress, invited “Governments ... to 
implement the principles contained therein, taking 
into account the economic, social, legal and cultural 
specificities of their respective States”.452
Paradoxical as the question may now sound, and 
in the light of the question of the specificity of laws 
(originally pondered so extensively by Hale, Mon­
tesquieu, Pound and Savigny), one may still won­
der that, while Member States are jointly affirming 
the specificity of crime prevention and criminal jus­
tice in each country, why do each of them declare the 
same thing? Is this not then evidence of the commo­
nality of specific problems? If so, is the “specificity 
rule” a legal disclaimer protecting State sovereign­
ty rather than something that declares real differen­
ces? Second, why did each country affirm that only 
locally-driven modernization can be beneficial to 
effec tive and humane crime prevention and criminal 
justice, while at least some Member States also advo­
cated the contrary view that the entire world should 
have a centrally led new international economic 
order? 
The probable (if not obvious) explanation for 
the latter question is the political compromise that 
needs to be reached by all Member States, if they 
want to adopt such a document by consensus. For its 
sake, they agree to leave in the text of the declaration 
the contradictory statements.
But there are two other plausible explanations. 
The first explanation suggests that both affirmations 
(generality and specificity) are not internally con-
tradictory. They are, rather, a collective antithesis of 
the individual positions. They are a demonstration 
of legal unity in diversity, for the United Nations law 
is a universalizing system of “We the peoples”. It or­
dains cultural, political, social and economic spe­
cificities. It expresses a collective ”Volksgeist” or 
”Weltgeist” (Hegel) much in the same way as Hale, 
Montesquieu, Pound and Savigny independently of 
one another meant the former only for a single do­
mestic legal system. That ”world spirit” is essentially 
alive and active throughout mankind’s history. ”He-
gel identifies the spirit of a people with its historical 
and cultural accomplishments, namely its religions, 
its mores, its constitution, and its political laws. 
They are the work of a people, they are the people”.453 
Nothing less, nothing more. 
However, since the above explanation may still 
be somehow unsettling (the argument of specifici­
ty still lingers behind religions, morality, constituti­
on and laws), a second, less troubling, explana tion 
was advanced by Leszek Kołakowski (1927-2009), 
Polish moral philosopher and historian of ideas.454 In his 
Oxford lectures he argues that it is not the speci ficity 
that really matters. What matters is a still­dominant 
tribal tradition that treats what is “ours” as “good” and 
what is “theirs” as “bad”. But, across and above this 
tribal morality of peoples, if not for real than at least 
nominally, there is an emerging common core of hu­
man values. Even if those values are violated by the 
“barbarians” themselves, he con cludes that they, at 
least half­wittingly, at the bottom of their hearts, 
know that such violations are indeed barbarous.455 
And indeed they are, as elsewhere the same philo­
sopher convincingly argues by saying:456 “When one 
attempts to derive human rights from historical or 
anthropological material, these will always be the 
laws of particular groups, races, classes, nations that 
on the strength of those laws are free to eliminate or 
enslave other groups. Humankind is a moral concept, 
and if we do not accept it, we have neither a good 
451	 General	Assembly	resolution	35/171	(Annex),	15	December	1980.	
452	 General	Assembly	resolution	65/230	of	21	December	2010.
453	 Rotenstreich	2003	Vol.	4:491.
454	 In	his	youth,	Leszek	Kołakowski	was	a	devout	communist.	After	visiting	the	Soviet	Union,	he	found	communism	repulsive.	He	broke	with	Stalin-
ism,	becoming	a	“revisionist	Marxist”	and	advocating	a	humanist	interpretation	of	Marx.	He	became	increasingly	fascinated	by	the	contribu-
tion	that	Christianity	makes	to	Western,	and,	in	particular,	modern	thought.	In	1968,	he	emigrated	from	Poland,	first	to	Canada,	then	moved	
to	the	United	States	and	eventually	to	the	United	Kingdom	where	in	1970	he	became	research	fellow	at	All	Souls	College,	Oxford.	His	Oxford	
lectures	were	also	published	in	German	(Mini-Traktate	über	Maxi	Themen,	Büchergilde	Gutenberg,	2003).
455	 Kołakowski	2009:189.
456	 The	above	views	are	the	outcome	of	a	major	paradigm	shift	in	Western	historiosophy	on	the	ideas	that	govern	world	development.	Before	
the	outbreak	of	the	Second	World	War,	the	main	current	in	that	historiosophy	broke	away	from	earlier	universalistic	ideas	and	gave	in	to	
nationalistic	particularities	and	xenophobic	ideas,	the	(re)occurrence	of	which	was	attributed	to	the	overpowering	of	man	by	the	forces	of	
industrialization	that	charted	on	their	own	the	destiny	of	both	individuals	and	nations	(Berdyev,	Husselr,	Sorokin).	After	the	Second	World	War,	
leading	thinkers	realized	that	the	dropping	of	atom	bombs	on	Hiroshima	and	Nagasaki	in	August	1945	ultimately	redefined	the	common	values	
of	mankind.	At	the	time	when	Kołakowski	was	still	a	Marxist	philosopher,	Karl	Jaspers	(1883-1969),	a	German	philosopher	(and	criminologist	
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basis to question slavery nor its ideology”.457 Hence, 
there is no question that “a border is [only] a veil not 
many people can wear”.458 
In some instances the argument of specificity 
may well be yet another veil, protecting particular 
group interests rather than the interests of the Sta­
te. The example of the UN response to corruption is 
a case in point. Often related to human trafficking, 
corruption is very difficult to fight internationally, let 
alone be assessed in terms of another State’s techni­
cal assistance needs. The UNODC experience shows 
that States object to such external assessments based 
on the UNCAC when State Parties, through their 
own internal self­assessment, know beforehand how 
corrupt their apparatus indeed is. In such cases argu­
ments are heard that the specificity of the situation 
would not allow anyone to make an objective exter­
nal assessment. In fact, this says that countries with 
integrity deficits resist being scrutinized by others. 
Since that attitude is more or less common, it 
should be added that the “specificity” argument as a 
smoke screen may be overcome. One example of this 
is that the legislation and practices of some countries 
allow difficult corruption cases to be addressed by a 
new method, in which the cases are investigated by 
two autonomous working teams. Such double inves­
tigations are more resilient to corrupting influences. 
Further, where specificity really matters, the UNO­
DC has started developing recommendations on adap­
ting culture-specific good practices to other cul tures, 
as is being done with the prevention of drug abuse 
through parental skills training. For that purpose, the 
UNODC conducted a review of some 130 family skills 
training programmes and the evidence of their coun­
ter-drugs effectiveness worldwide. The review focused 
on universalistic programmes that target all parents 
and families, and selective programmes that target pa­
rents and families that belong to groups or commu­
nities which, by the virtue of their socio­economic si­
tuation, are particularly at risk of problems related to 
substance abuse. The review concluded with a list of 
principles that enabled the cultural adaptation of fami­
ly skills training programmes.459 In fact, these recom­
mendations are so generic that they may also be helpful 
in the cross­cultural prevention of urban violent crime.
This shows that the “specificity” argument may 
be reduced by such universalistic methods and argu­
ments. This broadens a shared understanding (the 
“common language of justice”) of problems and has 
nothing to do with limiting State sovereignty, an is­
sue which is often raised by the other defensive and 
deflecting argument noted above. 
Researchers say: “[I]t is not ... to go from the Uni-
versal to Particular…[H]uman organizations with the 
most effective change programs have developed a cul-
ture of dialectics. This means that change is best ini-
tiated by putting one orientation in the context of the 
other rather than opposing values. The elegance of 
this approach is that the existing [legal – added] cul-
ture is not threatened but enriched”.460
These universalistic arguments cut across vari­
ous “laws of lands”. In comparison with the argu­
ments of early legal philosophers denouncing the in­
fluence of foreign law on domestic law, and, in, fact, 
purifying the latter from the former, these contem­
porary universalistic arguments are both global and 
local, or “glocal” for those technical assistance prac­
titioners who see universalism and specificity as one 
concept (as did Montesquieu). In fact, they go to 
the heart of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime with its two proto­
cols against trafficking in humans and the smuggling 
of migrants, where there cannot be any derogation of 
slavery. They also cut across various cultures because 
of the target populations: exploited, disadvantaged 
or vulnerable peoples who because of this problema­
tic status are the same everywhere. These arguments 
lead to an additional common denominator for all of 
these peoples – that of the different levels of state­
hood of the countries in which they live. 
by	education)	who	was	persecuted	up	to	the	end	of	that	war	for	his	anti-Nazi	sentiments,	wrote	in	his	book:	“The atomic bomb created an en-
tirely new situation. Either all of mankind will be physically destroyed or there will be a metamorphosis of the moral-political situation of man” 
(Jaspers	1958:5).	There	has	to	be	a	superior	value	for	mankind	(see	also	Box	7).	In	parallel,	Arnold	J.	Toynbee	(1889-1975),	a	British	historian,	
the	author	of	a	twelve-volume	“History of Civilizations”,	an	intelligence	analyst	during	the	First	World	War,	and	editor	of	the	annual	Survey 
of International Affairs,	wrote	that	the	only	intelligible	subjects	of	historical	cognition	are	not	the	nations	or	States,	but	entities	of	a	higher	
order,	separate	civilizations	or	societies,	for	only	on	such	a	macro	scale	may	one	capture	essential	regularities	of	social	and	cultural	dynamics	
(Thornhill	1966:25).	The	ideological	differences	during	that	early	Cold War	time	between	Kołakowski	and	the	other	two	philosophers	docu-
ment	how	Marxist	ideology,	and,	in	fact,	Realpolitik	had	quickly	forgotten	the	horrors	of	the	Second	World	War,	indeed	to	the	point	where,	as	
should	be	recalled,	the	representatives	of	the	States	of	the	socialist	block	voted	against	General	Assembly	resolution	415	(V)	of	14	December	
1950	by	which	the	United	Nations	crime	programme	was	mandated.
457	 Kołakowski	1990:87.	However,	Kołakowski	was	aware	of	the	shortfalls	of	the	United	Nations.	In	his	essays	he	occasionally	lamented	its	politi-
cized	human	rights	machinery	which	does	not	do	justice	to	human	rights	abuses	in	the	developing	world.
458	 Danticat	1998:364.
459	 UNODC	2009,	ch.4.	See	Glossary.
460	 Tromenaars	1997:27-46.
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It is in this humanistic and capacity­building con­
text that one should read what “specificity” means 
when it is invoked in United Nations General As­
sembly resolutions. These resolutions remind us that 
specificity involves every civilization, every country 
and every level of statehood. They also remind us 
that in each civilization, tolerance is one of the fun­
damental values essential to international relations 
in the twenty-first century. Tolerance should in­
clude the active promotion of a culture of peace and 
dia logue among civilizations, with human beings 
respect ing one another, in all their diversity of belief, 
culture and language. There should be neither fear 
nor repression of differences within and between so­
cieties but the cherishing of “specificity” as a precio­
us asset of humanity.
If all this is true, then getting to know the idio­
syncrasies of United Nations law and thought, stu­
dying their internal logic, “reading between the lines” 
of the ius gentium in order to assist in strengthe­
ning the statehood process, emphasizing such “blue” 
in gredients, and – last but not least – winning the 
hearts and minds of domestic decision­makers by 
international criminal justice reformers, all this may 
warrant pursuing it in the broader context of the 
United Nations Studies. This is the next topic.
XVIII United Nations criminology 
and Criminal Justice Studies 
and mandates
In 1940, Leon Radzinowicz together with the not­
ed criminal lawyer J. W. C. Turner published an ar­
ticle about the ”Language of criminal science” – the 
”language” in which the knowledge of crime may 
be best communicated and the scope of criminolo­
gy defined. The authors emphasized that in that lan­
guage, criminal law is one of the branches of the vast, 
complex and expanding science of crime. They wrote 
that its adoption in the curricula of academic edu­
cation is increasing in proportion to how its prac­
tical utility is appreciated.461 But as should also be 
remembered, in the immediate aftermath of the Se­
cond World War Radzinowicz and other like-mind­
ed academics, including the three other Polish crim­
inologists mentioned at the beginning of this study, 
ignored the criminogenic consequences of war, thus 
failing in this respect to contribute to the “language” 
for the knowledge of crime. Surprisingly, they were 
immune to it, being partly preoccupied with dog­
matic considerations of what should or should not 
fall within the definition of criminology and partly 
whether or not Lombroso’s anthropological school 
made a progressive contribution to the response to 
crime. 
But why has the preoccupation with Lombroso’s 
school of thought not crisscrossed with Churchill’s 
view that Hitler should be regarded as a gangster, 
an organized criminal ­”the mainspring of evil”, as if 
one could not incorporate Hitler among the homini 
delinquenti studied by so many criminologists? In 
other words, why did the politicians but not the aca­
demics have the courage to call a spade a spade, and 
why did Sir Winston Churchill but not Sir Leon Rad­
zinowicz have that criminological thought? In yet 
other words, and finally, why have the academic 
sciences shied away for so long from taking on board 
crime and justice issues involved in the maintenance 
of peace and security? 
Perhaps when criminology as an academic dis­
cipline was still in its formative phase (i.e., when 
Radzinowicz wrote his article seeking to legitima tize 
it as a part of criminal science), that parochial focus 
had been prior and central. From the retrospective 
of 2010, that priority and centrality of criminology 
moved somewhere else, both for criminology as an 
academic science and in the UN crime programme 
mandate.
In 1957, when UNESCO published its book on 
the teaching of criminology,462 it included 10 reports 
about how criminology has been taught in Brazil, 
Turkey, USA and six other Western countries (plus 
ex-Yugoslavia), with a summary general report by 
Dennis Carrol and Jean Pinatel, respectively Presi­
dent and Secretary­General of the International So­
ciety of Criminology. 
At that time the UN crime programme had on­
ly one international legal instrument, the Standard 
Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners. Quite 
understandably then, what was between the ”blue” 
covers of such publications was national rather than 
United Nations, let alone, international criminolo­
gical thought. The UNESCO merely gave its ”blue” 
imprimatur to that collection which otherwise (in 
the absence of UN legal instruments and books) 
would probably not have appeared. What appeared 
there was simply reflective of the Cold War phase of 
461	 Turner	and	Razinowicz	1940:226.
462	 Carroll	1957.
Blue Criminology
191
Pa
rt
 II
I
criminal justice reform (until 1989), as if the bruta­
lization effect of the Hot War from 1939 to 1945 had 
worn off, for nothing in that book deals with the im­
pact of the war on the post­war criminological cur­
ricula. 
As of this writing, what one may find between 
such covers are the ”blue” ideas, contained either in 
the numerous United Nations crime prevention and 
criminal justice standards and norms or in vari ous 
United Nations reports and books. This “Blue Crimi­
nology” had its own formative stage, during which 
criminological thought – paradoxically enough in the 
form of “my country” statements, but also in the form 
of much more substantive and helpful national in­
put that included various research findings as well as 
“good” and “state” practices – underwent further Uni­
ted Nations review, systemization, syntheses and me­
ta­syntheses. This now constitutes the core of “Blue 
Criminology”. A reciprocal exchange process is now in 
place between “blue” and academic criminology. 
And yet, while only pioneering this process, the 
UNESCO book ends with a message that may be re­
peated today almost word for word, now that the 
UNODC has become the custodian of more than 60 
legal crime prevention and criminal justice instru­
ments as well as of related substantive knowledge, 
thus giving United Nations criminology crucial sub­
stance. That message, which should be understood 
in the context of the preamble of the UNESCO con­
stitution (which states that if wars begin in the minds 
of men, then it is in their minds that defences of peace 
must be constructed), reads as follows:
”In this age of effervescence and transition, and 
in a world which twice in twenty years has been con-
vulsed by war, our ambitions must not be excessive; 
but we must work with courage and perseverance for 
the advance of criminology. We must have at our dis-
posal, in all the countries of the world, specialists and 
savants who, endowed with the same spirit and using 
a common method, will take up the study of the crimi-
nal phenomenon in a new perspective, from the point 
of view of man and his needs ...”.463
In the above light it is now even more understand­
able that additional substance comes also from the 
doctrine of international humanitarian law. This in­
forms the UNODC mandate about the imminent le­
gal changes resulting from moving from the phase of 
international to global justice.464 In turn, the practice 
of international humanitarian law provides con crete 
examples in which the UNODC field experience in 
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ko­
sovo, Liberia, the occupied Palestinian territory, So­
malia and Sudan has its share.465
As shown by Box 15, UN teams there learnt to take 
an extremely proactive (if not also progressive in the 
sense of art. 13. 1 (a) of the UN Charter) approach 
to conflict resolution by seeking avenues to lay the 
foundation for rule­of­law work after the cessation 
of conflict. 
To enhance that type of work, an interagency 
cooperation mechanism of “One United Nations” 
(“Delivering as One”)466 was established in 2007, in­
volving also the UNODC. This mechanism also pro­
vides the UNODC and its partners a great opportu­
nity and transformative potential to contribute to 
the strengthening of a new discipline: United Na­
tions Studies, to which the emerging sub­discipline 
of United Nations Criminal Justice Studies certain­
ly belongs.467 
United Nations Criminal Justice Studies are a 
mirror reflection of the ever-evolving United Na­
tions crime mandate. This terminology suggests a se­
paration with criminology. In fact, in the United Na­
tions and academia they are interwoven. To draw on 
the comparison between academic criminology with 
its European roots, and criminal justice studies with 
their American roots, while both are multidiscipli­
nary and use the same scientific methods,468 United 
Nations criminology and United Nations Criminal 
Justice Studies are similarly interwoven. What dif­
fers is their focus: in the former, research on crime, 
its control and prevention, and in the latter involve­
ment in and the application of criminal policy; wor­
king on a decision­making process, attaining ef­
463	 Ibid.:51.
464	 Teitel	2003.
465	 ECOSOC	resolution	2004/25,	§1.
466	Within	the	One Programme,	there	are	five	thematic	areas	that	the	UN	will	concentrate	on	along	with	the	cross-cutting	themes	of	sustainable	
development,	gender	equality	and	human	rights.	“Criminal	justice”	is	a	part	of	“human	rights”.	One UN entails	becoming	one	in	four	areas:	
One	Programme,	One	Leader,	One	Budget,	One	Office.	These	are	supported	by	the	Operations	Management	Team,	the	Information	Technology	
Team	and	the	UN	Communication	Group	(A/61/583).
467	 For	obvious	reason	(freedom	of	thought),	there	is	no	comparable	global	academic	mechanism	which	could	have	such	a	transformative	po-
tential.	It	is	also	clear,	however,	that	the	coordination	mechanism	introduces	into	the	United	Nations	system	new	sources	of	confusion	by	
increasingly	intersecting	sources	of	normative	guidance.	Consequently,	there	is	now	a	growing	number	of	various	intersectoral	groups	(such	
as	the	Rule	of	Law	Coordination	and	Resource	Group	in	the	United	Nations	Secretariat)	the	task	of	which	is	to	streamline	substantively	and	
operationally	the	delivery	of	various	technical	assistance	projects	with	those	various	guiding	elements.	
468	Mueller	&	Adler	1991:18.
192
Introduction
In-country	 experiences	 from	Afghanistan,	 Chad,	 Co-
lombia,	 Darfur,	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo,	
Kosovo,	Liberia,	Nepal,	the	occupied	Palestinian	ter-
ritory,	Serbia,	Somalia,	Sri	Lanka,	and	Sudan,	suggest	
that	it	is	often	possible,	depending	on	circumstances,	
to	undertake	measures	already	during	ongoing	con-
flicts	aimed	at	laying	the	foundation	for	the	rule	of	law	
in	post-conflict	 situations,	based	on	a	 sound	under-
standing	of	the	nature	of	the	conflict	and	its	drivers,	
its	level	of	intensity,	and	an	assessment	of	the	actors.	
Measures	taken	to	lay	the	foundations	for	the	rule	of	
law	during	ongoing	conflicts	have	included	partnering	
with	national	stakeholders	to	deliver	justice	services	
to	war-affected	populations,	implementing	strategies	
to	prevent	and	respond	to	sexual	and	gender-based	
violence,	implementation	of	civic	education	activities,	
and	support	to	civil	society	and	media	 in	promoting	
transparency	and	holding	all	parties	accountable	for	
their	actions.
A. Entry points
Rule	of	law	assistance	should	not	be	to	the	detriment	
of	emergency	needs	 to	ensure	 survival	of	 victims	of	
conflict	 	 However,	 this	 should	 not	 delay	 the	 search	
for	 entry	 points	which	 should	 be	 undertaken	 at	 the	
earliest	 stages,	 before	 or	 during	 the	 conflict,	 to	 ad-
dress	the	root	causes	of	the	conflict.	For	example,	 it	
was	observed	that	while	many	conflict-affected	coun-
tries	 have	 elaborate	 constitutions,	 charters,	 criminal	
and	civil	codes	and	justice	systems,	the	rule	of	law	is	
nevertheless	 undermined	by	 a	 culture	of	 corruption	
and	 impunity,	 so	 that	 the	distance	between	 the	 law	
on	paper	and	conduct	of	 the	state	and	other	power	
holders	 becomes	 a	 source	 of	 conflict.	 Too	 often,	 as	
energy	is	exerted	in	the	deployment	of	peacekeeping	
operations,	peace	negotiations	and	basic	humanitar-
ian	assistance,	discussions	on	power	and	wealth	shar-
ing	among	 the	parties	 to	 the	conflict	are	allowed	 to	
take	centre	stage,	while	attention	to	the	root	causes	
of	conflict	and	adherence	to	the	rule	of	law	take	the	
back	seat.	The	repeated	 failure	of	 such	an	approach	
ficiency in the criminal justice system, and making 
the treatment of offenders, the protection of victims 
and crime prevention work. 
The essential difference between academic and 
United Nations criminology / criminal justice stu­
dies rests in the commitment of the United Nations 
to the promotion of social justice. Both are value­la­
den pursuits that may not necessarily (if at all) be 
supported by their academic counterparts, and by 
the students, scholars and lawyers in the Western 
world claiming political neutrality for liberal edu­
cation.469 This qualitative difference with the acade­
mic world (i.e. the promotion by the United Nations 
of social justice objectives) stems from its Charter.470 
Otherwise, in short, and simplifying, in both worlds 
“criminology” is more about education (“knowledge” 
/ “what?”), while “criminal justice studies” is about 
“skills” / “how?”
469	 But	eventually	“many	graduates,	both	legal	professionals	and	others,	also	come	to	understand	the	limits	of	law	as	an	agent	of	social	change.	In	
most	societies,	mere	changes	in	the	substance	of	law	do	not	by	themselves	create	a	deeper	connection	between	lives	of	citizens	in	their	local	
communities	and	the	overall	community	of	the	nation”	(Gallant	1999:228	&	232).
470	 Preamble	and	art.	55.
John Pace
From Roman to “One UN” Times: Silencing Arms through  
the Identification of Root Causes of Conflict and Developing  
New Legislation In Countries Emerging from it1
BOX 15
1 	The	title	paraphrases		the	maxim	Inter arma silent leges	(“In	times	of	war,	the	law	falls	silent”),		credited	to	Cicero	(106	-	43	BC),	a	Roman	
philosopher,	statesman,	lawyer	and		political	theorist.	It	seeks	to	communicate	that	in	comparison	with	the	mandate	of	the	League	of	Na-
tions,	the	mandate	exercised	by	the	United		Nations	builds	up	on	the	lessons	learnt	from	the	former’s	failure	to	prevent	military	conflicts.	
The	text	following	the	title	is	the	excerpted		and	abridged		version		of	John	Pace’s		summary		of		the	on-line	discussion	forum	Rule of Law 
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations	(cprp-net@groups.undp.org)	[Editor].

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Introduction
It	is	everyone’s	worst	nightmare:	getting	arrested	and	
being	put	in	prison	for	a	murder	you	did	not	commit.	
That	is	exactly	what	happened	to	28-year-old	Pastino	
Lubang	of	Juba,	Southern	Sudan.	After	18	months’	in-
carceration,	he	was	finally	pronounced	innocent	and	
released	from	prison.	This	is	his	story.
A. Abduction
In	December	2007,	Pastino’s	sister	was	abducted.	His	
family	 suspected	 that	 a	 certain	 young	 man	 was	 in-
volved,	so	Pastino	and	several	relatives	went	to	talk	to	
the	young	man’s	family.	The	discussion	became	heat-
ed	and	blows	were	exchanged.	Pastino	intervened	and	
broke	up	the	fight	and	his	family	went	home.
B. Custody
Then	the	police	arrived.	A	member	of	the	other	fam-
ily	had	been	hospitalized	with	serious	injuries.	“They	
arrested	13	members	of	my	family	and	took	us	to	jail,”	
Pastino	says.	“After	eight	days,	the	person	in	the	hos-
pital	died	and	we	were	all	charged	with	murder.”	After	
an	 initial	 screening,	 eight	of	 Pastino’s	 relatives	were	
released,	but	he	was	among	the	five	who	were	sent	
to	Juba	prison,	“even	though	most	of	us	had	nothing	
to	do	with	what	happened.”	It	was	not	until	June	2009	
that	two	of	Pastino’s	relatives	were	convicted	of	mur-
der	and	he	and	the	others	were	released.
In	police	custody	“detention	conditions	and	treat-
ment	were	very,	very	bad,”	Pastino	says,	whereas	 in	
prison	“we	were	treated	well	and	we	did	not	face	cor-
poral	punishment	or	beatings.	There	were	some	con-
has	demonstrated	the	need	to	address	root	causes	of	
conflict	and	to	rebuild	the	trust	in	the	affected	popula-
tions,	in	order	to	avoid	relapse	into	conflict.
B. Partnership
Partnerships	 with	 affected	 populations	 are	 an	 es-
sential	aspect	of	delivering	services	during	and	after	
conflict	 situations.	 People	 affected	 by	 the	 conflict,	
including	 internally	 displaced	 persons	 and	 refugees,	
need	to	be	empowered,	especially	in	those	rule	of	law	
activities	which	are	aimed	at	restoring	their	protection	
and	enabling	 them	 to	 resume	 their	 lives.	 Traditional	
leaders	often	play	a	vital	role	where	the	powers	of	a	
state	 are	weak	 or	 non-existent,	 exercising	 their	 role	
as	 facilitators	 in	 settling	disputes	and	providing	war-
affected	groups	with	the	means	to	reclaim	justice	and	
exercise	their	rights.
C. Assessments and consequence
It	was	felt	that	international	support	was	best	devel-
oped	when	 it	 is	based	on	accurate	 in-country	know-
ledge	of	 the	needs	and	priorities	of	 the	affected	na-
tional	partners	and	populations,	and	draws	upon	their	
existing	capacities.	Further,	according	to	the	findings	
of	an	assessment	of	 the	 state	of	post-conflict	 recov-
ery	in	some	African	countries,	it	was	emphasized	that	
discussion	on	the	rule	of	 law	should	be	expanded	to	
the	 regional	 and	global	 levels,	 to	 identify	and	 tackle	
negative	extra-national	factors	that	impede	the	rule	of	
law	at	the	country	level,	such	as	corruption	in	multina-
tional	trade	and	shady	banking	practices	that	encour-
age	the	embezzlement	of	natural	resources	by	corrupt	
officials	and	leaders	in	developing	countries.
D. Conclusion
In	 conclusion,	 the	discussion	has	 reflected	a	distinct	
trend	towards	earlier	and	more	punctual	involvement	
in	 taking	 steps	 to	 strengthen	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 -	 even	
when	 conflict	 is	 still	 ongoing,	 but	 where	 sufficient	
space	and	entry	points	are	 identified.	Such	 interven-
tions	 should	 be	 undertaken	 in	 partnership	 with	 na-
tional	 and	 local	 stakeholders,	 including	 government,	
civil	 society	 and	 communities.	Moreover,	 it	 was	 the	
particularities	of	the	conflict	situation	that	ultimately	
determined	the	modalities,	including	timing	and	entry	
points,	for	measures	aimed	at	enhancing	a	rule	of	law	
culture.		¢
Delivering UN Justice for One: The Case of Pastino Lubang
BOX 16
1	 	Adapted	from	the	UNODC	press	release	of	10	June	2010.
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Introduction
Looking	 back	 at	 over	 sixty	 years	 of	 the	 provision	 of	
United	Nations	technical	assistance	 in	crime	preven-
tion	 and	 criminal	 justice	 gives	 a	 wealth	 of	 ideas	 on	
how	 it	 can	 best	 be	 rendered	 in	 the	 future.	None	of	
its	early-years	principles	have	lost	their	import.	How-
ever,	not	only	the	political	rationale	behind	them	has	
changed,	 but	 also	 patterns	 and	 dynamics	 of	 crime,	
and	the	views	on	its	aetiology	and	preventability.	
The	original	 legacy	of	 the	1948-1961	United	Na-
tions	resolutions	aiming	at	eliminating	illiteracy,	hun-
ger	and	disease	by	increasing	productivity	of	people	to	
grow	only	the	gross	national	product	has	been	broad-
ened	 since	 the	 1980s.	With	 the	 Caracas	Declaration	
of	the	Sixth	Congress	(1980)	it	has	started	addressing	
such	 social	 problems	 with	 due	 account	 of	 their	 na-
tional	specificities,	but	also	of	a	general	objective	of	
achieving	a	better	quality	of	 life,	then,	 later,	through	
flicts	among	prisoners	because	there	were	no	guards	
inside	the	prison,	but	beside	that	we	were	fine.”	But	
physical	 conditions	were	 abysmal:	 the	 prison	 lacked	
sanitation	 and	 bedding,	 and	 even	 food	 and	 water	
were	in	short	supply.
Today	Pastino	works	as	an	electrician	at	Juba	pris-
on	and	says	that	conditions	for	prisoners	have	gradu-
ally	improved.	Before	his	incarceration,	he	was	unem-
ployed	for	many	years,	so	he	is	glad	to	have	the	job,	
but	he	wants	more	training.	“I	have	only	one	hope,”	
he	says,	“to	get	out	of	poverty	so	that	I	can	better	take	
care	of	my	family”.
C. Treatment of prisoners
Pastino’s	 experience	 is	 not	 unusual.	 Southern	 Sudan’s	
criminal	 justice	 system	 has	 been	 all	 but	 destroyed	 by	
two	decades	of	civil	war.	The	legal	framework	and	prison	
policies	 still	 require	 extensive	 reform,	 and	both	prison	
administrators	and	prisoners	need	a	better	understand-
ing	of	the	law.	Very	few	prison	facilities	survived	the	war	
and	those	that	did	are	mainly	staffed	by	demobilized	sol-
diers	and	officers	with	little	if	any	relevant	training.	Many	
people	are	held	without	due	process	or	are	incarcerated	
unnecessarily,	exacerbating	prison	overcrowding.
D. Reform
UNODC,	 in	partnership	with	the	United	Nations	Mis-
sion	 in	 the	Sudan	and	 in	cooperation	with	the	 Inter-
national	Centre	for	Criminal	Law	Reform	and	Criminal	
Justice	 Policy,	 is	 strengthening	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	
Southern	 Sudan	 Prison	 Service	 to	 institute	 reforms,	
meet	 international	 humanitarian	 standards	 and	pro-
tect	 prisoners’	 human	 rights.	 Since	 2007,	 UNODC	
has	trained	nearly	1,500	prison	staff	in	areas	such	as	
leadership,	policy	and	 regulations,	 information	man-
agement,	and	the	treatment	of	prisoners	with	special	
needs,	including	women,	children	and	the	mentally	ill.	
UNODC	provides	vocational	 skills	 training	 for	prison-
ers	so	that	people	like	Pastino	can	learn	a	trade	that	
will	 help	 them	find	work	after	 their	 release,	and	we	
are	 helping	 revive	 the	 probation	 system	 to	 reduce	
prison	overcrowding.	UNODC	also	supports	efforts	to	
ensure	more	frequent	review	of	criminal	cases	so	that	
innocent	 people	 like	 Pastino	 do	 not	 remain	 unjustly	
imprisoned.		¢
Back to the Future: Towards Development of New Principles 
of United Nations Technical Assistance in Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice1
BOX 17
1	 Adapted	from:	S.	Redo,	For	a	common	language	of	justice:	translating	words	into	deeds	(in:)	E.	W.	Pływaczewski,	Aktualne Problemy Prawa 
Karnego i Kryminologii,	Wydawnictwo	Temida	2,	Białystok	2009;	Promoting sustainability and integrality in alternative development as 
an important part of drug control strategy in States where illicit crops are grown to produce drugs,	ECOSOC	resolution	26/2008	of	24	July	
2008.	Annex;	Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation,	United	Nations,	Sales	No.	E.05.XI.13;	UNODC,	Handbook on Plan-
ning and Action for Crime Prevention in South Africa and the Caribbean Regions,	Vienna	2008;	S.	Chesterman,	“Ownership”:	The	transfer	
of	authority	in	Postconflict	Operations	(in:)	A.	Hurwitz	with	R.	Huang,	Civil War and the Rule of Law. Security, Development, Human Rights, 
London,	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers/Boulder	2008:139-162,	and	G.	Bassu,	Law	overruled:	Strengthening	the	rule	of	law,	Global Governance, 
Vol.	14,	No.	1	Jan.-Mar.	2008:21-38.	
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sustainable	 intergenerational	 equitable	 solutions	
(1987),	with	 the	growing	emphasis	on	 good	govern-
ance	 (1992),	and	since	2004	 in	a	general	 rule-of-law	
framework	with	its	“common	language	of	justice”	for	
countries	in	which	there	are	different	levels	of	access	
to	justice.	
Within	 this	 increasingly	 holistic	 approach,	 the	
United	Nations	through	accordingly	reconceptualised	
projects	 has	 been	 assisting	 in	 counteracting	 crime-
type	 specific	 sustainable	 development	 problems.	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 currently	 emerging	 evidence-based	
knowledge	 from	 pilot	 practice,	 combined	 and	 syn-
thesized	from	anti-crime	and	drugs	field	work,	includ-
ing	 research	 meta-analyses	 and	 project	 evaluations	
(partly	 also	 discussed	 in	 this	 essay),	 the	 following	
complementary	principles	of	the	United	Nations	tech-
nical	assistance	can	be	recommended	with	regard	to	
counteracting	ordinary,	especially	violent	street,	crime	
and	 some	 forms	of	 organized	 crime,	 especially	 illicit	
drug	cultivation.	
A. Assist in developing an incremental 
strategy for a sustainable legal change 
The	main	objective	is	to	assist	in	transforming	crime-
ridden	target	communities	by	limiting	their	vulnerabil-
ity	to	it	in	a	participatory,	people-centred	way	and	at	a	
pace	appropriate	to	each	stage,	to	allow	the	changes	
to	be	accepted	and	 introduced	by	 the	 communities.	
Depending	on	that	pace,	a	ten-	to	twelve-year	horizon	
in	a	project	design	may	be	foreseen.
Sustainability	in	this	context	means	that	the	com-
munities	 develop	 and	 renew	 social	 and	 economic	
resources	 and	 are	 able	 to	maintain	 equitable	 social	
and	cultural	 integrity	and	contribute	 to	 their	natural	
and	social	environment.	With	this	working	definition	
in	 mind,	 ideally,	 life-chances	 mechanism	 should	 be	
developed	that	allows	people	and	a	healthy	environ-
ment	to	benefit	greatly	from	one	another,	either	by	le-
gitimate	income	generation	or	meaningful	vocational	
training	 and	 education	 aimed	 at	 social	 inclusion	 for	
the	culture	of	prevention.	
Continuous	education	 should	ensure	 that	 future	
generations	 will	 be	 able	 to	 pursue	 legitimate	 liveli-
hoods,	 cope	with	 the	 pressures	 of	 globalization	 and	
create	 for	 themselves	 opportunities	 for	 growth.	 The	
progressive	 introduction	 of	 viable	 sustainable	 live-
lihoods	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 development	 is	
needed	without	severely	curtailing	available	means	of	
survival	of	the	people	 involved	 in	crime	at	the	 initial	
period	of	technical	assistance.	Do	not	rush.
This	may	gradually	lead	to	the	creation	of	a	viable	
value	 chain	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Revenue	 from	 value-
added	goods	locally	manufactured	must	contribute	to	
the	social	benefits	of	the	target	communities	and	so-
ciety	 in	general.	Such	social	entrepreneurship,	which	
includes	the	practice	of	using	business	profits	to	gen-
erate	 social	 goods,	 can	 lead	 to	 real	 socioeconomic	
sustainability,	 including	restoring	the	sense	of	 justice	
and	 to	 communal	 renewal	 of	 involvement	 in	 crime	
prevention.
Viable	livelihoods	should	be	available	to	all	mem-
bers	of	the	community:	the	young	and	the	elderly;	the	
fit	and	the	infirm;	victims	and	offenders,	and	men	and	
women	 alike.	Having	 a	 variety	 of	 income-generating	
activities	 may	 be	 a	 safeguard	 against	 weakened	 in-
terests	in	an	individual	product	or	activity.	Livelihood	
diversification	is	in	fact	a	major	success	factor	in	sus-
tainable	alternative	livelihood	development.
B. Obtain high-level political commitment 
and acknowledgement of a common cause
When	there	is	high-level	political	commitment	to	ad-
dress	a	 common	problem,	 there	will	 also	be	 the	ac-
knowledgment	of	a	common	cause,	hence	there	may	
be	support	for	infrastructure	and	adequate	funding.
C. Develop structures, partnerships and 
opportunities based on existing capacities 
rather than creating new ones
Around	them	can	operate	government	and	non-gov-
ernment	organisations	with	a	common	strategic	plan,	
area-based	 for	 a	 greater	 concentration	 of	 expertise	
and	inputs.	Those	should	include	low-cost	and	yet	ef-
fective	 interventions	 that	 are	 already	 an	 established	
social,	cultural,	 institutional	or	legal	practice	and	can	
be	 sustained	 and	 replicated	 with	 minimal	 govern-
ment	support.	Since	many	organisations	do	not	have	
the	capacity	for	ongoing	research	and	analysis,	user-
friendly	ways	 to	share	 information	about	good	prac-
tices	from	ongoing	interventions	should	be	developed	
and	 shared.	 Development	 activities	 must	 be	 based	
on	continuity:	each	activity	should	lead	into	another,	
build	on	the	success	of	previous	 initiatives	and,	over	
time,	 increase	 the	 hope	 and	 capabilities	 of	 the	 per-
sons	involved.	
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D. Balance and streamline technical 
assistance components 
It	is	necessary	to	achieve	a	balance	between	“control”	
and	“prevention”	project	components,	and	a	bottom-
up	and	a	top-down	approach.	Clear	and	constant	com-
munication	is	critical,	especially	at	the	beginning,	for	
knowledge	and	experiences	to	be	transferred	not	only	
from	technical	assistance	providers	but	also	to	them.
E. “Speak in the language” of the donee 
When	 looking	 for	 opportunities	 to	 render	 technical	
assistance,	getting	to	know	the	donee’s	“language”	is	
an	advantage	for	the	donor.	It	is	important	to	use	the	
“language”	 of	 a	 donee,	 that	 is	 to	master	 the	 logical	
system	of	that	 language,2	because	 it	may	differ	from	
the	donor’s	language.	E.g.,	“justice”	may	mean	“mob	
justice”	 or	 “prosecution”,	 “domestic	 violence”	 may	
mean	violence	against	the	elderly	only,	and	“criminal	
law”	may	also	mean	different	things	in	different	legal	
systems.3
F. “Write in” donor’s knowledge of 
international legal instruments and  
best practices into the technical  
assistance project
Once	 the	 technical	 assistance	application	 is	 success-
ful,	 it	may	be	necessary	to	rewrite	what	needs	to	be	
done	in	an	agreed	language,	upon	which	the	project	
idea	will	 embrace	common	values.	This	 is	 important	
for	a	common	language	of	justice	and	not	just	for	the	
language	of	justice	of	a	client	(for	instance,	improving	
physical	 prison	 infrastructure	 in	 undemocratic	 coun-
tries).	
What	 is	necessary	 for	 that	common	 language	 is:	
(1)	an	impartial	system	of	law	in	which	criminal	justice	
and	crime	prevention	contributes	to	upholding	funda-
mental	 civil	 and	political	 rights	with	mechanisms	 for	
conflict	 resolution	 and	 for	 peaceful	 regime	 change	
and	 institutional	 renewal,	 (2)	 protection	 of	 personal	
security	 and	 provision	 of	 a	 context	 of	 consistent,	
transparent	 rules	 for	 the	 transactions,	 (3)	 a	 profes-
sionally	competent,	capable	and	honest	public	service	
which	operates	within	an	accountable,	rule-governed	
framework	and	 in	which	 the	principles	of	merit	 and	
the	public	 interest	are	paramount,	 (4)	 territorial	and	
ethnocultural	representation,	(5)	checks	on	executive	
power,	 effective	 and	 informed	 legislatures,	 (6)	 clear	
lines	of	accountability	from	political	leaders	on	down	
through	 the	 bureaucracy,	 and	 (7)	 an	 open	 political	
system	which	 encourages	 an	 active	 and	 vigilant	 civil	
society	 whose	 interests	 are	 represented	 within	 ac-
countable	government	structures	and	which	ensures	
that	public	offices	are	based	on	law	and	consent4. 
G. Remain accountable to ultimate 
beneficiaries
Project	monitoring	and	evaluation	hold	 technical	as-
sistance	 providers	 accountable	 for	 their	 action,	 and	
that	is	crucial,	since	people’s	lives	depend	on	the	per-
formance	of	 those	practitioners,	 and	 imprudent	and	
uncaring	development	often	has	adverse	effects.
H. Build donee’s confidence through  
“quick impact” 
Activities	that	provide	people	with	alternative	cash	in-
come	and/or	produce	other	project-related	immediate	
benefits	within	the	first	few	months	or	days	(so-called	
“quick	impact”)	are	vital	to	building	trust	and	enabling	
an	immediate	transition	from	illegitimate	to	legitimate	
sources	of	income,	which	can	begin	to	transform	the	
economic	prospects	of	a	community.	Successful	“quick	
impact”	builds	 confidence	and	 strengthens	 coopera-
tion	among	stakeholders	at	all	 levels,	from	people	at	
the	grassroots	level	and	local	authorities	to	leaders	at	
the	national	level.
I. Assess the impact 
To	 ensure	 that	 development	 objectives	 are	 realized	
as	 expected,	mechanisms	must	 be	 in	 place	 to	 allow	
frequent	 assessments	 and	 necessary	 adjustments,	
starting	 with	 comprehensive	 census	 baseline	 data	
captured	 through	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	
development	indicators.	

2	 Robert	B.	Kaplan,	“Cultural	thought	patterns	in	inter-cultural	education”,	Language Learning,	16,	Nos.	1	and	2:	p.14.
3	 See	also	G.	P.	Fletcher,	The Grammar of Criminal Law. American, Comparative, and International,	New	York,	Oxford	University	Press	2007	
(Introduction	and	chapter	2).
4	 Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Development,	Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development: Goals in Conflict? Views and Recom-
mendations of the Committee for Development Planning,	United	Nations,	New	York,	1992,	ST/ESA/234,	sec.	5.
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With more than 60 legal instruments on most of 
the basic aspects of crime prevention and criminal jus­
tice in the world and with the institutional memory of 
their development, the UNODC mandate has proven 
sufficiently broad and incisive as a legislative basis for 
being a part of United Nations Studies. As men tioned, 
it contains two conventions against transnational or­
ganized crime and corruption, and three drug control 
conventions. There are also sixteen universal counter-
terrorism instruments. In sum, there are about 2000 
substantive standards and norms in crime prevention 
and criminal justice embraced by the UN crime pro­
gramme. If multiplied by 193 Member States which 
created and/or are the addressees of those provisions, 
there is a total of about 400,000 of them to be imple­
mented in specific political, cultural and socio-econo­
mic realities. In addition, there are hundreds of sub­
stantive programme documents, including reports 
and publications (journal articles and monographs) 
of a colossal interest to the outside world (as this stu­
dy sought to show), be it science or policy and decisi­
on­making. This is the core material for United Na­
tions Criminal Justice Studies, inextricably linked to 
the question of governance – an element of statehood. 
The degree of academic freedom with which it will be 
treated will determine in which directions these stud­
ies will develop.
From a normative perspective, despite the cen­
tral role played by the UN standards and norms in 
crime prevention and criminal justice in the de­
velopment and application of international legal 
instruments and criminal justice policies, it should 
be noted that they were developed at different times 
(with some dating back fifty years) and in different 
contexts. 
The world has changed significantly. That change 
continues at an unprecedented pace, in at least 
four directions: (a) new and sophisticated forms of 
crime have emerged, requiring more effective cri­
minal justice responses; (b) the constantly evolving 
social, cultural and economic environment creates 
novel challenges for criminal justice and law enforce­
ment authorities, or changes dramatically the ap­
proach to, and impact of, traditional and conventional 
criminality; (c) crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice should not only be the precondition for success­
ful restoration of peace and security (as the UNBiH ex­
perience documents), but this precondition should 
also be factored into the mitigation of consequences 
of natural environmental disasters (as the MINUS­
TAH 2010 example of gang-related violence in Haiti 
has documented); and (d) the spread of modern in­
formation and communication technologies, as well 
as the growing transnationality of related criminal 
activities create a vast range of new opportunities for 
the commission of crimes. 
Therefore, a new approach to the role of crime 
prevention and criminal justice as central to peace 
J. Shift implementation power to local 
institutions and other constituencies
Related	to	the	above	locally-focused	process	is	the	em-
powerment	of	 local	entities.	 It	 is	 important	 to	unlock	
the	potential	of	those	entities	which	in	the	process	of	
improved	self-governance	may	do	more	for	justice	de-
livery	than	in	a	centrally	planned	and	executed	process.	
Strong	and	committed	leadership	is	required	to	ensure	
that	development	policies	and	activities	are	based	on	
a	true	understanding	of	the	needs	and	concerns	of	the	
target	communities	at	the	grass-roots	level.
Ultimately,	the	key	to	sustainable	livelihood	devel-
opment	is	community	ownership.	Community	owner-
ship	means	not	only	political	and	physical	ownership	
of	the	arrangements	but	also	emotional	ownership	on	
the	part	of	the	community	of	its	own	progress	and	fu-
ture,	from	the	very	start.	Since	the	issue	of	sustainabil-
ity	envisages	the	long-term	commitment	of	all	parties	
involved,	 it	also	calls	 for	 longer-term	and	sufficiently	
flexible	 funding	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 sources,	 including	
Governments,	 international	 organizations,	 multilat-
eral	financial	institutions	and	other	donors	and	devel-
opment	partners.
K. Scan locally and globally; reinvent locally
Look	 for	 substantive	 and	 technical	 solutions	 every-
where.	Adapt	them	to	local	circumstances.
L. Think and act in terms of sustainable 
capacity outcomes and plan an exit strategy 
Keeping	in	mind	the	goal	of	sustainability,	technical	as-
sistance	advisors	should	see	their	role	as	facilitators	of	
progress	and	should	plan	their	exit	strategy	to	enable	
the	communities	to	continue	the	activities	without	ex-
ternal	intervention.	¢
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and security is essential. On a broad policy plane, 
the United Nations Security Council was and is in a 
position to bring crime prevention and criminal jus­
tice into its central focus, as it has done more than o 
nce before.471
This means: (a) updating or supplementing exis­
ting standards and norms in order to ensure that 
they respond adequately to contemporary needs of 
all Member States, regardless of the level of deve­
lopment; (b) incorporating the United Nations stan­
dards and norms into curricula for international cri­
minal justice education for the rule of law; and (c) 
developing new teaching and training techniques. 
From the UNODC operational perspective, this 
requires (a) surveying, collecting, reviewing and 
publishing “good practices” in international crime 
prevention and criminal justice education, in line 
with the United Nations standards and norms; (b) 
moving from their promotion (awareness-raising) 
to education by adding to “what” should be taught 
and trained, “how” to do this; (c) developing train-
ing templates, based on both “good practices” and 
the United Nations standards and norms. If the lat­
ter do not exist, then a United Nations publication 
of “good practices” should be a precondition to pur­
suing their eventual legal recognition as “State prac­
tices” by United Nations policy­making bodies.472 
Pursuing “studies” on such a diversified and le­
gally complex material is (still) not very much evi­
dent in the UNODC programme. More often than 
not, project staff, including hired consultants, base 
their project activities on outside knowledge. In 
practice, they teach and train the target audiences 
in what they know from their education and expe­
rience, and not from what is encapsulated in the 
United Nations crime prevention and criminal jus­
tice standards and norms. This is a more elabo rate 
version of “my country” statements. It shows that 
owing to this cognitive dissonance the delivery of 
the United Nations rule of law message which has 
defined values tends to be shallow. But the poten­
tial for improving the delivery is great. As of 2010 
the UNODC has operated ten regional offices, nine 
country offices and 33 programme offices with alto­
gether some 1,700 staff members worldwide, includ-
ing 340 core staff. In sum, the UNODC has 52 out­
posts across the world covering 144 Member States 
through which it can and does assist in making do­
mestic crime prevention and criminal justice work. 
There are 18 Programme Network Institutes and 
specialized centres. Making crime prevention and 
criminal justice work with the use of international 
legal instruments in the custody of the UNODC is 
now taking place there. 
This work should be and is being implemented 
with increasingly diversified teaching and training 
methods, including psycholinguistic skills enabling 
the establishment of a relationship with the audi­
ence, especially with those from different cultu­
ral backgrounds. Crosscutting and interdisciplina­
ry United Nations Criminal Justice Studies should 
support the above process by generating the ideas, 
proposals for programme and practical activities 
of this great world organization which needs more 
than autonomous academic consideration, and 
even more than a limited ”country” knowledge of 
the problem. No single domestic legal system, no 
particular academic school of thought, be it in in­
ternational law, criminology, political science, etc., 
but a supranational process combining various ap­
proaches, theoretical and practical, should cater to 
that emerging United Nations Criminal Justice Stu­
dies mandate. 
And yet, very often at the sessions of the United 
Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Cri­
minal Justice, its participants specifically limit them­
selves to a ”my country” statement, making others 
wonder (if they are at all interested), how much that 
country’s experience is really relevant to the interna­
tional issue in question, and what is its benefit for 
global crime prevention and criminal justice.473
This then is still of too little help. The profession­
al debate at the Commission more often than not re­
mains parochial, hence also of marginal utility for 
United Nations Criminal Justice Studies. The few ex­
ceptions occur particularly at the time of the so­cal­
led “thematic debate”, that is a debate on the special 
theme chosen by the Commission and discussed by 
471	 SC	9867.
472	 In	principle,	before	international	“State	practice”	is	recognized	in	United	Nations	“soft	law”	instrument	as	a	pre-existing	or	desired	custom,	it	
may	be	preceded	as	“good	practice”	of	a	limited	territorial	nature	(local,	one-country,	subregional,	regional).	In	other	words,	from	the	legal	
point	of	view	“good	practice”	may	then	be	custom-forming,	but	does	not	oblige	in	any	way	a	State	to	follow	it,	unless,	e.g.	through	the	Com-
mission	on	Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	 Justice,	 it	eventually	becomes	agreed	“interstate	practice”	and	 is	recognized	 in	United	Nations	
resolutions	(whether	declaratory	of	pre-existing	custom(s)	or	recommendatory).	Consequently,	United	Nations	crime	prevention	and	criminal	
justice	education	based	only	on	“good	practices”	falls	short	of	the	essential	interstate	normative	component	that	otherwise	would	inform	the	
development	of	UNODC	training	“templates”	with	the	relevant	UN	standards	and	norms	(whether	generated	by	the	UNCPCJP	or	by	another	
UN	programmatic	mechanism).
473	 For	a	similar	critique	of	bilateral	legal	study	and	work,	see:		Schukoske	1999:	240-241.	
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a panel of speakers selected in advance by the Com­
mission. For such a debate, the panel’s moderator is 
authorized to intervene in order to seek the coope­
ration of the speaker in preventing the reading of a 
national statement. Some of the speakers measure 
up to the international level of the discussed theme, 
while others still do not. 
To mobilize better­quality preparations for and 
interventions at the Commission, since its nine­
teenth (2010) session, it has been occasionally web­
cast (thematic debate), as has already been the case 
for the Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses. This thus 
opens the way to using the webcasts as a part of 
train ing materials on the implementation of United 
Nations crime prevention and criminal justice stand­
ards and norms. 
Separately, the progress in information techno­
logies has enabled the UN Crime Prevention and Cri­
minal Justice Programme, with the assistance of the 
Korean Institute of Criminology, one of the PNIs, to 
create the Virtual Forum against Cybercrime.474 The 
same institute took the lead on the follow­up to the 
Twelfth Congress workshop on “International crimi-
nal justice education for the rule of law”. A virtual cri­
minal justice academy may be created which would 
draw on various source materials.
Last but not least, for the first time, at the Twelfth 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
in 2010, the Organization in its own ”language” and 
on its own terms considered the vast, complex and ex­
panding United Nations Criminal Justice Studies as a 
part of the academic curricula dealing with interna­
tional criminal justice education for the rule of law, 
and as a part of United Nations Studies. In its Salva-
dor Declaration the Congress accordingly stated that:
”We endeavour to take measures to promote wi-
der education and awareness of the United Nations 
standards and norms in crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice to ensure a culture of respect for the rule 
of law. In this regard, we recognize the role of civil 
society and the media in cooperating with States in 
these efforts. We invite the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime to continue to play a key role in the 
development and implementation of measures to pro-
mote and develop such a culture, in close coordinati-
on with other relevant United Nations entities ... We 
undertake to promote appropriate training of offici-
als entrusted with upholding the rule of law, includ-
ing correctional facility officers, law enforcement of-
ficials and the judiciary, as well as prosecutors and 
defence lawyers, in the use and application of those 
standards and norms”.475
474	 KICJP	2006:13-16;	81-259.
475	 GA	resolution	65/230,	§§	43-44.
Picture 32.	 G.O.W.	Mueller,	 Chief	
of	 the	United	Nations	Crime	Pre-
vention	 and	 Criminal	 Justice	
Branch	(second	on	the	right,	 low-
er	row)	with	his	staff	(Lamin	Sesay	
and	 Eduardo	 Vetere,	 second	 and	
third	 on	 the	 left	 lower	 row)	 the	
late	Kurt	Neudek,	the	author	and	
Bill	 Burnham	 (left	 upper	 row)	 in	
the	 company	 of	 Austrian	 law	en-
forcement	officials	during	a	cour-
tesy	 visit	 to	 the	 provincial	 police	
HQ	in	Eisenstadt	(close	to	Vienna,	
Austria,	1982)
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Picture 33.	 Commission	 on	
Crime	 Prevention	 and	 Criminal	
Justice	 (Vienna,	 Austria,	 2009	
in	the	Board	Room	dedicated	to	
the	memory	 of	 Prof.	 John	Mar-
tinussen	 (1947-2002),	 pioneer	
of	 sustainable	 industrial	 devel-
opment)	 while	 considering	 the	
item	on	the	preparations	for	the	
Twelfth	United	Nations	Congress	
on	Crime	Prevention	and	Crimi-
nal	 Justice	 (Salvador	 de	 Bahia,	
Brazil,	2010).	Sitting	from	left	to	
right:	Cosmin	Dinescu	(Romania,	
Chairman	 of	 the	 Commission),	
Andres	 Finguerut	 (Secretary	 of	
the	Commission),	Dimitri	Vlassis	
(Secretary	of	the	Twelfth	United	
Nations	Congress),	Sandra	Valle,	
Interregional	 Adviser	 on	 Crime	
Prevention	and	Criminal	Justice,	
Sławomir	 Redo	 (Coordinator	 
of	 the	 Twelfth	 United	 Nations	
Congress	Workshops)
Picture 34.	 Address	 by	 Antonio	
Maria	 Costa,	 Secretary-Gener-
al	 of	 the	 Twelfth	 Congress.	 On	
the	podium,	 sitting	 from	 left	 to	
right:	 John	 Sandage,	 Executive	
Secretary,	 Ambassador	 Helmut	
Böck	(Austria),	Vice-Chairman	of	
the	Congress,	Vivian	Pliner,	Sec-
retary	 of	 the	 plenary	 meeting,	
Dimitri	 Vlassis,	 Substantive	 Co-
ordinator.	Below:	Maher	Nasser,	
Director	 of	 UNIS,	 servicing	 the	
plenary
Picture 35.	 The	 “Committee	
of	 the	 Whole”	 negotiating	 the	
draft	Salvador	Declaration	at	the	
Twelfth	United	Nations	Congress	
on	Crime	Prevention	and	Crimi-
nal	Justice
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The	 Secretariat	 is	 the	work	 force	 of	 the	 United	 Na-
tions.	One	of	its	many	functions	is	to	conduct	research	
and	prepare	reports	mandated	by	United	Nations	leg-
islative	bodies	in	specific	areas	such	as	the	treatment	
of	 offenders	 and	 victims,	 capital	 punishment,	 crime	
trends,	corruption,	human	trafficking	and	other	forms	
of	organized	crime,	the	independence	of	the	judiciary,	
and	cybercrime,	 so	 that	Member	States	will	be	able	
to	 formulate	 policies	 and	 strategies	 in	 dealing	 with	
crime.	The	Secretariat	may	conduct	its	research	by,	for	
example,	sending	out	questionnaires	directly	to	Gov-
ernments.	This	unique	method	of	data	collection	en-
sures	that	the	Organization	receives	“raw”	information	
and	statistics	from	a	primary	source.	Then,	results	are	
analyzed,	synthesized	and	distributed	in	reports	pre-
sented	to	one	of	several	legislative	bodies	or	specially	
convened	United	Nations	meetings.	Occasionally,	the	
Organization	will	prepare	sales	publications	and	non-
sales	publications	 aimed	at	 external	 institutions	 and	
readers.	 Many	 United	 Nations	 reports	 and	 publica-
tions	capture	the	world	crime	prevention	and	criminal	
justice	developments	 in	a	very	comprehensive,	 facts	
and	 figures-based	 fashion.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 some	
may	be	 regarded	 in	 research,	policy-making	and	op-
erational	terms	as	spearheading	and	groundbreaking	
as	has	been	the	case	of,	e.g.,	economic	costs	of	crime1, 
and	computerization	of	criminal	justice	information2. 
In	order	to	facilitate	the	preservation	of	all	its	re-
ports	and	to	provide	research	support	for	its	staff,	as	
well	 as	external	 institutions	and	 readers,	 the	United	
Nations	 has	 established,	 in	 1946,	 the	 Dag Ham-
marskjöld Library3 located	 at	 United	 Nations	 Head-
quarters,	New	York.	In	that	same	year,	the	Dag	Ham-
marskjöld	Library	took	a	major	step	to	purvey,	at	the	
global	 level,	United	Nations	 documents	 through	 the	
establishment	of	a	network of a depository libraries.4 
Since	then,	the	Dag	Hammarskjöld	Library	continually	
distributes	specific	documents	and	publications	to	this	
network.	 At	 present,	 there	 are	 over	 400	 depository	
libraries	 located	throughout	 the	world,	covering	140	
countries,	maintaining	material	from	the	date	of	des-
ignation	as	a	depository	to	the	present.	
Drawing in the above context is still important for 
two reasons. First, it shows that international crimi­
nal justice education for the rule of law has been ac­
knowledged for the first time in the Salvador Declara-
tion as an emerging topic for the United Nations 
action. Second, the development of certain crime pre­
vention and criminal justice ideas and topics at the 
global scale takes time, as shown, for example, by the 
development of the topic of computer (cyber) crime. 
Regarding it, as foreseen (and as mentioned ear­
lier by Wolfgang), legal cyberspace developments 
are gradually influencing the global security agenda, 
within which crime prevention and criminal jus tice 
issues have increasingly been factored. While not 
pretending to be an oracle, one can probably still say 
that the further development of this agenda will be 
spearheaded first of all by the question of the legal 
protection of minors in cyberspace, in line with the 
traditional considerate look of governments at the 
lot of succeeding generations. Thus after the original 
development of the question of child welfare in the 
pre-United Nations period (1846-1945), and the UN 
child welfare legal and social developments (1946-
2010), in the future such global developments will 
pave the way for various progressive agreements, the 
contents of which will eventually permeate the glo­
bal question of the prevention and control of adult 
criminality. 
Emil Wandzilak 
Researching United Nations Criminological Ideas:  
Where to Find United Nations Crime Prevention  
and Criminal Justice Documentation
BOX 18
1	 A/CONF.56/7,	Economic and social consequences of crime: new challenges for research and planning,	working	paper	prepared	by	the	
Secretariat.	
2 Guide to Computerization of Information Systems in Criminal Justice,	ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/58,	United	Nations,	New	York	1992
3	 See	http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/
4	 See	http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/deplib/index.html
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Historical	crime	prevention	and	criminal	justice	in-
formation	and	documents	are	archived	at	the United 
Nations Library at Geneva,5 previously	 the	 League 
of Nations Library which	was	established	 in	1919.	 It	
became	 the	United	Nations	 Library	 at	Geneva	when	
the	 League’s	 assets	 were	 transferred	 to	 the	 United	
Nations	 in	1946.	 The	archives	of	 the	Geneva	 Library	
include	 rare	 material	 from	 the	 International Penal 
and Penitentiary Commission (IPPC),	the	predecessor	
of	the	United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme. 
Several	indexes	are	available	for	use	by	research-
ers.	 For	 example,	 UNBISnet6	 is	 the	 primary	 online	
index	to	United	Nations	document	since	1979.	It	is	in-
dexed	by	the	Dag	Hammarskjöld	Library	and	the	Unit-
ed	Nations	Library	at	Geneva.	It	also	includes	a	cata-
logue	 of	 non-United	Nations	 books	 of	 both	 libraries	
and	provides	access	to	voting	records	on	resolutions	
adopted	by	 the	General Assembly (GA),	 since	1983,	
and	 the	 Security Council,	 since	 1946.	 The	 great	 ad-
vantage	of	UNBISnet	is	that	it	is	constantly	being	kept	
up-to-date,	and	 is	also	being	expanded	retroactively.	
Documents	 indexed	 during	 the	 day	 are	 loaded	 onto	
the	 system	 during	 the	 night,	making	 the	 data	 avail-
able	to	researchers	world-wide.	Another	great	feature	
of	UNBISnet	 it	 that	 it	 links	 to	 the	 full	 text	 of	 recent	
United	Nations	documents	in	all	six	working	languages	
(Arabic,	 Chinese,	 English,	 French,	 Russian	 and	 Span-
ish).	Texts	of	resolutions	adopted	by	the	GA,	Security	
Council,	Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),	and	
the Trusteeship Council	going	back	to	1946	can	also	
be	retrieved.	The	full	text	of	recent	speeches	can	be	
accessed	 through	 the	 index	 and	 the	 Voting	 Records	
database	provides	easy	access	to	the	cited	resolution.
UN-I-QUE7	is	the	Dag	Hammarskjöld	Library’s	first	
database	launched	into	cyberspace.	It	is	an	electronic	
research	 tool	 that	 serves	 as	 a	 user-friendly	 guide	 to	
the	 symbols/sales	 numbers	 of	 tens	 of	 thousands	 of	
selected	documents	from	1946	to	the	present.	Among	
the	symbols	which	can	be	easily	 traced	through	UN-
I-QUE	 are	 those	 of	 resolutions	 granting	 countries	
membership	 in	 the	United	Nations,	 speeches	 in	 the	
general	debate	of	the	GA,	sessional	reports	of	major	
committees/commissions	 and	 their	 terms	 of	 refer-
ence,	reports	prepared	by	Special	Rapporteurs	in	the	
fields	of	human	rights	and	international	law,	periodic	
reports	submitted	by	countries	in	compliance	with	hu-
man	rights	instruments,	and	reports	of	United	Nations	
conferences.	More	often	than	not,	all	these	resources	
contain	 original	 data	 and	 information	 on	 various	
global	 and	 domestic	 facets	 of	 crime	 prevention	 and	
criminal	justice.
During	the	mid-1980s,	rapid	technological	devel-
opments	regarding	personal	computers	coupled	with	
the	emergence	of	the	internet	and	growing	pressure	
to	 reduce	 publishing	 costs	 forced	 what	 is	 now	 the	
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
to	adopt	the	web	as	a	platform	for	disseminating	infor-
mation	and	to	establish	its	presence	on	the	internet.	
A	second	aim	was	to	establish	how	the	web	could	be	
used	 as	 an	 information	 and	 discussion	 platform	 by	
the	 international	 criminological	 community.	 In	 pur-
suit	of	these	goals	and,	originally,	at	the	inspiration	of	
Ms	 Irene	Melup,	 retired	 senior	 staff	member	 of	 the	
United	Nations	Secretariat,	 the	creation	of	 the Unit-
ed Nations Crime and Justice Information Network 
(UNCJIN)8	 was	 considered	 and,	 later,	 mandated	 by	
ECOSOC	resolution	1986/11.	UNCJIN,	established	with	
the	 assistance	 of	 the	 University	 of	 Vienna	 (Austria),	
served	as	an	electronic	clearing-house	and	represents	
the	culmination	of	several	years	of	efforts	by	UNODC.	
At	that	time,	the	ambition	for	UNCJIN	was	to	be	able	
to	access	and	download	all	United	Nations	documents	
in	 the	field	of	 crime	prevention	and	criminal	 justice,	
which	was	achieved	with	limited	success.	 In	a	sense,	
UNCJIN	was	an	idea	that	was	simply	ahead	of	its	time,	
but	that	very	idea	had	sown	the	seeds	for	the	future	
development	 and	 eventual	 establishment,	 by	 the	
United	Nations,	of	an	electronic	storage/retrieval	sys-
tem	via	the	internet.
Similarly,	 criminological	 libraries	 started	 to	 feel	
the	pressures	of	reduced	budgets	and	staff,	along	with	
increases	 in	subscription	fees	for	 journals.	Prompted	
by	other	global	developments	such	as	UNCJIN,	and	in	
order	to	deal	with	the	new	reality,	a	meeting	of	librar-
ians	 and	 criminal	 justice	 information	 specialist	 was	
held	in	1991,	by	the	School	of	Criminal	Justice,	Rutgers	
University	(U.S.A.),	at	the	initiative	of	Professor	G.O.W.	
Mueller,	then	the	retired	Chief	of	the	United	Nations	
Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	 Justice	Branch.	 It	 led	
to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 World Criminal Justice 
Library Network	 (WCJLN)9.	 The	 founding	 members	
5	 See	http://www.unog.ch/library	
6	 See	http://unbisnet.un.org/	
7	 See	http://lib-unique.un.org/	
8	 See	www.uncjin.org/index.html	
9	 http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~wcjlen/WCJ/
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of	WCJLN	were	unanimous	in	their	recognition	of	the	
increasing	demands	and	pressure	placed	on	criminal	
justice	libraries	because	of	the	globalization	of	crime	
and	 the	 information	 explosion.	 It	 was	 clear	 that	 no	
library	 could	 hope	 to	 collect	 everything,	 or	 to	 serve	
the	diverse	and	increasingly	international	needs	of	its	
clients.	Furthermore,	the	duplication	of	efforts	on	the	
part	of	 all	 libraries	was	not	 cost	beneficial	 in	 an	era	
of	 information	explosion.	The	main	goal	of	WCJLN	 is	
to	develop	ways	to	share	services	and	criminal	justice	
information	on	a	global	scale.
At	 the	 1993	WCJLN	meeting,	 hosted	 by	 the	 In-
ternational	 Institute	 of	 Higher	 Studies	 in	 Criminal	
Sciences	 (Siracusa,	 Italy),	 a	 member	 of	 the	United 
Nations Programme Network of Institutes,10 the 
subject	 for	 discussion	 focused	 on	 “gray	 literature”	
(i.e.,	 United	Nations	 reports),	 the	 difficulties	 librar-
ies	 experienced	 in	 acquiring	 it	 and	development	of	
strategies	 to	overcome	these	difficulties.	The	meet-
ing	also	 recognized	 that	much	valuable	 information	
is	printed	as	“gray	literature”,	but	not	formally	pub-
lished	 by	 various	 organizations	 and	 national	 agen-
cies.	In	response,	participants	of	the	meeting	agreed	
to	prepare	a	 list	of	such	 literature	available	at	their	
respective	organizations	so	that	these	lists	could	be	
shared	 to	 facilitate	 future	 exchange	 of	 documents	
amongst	network	members.	A	list	of	United	Nations	
relevant	 reports,	 resolutions,	 etc.,	 going	 back	 10	
years	was	prepared.	As	a	consequence	of	the	interest	
expressed	in	the	listed	documents,	a	comprehensive	
list,	 going	 back	 to	 1946,	was	 prepared	 and	 initially	
published	 in	 the	 International	 Review	 of	 Criminal	
Policy	(IRCP).11	Subsequently,	an	updated	list	was	is-
sued	on	a	CD-ROM112	 and	memory	 stick	 (the	 latter	
distributed	 at	 the	 Twelfth	United	Nations	 Congress	
on	Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	Justice,	held	at	Sal-
vador,	Brazil	 in	2010).	This	compilation	lists	titles	of	
documents	and	their	symbols.	Having	these	symbols	
serves	as	a	great	asset	when	trying	to	download	doc-
uments	 from	 the	 Official	 Document	 System,	 which	
will	be	discussed	below	in	detail.
The	 IRCP,	a	sales	publication,	was	the	main	pe-
riodical	 issued	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 since	 1952,	
dealing	 with	 crime	 prevention	 and	 criminal	 justice	
topics.13	 It	 served	 as	 a	 journal	 of	 applied	 criminol-
ogy	 that	 provided	 information	 to	 the	 international	
community	 on	 current	 methods,	 techniques	 and	
approaches	in	the	field	and	assisted	countries	in	the	
development	of	 criminal	policy	 and	 criminal	 justice	
practices.	Its	emphasis	was	on	a	pragmatic	approach	
to	the	prevention	and	control	of	crime	and	the	treat-
ment	of	offenders.
The	IRCP	presented	a	series	of	articles	by	various	
eminent	 criminological	 and	world-policy	 authorities.	
Themes	 covered	 in	 the	 IRCP	 include:	 crime	 and	 de-
velopment;	juvenile	delinquency;	training	of	criminal	
justice	personnel;	role	of	police	and	law	enforcement	
agencies;	prison	labour,	to	name	only	a	few.	The	last	
volume	published	was	nos.	49/50	(1999)	on	the	sub-
ject	of	The United Nations and Juvenile Justice: a Guide 
to the International Standards and Best Practice. The	
United	Nations	discontinued	the	IRCP	and	since	2001	
has	published,	in	its	place,	the	Forum on Crime and So-
ciety,14 in	the	six	official	United	Nations	languages.	To	
date,	six	issues	have	appeared	in	print	covering	topics	
such	as	organized	crime,	corruption,	computer	crime,	
homicide,	 imprisonment,	 human	 trafficking	 and	 ter-
rorism.	The	most	recent	 issue	is	Vol.	5,	Nrs.	1	and	2,	
2006,	 ISBN	978-92-1-130288-2,	E.09.IV.18,	published	
in	2009,	on	the	subject	of	“Improving	knowledge	on	
crime:	towards	better	data”:	proceedings	of	the	meet-
ing	 of	 the	 open-ended	 expert	 group	 on	 ways	 and	
means	 of	 improving	 crime	 data	 collection,	 research	
and	analysis	with	a	view	to	enhancing	the	work	of	the	
United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime	and	other	
relevant	 international	 bodies,	 Vienna,	 8-10	 February	
2006.
In	 preparation	 for	 the	 Eleventh	 United	 Nations	
Congress	 on	 Crime	 Prevention	 and	 Criminal	 Justice,	
held	at	Bangkok,	Thailand,	 in	2005,	and	to	mark	 the	
celebration	 of	 50	 years	 since	 the	 first	 Congress	was	
held	 in	 1955,	 a	 massive	 project	 was	 undertaken	 to	
scan	 all	 the	 documents	 that	were	 prepared	 for	 and	
submitted	to	 the	first	 to	 the	 tenth	Congresses,	 in	all	
the	working	languages	of	each	Congress.	This	project	
culminated	at	the	Eleventh	Congress	with	the	release	
10	 See	http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/Related%20Sites/United_Nations_Network.htm
11	 See	The United Nations and Criminal Justice, 1946-1996: Resolutions, Reports, Documents and Publications	(1997),	IRCP,	nos	47/48,	ST/
ESA/SER.M/47-48	(E.97.IV.4),	available	in	English,	French,	Spanish	and	Russian.
12	 To	obtain	a	copy	of	Compilation of United Nations Resolutions, Reports, Documents and Publications in the field of Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice,	Revised	edition,	2005,	send	an	e-mail	to:	emil.wandzilak@unodc.org.	
13	 See	further:	Thorsten	Eriksson,	The Reformers: A Historical Survey of Pioneer Experimenters in the Treatment of Criminals),	New	York:	
Elsevier	Scientific	Pub.	Co.	1976,	p.	244.
14	 The	Forum	is	available	in	hard	copy	as	a	sales	publication	or	on-line	at:	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/Forum-on-
Crime-and-Society.html
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of	another	CD-ROM,	entitled	Documentation from the 
First to the Tenth United Nations Congresses on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice (1955-2000). To	make	
these	 documents	 easily	 available,	 electronic	 copies	
have	 been	 posted	 on	 the	 internet	 at:	 https://www.
asc41.com/UN_Congress/undocs.htm15.
In	1991,	the	United	Nations	started	to	use	an	Op-
tical Disc System	for	storage	and	retrieval	of	its	docu-
mentation	based	on	proprietary	software	and	optical	
disc	technology,	which	were	considered	state-of-the-
art	 at	 that	time.	 In	2000,	 a	project	was	 launched	 to	
re-engineer	 the	 optical	 disc	 system	 with	 up-to-date	
technology,	 non-proprietary	 standards,	 and	 an	 in-
ternet	browser.	The	new	system	uses	magnetic	disks	
which	are	fast,	reliable	and	inexpensive,	even	for	large	
amounts	 of	 storage	 space.	On	 4	 September	 2001,	 a	
new	 system	 called	 the	 Official Documents System 
(ODS) has	begun	its	operation16. 
The	ODS	is	a	full-text	retrieval	system	for	United	
Nations	documents	which	offers	two	main	search	ar-
eas:	“United	Nations	Documents”	and	“Resolutions”.	
The	 “United	Nations	Documents”	 area	 gives	 access	
to	 parliamentary	 documents	 of	 the	United	Nations	
in	all	six	working	 languages.	The	“Resolutions”	area	
provides	 access	 to	 the	 resolutions	 of	major	 United	
Nations	 organs	 such	 as	 the	 GA,	 Security	 Council,	
ECOSOC,	and	Trusteeship	Council	going	back	to	1946.	
The	 system	 also	 allows	 full-text	 searching	 in	 all	 six	
languages.
The	 ODS,	 originally	 a	 joint	 undertaking	 of	 the	
duty	 stations	 in	 New	 York	 and	 Geneva,	 started	 as	
a	pilot	 project	 in	 1992.	Addis	Ababa,	Bangkok,	Bei-
rut,	Nairobi,	Santiago	and	Vienna	joined	the	system	
at	 a	 later	time.	 Each	duty	 station	 is	 responsible	 for	
inputting	material	 produced	 locally.	 The	 short-term	
objective	 is	 to	bring	all	duty	stations	 fully	online	so	
that	 United	 Nations	 documents	 issued	 anywhere	
can	be	accessed	immediately	upon	release	by	users	
world-wide.	A	longer-range	goal	is	to	expand	cover-
age	retrospectively	to	1946.	The	Dag	Hammarskjöld	
Library	 in	New	York	 is,	 for	 example,	 scanning	older	
United	Nations	documents	on	a	continuous	basis	and	
uploading	them	to	the	ODS.	As	 in	the	case	of	UN-I-
QUE,	ODS	offers	an	unrivalled	amalgamation	of	crime	
prevention	and	criminal	justice	data	and	information	
from	 various	 United	 Nations	 bodies	 which,	 in	 line	
with	their	mandate,	look	at	socio-economic	develop-
ment	in	a	crosscutting	way.
UNODC	 maintains	 it	 own	 webpage.17	 This	 page	
is	an	amalgamation	of	three	earlier	webpages.	Up	to	
the	end	of	 the	1990s,	one	page	was	devoted	 to	 the	
United	Nations	Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	Justice	
Programme,	 the	 second	 to	 the	United	Nations	Drug	
Control	Programme	and	the	third	to	the	Director-Gen-
eral’s	Office	at	the	United	Nation	Office	at	Vienna.	But	
due	to	several	restructuring	exercises	that	lead	to	the	
eventual	merger	of	the	crime	and	drug	programmes,	
and	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	Office	on	
Drugs	and	Crime	during	2002,	a	unified	webpage	was	
created	 to	 reflect	 the	new	 status	of	 the	programme	
and	Office	at	Vienna.	
The	UNODC	webpage	 is	 rich	with	 information.	 It	
covers	the	full	range	of	themes	that	fall	under	its	man-
date,	such	as	corruption,	HIV	and	AIDS,	human	traffick-
ing	and	smuggling,	illicit	drugs,	crop	monitoring,	crimi-
nal	 justice	 reform,	crime	prevention,	money-launder-
ing,	 transnational	 organized	 crime,	 terrorism,	 just	 to	
name	a	few.	It	also	provides	access	to	documentation	
of	all	United	Nations	congresses	 that	will	have	 taken	
place	 as	well	 as	 the	Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
and	the	Commission on Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice.	Current	publications	and	press	releases	are	
likewise	accessible,	as	well	as	video	clips,	and	informa-
tion	on	upcoming	UNODC	meetings.	¢
15	 The	United	Nations	would	like	to	acknowledge	that	the	American	Society	of	Criminology	generously	funded	the	scanning	of	the	docu-
ments	and	that	without	the	commitment	and	support	of	Dr.	Cindy	Smith,	the	tedious	hours	of	scanning	thousands	of	pages	by	Jennifer	
Bechtel	and	Richard	Smith,	the	CD-ROM	that	this	project	produced	would	not	have	materialized.	The	CD-ROM	contains	over	300	docu-
ments	in	each	language.	They	were	catalogued	and	posted	on	the	internet	through	the	technical	assistance	of	Richard	Smith.
16	 For	access	to	the	Official	Document	System,	go	to:	http://documents.un.org/
17	 See	http://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html
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The	 gap	 between	 criminologists/international	 crimi-
nal	justice	teachers	and	the	United	Nations	Crime	Pre-
vention	and	Criminal	 Justice	Programme	may	not	be	
as	great	as	that	between	academics	and	practitioners	
in	other	fields	of	the	United	Nations.	There	are	several	
notable	examples	of	academics	providing	the	impetus	
for	supporting,	for	example,	the	rights	of	victims,	the	
international	 criminal	 court,	 and	 the	 anti-corruption	
treaty.	 In	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 crime	 program,	 the	
Crime	Committee	was	made	up	of	real	crime	experts	
and	 the	 crime	 programme	 heads	 were	 academics	
themselves.	 More	 recently,	 the	 intergovernmental	
bodies	 have	 been	 composed	 primarily	 of	 diplomats	
who	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 acknowledge	 either	 the	 extent	
of	crime	and	corruption	in	their	own	countries	or	the	
weaknesses	of	their	own	justice	systems.	
A	wealth	of	data,	 good	practice,	 guidelines,	 and	
case	 studies	 has	 been	developed	 by	 the	United	Na-
tions	Office	 on	Drugs	 and	 Crime.	Unfortunately,	 the	
existence	of	such	“knowledge	products”	is	not	widely	
known	among	academics.	The	negative	impressions	of	
teachers	and	researchers	(cursory	as	they	may	be)	are	
partly	due	to	the	hortatory	language	and	generalities	
of	the	resolutions	emanating	from	the	United	Nations	
bodies	and	the	reluctance	of	 its	 treaty	bodies	 to	es-
tablish	 independent	critical	monitoring	mechanisms.	
Moreover,	academics	have	no	direct	structured	access	
to	the	official	bodies	or	to	the	Secretariat.
The	natural	hostility	of	public	institutions	towards	
academic	skepticism	and	external	criticism	has	been	
underscored	by	Robert	Merton,	 the	eminent	Ameri-
can	sociologist.	Those	who	argue	that	this	hostility	is	
general,	 Merton	 says,	 have	 simplified	 the	 issue	 be-
cause	academic	skepticism	is	not	a	general	value	but	
an	analytical	method	only.1	Hence	three	questions:	Is	
the	United	Nations	as	an	international	public	organiza-
tion	hostile	 to	academia?	 Is	 academia	hostile	 to	 the	
United	Nations?	Is	there	still	a	way	for	each	to	learn	
from	one	another?
Responding	 to	 the	 first	 question,	 provoked	 by	
Merton’s	observation,	one	must	concede	that	while	it	
is	probably	true	that	any	bureaucracy	is	self-protective	
and	cautious	in	accepting	external	criticism,	the	Unit-
ed	Nations	has	had	many	books	and	articles	written	
about	its	activities	in	a	critical	manner	usually	with	its	
cooperation.	Many	attempts	have	also	been	made	to	
reach	out	 to	 the	academic	world	 to	 inform	students	
about	the	work	and	the	challenges	of	the	United	Na-
tions.	The	most	 recent	“Academic	 Impact”	 initiative2 
is	 the	 latest	 attempt	 to	 bridge	 the	 practitioner–aca-
demic	divide.
The	United	Nations	Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	
Justice	Programme	does	utilize	external	academic	re-
search.	It	not	only	produces	a	varied	and	ever-growing	
number	of	reports	and	publications,	but	also	involves	
academics	in	their	production	as	well	as	in	projects	as	
consultants.	Often	the	bureaucracy	can	use	academic	
research	as	a	fig	leaf	to	say	things	that	its	bureaucrats	
can	not.	However,	on	a	day-to-day	basis,	the	UN	bu-
reaucracy	is	hardly	an	amicable	partner	for	academia,	
and	 the	 UNODC	 is	 no	 exception.	 As	 argued	 in	 this	
book,	the	reason	for	this	is	that	academic	research	is	
about	objective	concepts	and	methods,	while	the	bu-
reaucracy	is	about	its	own	authority	and	mandate.	To	
respond	to	the	mandate,	as	Merton	stresses,	most	in-
stitutions	demand	unqualified	loyalty	from	their	staff,	
while	scientific	inquiry	makes	skepticism	a	virtue,	and	
demands	 objectivity.	 Where	 I	 differ	 with	 this	 view	
vis-à-vis	the	UN	bureaucracy	is	that	to	believe	in	the	
United	Nations	as	an	institution	is	also	a	virtue.	
Responding	 to	 the	 second	question,	 the	 answer	
is,	 surely,	 negative.	 Most	 academics	 are	 not	 hostile	
per	 se	 to	 the	 United	 Nations,	 although	 there	 have	
been	 ideological	 critics	 in	many	 countries.	 Academ-
ics	 are,	 however,	 largely	 the	 prisoners	 of	 their	 own	
preconceptions,3	 theory-driven,	 and	 often	 insensi-
tive	to	incoming	information.4	With	regard	to	the	UN	
Crime	 Prevention	 and	 Criminal	 Justice	 Programme,	

Michael Platzer
Connecting United Nations Practitioners and Academics
BOX 19
1	 R.K.	Merton,	Science	and	the	social	order,	Philosophy of Science,	Vol.	5,	1938:334,	ftn.	27.
2	 http://academicimpact.org/index.phpis
3	 P.E.	Teatlock,	Theory-driven	reasoning	about	plausible	pasts	and	probable	futures	in	world	politics:	Are	we	prisoners	of	our	preconceptions?	
American Journal of Political Science,	Vol.	43,	No.	2	(April	1999):335-366.
4	 Ch.	Koopman,	J.	Snyder,	and	R.	Travis,	Theory-driven	versus	data-driven	Assessment	in	a	crisis:	A	survey	of	International Security	readers,	
Journal of Conflict Resolution,	Vol.	34:	No.	4	(December	199o):694-722.
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academia	can	be	accused	of	being	largely	indifferent.	
At	the	ACUNS	international	colloquium	provocatively	
entitled	 “Can the United Nations be Taught?”5	 com-
parative	research	showed	that	in	Austria	by	and	large,	
the	“United	Nations”	 is	taught	as	one	of	many	inter-
governmental	organizations.6	And	so	is,	as	confirmed	
by	the	colloquium’s	participants,	in	the	United	States,	
who	also	saw	there	a	dwindling	interest	in	the	United	
Nations	 studies,	 which	 had	 earlier	 been	 vigorously	
pursued.	
Responding	to	the	third	question,	it	was	agreed	at	
the	ACUNS	colloquium	that	training	should	be	made	
much	 more	 practical,	 utilizing	 the	 new	 media	 and	
teaching	 techniques,	 and	 that	practitioners	and	aca-
demics	should	collaborate	much	more	closely.	
There	 are	 new	 ways	 of	 learning	 from	 one	 an-
other.	 In	 addition	 to	 creating	 a	 knowledge-sharing	
culture	 in	 international	 organizations	 and	 incorpo-
rating	Wiki-based	 social	 networks,	 e-learning	 across	
continents	could	be	promoted	by	all	the	UN	agencies.	
In	 the	field,	 far	 away	 from	headquarters,	 interactive	
computer-based	courses,	practical	case	studies,	moot	
courts,	and	video	 lectures	could	 improve	the	quality	
of	 instruction	to	staff	as	well	as	project	counterparts	
(as	 top	 educators	 can	 be	 encouraged	 to	 give	 online	
courses	 and	 proven	materials	 used).	 These	 “virtual”	
courses	 would	 have	 to	 be	 supplemented	 by	 onsite	
“resource”	persons.
	UNODC	should	also	do	a	much	better	job	of	con-
veying	 the	 importance	 of	 its	 criminal	 justice	 stand-
ards,	 its	wealth	of	data	and	criminological	findings,	
and	 the	 existence	 of	 handbooks,	 country	 studies,	
films	and	other	“knowledge	products”	 to	social	 sci-
ence	students	and	professors.	Academic	visits	to	the	
UN	Office	in	Vienna,	joint	seminars,	and	involvement	
of	 experienced	 multi-cultural	 teachers	 in	 develop-
ing	 UNODC	 training	 courses	 should	 be	 increased.	
The	 United	 Nations	 Crime	 Prevention	 and	 Criminal	
Justice	 Information	Network,	which	once	promoted	
closer	collaboration	between	the	academic	and	the	
UN	worlds,	should	be	reinvigorated	to	better	recon-
nect	teachers	of	criminology	and	criminal	justice	with	
UNODC	 officials.	 UNITAR,	 UNESCO,	 UNICEF,	 UNDP,	
the	OHCHR,	 the	UN	Department	 for	 Peace-keeping	
Operations,	Office	of	 Legal	Affairs,	DIESA,	UN-Habi-
tat,	the	World	Bank,	the	UN	Regional	Commissions,	
and	 the	United	Nations	University	have	Web-based	
courses	 pertaining	 to	 children’s	 rights,	 women’s	
rights,	human	rights,	governance,	corruption,	crime	
prevention,	 community	 participation,	 juvenile	 jus-
tice,	post-conflict	reconstruction,	and	rule	of	law,	as	
well	 as	 various	assessment	 tools.	As	 can	happen	 in	
international	 bureaucracy,	 several	 overlap	 UNODC	
mandated	subjects.	It	would	mutually	advantageous	
for	 an	 inventory	 of	 all	 online	 education	 promoting	
the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 and	 Security	 Sector	 Reform	 to	 be	
undertaken,	a	clearing	house	of	information	of	avail-
able	open-source	criminal	justice	e-learning	courses	
created,	 distance	 degree	 programs	 listed,	 a	 Web-
based	 forum	 of	 useful	 resources,	 bibliographies,	
teaching	 outlines,	 and	 syllabuses	 established,	 and	
comments	 submitted	 by	 instructors.	 The	 need	 for	
this	is	great.	The	goal	would	be	to	establish	a	“Virtual	
Academy”	within	the	next	decade.	Engaged	scholars	
and	 thoughtful	 practitioners	 from	 across	 the	world	
are	 those	who	 can	 do	 this.	 They	may	 draw	 on	 the	
“lessons	 learned”	which	the	United	Nations	puts	at	
their	disposal.7	The	UN	knowledge	and	technical	as-
sistance	expertise	is	a	click	away	from	the	computer	of	
a	scholar	or	practitioner.8	And	last	but	not	least,	most	
successful	 researchers	 in	 the	 biological	 and	 physical	
sciences	also	tend	to	have	the	highest	levels	of	inter-
action	with	practitioners.9	Hence	another	provocative	
question:	Are	social	scientists	different?		¢
5 Can the United Nations be Taught?,	Proceedings	of	a	Colloquium	on	Innovative	Approaches	to	Teaching	the	UN	System,	held	at	the	Dip-
lomatic	Academy	of	Vienna,	Austria,22–23	November	2008,	http://www.davienna.ac.at/jart/prj3/diplomatische_akademie/resources/
dbcon_def/uploads/prj3/diplomatische_akademie%7C/UNDidaktik.pdf
6	 Axel	Wustenhagen,	Teaching	the	United	Nations	at	Austrian	Universities	and	Post-Graduate	Institutions	23-26,	(in:)	Can the United Nations 
be Taught?,	Vienna	2008:23-26.
7	 See,	e.g.,	Office	of	the	Higher	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights,	Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States. Monitoring the Legal System,	New	York	
2006:	35-36,	http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RuleoflawMonitoringen.pdf
8	 Information	 on	 its	 current	 documentation	 comes	 through	 the	 RSS	 (“Really	 Simple	 Syndication”)	 feed,	 see:	 http://iseek.un.org/web-
pgdept1932_4.asp	.
9	 S.	L.	Rynes,	J.	M.	Bartunek,	R.,	L.,	Daft,	Across	the	great	divide:	Knowledge	creation	and	transfer	between	practitioners	and	academics,	
Academy of Management Journal,	Apr.	2001,	Vol.	44,	No.	2:343.	
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To sum up the above developments, one may ob­
serve that from about 1995 to 2010 there has been a 
considerable acceleration of the development of the 
UN crime mandate. Until 1995, the Secretary-Gene­
ral self­critically acknowledged that the Organiza­
tion had not really been involved in developing it as 
a component of its rule­of­law work.476 
The approach has started to change in 1995 when 
the Economic and Social Council adopted Guidelines 
for the prevention of urban crime. In 2000-2004 there 
have been further changes in the UN crime program­
me and the work programme of the entire United Na­
tions Secretariat. The latter has recognized structural 
prevention which is conceptually closer to crime pre­
vention than preventive diplomacy. Thanks to the re­
port of the Secretary­General on The rule of law and 
transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict socie-
ties,477 work on crime prevention has not only been 
strengthened by the up to then lingering emphasis on 
criminal victimization, but also by stating that preven-
tion is the first imperative of justice-”.478 
The process initiated by the United Nations Com­
mission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
with the workshop at the Twelfth Congress to develop 
United Nations Criminal Justice Studies seems to be 
the logical consequence of the change in 2000 of the 
approach to the rule of law question in general. Since 
then the United Nations Crime Prevention and Crimi­
nal Justice Programme has caught up with the system­
wide progress on the rule of law, human rights and 
development. Not only has it become an important 
component of this general process, but it also spear­
heads it in some areas. These elements are politically 
and conceptually not fully compatible with one ano­
ther.479 But surely had they been absent, crime preven­
tion and criminal justice in the United Nations would 
have been a less successful and promising endeavour. 
In line with the thrust of this study, which fo­
cuses on the meandering path and idiosyncrasies of 
criminological thought, one should add that there 
is some incompatibility of methodologies between 
academic and intergovernmental crime prevention 
and criminal justice project evaluations designed to 
objectively assess the process and outcome of an in­
tervention policy. Rarely can the same measure of 
evaluation be applied to academic and bureaucratic 
project evaluation.
It should be recalled that the evaluation of pub­
lic policies has progressively been set up as a quasi­
systematic requirement under double pressure: the 
general retreat of the welfare state during the 1980s 
and 1990s and the rationalisation of public expendi­
tures. Consequently, today, evaluation is a priority. 
The outcomes of projects do matter. They can be eva­
luated objectively, if a control group is included in 
those criteria. 
This methodological requirement of a control 
group, a requirement emphasized here so many times, 
is hard to meet in United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice projects. Consequently, in the 
flagship document by the United Nations Juvenile 
Justice Panel (2010), this requirement does not fea­
ture among the common evaluation criteria. As no­
ted there, “it is rarely the case that juvenile justice 
programmes lend themselves to some of the more ri­
gorous evaluation methods (experimental, quasi-ex­
perimental designs). Before and after measurements 
will very often suffer from the near absence of reli-
able baseline data. Finally, many of the reforms that 
are being promoted in the juvenile justice area are 
more likely to yield long­term rather than short­term 
outcomes”.480 Can this be otherwise improved, that is 
to pursue a control group evaluation, for example in 
the United Nations alternative development project 
aiming at illicit drug crop substitution: by introduc­
ing it in one community, but not a comparable pro­
gram in another one, or pursuing it in country A by 
including country B as a control? 
Confronted with this dilemma (after all a com­
mon dilemma in the developmental assistance field), 
experimental research academics involved in the 
World Bank’s educational development projects argue 
that new methodological standards for field projects 
may help to solve this reformist challenge through the 
randomization of experiments targeted at individuals 
or communities without a control group, but with ad­
ditional internal evaluation methods.481 That sort of 
“unscientific” randomization is a close cousin of a more 
rigorous randomization through control trials in area­
based situational crime prevention projects.482 
476	 This	has	been	shown	in	his	two	already	mentioned	reports	(“Agenda for Peace”,	and	“Supplement”),	which	document	how	marginal	it	was	
(A/47/277-S/24111,§55;	A/50/60S/1995/1,	§§13-14	&	97).	
477	 S/2004/616.
478	 Ibid.,§	4.
479	 Rajagopal	2008:54.
480	 UN	Panel	2010:23.
481	 Benarjee	&	Duflo	2008.
482	 Knutson	&	Tilley	2009:3.
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The main virtue of the randomization of expe­
riments through more internal controls is that it is 
less politically intrusive, and hence does not cre ate 
a political backlash. Through close collaboration 
between researchers and implementers, that sort 
of randomization allows within one project the es­
timation of parameters in the face of complex and 
multiple channels of causality. Otherwise these pa­
rameters could only be evaluated through the in­
volvement of a control group. In this case, on ave­
rage, those who are exposed to the program are no 
different than those who are not. Consequently, a 
statistically significant difference between the two 
groups in the outcomes can be confidently attri­
buted to the project. 
For a broad class of development programmes, 
such randomized project evaluations are a way to 
obtain credible and transparent estimates of the im­
pacts of projects because they overcome the prob­
lems when using other evaluation practices, includ­
ing control groups. Moreover, the same method of 
randomization may be used in other (non-UN) pro­
jects. Depending on the answer to the question of 
whether or not one can have better process­data by 
applying internal controls to the project that may 
negatively impact the outcome one wants to achieve 
through it, there will be those who will find that out­
come contradictory and untenable and those who 
might be called pragmatists. The pragmatists have 
a more open attitude towards what is acceptable and 
what is not in academic research and reformist work. 
For them a thin blue line offered by such a randomi­
zation may chart the path to follow. The policy and 
academic worlds can hardly share more common 
ground than this. 
This thin blue line itself has intricacies of its own 
that internally distinguish the United Nations from 
the World Bank and the World Health Organiza­
tion. The WHO promotes rigorous evidence­based 
violence prevention, in the tradition of what consti­
tutes evidence in medicine. The United Nations in 
its own work on responding to crime also promotes 
good practices that may be promising solutions to 
certain forms of crime, and rights­based practices 
with no evidence whatsoever. This is because un like 
the WHO with its clear focus on the protection of 
health, the United Nations promotes social justice 
values that are based on first acquiring certain rights. 
The importance of evaluating programmes, prac­
tices or policies took on sufficient scope for the Uni­
ted Nations to have created in 1984 the Inter­Agen­
cy Working Group on Evaluation, since 2003 known 
as the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In 
2005, UNEG published483 the following eight me­
ta-evaluation criteria: (1) Transparency of evalua-
tion processes; (2) Expertise; (3) Independence from 
the other management functions; (4) Impartiali­
ty of evaluators; (5) Intentionality, that is, an intent 
to use evaluation results, and assuming timely plan­
ning aligned with future decisions; (6) ”Evaluabili-
ty”, that is, the usefulness of verifying, prior to the 
evaluation, that the programme to be evaluated has 
sufficient measurable indicators; (7) Quality of eva­
luation; and (8) Follow-up of evaluation recommen­
dations.484
The focus selected here for United Nations Cri­
minal Justice Studies, – on the United Nations crime 
prevention and criminal justice standards and 
norms – should not imply that other approaches to 
those Studies should not be pursued. On the contra­
ry, in line with the concept of “Delivering as One”,485 
“Security Sector Reform”,486 “Peace Keeping”,487 “Uni­
ted Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Em­
powerment of Women” / “UN Women”,488 etc. such 
mandates open up compatible cross­cutting ave­
nues. These avenues help to develop criminal jus­
tice studies further through the feedback they re­
ceive from the practical field-oriented delivery of 
one UN criminal justice message. The number of 
such UN and international mandates is growing, in­
cluding those of UN­Habitat, UNESCO, UNDP and 
the World Bank. 
Under different names, each of these entities has 
its own crime prevention and criminal justice pro­
jects or programmes. But in only a very few of them 
is there a genuine normative United Nations input 
from its treaty and soft law instruments. “Delivering 
as One” certainly is a desired goal facilitating the in­
corporation of the United Nations crime preven­
tion and criminal justice standards and norms in­
483	 http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp?doc_cat_source_id=4.
484	 UNEG	2005a.	These	criteria	do	not	mention	any	particular	evaluation	method	(such	as	experimental	randomization)	nor	has	the	UNODC	so	far	
pursued	this	qualitatively	advanced	evaluation	method	in	its	own	field	projects.	It	is	probably	too	early	for	that.	Surely,	however,	independent	
evaluation,	as	called	by	another	meta-criterion,	has	been	the	issue	in	the	UNODC,	which	now	only	has	an	evaluation	unit	reporting	to	the	Of-
fice	of	the	Executive	Director.
485	 A/61/583.
486	 A/62/659-S/2008/39.
487	 A/55/305-S/2000/809.
488	 GA	resolution	64/289	of	21	July	2010.
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to such projects or programmes. Last but not least, 
their implementation implies their testing and eva­
luation. This would yield returns for United Nations 
Criminal Justice Studies themselves. Increasingly in­
tegrating and comprehensive, they are becoming na­
tural “good practices” resource providers driving the 
development of course syllabi for United Nations 
Criminal Justice Studies that should generalize find-
ings from the application of United Nations criminal 
policy in Member States. 
A. Introduction
Shortly	 before	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 the	 prominent	
Austrian	law	sociologist	Eugen	Ehrich	emphasized	that	
“the	centre	of	gravity	of	legal	development	lies	not	in	
legislation,	nor	in	juridical	science,	nor	in	judicial	deci-
sions,	 but	 in	 society	 itself”.1	 This	was	written	 at	 the	
time	when	major	Western	law	philosophers	expound-
ed	the	national	virtues	of	domestic	legal	systems,	and	
some	penal	scientists	echoed	them.2 
Shortly	 before	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 the	 fa-
mous	English	comparatist	Harold	C.	Gutteridge,	as	 if	
anticipating	 that	 this	 narrow	 perspective	 may	 soon	
prove	disastrous,	argued	against	“the	 isolation	of	 le-
gal	 thought	 in	 national	 watertight	 compartments	 ...	
most	prolific	 in	producing	 that	 frame	of	mind	which	
leads	 to	a	 spirit	of	national	egotism.	We	have	much	
to	learn	from	one	another	in	legal	as	well	as	other	de-
partments	of	human	activities,	and	it	is,	in	a	sense,	a	
reproach	to	the	lawyers	of	all	nations	that	they	have	
been	unable,	up	to	the	present,	to	arrive	at	the	free	
interchange	of	knowledge	and	ideas	which	has	been	
attained	in	other	branches	of	learning”.3
International	 legal	 cooperation	 of	 the	 kind	 pos-
tulated	 above	 has	 been	 taken	 over	 by	 several	 post-
Second	World	War	ground-breaking	events.	First	and	
foremost,	by	the	founding	of	the	United	Nations	with	
its	antiwar	developmental	agenda.	To	address	 it,	the	
objective	and	 the	essence	of	 the	criminal	 justice	 re-
form	work	has	been	reconceptualized.	Bilateral	 legal	
reform	work	of	a	colonial	character	has	been	replaced	
by	bilateral	and	multilateral	technical	assistance	sup-
porting	 the	 right	 to	 self-determination.	 Whether	
economic,	 legal	or	social	 reform,	from	the	very	start	
it	involved	various	forms	of	advice,	including	training.	
To	that	end,	and	unlike	in	colonial	times,	provision	of	
that	 advice	 had	 to	 include	 capacity-building	 meas-
ures.	 New	 experiences	 have	 led	 to	 the	 gradual	 de-
velopment	of	various	 technical	assistance	standards,	
among	which,	however,	those	involving	common	UN	
standards	have	for	a	 long	time	been	 in	short	supply.	
”Delivering	as	One”	has	been	a	very	recent	postulate.	
B. Precipitating a common language of 
justice
Against	 this	background,	 the	eventual	emergence	of	
the	need	for	a	UN	common	language	of	justice	as	a	ca-
pacity-building	measure	may	now	be	credited	to	three	
distant,	 but	 thought-	 and	 action-provoking	 events.	
Historically,	they	may	be	regarded	as	the	antecedents	
of	 the	UN	 “Dialogue among Civilizations”	 that	 since	
the	 Millennium	 Declaration	 has	 taken	 a	 new	 turn.	
These	events	highlight	 the	 importance	of	operation-
ally	focusing	the	Organization’s	agenda	on	effectively	
delivering	globally	its	security	and	justice	messages.	
The	first	 event	 (the	 “Spandau case”)	 dates	back	
to	 the	 sentencing	 of	 the	 Nazi	 war	 criminals	 by	 the	
International	 Military	 Tribunal.4	 The	 sentenced	 war	
criminals	 had	 been	 imprisoned	 in	 Spandau	 (West	
Berlin,	 Federal	 Republic	 of	 Germany)	 with	 the	 right	
to	be	attended	by	a	prison	chaplain.	In	1947,	the	Al-
lies	 (France,	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	
and	the	USA)	had	agreed	that	such	a	service	may	be	
Towards a Common Language of Justice through 
Intercultural Training Skills 
BOX 20
1	 Eugen	Ehrlich,	Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law,	transl.	W.	L.	Moll,	Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge	1912/1936:xv.
2	 Huber	1916.
3	 Harold	C.	Gutteridge,	The	comparative	aspects	of	legal	terminology,	Tulane Law Review	12	(1938):410.
4	 Its	verdicts	were	accepted	by	the	United	Nations	resolution	of	11	December	1946	as	binding	norms	of	international	law,	hence	also	of	
United	Nations	law.
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best	rendered	by	French	German-speaking	protestant	
chaplains	 coming	 from	Alsace	 -	 the	French	 trilingual	
(French,	 German,	 Alsatian)	 region.	 Apparently	 the	
decision	to	appoint	French	prison	chaplains	had	been	
taken	 after	 considering	 that	 such	 persons	 not	 only	
have	a	good	command	of	the	German	language,	but	
also	know	better	the	German	mindset	(Alsace	has	had	
a	common	French-German	history).	In	sum,	this	ena-
bled	more	effective	communication	with	the	prisoners	
of	war,	 if	not	also	 learning	about	 their	personal	atti-
tudes	vis	à	vis	the	official	guilty	verdicts.5
The	second	event	(the	“Japan	case”)	occurred	at	
about	the	same	time.	Then,	the	US	forces	occupying	
post-Second	World	War	Japan	had	to	solve	the	ques-
tion	 of	 the	 criminal	 responsibility	 of	 the	 Japanese	
military	commanders.	They	did	so,	following	the	rec-
ommendations	of	Ruth	Benedict,	US	cultural	anthro-
pologist.6	She	advised	them	on	the	basis	of	research	
carried	out	on	the	“guilt	culture”	with	which	the	West	
is	 familiar	 from	 its	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 and	 the	
“shame	culture”	of	Japan.
The	third	event	(the	“Korean war	case”)	could	be	
traced	to	miscommunication	 in	one	of	the	battles	of	
the	Korean	War	(1950-1953)7	which	had	led	to	tragic	
results.	
On	April	23,	1951,	no	fewer	than	three	Chinese	
divisions	attacked	one	British	brigade.	Four	hundred	
men	from	one	of	 its	battalions,	 the	Gloucestershire	
Regiment,	were	cut	off	and	surrounded	on	the	crest	
of	Hill	235	(“Gloster	Hill”),	located	south	of	the	Imjin	
(The	Republic	of	Korea).	The	battle	at	the	Gloster	Hill	
started	badly,	then	got	worse.	One	British	command-
er	 -	with	 characteristic	 understatement	 -	 described	
the	Glosters’	situation	to	his	US	counterpart	as	“pret-
ty	sticky”.	This	was	misinterpreted	on	the	American	
side	as	a	situation	other	than	critical.	Reinforcements	
did	not	reach	the	British	in	time.	Only	39	British	sol-
diers	 escaped.	 The	 rest	were	 either	 killed	 or	 taken	
prisoner.	
C. Questions
Exemplary	as	such	events	here	are,	they	certainly	lead	
to	 certain	 general	 questions.	 If	within	 one	 language	
culture	 there	may	 be	 obstacles	 to	 communicate	 ef-
fectively,	 might	 it	 not	 be	 that	 in	 any	 language	 one	
can	 only	 express	 certain	 thoughts,	 and	 that	 these	
thoughts	 differ	 from	 culture	 to	 culture?	 If	 law	 lives	
in	and	through	language,	what	happens	to	it	when	it	
is	 transferred	 to	 another	 language?	 If	 the	 structure	
of	 the	 language	 influences,	 or	 even	determines,	 the	
mode	and	content	of	 thought,	how	others	can	com-
municate	and	understand	in	their	own	languages	with	
their	own	characteristics	what	is	meant	for	them,8	let’s	
add,	in	the	global	justice	and	security	terms?	And	last	
but	 not	 least:	 since	 “guilt”	 and	 “shame”	 culture	 are	
different,	how	then	can	one	be	able	 to	pursue	com-
mon	 principles	 of	 responsibility	 for	 offences	 against	
peace	and	security	of	mankind?	
D. A call for the answers 
The	above	questions	signal	how	the	United	Nations,	
tasked	since	its	inception	through	its	Charter	“to	save	
the	succeeding	generations	from	the	scourge	of	war”,	
has	been	looking	for		effective	answers.	Some	of	them,	
tenuous	as	they	may	be	(e.g.,	the	definition	of	“guilty	
mind”	in	the	ICC	Statute),	are	already	in	place.	In	the	
anticipation	of	further	answers,	this	so	far	has	resulted	
in	an	interim	call	for	a	common	language	of	justice	in	
the	United	Nations.	
One	may	see	 it	as	a	modest	outcome.	However,	
achieving	something	common	by	the	United	Nations	
has	to	be	estimated	as	a	multiplication	of	recommen-
dations	of	193	Member	States.	Their	sum	will	still	not	
give	a	grand	total	and	will	not	capture	the	letter	and	
spirit	of	 the	Organization	without	 the	 inputs	of	hun-
dreds	of	 intergovernmental	organizations,	thousands	
of	 non-governmental	 organizations,	 and	 the	 rest	 of	
civic	community.
5	 See	further:	Laure	Joanin-Lllobet,	Les 7 De Spandau. Les Secretes Révélés des Derniers Criminels Nazis,	Oh!	Editions,	Paris	2008.	
6	 Ruth	Benedict,	The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture,	Houghton	Mifflin	Company,	New	York	1946/2005.
7	 A	 bitterly	 contested	 conflict	 inspired	 by	 intense	 Cold	War	 geo-strategic	 rivalry	 and	 competing	West/East	 ideologies.	 The	war	 fought	
against	North	 Korea	 and	 China	was	 a	 truly	 international	 affair:	 on	 the	UN	 side,	 40%	of	 combatants	were	 South	 Korean	 (ROK),	 50%	 
American	and	10%	other,	including	forces	from	the	British	Commonwealth,	Belgium,	Luxembourg,	Colombia,	Ethiopia,	France,	Greece,	
the	Netherlands,	the	Philippines,	Thailand	and	Turkey.	Eventually,	a	UN	coalition	of	16	countries,	led	by	a	1.3	million	strong	US	force,	re-
inforced	ROK’s	desperate	defence.	After	a	British	proposal	for	a	Unified	UN	Command,	US	General	MacArthur	was	UN	commander	(Ronan	
Thomas,	The	war	that	won’t	end,	Asia Times,	25	May	2010).	Although	this	form	of	UN	command	exists	up	to	the	present	for	that	military	
operation,	it	does	not	imply	the	UN	peacekeeping	authority	mandated	to	it	by	the	Security	Council.	The	absence	of	it	is	due	to	the	absence	
of	the	Soviet	Union	–	a	permanent	member	of	the	Security	Council	when	the	voting	on	the	UN	command	took	place	(Peter	Malanczuk,	
Modern Introduction to International Law,	Seventh	Revised	Edition,	Routledge,	London	1996:391-392).	
8	 Bernhard	Grossfeld,	The Strength and Weakness of Comparative Law,	trans.	T.	Weir,	Oxford	Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	1990:101.
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E. The key objective and guiding notions 
of intercultural training: pluralism, 
convergence and multivalent logic 
Since	 peace	 and	 justice	 between	 peoples	 are	 not	
gained	at	the	level	of	personal	adjustment	but	through	
the	reform	of	political	and	economic	institutions,9 the 
key	objective	of	United	Nations	intercultural	training	is	
to	contribute	to	that	reform	with	a	view	to	facilitating	
achieving	by	the	Organization	common	understanding	
and	outcomes	for	the	strengthening	of	peace	and	jus-
tice	between	peoples.	
Among	the	notions	that	can	advance	criminal	jus-
tice	reform	are	two	that	are	only	seemingly	incompat-
ible,	legal	pluralism	and	convergence. 
Pluralism	 can	 be	 achieved	 by:	 (a)	 inscribing	 the	
legal	 reform	objective	 into	 relatively	 content-neutral	
legal	tools,	and	(b)	adapting	the	United	Nations	legal	
concepts	 in	a	way	acceptable	 to	 the	addressed	 legal	
culture.10	By	and	large,	United	Nations	criminal	justice	
reform	 handbooks	 and	 manuals	 are	 such	 content-
neutral	 tools.	United	Nations	 legal	concepts,	such	as	
transnational	 organized	 crime	 or	 money	 laundering	
are	 formulated	relatively	broadly,	and	some	are	pur-
posely	left	ambiguous	or	even	undefined	(e.g.,	corrup-
tion).	This	can	facilitate	convergence	of:	(a)	views	on	
the	criminal	justice	reform	needs	and,	in	some	cases,	
(b)	legal	convergence	(see,	e.g.,	common	law	conspir-
acy	and	civil	law	Komplott, association de malfaiteurs 
in	 the	 name	 of	 one	 common	 concept	 of	 entreprise	
responsibility,	formulated	in	the	UNTOC).
Such	advances	are	possible	because	the	applica-
tion,	in	the	pursuit	of	the	United	Nations	common	lan-
guage	of	justice,	of	multivalent	logic	-	another	guiding	
notion.	It	tolerates	ambiguity.11
F. Conclusion
Coming	 back	 to	 the	 three	 thought-provoking	 cases,	
the	following	observations	may	now	be	in	place.	First,	
and	obvious	as	this	may	seem,	in	intercultural	criminal	
justice	training	(as	in	so	many	other	things)	it	is	in	lan-
guage	 that	 messages	 are	 communicated.	 Regarding	
the Korean war	case,	in	“England	and	America	(…)	two	
countries	separated	by	a	common	language”	(George	
Bernard	Shaw),	command	of	English,	and	logical	rea-
soning	-	bivalent	in	principle	(“yes”/”no”)	-	in	practice	
exemplifies	how	even	within	one	legal	culture	the	use	
of	one	and	the	same	language	may	lead	to	the	draw-
ing	of	a	false	conclusion.	Second,	a	particular	way	of	
thinking,	as,	e.g.,	explicit	for	the	English	commander,	
is	 implicit	 for	 others,12	 and	 thus	 may	 be	 misunder-
stood,	as	was	the	case	with	the	US	commander.	Surely,	
the Spandau	case	exemplifies	explicit	communication	
that	can	be	effective,	at	 least	 in	principle.	Third,	and	
regarding	the	influence	of	the	Second	World	War	on	
intercultural	 West-East	 communication	 (the	 Japan 
case),	 it	 prompted	 not	 only	 American	 (Western)	 ex-
perts	 to	 study	 deeper	 the	 intricacies	 of	 Eastern	 cul-
ture,	but	also	Japanese	intellectuals	to	undertake	new	
analyses	of	their	culture	and	nation13	in	broad	Eastern	
ways	of	thinking,	including	comparative	rules	of	logic	
and	logical	systems.14
With	the	knowledge	we	now	have,	training	skills	
are	needed	to	deliver	effectively	criminal	justice	mes-
sages	from	West	to	East,	East	to	West	and	across	the	
entire	 world.	 “Delivering	 as	 One”	 for	 the	 “Dialogue 
among Civilizations”	 by	 the	 United	Nations	 requires	
this. ¢
9	 Alfred	G.	Smith,	Content	decisions	in	intercultural	communication	(in:)	Gary	R.	Weaver	(ed.),	Culture, Communication and Conflict. Read-
ings in Intercultural Relations,	Pearson	Publishing	2000:79.
10	 See	further	Denise	Réume,	cited	in:	Esin	Örücü,	The Enigma of Comparative Law. Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-first Century, 
Marinus	Nijhoff	Publishers,	Leiden	2004:130.
11	 “It	will	be	not	be	possible	to	be	and	not	to	be	the	same	thing,	except	in	virtue	of	an	ambiguity”	(Aristotle,	quoted	by	H.	Patrick	Glenn,	Legal 
Traditions of the World. Sustainable Diversity in Law,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	2000:325).
12	 Ibid.
13	 Arthur	 F.	 Wright	 in	 the	 Foreword	 to:	 Hajime	 Nakamura,	 The Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples,	 compiled	 by	 Japanese	 National	 
Commission	for	UNESCO,	Greenwood	Press,	New	York	1960/1988:v.	
14	 Nakamura	1988:3.
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Picture 36.	 Delegation	 of	 Po-
land	at	 the	Twelfth	United	Na-
tions	 Congress	 on	 Crime	 Pre-
vention	 and	 Criminal	 Justice	
(from	left	to	right:	Ambassador	
Jacek	Junosza-Kisielewski,	head	
of	delegation,	Dr	Wojciech	Filip-
kowski,	Rapporteur	of	Commit-
tee	II	of	the	Congress,	Prof.	Emil	
Pływaczewski,	 Vice-Chairman	
of	the	Congress)
Picture 37. Eleventh	 Congress	
Workshop	 “Measures	 to	 Com-
bat	 Computer-related	 Crime”	
which	opened	 the	way	 for	 the	
creation	 by	 the	 Korean	 Insti-
tute	of	 Criminology	of	 the	Vir-
tual	 Anti-Cybercrime	 Forum.	
Among	those	sitting	at	the	po-
dium	 from	 right	 to	 left:	 KIC	
President	Dr.	Taehoon	Lee,	Prof.	
Peter	Grabowsky	(Australia),	Jo	
Dedeyne	 (UNODC),	 Iskander	
Ghattas	 (Egypt,	 Chairman),	
Sławomir	Redo	(UNODC),	Mark	
Shaw	 (UNODC),	 Gareth	 Samp-
son	(Canada)
Picture 38.	KIC/UNODC	Expert	Group	Meeting	on	the	Development	of	the	Virtual	Anti-	Cybercrime	Forum	(Seoul,	
2006).	Hosts:	in	the	middle	Dr	Taehoon	Lee	(Director	of	the	KIC),	first	on	the	right	side	and	Dr	Joon	Oh	Jang	with	the	
experts	and	the	KIC	and	UNODC	staff
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Picture 40.	Considering	the	Salvador	Declaration	of	the	Twelfth	United	Nations	Congress	on	Crime	Prevention	and	
Criminal	Justice	at	the	follow-up	session	of	the	Commission	on	Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	Justice	(Vienna,	Aus-
tria,	2010).	Behind	the	name	plate	of	Qatar	(the	host	of	the	Thirteenth	United	Nations	Congress	on	Crime	Preven-
tion	and	Criminal	Justice,	2015):	General	Dr	Abdulla	Al-Mall,	Advisor	to	the	Minister	of	Internal	Affairs,	head	of	dele-
gation.	On	his	right	the	delegation	of	San	Marino,	on	its	left	the	delegations	of	Portugal	and	Poland.	Behind	the	front	
row	(left)	two	representatives	of	the	United	Nations	Office	of	the	Higher	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	(Geneva,	
Switzerland)	and	other	international	representatives
Picture 39.	 Twelfth	 Congress	
Workshop	”International	Crim-
inal	 Justice	 Education	 for	 the	
Rule	of	Law”	organized	by	the	
KIC,	HEUNI,	ISISC,	ISS	and	RWI
214
Figure 5.	United	Nations	Criminal	Justice	Studies,	training	and	mandates
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XIX Conclusion
Obvious as the following conclusion may sound, 
there are important differences and similarities be­
tween international academic and practical perspec­
tives in responding to crime. United Nations crim­
inological thought has a far greater outreach than 
academic criminology, since it has a greater trans­
formative power than the latter has, and rests on 
partly different methodological principles, as not­
ed in the introduction to this study. But there is al­
so a common criminological thread in both pursuits. 
This is the need to counteract crime in the name of 
sustained development of a society and individual – 
so ably envisioned for the whole world by Gandhi. 
United Nations and academic ideas, sometimes 
jointly, sometimes separately, should work towards 
this common goal. As to how and when it can be gra­
dually achieved while the criminological horizon is 
always on the move, this study once more empha­
sizes its leading motto by Hugo. The time for their 
discussion and materialization comes when the si­
tuation is ripe, whereas new challenges are emerging 
ahead. And this is beautiful in this evolutionary mu­
tually beneficial process and relationship!
XX Afterword
This monographic study of the UN crime programme 
is motivated by the experiences and vision of its au­
thor, from his own standpoint – that of a criminolo­
gist and an international civil servant. By and large, 
this book excludes the accounts relevant to the role 
of higher United Nations hierarchies, be it directors 
of the Social Division to which the crime programme 
chiefs reported, or even higher levels – those of the 
Assistant Secretary­Generals, the Under Secretary­
Generals or the Secretary­Generals of the United Na­
tions, who certainly contributed their own work to 
“Blue Criminology”. That may deserve a monograph 
or series of monographs.
This more modest present text has normative 
and analytical components in its “knowledge” part, 
and operational information in its “skills” part. Those 
parts are interwoven, in line with the study’s ori ginal 
intention of pursuing a path analysis of the develop­
ment and implementation of certain criminological 
ideas. It is, then, a hybrid text that emerged under 
the strong influence of a chance to verify my acade­
mic knowledge in Central Asia. In the course of my 
UN service as a Senior Crime Prevention and Crimi­
nal Justice Expert there, I came across the ongoing 
process of creation of the Tajik Drug Control Agency 
(TDCA). Its functioning has incidentally been based 
on the academic principle of reflexive reformation, 
directed towards institutional rehabilitation of cor­
rupted State organs involved in countering illicit 
drug trafficking and drug abuse. One of these cor­
rupted organs was the State Drug Control Commis­
sion, the predecessor of the TDCA.489
At the moment of connecting this kind of theo­
retical knowledge with a practical TDCA example, I 
have started to understand this knowledge in a much 
more comprehensive and in­depth manner, much 
more than my academic and bureaucratic knowledge 
allowed me to do before that encounter. I have al­
so started to understand that autonomous divisions 
in science, armchair divagations and recommenda­
tions, although they are good intellectual exercise 
and hence are needed individually, in their dogmatic 
excess they may make science a futile work. I have be­
gun to understand “good” and ”bad” science, ”good” 
and ”bad” bureaucracy with its frustrations, not real­
ly a result of the conflict between academic and prac­
tical priorities, but of the success (or the lack of suc­
cess) in the practical application of academic science 
and life experience to responding to crime. Finally, 
I have started to understand that academic educa­
489	 Redo	2004	&	2007.	To	recall,	“reflexive reformation”	(i.e.,	a	reversal	of	Edwin	Sutherland’s	aetiological	principle	of	differential	association	
“birds of a feather flock together”,	emphasizing	that	an	offender	can	be	rehabilitated	if	he/she	is	influenced	by	a	formerly	rehabilitated	of-
fender	as	a	“significant other”)	was	developed	by	Donald	Cressey,	Sutherland’s	student.	Cressey	formulated	his	principle	after	field	visits	to	
groups	of	Anonymous Alcoholics	and	drug	abusers	(Synanon).	Both	groups	rehabilitate	their	members	by	involving	in	the	process	former	ad-
dicts	who	are	able	to	play	the	role	of	a	“significant other”. 
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tion should not only be about “knowledge”, but al­
so about “skills”, that is about how to manage it for a 
practical purpose through training. Accordingly, de­
livering a United Nations message across the world 
in which the power of the United Nations’ justice is 
also illusive, requires special interstate and intercul­
tural efforts. 
Regarding the interstate efforts, in 2010 they 
yielded three important outcomes. First, the United 
Nations General Assembly endorsed the Salvador 
Declaration of the Twelfth United Nations Con gress 
in which it recognized “the centrality of crime pre­
vention and the criminal justice system to the rule 
of law and that long­term sustainable economic 
and social development and the establishment of a 
functioning, efficient, effective and humane crimi­
nal justice system have a positive influence on each 
other”. Second, the Security Council included the 
consideration of the question of transnational orga­
nized crime among global peace and security threats. 
Third, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 
troubled by the impunity of perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of international concern, but con­
vinced that there can be no lasting peace without jus­
tice, recommended more complementarity between 
the ICC’s jurisdiction and national jurisdictions to pro­
secute those perpetrators, in accordance with inter­ 
 nationally­recognized fair trial standards.490 In other 
words, the primary responsibility for prosecution 
and adjudication is at the country level, whether for 
crimes of international concern or ordinary crimes, 
because certain ordinary crimes, if committed in a 
systematic or widespread manner or on a mass scale, 
can amount to crimes of international concern. Im­
punity can be fought better if domestic criminal jus­
tice systems work better, according to the United 
Nations crime prevention and criminal justice stan­
dards and norms. Their promotion, implementation 
and studies on them are at the core of the United Na­
tions’ work for peace and democracy in the world. 
It would be yet another illusion to see the effects 
of that complementary work soon. This is a process 
and not an end in itself. But if Alexis de Tocqueville, 
on whose parochial view of prison reform this stu­
dy commented in its preface, could now have looked 
“back to the future”, would he have been pleased to 
see the inherent connection between domestic cri­
minal justice reform and democracy in the world, 
and the cumulative progress made by the United 
Nations? And how would he have reacted to Nelson 
Mandela’s dictum, “No one truly knows a nation un-
til one has been inside its jails. A nation should not be 
judged by how it treats its highest citizens but its low - 
est ones”?
Regarding the intercultural efforts, two dicta of 
other Nobel Prize winners (one from the East and 
one from the West) should be quoted here. As for the 
East, Alexander Solzhenitsyn said “When we do not 
punish or condemn the perpetrators of evil, it is not 
that we protect their trivial old age, but remove the 
foundings for justice for the succeeding generations”. 
First, that part of the knowledge (how to pro-
gress in preventing the recurrences of this?) and com­
mitment is in short supply. Second, it goes without 
saying that the political commitment of decision­
makers without “skills” training in crime preven tion, 
law enforcement and criminal justice personnel ren­
ders this objective difficult to achieve, because it is 
through their daily on­the­job performance that the 
United Nations standards and norms are (or not) 
applied in practice. Third, and as for the West, to 
make crime prevention and criminal justice success­
ful, the skills should be effectively communicated, 
because, as George Bernard Shaw said, “The single 
biggest problem in communication is the illusion that 
it has taken place”. 
I wrote that I had no illusion of seeing the ef­
fects of that United Nations rule­of­law work soon. 
But I would also like to emphasize at the end that the 
Organization which I served has, since its inception, 
taken its own place in the dialogue of civilizations. 
This monographic study, “Blue Criminology: The Po-
wer of United Nations Ideas to Respond to Crime Glo-
bally”, which hopefully contributes to this intercul­
tural dialogue, was written to serve as another bridge 
across the divides. 
490	 Res.	RC/Res.1	and	res.	RC/4,	Kampala	Declaration,	§	5,	11	June	2010.
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XXI Synopsis
Concluding this study, its goal in its last section is to 
focus on a non­discursive, fully descriptive summa­
ry of major criminological developments that con­
tributed to the current legacy of the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme 
and its current outlook.
This will be done by capturing the essence of 
the preceding text (both its body and boxes), with 
a view to providing an action­oriented synthesis of 
the book. 
PART	I Against Fear and Want, 
for Sustainable Development
The United Nations crime prevention and criminal 
justice programme draws on crime and justice devel­
opments over more than two centuries. They started 
with the international penal reform work initiated 
by the classical criminal law school of Cesare Becca­
ria (1764) and the first comparative penitentiary re-
commendations of John Howard (1777). Its interna­
tional institutional beginnings may be credited to 
the International Penitentiary Congress in Frankfurt 
am Main (1846), and to a subsequent series of twelve 
international penal and penitentiary congresses 
(London, 1872 – The Hague, 1950). Its programma-
tic beginnings have developed not only through the 
above accomplishments, but also through increas­
ingly prominent social welfare policy in the era of in­
dustrialization and urbanization (modernization). 
Particularly in the second half of the nineteenth cen­
tury, modernization has entered the European agen­
da and has spread across the world ever since. From 
that time on, the United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice mandate has inherited a pro­
grammatic and always dynamically adjusted focus of 
“social”, then “juvenile” and “criminal” justice, with 
a special reference to the position of children in the 
justice system, starting with the question of their 
solitary confinement and philanthropic concerns re­
garding their welfare. 
After the Second World War, as the “succeeding 
generations” (or under any other similar notion), the 
lot of children and adults has been the centrepiece of 
international attention and action. In 1945, the Uni­
ted Nations, the largest ever peace­oriented inter­
governmental organization, fearing the recurrences 
of the horrors of war that destroyed millions of lives 
and livelihoods and led to poverty of peoples and na­
tions, started meeting its Charter’s objective of pre­
venting those recurrences by promoting social and 
economic development (“sustainable development”) 
and human rights (1948-1987). 
Eventually, since the beginning of 1990s, deve-
loping and developed member countries of the Uni­
ted Nations jointly arrived at a number of multi lateral 
agreements paving the way for the operationaliza­
tion of the common fight against security challen­
ges, among which human and urban security, justice 
and security sector reform have been incorporated. 
Against this background, academic research 
and United Nations criminal policy, which both 
have reacted to the basic ideas of the freedom from 
fear and want and to the idea of sustainable de­
velopment, have either autonomously or jointly 
contributed their share to these three fundamen­
tal ideas.
PART	II The United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Mandate
Since 1946 onwards, the United Nations crime pre­
vention and criminal justice mandate has incremen­
tally built in its scope various technical facets of so­
cial and economic development. It began with the 
treatment of children/juveniles and adults, and al­
ready in 1955, through the First United Nations Con­
gress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders, it set the landmark Standard Mini­
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs).
The twelve United Nations crime prevention and 
criminal justice congresses, held every five years since 
then (1955-2010), and the related actions by the in­
creasingly substantively and institutionally expert 
(1950-1991) and then intergovernmental mechanism 
(the Commission on Crime Prevention and Crimi­
nal Justice) have produced for the Economic and So­
cial Council, the General Assembly and the Security 
Council (organs of the United Nations) viable re­
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commendations, respectively declared by them to be 
United Nations law on responding to crime.
Most prominent among United Nations instru­
ments have been the aforementioned “soft law” 
SMRs, and the treaty law (the United Nations con­
ventions against transnational organized crime 
(2000) and corruption (2003)). Between 1955 and 
2010 the United Nations Crime Prevention and Cri­
minal Justice Programme has adopted altogether 
about 60 soft law instruments, and the United Na­
tions Office on Drugs and Crime (its constituent 
part), has been the custodian of those soft law and 
treaty law instruments, plus of three United Nations 
conventions against drugs and psychotropic sub­
stances (1961, 1972 and 1988), and 16 universal legal 
treaties against terrorism. 
Today, the above constitutes the legislative es­
sence of “blue criminology”. Over time it has under­
gone various stages of development, with a great 
measure of social defence components (1946-1990), 
currently replaced by other social welfare­orientated 
ideas and programmes aimed at continuing the ob­
jective of a humane and effective response to crime, 
drugs, terrorism and victimization. 
The standard­setting continues, and involves le­
gally and diplomatically negotiating skills assuring 
the progressive development of those standards and 
the rule­of­law United Nations content. The imple­
mentation of all the international legal instruments 
that have been enacted in the area of international 
criminal justice reform through field technical as­
sistance, off- and on-line training has essentially 
become the reverse side of the same coin. Lessons 
learned in making those legal instruments work 
have increased the available pool of expertise, espec-
ially needed for further improving the success of va­
rious United Nations peace­keeping missions app­
lying the United Nations rule­of­law principles in 
practice. 
One can observe not only new forms of increas­
ingly globalized crime, but also a gradual conver­
gence of legal regimes for controlling it, and slower 
but evident cooperative and partner­based urban 
and other crime prevention. This has started against 
the larger picture of international criminal law re­
form that continues in the world since its scientific 
beginnings in the second half of the nineteenth cen­
tury, and particularly has been dynamic and prolific 
after the Cold War period (1945-1989) when transi­
tional justice work in post-conflict countries began. 
While responding to crime, by pursuing the balance 
between control and prevention, international crimi­
nal justice reform now involves alternatives to impri­
sonment, restorative justice, and last and least, vic­
tim assistance and compensation. They relate to old 
and new forms of crime, including transnational 
crime, with emerging cybercrime as one of the most 
sophisticated and challenging forms
The record of the United Nations in some of 
these fields is satisfactory, in some other fields less so. 
The international criminal justice reformers, among 
whom there have been United Nations senior and 
technical staff, have focused on assisting develop ing 
countries in modifying their legal and criminal jus­
tice system responses to such crime, in the context of 
evolving international criminal policy recommenda­
tions and ideological concepts of progress through 
various, sometimes incompatible, forms of modern­
ization. With the declining (contrary to the origi­
nal ideals expressed in the United Nations Char­
ter) independence of the United Nations Secretariat 
as one of the main organs of the Organization, the 
staff of the UNODC and preceding administrative 
units have been subject to various ideological, poli­
tical and criminal policy controversies, affecting the 
Organization’s integrity and performance. 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
extra-budgetarily funded technical assistance pro­
grammes and projects which have been a part of the 
United Nations programme since its early years, have 
become evidence­based capacity­ and skills­training 
work in responding to crime, work that involves do­
mestic ownership and political commitment with a 
view to sustainable change. The recent side-effect of 
the overwhelming reliance on extra-budgetary fund-
ing has involved changing the UN staff composition 
with a further erosion of the original concept of their 
integrity. 
Supported by the advocacy work involving the 
promotion of the United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice standards and norms and good 
practices (published and shown worldwide), their 
domestic, regional and interregional application 
has been carried out by the UNODC, 17 Programme 
Network Institutes and numerous non­governmen­
tal organizations through evolving partnerships, in 
response to the changing demands: whether involv­
ing work in response to transnational organized 
crime and corruption, or national and local work in 
responding to urban and youth crime. 
Blue Criminology
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PART	III Back to the Future
Notwithstanding the large­scale comparative le­
gal and socio­economic approach to responding to 
crime, the UNODC applies also neurobiological and 
similar evidence-based findings relevant to individ­
ual risk and protective factors in youth violent crime 
and drug abuse. It draws on recent academic advan­
ces.
Whether micro­ or macro­orientated, “blue Cri-
minology” is basically focused on peoples (commu­
nities/individuals). For the implementation of the 
United Nations mandate it pursues a methodology 
that in part differs from that of academic crimino­
logy. 
This book documents that the transformative 
power of the United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme has been considerable, 
but in some fields has been more so than in others. 
It is driven, sometimes jointly, sometimes separately, 
by academic and intergovernmental ideas. It renders 
itself to an even more transformative, powerful and 
focused action that may contribute to peace and se­
curity in the world. “United Nations Criminal Justice 
Studies”, the emerging discipline, has been sin gled 
out in the present monographic study as a potenti­
ally influential and practical instrument for getting 
the United Nations crime and justice message out to 
the world.
Figure 6 shows in the form of an ideograph the 
progressive development of international ac tion in 
response to crime in the world, since its very start 
in 1764 (Cesare Beccaria) until 2010 – the year of the 
Twelfth United Nations Congress, of the Se curity 
Council meeting at which transnational organized 
crime was declared a threat to internation al peace 
and security, and of the adoption by the General As­
sembly of the Standard Minimum Rules for Women 
Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women 
Offenders (“The Bangkok Rules”). The ideograph 
shows the dates of important international con­
ferences, and the major ideas that in crementally re­
sulted in what is now United Nations criminal po­
licy. 
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Figure 6.	Progressive	development	of	international	action	against	crime	in	the	world,	1764-2010
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Annexes
I GLOSSARY
Access to justice is the capability of citizens to de-
mand and obtain responses through formal or in-
formal justice institutions, in compliance with rule 
of law principles and human rights standards and 
norms.
Adaptability of good practice refers here to the 
transfer of evidence-based drug abuse and violent 
(particularly urban) crime prevention programmes 
developed elsewhere for family skills training to a lo-
cal community or culture other than the original from 
which they come. The adaptation process should be 
systematic and carefully planned in order to balance 
the needs of the community with the need to retain 
fidelity to the original programme that was evaluated 
as having been effective. It requires: (a) collection 
of information on appropriate evidence-based pro-
grammes to address the assessed needs of the target 
population; (b) creation of a cultural adaptation team 
to plan and oversee the implementation of the mini-
mal adaptation process to ensure balance between the 
needs of the community and fidelity to the evidence-
based programme; (c) professional translation of the 
training programme, the monitoring and evaluation 
instruments and the materials into the local language 
to ensure that key messages are not lost in the process; 
(d) measurement of the baseline by collecting base-
line data on the targeted outcomes, other vari ables 
specified in the change model and those related to the 
population and context. The baseline data collec tion 
provides information about the target population and 
context before the intervention, so that it is possible 
to compare it to the situation after the intervention; 
(e) inclusion of a strong monitoring component, par-
ticularly crucial during the implementation of a fresh-
ly translated and minimally adapted evidence-based 
programme developed elsewhere. Every effort should 
be made to utilize the monitoring instruments to the 
fullest in documenting attendance rates, obtain ing 
feedback from participants, assessing fidelity to the 
original programme and documenting successes and 
barriers; (f) making a “continuous quality improve-
ment cycle”, by a post-implementation assessment 
of the situation among the target population and the 
context should be conducted to provide the data for 
comparison with the data collected during the base-
line. Enough data to assess the process and the im-
pact of the adapted programme should be collected. 
It is crucial that this information be collated, analysed 
and, above all, fed back into the programme to further 
improve it.491 
Alternative development492 is “A process to pre-
vent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants 
containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances through specifically designed rural develop-
ment measures in the context of sustained national 
economic growth and sustainable development ef-
forts in countries taking action against drugs, recog-
nizing the particular socio-cultural characteristics of 
the target communities and groups, within the frame - 
work of a comprehensive and permanent solution to 
the problem of illicit drugs”. 
Budget of the United Nations. The regular budget 
of the UN is about $2 billion per year. It pays for 
UN activities, staff and basic infrastructure but not 
peacekeeping operations, which have a separate 
budget. All States of the UN are obligated by the 
Charter - an international treaty - to pay a portion 
of the budget. Each State’s contribution is calcula-
ted on the basis of its share of the world economy. 
491 Adapted from UNODC 2009, ch. 4. 
492 Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development, UN GA Special Session 
(UNGASS) on the World Drug Problem, 1998.
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UN spending is determined through a rigorous pro-
cess involving all Member States. The budget is ini-
tially proposed to the General Assembly by the Sec-
retary-General, after careful scrutiny of requests from 
individual UN departments. It is then analyzed by 
the 16-member Advisory Committee on Administra-
tive and Budgetary Questions and by the 34-mem-
ber Committee for Programme and Coordination. 
The Committees’ recommendations go to the General 
Assembly’s Administrative and Budgetary Commit-
tee (“The Fifth Committee”) made up of all Member 
States, which gives the budget further scrutiny. Finally, 
it is sent to the General Assembly for final review and 
approval. Since 1988, the budget has been approved 
by consensus - a practice that gives countries the le-
verage to restrain increases.493 Extra-budget resources 
come from voluntary contributions of Member States, 
other entities and individuals. In the UNODC case, 
those contributions that may carry donor conditiona-
lity, may be earmarked as general or special pur pose 
funds. The former assist in the “executive direction 
and management, programme and programme sup-
port components of the biennial budget”, the latter 
“mean earmarked voluntary contributions to the 
UNODC Funds that are provided to finance techni-
cal cooperation and other activities”.494
Capacity-building. An outgrowth of the concept 
of technical assistance that gained currency during 
the late 1990s as a result of changing conceptions of 
the notion of development. Capacity building means 
not only the transfer and acquisition of know-how 
skills but also the sustainable creation, utilization 
and retention of the ability of individuals, organiza-
tions, and societies to perform functions and solve 
problems in order to reduce poverty, enhance self-re-
liance, improve people’s lives, and transform society. 
The most innovative implications of capacity build-
ing are the emphases placed on the value of indivi-
dual participation in the elaboration and implemen-
tation of projects and the sustainable development 
of social capital.495 Capacity-building is a tailored 
process that should successfully address the various 
levels of interest in participating in it, conditioned 
by the cultural, socio-economic, economic, political 
and religious factors.
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice. A subsidiary body of the Economic and So-
cial Council. It was preceded by a more technically fo-
cused Committee on Crime Prevention and Con trol, 
formed in 1971 to replace an earlier expert advisory 
committee and tackle a broadened scope of UN inte-
rest in criminal justice policy. The Economic and So-
cial Council, on the recommendation of the General 
Assembly, established the Commission by its resolu-
tion 1992/1, entitled ”Establishment of the Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,” and pro-
vided for the Commission’s mandates and priorities 
in its resolution 1992/22, entitled ”Implementation 
of General Assembly resolution 46/152 concerning 
operational activities and coordination in the field of 
crime prevention and criminal justice”. This functio-
nal ECOSOC commission, composed of 40 Member 
States elected by the ECOSOC for a two-year term 
(and observer Member States), is mandated with: (a) 
international action to combat national and transna-
tional crime, including organized crime, economic 
crime and money laundering; (b) promoting the role 
of criminal law in protecting the environment; (c) crime 
prevention in urban areas, including juvenile crime 
and violence; and (d) improving the efficiency and 
fairness of criminal justice administration systems. 
Aspects of these principal themes are selected for dis-
cussion at each annual session of the Vienna-based 
Commission. The Commission develops, monitors 
and reviews the implementation of the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme 
and facilitates the coordination of its activities. The 
Commission provides substantive and organizational 
direction for the quinquennial United Nations Con-
gress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice Programme Network supports the implementati-
on of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Cri-
minal Justice Programme and contributes to the work 
of the Commission. The Commission acts as the go-
verning body of the United Nations Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Fund that provides resources for 
promoting technical assistance in the field of crime 
prevention and criminal justice. The Commission 
convenes: (a) intersessional meetings between its re-
gular sessions to finalize the provisional agenda of the 
Commission, to address organizational and substan-
tive matters, and to provide continuous and effective 
policy guidance to the Programme; (b) regular infor-
mal joint meetings of donor and recipient countries 
on the planning and formulation of the operational 
activities of the Programme, including projects; (c) 
open-ended groups to act on particular topics under 
493	 http://www.un.org/geninfo/ir/index.asp?id=150.
494	 http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/WG-GOVandFiN/GP_and_PSC_definitions_14_May_2010.pdf.
495	 Adapted	from	Fomerand	2007:38.
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the guidance of the Extended Bureau (Chairperson, 
three Vice-Chairpersons, Rapporteur plus the chairs 
of the regional groups, the Presidency of the Euro-
pean Union, and the Chair of the Group of 77 and 
China).
Common language of justice. A metaphoric and 
pragmatic United Nations expression of the need to 
arrive at a better international understanding for a 
more effective operationalization of such key con-
cepts as justice, the rule of law and transitional justice 
- essential to enhance human rights, protect persons 
from fear and want, address property disputes, en-
courage economic development, promote account-
able governance and peacefully resolve conflict.496
Consensus building or collective problem solving is 
a decision-making process. Its participants can raise 
issues, seek to understand each other’s views, and 
then cooperatively, often through compromise, deve-
lop an agreed-upon resolution. Consensus building 
involves a longer time-frame than most other forms 
of decision-making. Especially in the United Nations 
development and human rights context, which is the 
context of the right to self-determination, disarma-
ment, peace and security, difficult decisions on sig-
nificant issues require patience, time and participa-
tion. Therefore it may be necessary to break down big 
decisions into ”mini-agreements” (for example on le-
gal measures against terrorism) in order to help build 
group trust and lay the foundation for major deci-
sions that can be supported and implemented. Most 
United Nations policy-decision making is aimed at 
achieving consensus. In case this is not possible, vo-
ting may take place, but is less common than adop-
tion by consensus. Voting then is indicative of diversi-
fied positions of Member States vis-à-vis the United 
Nations legal instruments / obligations that may be 
contained in / formulated through its resolutions. In 
the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme, consensus building measures ori-
ginally involved individual-expert committees (e.g., 
the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control and 
other less representative expert meetings), then a re-
current series of individual-expert and intergovern-
mental meetings, and now such meetings either man-
dated by the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice or by the conferences of the State Par-
ties to the UNTOC and UNCAC. Generally, consen-
sus building incrementally moves through a process 
of: (a) participant identification; (b) problem defini-
tion and analysis; (c) identification and evaluation of 
alternative solutions; (d) decision-making; (e) finali-
zation and approval of the settlement; and (f) imple-
mentation. The eventual consensus is a decision that 
takes account of all the legitimate concerns raised.497 
In the United Nations, the ECOSOC, GA and the Se-
curity Council (which go through the similar process) 
may be regarded as higher-level steps for reaching the 
eventual consensus insofar as they involve matters on 
which these bodies and its committees are seized, 
and for mandating its participants with the autho-
rity to act. 
Crime prevention. Comprises strategies and me-
asures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occur-
ring, and the potential harmful effects of crime on 
individuals and society, including fear of crime, by 
intervening to influence their multiple causes or risk 
factors. These causes and risk factors include glo-
bal changes and trends which affect the social and 
economic conditions of regions and countries; fac-
tors affecting individual countries and local envi-
ronments and communities; those relating to the 
family and close relationships; and those which af-
fect individuals.498 In particular, primary prevention 
addresses individual and family level factors correla-
ted with later criminal participation. Individual le-
vel factors such as attachment to school and involve-
ment in pro-social activities decrease the probability 
of criminal involvement. Family level factors such 
as consistent parenting skills similarly reduce indi-
vidual level risk. Risk factors are additive in nature. 
The greater the number of risk factors present, the 
greater the risk of criminal involvement. In addition 
there are initiatives which seek to alter rates of crime 
at the community or aggregate level. Policing hot 
spots, areas of known criminal activity, decreases the 
number of criminal events reported to the police in 
those areas. Secondary prevention uses techniques 
focusing on at-risk situations such as youth who are 
dropping out of school or getting involved in gangs. 
It targets social programs and law enforcement in 
neighbourhoods where crime rates are high. The use 
of secondary crime prevention in cities such as Bir-
mingham and Bogotá has achieved large reductions 
in crime and violence. Programs that are focused on 
youth at risk have been shown to significantly re-
496	 Adapted	from	S/2004/616,	§	5.
497	 Adapted	from	www.nps.gov/nero/rtcatoolbox/dec_consensus.htm;	http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/consensus_building/
498	 Adapted	from	ECOSOC	resolution	2002/13	(Annex)	and	the	UNODC	Handbook on the United Nations Crime Prevention Guidelines: Making 
Them Work  (2010).
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duce crime. Tertiary prevention is used after a crime 
has occurred in order to prevent successive incidents 
through the reintegration of offenders.499 
Criminal justice. A constitutive part of a social sys-
tem and declared by the United Nations to be a cen-
tral part of sustainable social and economic deve-
lopment which, through its formal and informal law 
enforcement and adjudication process, aims at the 
control of crime and some forms of social deviance 
within the criminal justice purview, and deals with 
the humane and effective treatment of offenders and 
victims of crime and related social deviance.
Criminal policy. All activity on the part of organ-
ized society specifically directed at the prevention of 
crime and the humane and effective treatment of de-
linquents, offenders and victims, with a view to pro-
gressive development and application of non-custo-
dial and restorative measures.500
Dependency theory. Emerged in the late 1950s, ini-
tially in economics and not in social science. Predica-
ted on the notion that resources flow from a ”periphe-
ry” of poor and underdeveloped states (“South”) to a 
”core” of wealthy states (“North”), enriching the lat-
ter at the expense of the former. A central contention 
of dependency theory is that poor states are impover-
ished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states 
are integrated into the ”world system”. The the ory 
was a counter-reaction to some earlier theories of 
development (especially the modernization the-
ory). Dependency theorists argued that developing 
countries are not merely earlier versions of deve -
loped countries, but have unique features and struc-
tures of their own. Moreover, they are in the situa-
tion of being the weaker members in a world market 
economy, whereas the developed countries were ne-
ver in an analogous position, because they have never 
existed in relation to a bloc of more powerful coun-
tries than themselves. Dependency theorists fur ther 
argued that developing countries need to reduce 
their connectedness with the world market, so that 
they can pursue a path more in keeping with their 
own needs, less dictated by external pressures.501 De-
pendency theory has various representatives among 
whom liberal reformists, Marxists and the world sys-
tems theorists are most frequently mentioned. 
Developing countries.502 Term used synonymously 
with others, such as emerging nations, underdeve­
loped countries, less developed countries, Third 
World and Global South to refer to non-Western 
countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the 
Middle East sharing common characteristics in spite 
of cultural, political, and economic differences. Such 
characteristics include a wide incidence of poverty, 
high population growth rates, low levels of indust-
rialization, widespread illiteracy and disease, as well 
as a general economic and technological depen dence 
on the exports of primary products to the developed 
countries in return for finished products. Several 
of them gained their independence from colonial 
rule during the postwar era, and face problems in na-
tion-building and state-building. With a few excep-
tions, individual developing countries tend to be mi-
nor players in international politics and, in order to 
increase their political leverage, are inclined to act 
collectively as a group through organizations such as 
the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 
Seventy-Seven (G77). As their number dramatical-
ly swelled in the United Nations, developing coun-
tries endeavoured throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
to reshape the political agenda of the organization, 
their major objective being to reduce their economic 
and political dependence on the industrial North. 
Since the General Assembly’s adoption of its Decla-
ration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, the influence of developing coun-
tries has waned considerably in the face of the resis-
tance of developed countries and as a result of wi-
dening differences in their political, cultural, and 
economic development. 
Development.503 The meaning of the concept of de-
velopment has undergone profound changes since 
it entered into the lexicon of the United Nations 
during the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Original-
ly, development was equated to economic growth as 
measured by increases in per capita income. The as-
sumption was that free trade coupled with injections 
of private and public capital and technical assistance 
would create the conditions for an economic take - 
off in developing countries and that the benefits of 
the resulting growth would “trickle down” to the 
bulk of their population. Two decades later, in spite 
of impressive advances in many countries, particu-
499	 Adapted	from	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime_prevention
500	 Adapted	from	IRCP	1952	No.	1:1.
501	 Adapted	from:	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_theory
502	 Fomerand	2007:92-93.	
503	 Fomerand	2007:92.
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larly in Asia and Latin America, the growing number 
of “absolute poor” led to a reassertion of the impor-
tance of social progress and a renewed emphasis on 
poverty eradication as a fundamental objective of de-
velopment. The shift in development thinking was 
highlighted by the Declaration on Social Progress 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and the 
increasing emphasis placed by donor countries on 
the satisfaction of basic needs and the improvement 
of living standards in their lending policies. During 
the 1980s, the prevailing concept of development 
was broadened by the recognition of the fundamen-
tal role of women as actors and beneficiaries in the 
economy and society. The mainstreaming of gender 
issues in development policies and the programs of 
aid agencies is now a well-recognized principle of 
national and international development strategies. 
United Nations—sponsored global conferences de-
voted to women have in no minor way contributed to 
this paradigmatic shift. During the mid-1980s and in 
the wake of the report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, environmental is-
sues have also nudged their way into development 
thinking and led to concerns about the sustainabili-
ty of the development process. 
The return during the 1990s to a neo-liberal or-
thodoxy centred on the primacy of markets; the lib-
eralization of trade, finance, and investment; to-
gether with the seemingly unstoppable process of 
globalization have triggered a new round of collec-
tive reflection on the understanding of development 
focused on the notion of human security advocated 
by the Human Development Reports of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
For the purpose of statistical comparisons, de­
velopment in the United Nations is, inter alia, meas-
ured by using GDP, GNP and/or Gini coefficient da-
ta. Countries are grouped as high, medium or low 
income countries.
Economic and Social Council. The UN organ re-
sponsible for the coordination of the economic, so-
cial and related work of the United Nations and the 
specialized agencies and institutions – known as the 
United Nations family of organizations. The Council 
has 54 Member States elected for three-year terms.504 
In order to perform all of the functions within the 
ECOSOC agenda, a number of commissions, sub-
commissions and committees have been established. 
The so-called functional commissions, which are de-
liberative bodies whose role is to consider and make 
recommendations on issues in their areas of respon-
sibility and expertise are: Statistical Commission, 
Commission on Population and Deve lopment, Com-
mission for Social Development, Commission on the 
Status of Women, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice, Commission on Science and Technology for De-
velopment Commission on Sustainable Develop-
ment, and United Nations Forum on Forests.505 
Evaluation. “An assessment, as systematic and im-
partial as possible, of an activity, project, programme, 
strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, operation-
al area, institutional performance, etc. It focuses 
on expected and achieved accomplishments, exa-
mining the results chain, processes, contextual fac-
tors and causality, in order to understand achieve-
ments or the lack thereof. It aims at determining the 
relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sus-
tainability of the interventions and contributions of 
the organizations of the UN system. An evaluation 
should provide evidence-based information that is 
credible, reliable and useful, enabling the timely in-
corporation of findings, recommendations and les-
sons into the decision-making processes of the or-
ganizations of the UN system and its members.”506 
The relevance of a project or programme is the ex-
tent to which its objectives are consistent with the 
beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs and pri-
orities, relevant international standards, global prio-
rities and the policies and objectives of partners and 
donors. Efficiency is a measure of how well inputs 
(funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into out-
puts. Effectiveness is the extent to which a project 
or programme attains its objectives and expected ac-
complishments and delivers the planned outcomes. 
Impact is a measure of all significant effects of the 
programme, positive or negative, expected or un-
foreseen, on its beneficiaries and other affected par-
ties. Sustainability is the extent to which the be-
nefits of the project or programme will last after its 
termination and the probability of continued long-
term benefits.507
504	 Adapted	from	the	United	Nations	Today	2008:10.
505	 http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/subsidiary.html
506 Norms for Evaluation in the UN System	(2005).(United	Nations	Evaluation	Group).	http://www.escwa.un.org/divisions/pptcd/upload/uneg.pdf	
507	United	Nations	Juvenile	Justice	Panel,	Criteria	for	the	Design	and	Evaluation	of	Juvenile	Justice	Reform	Programmes,	2010.
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Four Freedoms. The Four Freedoms were goals arti-
culated by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 6 
January 1941. In an address known as the Four Free­
doms speech (technically, the 1941 State of the Uni-
on address), he proposed four fundamental free-
doms that people “everywhere in the world” ought to 
enjoy: Freedom of speech and expression; Freedom 
of religion; Freedom from want; and Freedom from 
fear. The concept of the Four Freedoms became part 
of the personal mission undertaken by First Lady El-
eanor Roosevelt in inspiring the United Nations Dec­
laration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolu-
tion 217A (1948). Indeed, these Four Freedoms were 
explicitly incorporated into the preamble to the Uni­
versal Declaration of Human Rights, which reads in 
part, “Whereas disregard and contempt for human 
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent 
of a world in which human beings shall enjoy free-
dom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and 
want has been proclaimed the highest aspiration of 
the common people …”.508 The most elaborate rein-
terpretation of the Four Freedoms was given by Kofi 
Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General, in his 
report “In Larger Freedom” (A/59/205).
General Assembly. The main deliberative organ of 
the United Nations. It is composed of representatives 
of all Member States, each of which has one vote. Its 
main functions include: (a) to consider and make re-
commendations on the principles of cooperation in 
the maintenance of international peace and security, 
and (b) to initiate studies and make recommenda-
tions to promote international political cooperation, 
the development and codification of internation-
al law, the realization of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all, and international collabo-
ration in the economic, social, cultural, educational 
and health fields.509 The General Assembly allocates 
its various agenda items to its six committees. “The 
Third Committee”, which is the Social, Humanitari-
an and Cultural Affairs Committee, deals with items 
relating to a range of social, humanitarian affairs and 
human rights issues that affect peoples all over the 
world. An important part of the Committee’s work 
focuses on the examination of human rights ques-
tions, including reports of the special procedures of 
the newly established Human Rights Council. The 
Committee also discusses the advancement of wo-
men, the protection of children, indigenous issues, 
the treatment of refugees, the promotion of funda-
mental freedoms through the elimination of racism 
and racial discrimination, and the promotion of 
the right to self-determination. The Committee al-
so addresses important social development ques-
tions such as issues related to youth, family, ageing, 
persons with disabilities, crime prevention, criminal 
justice, and drug control.510
Good governance. The transparent and accountable 
management of human, natural, economic and fi-
nancial resources for the process of equitable and 
sustainable development. This process entails clear 
decision-making procedures at the level of pub-
lic authorities, transparent and accountable insti-
tutions, the primacy of law in the management and 
distribution of resources and capacity building for 
elaboration and implementing measures aiming in 
particular at preventing and combating corruption.511
Good practice. The accepted range of values as well 
as safe and reasonable practice that result in effi-
cient and effective use of available resources in or-
der to achieve quality outcomes for the beneficiary. 
Accepted good practice should also reflect standards 
for service delivery where these exist.512
In cases of direct application of good practice at 
other than the original field-level location, the “ne-
cessary conditions” should be found or created in 
a different context for the same (or a similar) pro-
gramme to produce similar results.513 The practice is 
“good” when it is proven. “Evidence-based practice” 
is then created. Other practices may be “promising” 
but not yet proven. Because of the issue of adapta-
bility (transferability) of good practice elsewhere, 
its examples rarely contribute to interstate prac - 
tice in their original form and content, as also is the 
case with “best practice” examples that undergo the 
same verification and adaptation process. However, 
the absence of universally recognized criteria of one 
or the other, and the fact that both practice-adjec-
tives are interchangeably used in the United Nations, 
conflates international custom-forming, other wise 
regulated by the same-level interstate process. It is 
508	 http://www.google.com/search?q=Four+Freedoms&rls=com.microsoft:en-gb:IE-SearchBox&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=ie7&rlz=1I7GGLJ
509	 Adapted	from	the	United	Nations	Today	2008:6-7.
510	 http://www.un.org/ga/third/index.shtml.
511 Adapted from art. 9 of the Cotonou Agreement (2000).
512	www.vn.government.bg/world/stranici/programi/novo/mladi/GLOSSARY.doc
513	United	Nations	Juvenile	Justice	Panel,	Criteria	for	the	Design	and	Evaluation	of	Juvenile	Justice	Reform	Programmes,	2010.
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only then in the United Nations Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Programme that this process 
leads to accepting such examples as a general inter-
state practice (hence as a standard or norm recog - 
nized by the ECOSOC/GA as either declaratory of 
the pre-existing custom or as custom-forming), 
when and if through the negotiations at the Com-
mission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
that practice is adapted and eventually consented to 
by all attending States, whether or not they are mem-
bers of the Commission.
Human security.514 Broad concept related to the 
notion of human development that focuses on the 
need to create and sustain societies that enable 
individual human beings to realize their full poten-
tial. For that purpose, individuals should be pro-
tected against threats arising not only from con-
flicts and war but also from non-military threats 
such as poverty, environmental degradation, infec-
tious diseases, illicit drug trafficking, other crime 
and victimization. The concept of human securi-
ty remains controversial. Critics argue that it is tan-
tamount to pouring old wine into new bottles and 
that it is too broad for concrete policy applications. 
Proponents, on the other hand, point to the rapid 
expansion of the range of security threats and find 
support in the United Nations report of the High­
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change 
which identifies several clusters of threats, with 
economic and social threats: disease and hunger, 
poverty and unemployment, and terrorism and eth-
nic conflicts.
International criminal justice. Substantive and 
procedural international criminal law, and its en-
forcement mechanisms. Substantive international 
criminal law includes several categories of crimes 
represented by a number of international conven-
tions. Procedural international criminal law repre-
sents international modalities of inter-State coope-
ration in criminal matters (i.e., extradition, mutual 
legal assistance, transfer of criminal proceedings, 
transfer of sentenced persons, recognition of foreign 
criminal judgements, law enforcement and intelli-
gence cooperation, and more specialized cooperati-
on in combating money-laundering). Enforcement 
mechanisms include international institutions for 
the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of 
certain international crimes, such as ad hoc institu-
tions established by the Security Council, the Inter-
national Criminal Court and mixed-model tribunals 
established by the United Nations and certain Go-
vernments.515 
International Scientific and Professional Advi-
sory Council of the United Nations Crime Pre-
vention and Criminal Justice Programme (IS-
PAC). The General Assembly of the United Nations, 
in its resolution 45/107 International co­operation 
for crime prevention and criminal justice in the con­
text of development of 14 December 1990, called for 
broader involvement of, and assistance by, non-go-
vernment organizations in order to fully implement 
the mandates emerging from the Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Programme and to pro-
vide additional technical and scientific expertise 
and resources for international cooperation in this 
field. The Seventh United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offen-
ders (1985) called for more intensive efforts to secure 
support and cooperation from scientific and profes-
sional organizations and institutions with an estab-
lished reputation in the field, so as to make greater 
use of those resources at the subregional, regional, 
interregional and international levels, and propo-
sed establishing an international council of scholar-
ly, scientific, research and professional organizations 
and academic institutions to strengthen internation-
al cooperation in crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice by furthering the exchange of information and 
providing technical and scientific assistance to the 
United Nations and the world community which 
it serves. Accordingly, the constituent assembly of 
the International Scientific and Professional Advi-
sory Council of the United Nations Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Programme, attended by 
some seventy representatives of non-government or-
ganizations, academic institutions and associations 
was convened in Milan (Italy, 21-23 September 1991). 
Adolfo Beria di Argentine, Honorary Attorney-Gene-
ral, Supreme Court of Italy; Secretary-General, Inter-
national Society of Social Defence and Centro Nazio-
nale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale, Milan, Italy was 
the founder and first Chair of ISPAC. 
Justice. For the United Nations, justice is an ideal 
of accountability and fairness in the protection and 
vindication of rights and the prevention and pu-
nishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the 
514	 Fomerand	2007:159.
515	 A/CONF.	213/12,	§	6.
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rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and 
for the well-being of society at large. It is a concept 
rooted in all national cultures and traditions and, 
while its administration usually implies formal ju-
dicial mechanisms, traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms are equally relevant.516
Juvenile justice. An integral part of the national de-
velopment process of each country, within a compre-
hensive framework of social justice for all juveniles, 
thus, at the same time, contributing to the protec-
tion of the young and the maintenance of a peaceful 
order in society.517
Modernization.518 The theory originally held that 
all societies progress through similar stages of devel-
opment. Consequently, the task of helping develop-
ing countries in alleviating poverty implies accelerat-
ing their progress on a common path of development 
by various means such as investment, technology 
transfers, and closer integration into the world mar-
ket. The theory was developed by the French sociol-
ogist Émile Durkheim. He studied how social order 
was to be maintained in a society and how primi-
tive societies might make the transition to more eco-
nomically advanced industrial societies. He suggest-
ed that in a capitalist society, with a complex division 
of labour, economic regulation would be needed in 
order to maintain order. He stressed that the major 
transition from a primitive social order to a more ad-
vanced industrial society could otherwise bring cri-
sis and disorder. Durkheim furthermore developed 
the idea of social evolution, which indicates how so-
cieties and cultures progress over time - much like a 
living organism - essentially saying that social evolu-
tion is like biological evolution with reference to the 
development of its components. In much the same 
way as organisms, societies develop through sever-
al stages, generally starting at a simplistic level and 
then developing into a more complex level. Socie-
ties adapt to their surrounding environments, but 
they interact with other societies, which further con-
tribute to their progress and development. This con-
cept, which is most frequently pursued in the Unit-
ed Nations, is based on a theory that looks at the 
internal factors of a country while assuming that, 
with technical assistance, developing countries can 
be brought to development in the same manner as 
more developed countries have. Within the United 
Nations framework, modernization theory in crimi-
nology was first advocated by William Clifford, Chief 
of the United Nations Social Defence Section. Mod-
ernization had been perceived as the flagship instru-
ment of “Westernization” and/or of colonization. 
In the colonized countries (now developing coun-
tries), it has been countered by local political and 
intellectual elites which feared being overwhelmed 
by Western policies distorting the pre-colonial “tra-
dition”. In the economic field, modernization theo-
ry has been countered by dependency theory (see 
above). In the legal field, through their own inter-
pretations of “modernity”, those colonized countries 
sought first to reject the legal transplants, eventual-
ly adopting hybrid arrangements. In the post-coloni-
al era, as, e.g., documented by the NIEO-related text 
of the Caracas Declaration of the Eighth United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, the United Nations has still 
grappled with the aftermath of such a Western kind 
of modernization, slowly adapting to the demands 
of developing countries for more indigenous solu-
tions to their own problems. However, irrespective 
of various relatively more recent conceptual under-
pinnings of modernization, its concept has always 
and everywhere included questions of industriali-
zation and urbanization. The question of industri-
alization has dominated the United Nations agenda 
since 1945 as a part of post-Second World War recon-
struction. At this formative phase, the General As-
sembly often discussed modernization, aware that 
internal situations in societies immediately affect its 
processes. A State in which favourites are rewarded 
and governmental corruption is prevalent causes the 
state to suffer in terms of modernization. This can 
repress the State’s economic development and pro-
ductivity and lead money and resources to flow out 
to other countries with more favourable investment 
environments. Several General Assembly resolutions 
echoed those discussions that gradually led to the 
emergence of the right of developing States to “self-
determination”, the NIEO referred to above, and sus-
tainable socio-economic development. The question 
of urbanization strongly entered the United Nations 
agenda when the UN-Habitat was established (1978). 
Its aim is to improve living conditions and working 
for all, through the efficient, participatory and trans-
parent management of human settlements within 
the overall objective of reducing poverty and social 
516	 S/2004/616,	§	7.
517 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice	(GA	resolution	40/33	of	29	November	1985,	§	1.1.4)
518	 Adapted	from	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernization_theory.
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exclusion. Social exclusion is also addressed through 
the UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme, estab-
lished in 1996. 
New International Economic Order.519 Adopted 
by the General Assembly at its sixth special sessi-
on 1974 at the recommendation of developing coun - 
tries (Southern countries), which sought far-reach-
ing changes in the world economy, by pursuing self-
reliant economic policies and indigenous solutions 
by developing countries. The demands contained in 
the NIEO stem from the growing concerns of deve-
loping countries that during the 1950s and the 1960s 
had, through the framework of the Nonaligned Mo-
vement (NAM) and the United Nations Conferen-
ce on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), pursued 
structural changes in the world economy, fairer 
terms of trade, and greater flows of finance for deve-
lopment on more liberal terms. Resistance of deve-
loped countries (Northern countries), which in-
sisted that any economic change should be discussed 
in the Bretton Woods institutions, and the success of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in increasing petroleum prices substantially 
in 1973 were the two catalysts that brought together 
and spurred the loose coalition of developing coun-
tries to press for adoption by the Assembly of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and 
of a Declaration on the Establishment of a New In­
ternational Economic Order. The specific measures 
called for in the NIEO include the adoption of an in-
tegrated approach to the management and pricing of 
core products in order to reduce excessive price and 
supply fluctuations and commodity prices in real 
terms; the indexation of the prices of exports from 
developing country to the rising prices of manufac-
tured exports from developed countries; the negoti-
ated redeployment of industries of some countries to 
developing countries; the lowering of tariffs on the 
exports of manufactures from developing countries; 
the establishment of mechanisms for the transfer of 
technology countries; and reaching the target of 0.7 
percent of the GNP of the developed countries in Of-
ficial Development Assistance (ODA). The General 
Assembly devoted two other special sessions to the 
implementation of the NIEO in 1980 and 1990. But 
the South’s lack of effective power in world politics, 
divergent interests among developing countries, the 
crushing debt burden that affected several Southern 
countries during the 1980s, and the sheer costs in-
volved in putting into effect the measures advocated 
in the NIEO simply led to its political demise.
Non-custodial measures. Any decision made by a 
competent authority to submit a person suspected 
of, accused of or sentenced for an offence to certain 
conditions and obligations that do not include impri-
sonment. Such decision can be made at any stage of 
the administration of criminal justice. The measures 
include alternatives to imprisonment for offenders 
which should enable the authorities to adjust penal 
sanctions to the needs of the individual offender in 
a manner proportionate to the offence committed.520
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Spe-
cial-purpose associations of individuals or groups 
created by means other than an agreement among 
States. It is estimated that the number of internation-
ally active NGOs exceeds 35,000. NGOs fulfil a wide 
variety of functions ranging from advocacy, research, 
and information to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.521 The Vienna Alliance of NGOs on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice was established 
during the early 1980s when the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme 
was transferred from New York to Vienna. Under 
the aegis of the alliance, around 30 NGOs (in con-
sultative status with ECOSOC) provide input to the 
UN programme on matters of interest to the NGOs, 
such as criminal reform projects, promotion of hu-
man rights, use and application of UN standards and 
norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, gen-
der issues, and matters related to social defence. In 
collaboration with the New York NGO Alliance and 
ISPAC, the Vienna Alliance has contributed regularly 
to the UN congresses on crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice by holding so-called “ancillary meetings” 
during which the work of the NGOs was presented, 
and professional expertise on criminal justice mat-
ters was provided. The Vienna and New York allian-
ces have laid great emphasis on the elaboration and 
application of the United Nations crime prevention 
and criminal justice standards and norms. The al-
liances have been strongly involved in the elabora-
tion of some of these standards. The worldwide net-
work of NGOs has made a significant contribution 
towards monitoring the implementation of stan-
dards. The NGO community has also contributed 
519	 Fomerand	2007:227-228.
520 Commentary on the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules),	UN	doc.	ST/CSDHA/22,	United	
Nations	New	York	1993:3.
521	 Fomerand	2007:231.
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significantly to the formulation of the United Na­
tions Convention against Transnational Organ ized 
Crime and its protocols, and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption.
Organs of the United Nations. The Charter of the 
United Nations established the following six princi-
pal organs: Security Council, General Assembly, Eco-
nomic and Social Council, Secretariat, International 
Court of Justice, and the Trusteeship Council (defun-
ct since 1994). 
Peacekeeping. United Nations operations deployed 
with the authorization of the Security Council and 
the consent of the host government and/or the main 
parties of the conflict. Peacekeeping has traditional-
ly involved a primarily military model of observing 
ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter- 
state wars. Today, it has evolved into a complex model 
of many elements – military, police and civilian – 
working together to help lay the foundations of a 
sustainable peace with transitional justice rule-of-
law components.522 
Peacemaking. The use of diplomatic means to per-
suade parties in conflict to cease hostilities, and to 
negotiate the peaceful settlement of a dispute. The 
United Nations provides various means through 
which conflicts may be prevented, contained and re-
solved, and their root causes addressed. The Securi-
ty Council may recommend ways to resolve a dis- 
pute or request the Secretary-General’s mediation. 
The Secretary-General may take diplomatic initia-
tives to encourage and maintain the momentum of 
negotiations.523 
Poverty. The Charter of the United Nations origi-
nally enjoined the Organization to promote “higher 
standards of living, full employment, and conditions 
of economic and social progress”. On that basis and 
with the mass entry to membership of developing 
countries during the 1960s, the United Nations vastly 
expanded the scope of its activities in development. 
Poverty eradication (or “freedom from want”), is now 
one of its overriding objectives. Poverty, first de fined 
as “denial of choices and opportunities for living a 
tolerable life” which includes adequate food, water, 
health care, and education,524 is widely and currently 
understood as the non-fulfilment of preferences and 
the non-satisfaction of basic needs. Inequality, de-
privation, relative deprivation, social exclusion, pow-
erlessness and vulnerability are dimensions of po-
verty measurable by social and economic indicators. 
Poverty may be defined in terms of individual con-
sumption levels of less than US$ 1 or 2 per day. Using 
this rather conservative indicator based on pur- 
chasing power parity techniques to facilitate compar-
isons across countries, we can see that over 1 billion 
of people, a quarter of the population of the deve-
loping world, now live below US$ 1 per day. Although 
there is no simple or direct correlation between in - 
equality and crime, especially violent crime, excessive 
economic and social inequality does appear to exa-
cerbate the likelihood of violent crime and imprison-
ment, especially when it coincides with other factors. 
Originating from the study of the problem of pover-
ty, relative deprivation theory suggests that inequal-
ity breeds social tension, since those who are less 
well-off feel dispossessed when comparing them- 
selves with others. This theory is based on the as-
sumption that individuals or groups are most likely 
to engage in violence if they perceive a gap between 
what they have and what they believe they deserve.525 
Even more subtle interpretations of that theory claim 
that material and time deprivation condition each 
other. “[T]hose who are present-oriented are swept 
into the future that others have laid out for them”526 
because children are unprepared by impoverished 
parents for the daily routines of mainstream culture 
ordaining their lives, hence reducing their interest 
in drugs and gang violence as idle time activities.527
Progressive development of international law. 
Broadly accepted as being an important task of States 
and the specific legislative process of the contem-
porary international community, as stipulated in the 
United Nations Charter (art. 13.1 (a)). It is a consci-
ous effort towards the creation of new rules of inter-
national law, whether by means of the regulation of 
a new topic or by means of the comprehensive vision 
of existing rules.528 In the process of the elaboration 
of the United Nations crime prevention and crimi-
522 Adapted from the United Nations Today	2008:77-78.
523 Adapted from the United Nations Today	2008:76-77.
524 UNDP Human Development Report	1997,	New	York	1997:3.
525 State of the World’s Cities 2006/7:143-144.
526	 Rifikin	1987:166.
527	 Levine	1997:189.	
528	 http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations/International-Law-INTERNATIONAL-LAW-COMMISSION.html
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nal justice standards and norms, including treaty law 
instruments, this development implies progressive 
humanistic treatment of offenders, victims of crime, 
juvenile delinquents and children in conflict with the 
law. It also includes enhancing the performance of 
the criminal justice system, the right to defence, the 
eventual abolition of death penalty, and respective 
improvements in responding to various forms of 
crime, whether traditional or modern.
Restorative justice. A way of responding to crimi-
nal behaviour by balancing the needs of the commu-
nity, the victims and the offenders. An approach to 
problem solving involving the victim, the offender, 
their social networks, justice agencies and the com-
munity. Restorative justice programmes are based 
on the fundamental principle that criminal beha-
viour not only violates the law, but also injures vic-
tims and the community. Any efforts to address the 
consequences of criminal behaviour should, where 
possible, involve the offender as well as these injured 
parties, while also providing help and support that 
the victim and offender require. Restorative justice 
refers to a process for resolving crime by focusing on 
redressing the harm done to the victims, holding of-
fenders accountable for their actions and, often al-
so, engaging the community in the resolution of 
that conflict. Participation of the parties is an essen-
tial part of the process that emphasizes relationship 
building, reconciliation and the development of 
a greements around a desired outcome between vic-
tims and offender. Restorative justice processes can 
be adapted to various cultural contexts and the needs 
of different communities. Through them, the victim, 
the offender and the community regain some control 
over the process. Furthermore, the process itself can 
often transform the relationships between the com-
munity and the justice system as a whole.529
Rule of law.530 For the United Nations, this refers to a 
principle of governance in which all persons, institu-
tions and entities, public and private, including the 
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independent-
ly adjudicated, and which are consistent with inter-
national human rights norms and standards. It re-
quires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the 
law, accountability to the law, fairness in the applica-
tion of the law, separation of powers, participa tion in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbi-
trariness and procedural and legal transparency.
Secretariat. One of the principal organs of the Uni-
ted Nations which services its other organs and ad-
ministers the programmes and policies laid down by 
them. At its head is the Secretary-General, who is ap-
pointed by the General Assembly on the recommen-
dation of the Security Council for a five-year, renew-
able term. The duties carried out by the Secretariat 
are as varied as the problems dealt with by the Uni-
ted Nations. These range from administering peace-
keeping operations to mediating international dis-
putes, from surveying economic and social trends to 
preparing studies on human rights and sustainable 
development.531 The Secretariat has some 40,000 
staff members around the world. Staff members 
and the Secretary-General, as international civil ser-
vants, answer to the United Nations alone for their 
activities, and take an oath not to seek or receive 
instructions from any Government or outside autho-
rity. Under the Charter, each Member State under-
takes to respect the exclusively international charac-
ter of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General 
and the staff and to refrain from seeking to influ ence 
them improperly in the discharge of their duties. 
The United Nations, while headquartered in New 
York, maintains a significant presence in Addis Aba-
ba, Bangkok, Beirut, Geneva, Nairobi, Santiago and 
Vienna, and has offices all over the world.532 
Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations 
– an international treaty – obligates Member States 
to settle their disputes by peaceful means, in such a 
manner that international peace and security and jus-
tice are not endangered. The Security Council is the 
United Nations organ with primary responsibility 
for maintaining peace and security. Under the Char-
ter, Member States are obliged to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council. The Council has 
15 members: five permanent – the People’s Republic 
of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom and the United States – and ten members 
elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms.533
529 Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes,	UNODC	Vienna	2006:	6-7.
530	 S/2004/616,	§	4.
531	 Adapted	from	the	United	Nations	Today	2008:13-14.
532	 http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/secretariat/
533	 Adapted	from	the	United	Nations	Today	2008:8	&	73.
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Security sector reform.534 A process of assessment, 
review and implementation as well as monitoring 
and evaluation led by national authorities that has 
as its goal the enhancement of effective and account-
able security for the State and its peoples without 
discrimination and with full respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. 
Social defence. The protection of society against 
crime through a systematically organized and cohe-
rent action by both the State and civil society. Since 
1831 this term has been used in the criminological 
and penological literature. The methods of achiev-
ing the inherent objective of social defence have been 
shifting with the advancement in social sciences and 
behavioural disciplines, and so have been the coun-
tries in which that movement has shaped their crimi-
nal policy agenda. Between 1946 and 1973 the social 
defence movement nominally served in the United 
Nations Secretariat, to an increasing degree, to com-
municate its unit’s/section’s work programme in the 
area of the prevention of crime and the treatment 
of offenders. The term was eventually abandoned in 
1989 with the change of the name of the United Na-
tions Social Defence Research Institute (UNSDRI) to 
the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute (UNICRI).
Social exclusion. It involves a multidimension-
al process of progressive social rupture, detaching 
groups and individuals from social relations and in-
stitutions and preventing them from full participa-
tion in the normal, normatively prescribed activi-
ties of the society in which they live.535 The concept 
emerged in 1980s in the European Union in the 
course of defining the activities of the European 
Community Programme to Foster Economic and 
Social Integration of the Least Privileged Groups, 
followed in the early 1990s by the European Obser-
vatory on Policies to Combat Social Exclusion.536 
Social inclusion. It refers to the extent to which in-
dividuals are incorporated within a wider moral and 
political community.537 It recognizes and values di-
versity, by increasing social equality and the partici-
pation of diverse and disadvantaged populations. Is-
sues of diversity and social inclusion have an impact 
on how programs and services are delivered to meet 
a wide range of client needs. As a result, the concepts 
of diversity and social inclusion have become critical 
to the evaluation of programs for governmental and 
community organizations.538
Soft law. Traditionally, the term is associated with 
international law, and often contrasted there with 
“treaty law”. In the United Nations it refers to legal 
instruments which either may not have any exter-
nal binding force at all (such as, e.g., “model laws”) 
or whose binding force is somewhat ”weaker” than 
the binding force of traditional “hard law”, but in 
any case binding on the United Nations Secretariat 
(pro foro interno, e.g., budget). The content of such 
instruments, which are a type of substantive recom-
mendations, and the way in which they were deve-
loped and adopted influences their legal value in 
Member States (pro foro externo). Soft law covers 
most resolutions and declarations of the Security 
Council (binding on Member States and the Secre-
tariat), the General Assembly, the ECOSOC and its 
functional commissions (binding on the Secretari-
at). Otherwise these are not binding sources of law 
that may contribute to the development of interna-
tional customary law beyond the United Nations. 
Depending on their status within that law, their cus-
tom-contents may be legally binding. Soft law in- 
cludes statements, principles, codes of conduct, co-
des of practice etc., often found as part of framework 
treaties; action plans; other non-treaty obligations.539
Soft law has made a significant contribution to 
promoting more effective and fair criminal justice 
structures in three dimensions. First, it can be uti-
lized at the national level by fostering in Member 
States in-depth assessments leading to the adoption 
of necessary criminal justice reforms, including im-
proving their practices in line with internationally 
recommended standards. Second, it can help them 
to develop sub-regional and regional strategies and 
practices for countering crime together. Third, cross-
regionally and globally, soft law may under certain 
conditions elevate ”good practices” as declaratory 
of pre-existing custom or custom-formative (recom-
mendatory).
534	 A/62/659-S/2008/39,	§	17.
535	 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_exclusion.
536	Martin	O’Brien	and	Majid	Yar,	Criminology. The Key Concepts,	Routledge.	Taylor	&	Francis	Group,	London	-	New	York	2008:153.
537	 Ibid.:153.
538	 Adapted	from	York	Institute	of	Health	Research,	http://yihr.abel.yorku.ca/peu/?page_id=51.
539	 Adapted	from	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soft_law
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Sustainable development.540 The development 
that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. It involves the right to fulfil the aspira-
tions of the present generation without limiting the 
developmental rights of future generations. Sustain-
able development in its original sense, as used by 
the World Commission on Environment and Deve-
lopment (1987), chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, 
at the time Norway’s Prime Minister, communicates 
that in the interest of the right to development of fu-
ture generations, the development of economy and 
civilization should not be pursued at the cost of ex-
hausting the non-renewable natural resources and 
the destruction of environment. Historically, the ori-
gins of the UN crime program mandate may be traced 
back to the antecedents of that welfare concept, 
expressed in the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the UN 
Charter (“to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war”), since the program started with the 
prevention of juvenile delinquency. Currently, this 
concept extends to a self-generating, creative, albeit 
also conflicting, mechanism for renewing socio-eco-
nomic and other resources. It is geared toward their 
multiplication and, generally, the broadening of hu-
man intergenerational capital in any creative areas of 
mankind, including science and education - the ne-
cessary doorway to a change in mindset and beha-
viour. A change in behaviour by everyone (citizens, 
companies, local and regional authorities, govern-
ments and international institutions) to counter the 
threats looming over our planet (climate change, loss 
of biodiversity; industrial, health and security risks; 
excessive but preventable economic and social ine-
quality, likewise crime and victimization levels, and 
so on).
Sustainable livelihood.541 A part of the above con-
cept of sustainable development. It was advanced at 
the UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (1992) as a broad goal for poverty eradication. It 
comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, 
claims and access) and activities required for a means 
of living which can cope with and recover from stress 
and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and 
assets, and provide opportunities for the next gener-
ation; and which contributes net benefits to other 
livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the 
short and long term. 
Technical assistance.542 A broad range of activi-
ties to enhance the human and institutional capa-
bilities of developing countries and foster their eco-
nomic and social development through the transfer, 
adaptation, and utilization of ideas, knowledge, 
practices, skills, and technology. It originally started 
with the “Expanded Programme of Technical Assist- 
ance”, initiated in 1949 in the United Nations by the 
United States, by providing expert advice, training, 
and fellowships through projects designed to im-
prove health and educational facilities, land culture 
methods, communication and transportation facili-
ties of developing countries, and their financial and 
administrative procedures. Soon technical assist- 
ance expanded further to crime prevention and cri-
minal justice services. Such activities now include 
the financing of experts, consultants and trainees, 
feasibility studies, engineering and construction ser-
vices for capital projects, institution-building ef-
forts, research related to development, and the like. 
Technical assistance, including its major component 
of “capacity building”, involves annual expenditures 
exceeding US$ 7 billion in over 150 Member States. 
Separately, there have been efforts to expand techni-
cal assistance among developing countries them-
selves, known as “South-South cooperation“. 
Transitional justice. Comprises the full range of 
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale 
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include 
both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with dif-
fering levels of international involvement (or none at 
all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-
seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, 
or a combination thereof.543
United Nations Convention against Corrupti-
on (UNCAC) is the first legally binding global anti-
corruption instrument. It was opened for signature 
and ratification by Member States in Merida (Mex-
ico, 9-11 December 2003). It entered into force on 14 
December 2005. A Conference of the States Parties 
has been established to review implementation and 
facilitate activities required by the Convention. In 
its eight chapters and 71 articles, the UNCAC obli- 
ges its States Parties to implement a wide and detailed 
range of anti-corruption measures affecting their 
540	 Adapted	from	http://www.veolia.com/en/glossary/s.aspx.
541	 Chambers	&	Conway	1992.
542	 Fomerand	2007:120	&	308.
543	 S/2004/616,	§	8.
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laws, institutions and practices. These measures aim 
to promote the prevention, criminalization and law 
enforcement, international cooperation, asset recov-
ery, technical assistance and information exchange, 
and mechanisms for implementation. In the absence 
of an agreed definition of corruption, UNCAC pro-
vides the definitions of its elements that may consti-
tute it through a list of defined mandatory offences 
(bribery of public officials, active bribery of foreign 
public officials, embezzlement, money laundering, 
obstruction of justice), and a list of other. non-man-
datory offences (passive bribery of foreign public of-
ficials, trading in influence, abuse of function, illicit 
enrichment, bribery in the private sector, and em-
bezzlement in the private sector). The Convention is 
the first-ever global legal treaty delineating the para-
meters of asset recovery. 
United Nations Convention against Transnatio-
nal Organized Crime (UNTOC). The United Na-
tions Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 
55/25 of 15 November 2000, is the main internation-
al instrument in the fight against transnational or-
ganized crime. It was opened for signature and rati-
fication by Member States in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 
December 2000. It entered into force on 29 Septem-
ber 2003. The Convention is further supplemented 
by three Protocols, which target specific areas and 
manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per­
sons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufactur­
ing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition. States must become 
parties to the Convention itself before they can be-
come parties to any of the Protocols. The Conven-
tion defines what is a transnational organized crime 
group, the trafficking in persons, the smuggling 
of migrants, and the illicit manufacturing and traf-
ficking in firearms and ammunition. The Conven-
tion is the first-ever global legal treaty delineating 
the parameters of its own implementation, including 
technical assistance measures, through the Confer-
ence of State Parties. 
United Nations congresses on crime preven-
tion and criminal justice. The United Nations 
congresses on crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice, held every five years since 1955, are the major 
global forum for exchanging information and expe-
riences, comparing criminal justice practices, find - 
ing viable solutions to crime and stimulating in-
ternational action. The congresses bring together 
representatives of the world’s national Govern-
ments, specialists in crime prevention and criminal 
justice, scholars of international repute and mem-
bers of intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations. Their recommendations, channel-
led through the Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice, impact on the legislative bo-
dies of the United Nations - the General Assem bly 
and the Economic and Social Council - and on the 
criminal justice policies and practices of national 
and local governments. The quinquennial Crime 
Congresses continue a tradition established by the 
former International Penal and Penitentiary Com-
mission (IPPC). Comprising experts and profes-
sionals from mostly European countries, the IPPC 
held congresses every five years from 1885 to 1910 
and from 1925 to 1935, and during the latter period 
was affiliated with the League of Nations. Its last 
congress was held in 1950. The IPPC was dissolved 
by General Assembly resolution 415 (V) of 1 Decem-
ber 1950, and its function and archives were trans-
ferred to the UN in 1951. From an early focus on pe-
nology and treatment of delinquents and offenders, 
the scope of the UN crime prevention and criminal 
justice congresses has broadened to include issues 
such as the relation between crime control and so-
cial and economic development and international 
responses to transnational crime, organized crime 
and cybercrime.
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Programme. Nominally established by Ge-
neral Assembly resolution 46/152 (Annex) of 18 De-
cember 1991, it has been developed since 1946 by the 
resolutions of various United Nations policy-making 
bodies, starting with those of the Temporary Social 
Commission. Currently, it comprises Member States 
(acting individually or through the Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice), the Uni-
ted Nations Secretariat, including the UNODC, Pro-
gramme Network institutes and non-governmental 
organizations. The goal of the Programme is to as-
sist the international community in meeting its pres-
sing needs in the field of crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice and to provide countries with timely and 
practical assistance in dealing with problems of both 
national and transnational crime.
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United Nations Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice Programme Network. Its establish-
ment commenced with the United Nations Asia and 
Far East Institute on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (1962), and continued with 
other institutes, including the United Nations Social 
Defence Research Institute (1968). It now consists of 
the UNODC and 17 interrregional and regional insti-
tutes around the world, as well as specialized cen tres. 
This open-ended network has been developed to as-
sist the international community in strengthening 
co-operation in crime prevention and criminal jus-
tice. Its components provide a variety of services, in-
cluding exchange of information, research, training 
and public education.
United Nations crime prevention and criminal 
justice standards and norms. These are global 
soft law provisions in crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice developed by Member States and non-
State actors (non-governmental organizations and 
individual experts) since the adoption of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In this 
participatory process, over those years a consider-
able body of United Nations standards and norms 
related to crime prevention and criminal justice has 
emerged, covering a wide variety of issues such as 
juvenile justice, the treatment of adult offenders, 
international cooperation, good governance, vic-
tim protection, and violence against women. These 
universal standards and norms have provided a 
collective vision of how the criminal justice sys-
tem should be structured and have helped to sig-
nificantly promote more effective and fair criminal 
justice structures in three dimensions. First, they 
can be utilized at the national level by fostering in-
depth assessments leading to the adoption of ne-
cessary criminal justice reforms. Second, they can 
help Member States to develop sub-regional and 
regional strategies and practices. Third, cross-re-
gionally and globally, they may under certain con-
ditions elevate ”good practices” as declaratory of 
pre-existing custom or custom-formative (recom-
mendatory).
Urban security. Includes strategic and managerial 
governmental capacity to counter, in a sustainable 
manner, insecurity, crime, violence and other disor-
der in cities. The term includes facilitating work to 
reduce disorder, excessive socio-economic inequali-
ty, social exclusion and land tenure problems, where 
these are significant factors.
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Alper, S. Benedict (1906-1994). The first Chief of 
the United Nations Social Defence Section (1946-
1947). Criminology graduate of the Harvard Uni-
versity (1927). Taught criminology at Boston College 
(MASS, USA), School of Law, the Rutgers Universi-
ty (Newark, N.J., USA) and the New School for So-
cial Research (New York City); probation officer in 
the Boston Juvenile Court; correctional officer in the 
Massachusetts State Prison; worked for the US Bu-
reau of Prisons; Research Associate to the Center of 
Studies in Criminal Justice, Law School, Universi-
ty of Chicago; a research director of a New York Le-
gislative Committee, Field Secretary of the Ameri-
can Parole Association; chief statistician and special 
assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons. 
During the Second World War served in the US Ar-
my and was assigned to the military police in Nor-
thern Africa and Italy, as a part of the Allied Military 
Government of Occupied Territories. Managed pri-
sons during and after the Second World War in Ita-
ly (Naples, Rome, Trieste) for civilian criminals and 
Nazi collaborators. Founding member and President 
of the UN Staff Association. Consultant to the Uni-
ted Nations Consultative Group on Crime (1968) and 
to the Fourth Congress (1970). Attended the Eighth 
Congress (1990). ”He was gifted with native intelli-
gence, an unusual sensitivity to people, managerial 
expertise, and a flair for writing”.544
Amor, Paul. (1901-1984). The third Chief of the Uni-
ted Nations Social Defence Section (1950-1952). Cri-
minal lawyer involved in juvenile justice matters; 
prosecutor and magistrate. Member of the French 
resistance movement in the Second World War; 
imprisoned by Germans. First post-Second World 
War Director of the French Prison Administration 
(1944-1947). Introduced in France a multi-discipli-
nary approach to the rehabilitation of prisoners. Ge-
neral Attorney at the Cour de Cassation (1952), the 
highest court in the French judiciary. First Editor 
of the International Review of Criminal Policy, pub-
lished in 1952 by the United Nations. UN Regional 
Representative for Social Defence in Europe and the 
Middle East (1953); Executive Secretary of the First 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders (1955); member of 
the French Commission on Legislative Penal and Pe-
nitentiary Matters (1959-1963). Knight of the Legion 
of Honour, granted the la Croix de Guerre, the Prison 
Medal and Education Medal. His efforts in promo-
ting the social defence movement placed France in 
the vanguard in the field of penology.545 “Real high-
ranking European senior official, which is rare and 
difficult because it involves, besides the qualities of 
an organized and precise “civil servant”, the culture, 
the experience and the qualities of a gentleman of 
such a scale and grandeur that he can really raise the 
function up to the higher international level its im-
plies, thanks to his influence and authority”.546
Clifford, William (1918-1986). The seventh Chief of 
the United Nations Social Defence Section (1968-
1971) / Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Sec-
tion (1971-1974). Lawyer and economist; worked on 
crime and social development issues in Northern 
Rhodesia (now Zambia) as Director of Social Wel-
fare and Probation Services (1958-1960) and Princi-
pal of the Oppenheimer College of Social Services 
(1960-1964); Vice-President of the Australian Acade-
my of Forensic Sciences (1977); Founding Director of 
the Australian Institute of Criminology (1975-1983); 
author of “Introduction to African Criminology” 
(1974) and many criminological articles; United Na-
tions Senior Consultant in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (1964-1966). “He had wide experience and 
a gift for establishing good relationships and useful 
contacts”.547
Galway, Edward (1918-1996). The fifth Chief of the 
United Nations Social Defence Section (1962-1966). 
Criminologist; Doctorate in Social Administra-
tion; Masters in Educational Psychology. For 25 
years employed by the United Nations Secretariat 
(DESA). Extensive travel in India, providing training 
to the Indian prison system (1952-53). Regional Ad-
visor, based in Bangkok (1956-58). Interregional Ad-
visor (1970-74). Wrote numerous analytical and po-
licy documents, and organized many regional and 
international meetings. Long-term focus included 
the questions of juvenile delinquency; prostitution 
544	 Swain	1993:	744
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and trafficking in women and children. Later, added 
a special focus on corruption, and on the theft of cul-
tural property. In the course of his career his adviso-
ry assignments numbered over 50 countries, in every 
region of the world. Founding Director of UNDSRI 
(1967-1970), inaugurated by the UN Secretary Gene-
ral, U Thant. “His criminological competence, rein-
forced by the field expertise, showed that through 
their joint combination, the recommendations on 
the new perspectives in international cooperation on 
crime prevention and criminal justice in developing 
world have been practical and viable”.548
Kahale, Georges (1923-2006). The sixth Chief of the 
United Nations Social Defence Section (1962-1964). 
Doctor of Law, Doctor of Psychology (Universi-
ty of Paris, Sorbonne); Criminologist; Legal Advis-
er (1948) and Alternate Delegate (1949) of Syria at 
the United Nations General Assembly; member of 
the task force involved in the preparations for the 
First and Second United Nations Congresses on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers (1955/1960); Editor of the International Review of 
Criminal Policy (1958); in charge of the United Na-
tions work programme related to the implementa-
tion of the 1949 Convention on the Suppression of 
the Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of Pros-
titution of Others (1955-1959); Chief of the United 
Nations Mission in the Republic of Congo / ”Con-
go-Léopoldville” (1961-1963); Secretary of the Unit-
ed Nations Advisory Committee of Experts on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(1958); Secretary of the Commission for Social Devel-
opment (1966-1972); Executive Secretary of the Third 
United Nations Congress (1965); Executive Secretary 
of the International Women’s Year (1974-1976); Spe-
cial (1973-1974/1976-1979) and Senior (1980-1983) 
Technical Adviser on Social Development.
López-Rey de Arroyo, Manuel (1902-1992). The 
fourth Chief of the United Nations Social Defence 
Section (1952-1961). Studied law, social science and 
criminology. In 1936, at the start of the civil war in 
Spain, he left his native country and emigrated to La-
tin America. He was the author of the Bolivian draft 
Penal Code, the Procedural Penal Code and the Code 
of Minors. After the Second World War, he had con-
tinued studies of penal systems in more than 60 
countries and had been involved in penitentiary re-
form in a number of them. In 1960 he established the 
basis for the organization of the UNAFEI (Japan). 
Published 12 books and more than 150 articles in 
French, English and Spanish in various areas of pen-
ology, penal law and criminology. Organized confer-
ences and gave courses in more than 50 countries. 
Executive Secretary of the First (1955) and Second 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders (1960). “Freedom, 
Justice, Peace and Development are the main issues 
orienting Professor López-Rey’s creative works 
and also his existential vocation characterized by 
passion ate concern to defend man’s dignity under 
every type of socio-political or cultural system”.549
Mueller, Gerhard, O.W (1926-2006). The eighth 
Chief of the United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Branch (1974-1981). Professor of 
Law, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers, The State 
University of New Jersey; Core Faculty Member and 
Program Director, National Judicial College, Uni-
versity of Nevada at Reno, (1970-74/1982-1985); Bri-
tish Military Government, Water Police (1945-1947); 
New York University School of Law: Associate Pro-
fessor of Law (1958-1960); Professor of Law, Direc-
tor, Comparative Criminal Law Project and Criminal 
Law Education and Research Center, 1960-1977 (on 
leave 1974-1977). President, American Society of Cri-
minology (1967-1968), Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations of the International Associa tion 
of Penal Law, and Instituto Superiore Internazion-
ale di Scienze Criminali, Siracusa, Italy (1967-1974, 
1982-2005). International Scientific and Professional 
Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Pre-
vention and Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC), 
Milan, Italy: Member of Executive Board and Chair, 
Functional Committee (1991), Standing Rapporteur 
(1992), Chairman of the Board (1996-2000); Executi-
ve Secretary of the Fifth (1975) and Sixth United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of and the Treat-
ment of Offenders (1980). Received the Beccaria 
Medal (1979), and the Order of Commander of the 
Lion of Finland for his efforts in the establishment 
of HEUNI. Author or co-author of over 25 mono-
graphs, 30 other books, 40 book reviews and about 
300 articles on international criminal law, compara-
tive criminal law, criminology, criminal science and 
victim ology. His concern for the role and efforts of 
the United Nations crime prevention and criminal 
justice can be seen reflected in articles such as those 
on the internationalization of criminal justice, the 
548	 David	1985:27.
549	 David	1985:13.
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work of the United Nations on crime prevention and 
control, standards, norms and guidelines for cri-
me control and criminal justice worldwide, world- 
crime surveys, and other topics. His publications ap-
peared in Arabic, English, Italian, Japanese, French, 
German, Polish, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish. 
In his words, ”A blind criminal justice, a deaf foren-
sic psychiatry, and a dumb sociological criminolo-
gy stand a good chance not only of survival - if they 
stand together - but also of bettering humanity’s 
plight”.550 “He always represented criminology as an 
interdisciplinary effort ... [He] has been very influen-
tial in international criminology, and he has carried 
abroad the need for scientific criminology, including 
the need for crime prevention and new crime con trol 
measures ... ”.551
Radzinowicz, Leon (1903-2000). The second Chief 
of the United Nations Social Defence Section (1948-
1949). Polish-born British criminologist and ed-
ucator. In 1924 studied at the University of Par-
is (Sorbonne); M.A., University of Geneva (1926); 
Graduated with another law degree from the Uni-
versity of Rome (1927) where he studied under the 
controversial criminologist Enrico Ferri. Returned 
to Poland (1932) to teach the positivist criminology 
that Ferri favoured; Professor at the Free University 
of Warsaw (Wolna Wszechnica Polska). His positi-
vist views made him unpopular. Before the outbreak 
of the Second World War he settled in Cambridge 
(1938). During the Second World War he established 
the Department of Criminal Science in the Faculty of 
Law at the University of Cambridge. Fellow of Trini-
ty College (1948). Played an active and distinguished 
part in the shaping of criminal policy in England 
from 1950 to 1972. First Wolfson Professor of Crim-
inology (1959) and the founding director of the In-
stitute of Criminology (1959-1972), which played a 
significant role in the development of the discipline 
and lent the subject a new legitimacy. He contribut-
ed to the scholarship of the field through numerous 
lectures and a number of books, most notably in his 
fifty-two-volume series English Studies in Criminal 
Science (later retitled Cambridge Studies in Crimi-
nology), 1948-1986. In 1991 he published The Roots 
of the International Association of Criminal Law, 
and in 1999 Adventures in Criminology (his mem-
oirs). Recognized as a leading authority on penal af-
fairs; university lecturer at several institutions in the 
United States; consultant to the Home Office of the 
United Kingdom; took a leading part in the debates 
on capital punishment and the treatment of danger-
ous prisoners; member of the Royal Commissions on 
Capital Punishment (1949-1953) and the Penal Sys-
tem (1964-1966). Consultant to the U.S. Justice De-
partment’s Kerner Commission on Violence. Knight-
ed in 1970. In 1992 awarded a testimonial by United 
Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in 
grateful recognition of dedicated service in support 
of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Crim-
inal Justice Programme. “He was a highly published 
scholar and solely contributed to the international 
perspective of crime and public policy. In some ways, 
he was ahead of his time in his view of political and 
governmental aspects that create criminal policy”.552
Shikita, Minoru (1932 ~). The ninth Chief of the 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Jus-
tice Branch (1982-1986). Public prosecutor (1956), 
Harvard University Law School studies (1957); Direc-
tor of the General Affairs Division, the Criminal Af-
fairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice (1978); Direc-
tor of UNAFEI (1980-82); Executive Secretary of the 
Seventh United Nations Congress (1985); Director-
General of the Correction Bureau, Ministry of Justice 
(1986); Chief Prosecutor of the Kyoto District Public 
Prosecutors’ Office (1987); Chairman of the United 
Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Con-
trol (1988); Superintending Prosecutor, Hiroshima 
High Public Prosecutors’ Office (1991); Superintend-
ing Prosecutor, Nagoya High Public Prosecutors’ Of-
fice (1993); Vice-President, IPPF (1990-98). Chair-
man of Board of Directors, Asian Crime Prevention 
Foundation (ACPF) (1995-2009); Special ACPF Ad-
viser (2010). Elected as Vice-President of the Interna-
tional Association of Prosecutors (IAP) (1996). Hon-
orary IAP Vice President for life; Honorary Emeritus 
Professor of Law of the East China University for Pol-
itics and Law (1999, Shanghai, the People’s Repub-
lic of China); awarded the Order of the Rising Sun 
(2002), Gold and Silver Star from the Emperor of Ja-
pan; Honorary Doctorate of Law Degree by the Dhu-
rakijpundit University (2002, Thailand, Bangkok). 
His prosecutorial career and his drive to interna-
tionalize Asian crime prevention perspectives were a 
landmark in bridging both with other regions of the 
world. “Well-known to all the staff ... and a first rate 
criminal justice specialist”.553
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Vetere, Eduardo (1945~). The tenth Chief of the Uni-
ted Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Branch (1987-1996), later Director of the Division 
(1996), and then Director of the Centre for Interna-
tional Crime Prevention (Vienna, 1997- 2003) and 
Deputy Executive Director of the ODCCP. Director 
of the Division for Treaty Affairs of the reconstituted 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNO-
DC, 2003-2005. Doctor of Law/Jurisprudence, Rome 
University “La Sapienza” (1967). Specialization in 
criminal law and criminology (Universities of Cam-
bridge and Rome, where he studied with Prof. L. Rad-
zinowicz and Prof. F. Ferracuti). Associate Professor 
of Criminology (Rome University, 1969-1975). Italian 
Bar examination (1970). Research Officer at UNICRI 
(1969-1975); Social Affairs Officer, Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch (CSDHA/DIESA, New 
York and Vienna, 1976-1984). Senior Programme Of-
ficer with the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse 
Control (UNFDAC, Vienna, 1984-1987). Executive 
Secretary of the Eighth (1990), Ninth (1995) and Ele-
venth United Nations Congresses on Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice (2005); in charge of the or-
ganization and servicing of the Ministerial Meeting 
on the Strengthening of the United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (1991) 
and of the United Nations World Ministerial Con-
ference on Organized Transnational Crime (1994). 
Contributed to the establishment of the Ad Hoc 
Committee for the negotiation of the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (1998), ser-
vicing the First Session of the Conference of Parties 
(2004) and the Ad Hoc Committee which negoti-
ated the United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion (2002-2003). Overall responsibility for prepa-
ring the documentation, organizing and servicing 
of the biennial sessions of the Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control (1988-1990), and the annual 
sessions of the Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice (1992-2005) and the Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs (2003-2005), as well as the 
ECOSOC and the GA on all matters related to drug 
control and crime prevention. Contributed to the es-
tablishment of ISPAC, chairing several meetings of 
its annual Conferences. Was also involved in a num-
ber of peace-keeping missions as UNTAC Provincial 
Director of Phnom Penh, serving also as Officer-in-
Charge for Public Security, overviewing the re-estab-
lishment of Cambodia’s criminal justice infrastruc-
ture and the drafting of a new provisional criminal 
code (Cambodia,1992-1993); as Director of the Office 
of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in Iraq 
and his Deputy (Baghdad, 1998-1999); and as Chair-
man of the Identification Commission of the United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum on Western Sa-
hara and Deputy Special Representative of the Secre-
tary-General (Layoun, 1999-2001). Editor and co-edi-
tor of several books and author of many publications 
in the fields of transnational organized crime, peno-
logy, victimology, comparative criminal justice, hu-
man rights in the administration of justice, crime 
trends and criminal justice statistics, development 
assistance and international cooperation in criminal 
matters. Honorary Member of the International As-
sociation of Penal Law and the International Penal 
and Penitentiary Foundation (2005). Highest ho-
norary award by the Italian President of the Repub-
lic (Ufficiale di Gran Croce). Cofounder of the Inter-
national Association of Anti-corruption Authorities 
(IAACA), Member of its Executive Committee and 
Vice-President (2006). Member of the Advisory Board 
of HEUNI (2007). “It was a good appointment ... He 
skilfully established his authority and provided ef-
fective leadership”.554
554	Mueller	&	Adler	1995:	12.
240
Blue Criminology
241
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
III BIBLIOGRAPHY555
III A List of academic and other research 
and legal publications
Academia Nazionale dei Lincei, Problemi Attuali 
di Scienza e Di Cultura, Secondo centario della 
pubblicazione dell’opera “Dei delitti e delle 
pene” di Cesare Beccaria. Atti delle Celebrazioni 
indette, sotto l’alto patronato del Presidente 
della Repubblica, dall’Academia Nazionale dei 
Lincei e dalla Commissione Nazionale Italiana 
dell’UNESCO, Roma, Villa della Farnesina, 15-16 
giugno 1964, Milano, Palazzo Marino, 18 giugno 
1964, Anno CCCLXII-1965, Quaderno N.71, Roma 
1965.
Adler, F., Nations Not Obsessed with Crime, 
Littleton, Colorado Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1983.
Adler, F., Laufer W., Merton, R.K. (eds), The Legacy 
of Anomie Theory. Advances in Criminological 
Theory, Vol. 6, Transaction Books, New 
Brunswick, NJ: 1995.
Alper, B. S., J. F. Boren with a foreword by William 
Clifford, Crime: International Agenda. Concern 
and Action in the Prevention of Crime and 
Treatment of Offenders, 1846-1972, D.C. Heath 
and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts 1972. 
Ancel, M., La Défense sociale devant les nouvelles 
forms de la criminalité, Cahiers De Defense 
Sociale 1976, No. 3:45-52.
Ancel, M., Social Defence: A Modern Approach to 
Criminal Problems, Routledge, London 1965.
Ancel, M., Znaczenie i Metody Prawa 
Porównawczego, Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, Warszawa 1979 (Utilité et méthodes du 
droit comparé. Eléments d’introduction générale 
à l’étude comparative des droits, Éditions Ides et 
Calendes, Neuchâtel 1971).
Aniyar de Castro, L., La politica criminal y la nueva 
criminologia en Latin America (en:) L. Aniyar de 
Castro (ed.), Criminología en America Latina, 
UNICRI, Publicación 33, Roma mayo 1990:9-38.
Al-Thakeb, F., Scott, J. E., Islamic law: an 
examination of its revitalization, The British 
Journal of Criminology, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1981):58-69.
Angbola, T., Architecture of Fear, African Book 
Publishers, Ibadan 1997.
Anttila, I., About Gerhard, the United Nations and 
Finland (in:) E. Weis (ed.), Criminal Science in 
a Global Society: Studies in Honor of Gerhard 
O. W. Mueller, Publications of the Comparative 
Criminal Law Project, Wayne State University, 
Detroit 1994.
Archer, D., Gartner R., Violence and Crime in Cross-
national Perspective, Yale University Press, New 
Haven 1984.
Ashdown, P., What I learned in Bosnia, New York 
Times, 28 October 2002.
Axworthy, L., Human security and global governance: 
putting people first, Global Governance 7, No. 1 
(2001):19-23.
Bafia, J. Problemy kryminologii. Dialektyka sytuacji 
kryminogennej, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze 
Warszawa 1978.
Barnes, E. H., Teeters, N. K., New Horizons in 
Criminology, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York 1951.
Bassiouni, Ch. M., International Criminal Law: 
A Draft International Criminal Code, Sitjhoff-
Noordhoff Publishers, The Netherlands 1980. 
Bassiouni, Ch. M., AIDP: International Association 
of Penal Law: Over a Century of Dedication to 
Criminal Justice and Human Rights, De Paul 
University Law Review, Vol. 38, Issue 4 (1989):899-
922.
Bassiouni, Ch. M., Introduction to International 
Criminal Law, Ardsley 2003. 
Bates, S., One world in penology, Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, March-April 
1948, Vol. 38, No. 6:565-577.
Bates, W., Review of the book Carroll, D. (ed.), 
The University Teaching of Social Sciences: 
Criminology, UNESCO, Paris 1957, American 
Catholic Sociological Review 1958, Vol. 3, 
Oct.:246-247. 
Becker, G., Biedni bogacze (Poor rich), Wprost Nr 
51/52, 26 XII 2007:84-86.
Becker, G.S., (1968), Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 76 (2):169-217.
Becker, G.S., Nobel Lecture: The economic way of 
looking at behaviour, The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 101, No. 3 (June, 1993):385-409.
Beirne, P. The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 36, 
No. 2 (Jun., 1985):285-286. 
Bellamy, Alex J., Conflict prevention and the 
responsibility to protect, Global Governance 
14/2008):135-156. 
Beltrani Scalia, M., Historical sketch of national and 
international penitentiary conferences in Europe 
and America (in:) E. C. Wines (ed.), Transaction 
of the National Congress on Penitentiary and 
Reformatory Discipline held at Cincinnati, Ohio, 
October 12-18, 1870, Weed, Parsons and Company 
Printers, Albany, New York 1871.
555	 E-links	last	visited	15	January	2012.	If	the	names	of	more	than	two	cities	appear	under	the	publisher’s	imprint,	only	the	first	name	is	given.	In	a	
succession	of	works	by	the	same	author,	the	entries	are	arranged	chronologically.	The	list	does	not	contain	the	bibliography	from	the	text	boxes.
242
Benarjee, A., Duflo, E., The experimental approach 
to development economics (paper, 2008).
Bertrand, M., The United Nations. Past, Present and 
the Future, Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht 
1996.
Binder, A., Geis, G., & Bruce, D. D.. Juvenile 
delinquency: Historical, Cultural and Legal 
Perspectives, Anderson Publishing Co., 
Cincinnati, OH. 1977.
Boff, L., Saber cuidar: Ética do humano compaixăo 
pela terra (To Know How to Take Care: Human 
Ethic, Compassion for the Earth), Editora Vozes, 
Petrópolis 1999.
Bonger, W., Criminality and Economic Conditions, 
Bloomington 1969.
Borodin, S. V., Liakchov, E., Miezhdunarodnye 
Sotrudnichestvo v Bor’be s Ugolovnoj 
Prestupnostiu. Problemy Deiatelnosti OON 
v Oblasti Predupreshdenija Prestupnosti 
i Obrascheniya s Pravonarushiteliami 
(International Cooperation in the Fight against 
Criminality. Problems of UN Action in the 
Field of Crime Prevention and the Treatment 
of Offenders), Meshdunarodnyje Otnoshenija, 
Moskva 1983.
Bossowski, J.J, Wiadomości z nauk 
kryminologicznych (News from the 
Criminological Sciences), Księgarnia 
Akademicka, Poznań 1945. 
Boulokos, A.C., Dakin, B., Toward a Universal 
Declaration of the Rule of Law: Implications for 
Criminal Justice and Sustainable Development, 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 
2001, Vol. 42, No.1-2: 145-162.
Brems, E., Human Rights: Universality and 
Diversity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague 2001.
Brown, R. H., A Poetic for Sociology. Toward a Logic 
of Discovery for the Human Sciences, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1978.
Buchholz E., R. Hartman, J. Lekschas, G. Stiller, 
Sozialistische Kriminologie, Berlin 1971. 
Bureau International pour L’Unification du Droit 
Penal. X e Anniversaire 1928-1938, Editions A. 
Padone, Paris 1938.
Burke, R. H., An Introduction to Criminological 
Theory, Third Edition. Willan Publishing, 
Abingdon 2009.
CAB 195/1, War Cabinet Minutes, W.M.(42) 47th 
Meeting – W.M.(42) 155th Meeting: 67-68, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/
cab_195_1_transcript.pdf .
Campbell, D., Sociological episemology (in:) 
D. Campbell & M. Jean Russo (eds.), Social 
Experimentation, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
California 1999. 
Campion, H., International statistics, Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Part II, Vol. 
112:105-143.
Carmignani, G., Teoria delle legi sulla sicurezza 
sociale, Pisa 1831.
Chambers, R. & Conway, G., Sustainable Rural 
Livelihoods: Practical Concepts for the 21st 
Century, IDS Discussion Paper 296, Institute of 
Development Studies, Brighton, UK 1992.
Charlsworth, H., Silences of the Blue Book, (in:) S. 
Lawson, The New Agenda for Global Security. 
Cooperating for Peace and Beyond, Allen & 
Unwin, Canberra 1995:133-147.
Charnovitz, S., Two centuries of participation: 
NGOs and international governance, Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Winter 1997(18):183-
286.
Chattoraj, B. N., Open prisons in India: A review, 
Social Defence No. 17 (1982):16-28.
Christie, N., Changes in penal values, Scandinavian 
Studies in Criminology, No. 2 (1968):161-172.
Christie, N., Restorative justice: Five dangers ahead, 
(in:) P. Knepper, J. Doak, J. Shapland, Urban 
Crime Prevention, Surveillance and Restorative 
Justice. Effects of Social Technologies, CRC Press. 
Taylor & Francis Group, Boca Raton 2009:195-
204.
Churchill urges FDR and Stalin to agree to the 
summary execution of ’50-100’ captured enemy 
leaders; Sept 17, 1944, http://www.f:co.uk/
History/Churchill/Lynch_Law/HydePark_170944.
html.
Clark, R., S., The United Nations Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Programme. Formulation of 
Standards and Efforts at their Implementation, 
Pennsylvania University Press, Philadelphia 1994.
Clifford, W., An Introduction to African 
Criminology, Oxford University Press, Nairobi 
1974.
Clifford, W., Foreword, (in:) Alper, B. S., J. F. Boren, 
Crime: International Agenda. Concern and 
Action in the Prevention of Crime and Treatment 
of Offenders, 1846-1972, Lexington, Mass 1972.
Clinard, M. J. & Daniel J. Abbott, Crime in 
Developing Countries, John Wiley & Sons, New 
York 1973.
Cohen, S., Against Criminology, Transaction Books, 
New Brunswick, New Jersey 1988.
Collier, P. and Anke Hoefler, Murder by numbers: 
Comparisons and inter-relationships between 
homicide and civil war, The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 2004.
Commission on Human Security, Human Security 
Now, New York 2003.
Conquest, R., The Great Terror, Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 1968.
Blue Criminology
243
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
Cornia, G.A., J. Court. Inequality, Growth and 
Poverty in the Era of Liberalization and 
Globalization, Policy Brief No. 4, Helsinki: 
United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research 2001.
Cot, J-P., Pellet, A., Forteau, M., La Charte des 
Nations Unies. Commentaire article par article, 
Economica, Paris 2005.
Cotonou Agreement, Partnership agreement 
between the members of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States of the one part, 
and the European Community and its Member 
States, of the other part (Cotonou Agreement), 
Cotonou, 23 June 2000 http://www.acpsec.org/
en/conventions/cotonou/accord1.htm .
Cressey, D.R. (1955). Changing Criminals: The 
Application of the Theory of Differential 
Association, American Journal of Sociology, 
61:116-120.
Danticat, E., The Farming of Bones, Soho Press, 
New York 1998.
David, R., Traité Élémentaire de Droit Civil 
Comparé. Introduction a L’étude des Droits 
Étrangers et la Méthode Comparative, Librairie 
Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris 1950.
David, R., J.E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems 
in the World Today. An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law, Second Edition, 
Stevens & Sons, London 1978.
Davies, J.; S.Sandström, A.Shorrocks and E.N. 
Wolff - “The Global Distribution of Household 
Wealth -2006”, II, http://www.Wider.unu.edu/
newsletter/newsletter.
Delmas-Marty, M., Towards a Truly Common Law. 
Europe as a Laboratory for Legal Pluralism, 
transl. by Naomi Norberg, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2002.
Demleitner, N.V., Challenge, opportunity and risk: 
An era of change in comparative law, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 46:647-655.
de Quirós, B., Modern Theories of Criminality, 
translated from the Spanish by Alfonso de Salvio, 
With an Introduction by Wm. W. Smithers, Esq., 
Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1912. 
de Tocqueville, A., Democracy in America, ed. by 
Isaak Kramnick, W.W. Norton & Company, New 
York 2008.
Di Gennaro, G., G. La Greca La droga, traffico, 
abusi, controlli, Giuffrè Milano 1992.
Doward, J., “Hitler must die without trial –­ 
Churchill”, The Observer, 1 January 2006, 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/
story/0,,1676068,00.html.
Drapkin, I., Crime and Punishment in the Ancient 
World, Foreword by Thorsten Sellin, Lexington 
Books, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 
Massachusetts / Toronto 1989.
Dupont-Bouchat, M.S., Du tourisme pénitentiaire 
à l’Internationale des philanthropes. La création 
d’un réseau pour la protection de l’enfance à 
travers les congrès internationaux (1840-1914), 
Paedagogica Historica, 38 (2002) 2-3:533-563.
Dupont-Bouchat,M.S., Eric Pieree (dir.) Enfance et 
justice au XIXe siècle, Paris, PUF, Coll. Droit et 
Justice, 2001.
Durkheim, E., The Division of Labour in Society, 
Free Press, New York 1951. 
Durkheim, E., The Rules of Sociological Method, 
Free Press, New York 1966.
Eisner, M., Long-term historical trends in violent 
crime, Crime and Justice 30 (2003): 83-142.
Ellis, L., Walsh, A., Criminology. A Global 
Perspective, Pearson-Longman, Boston 2005.
Eriksson, T., The Reformers: An Historical Survey 
of Pioneer Experiments in the Treatment of 
Criminals (C. Djurklou transl.), Elsevier Scientific 
Pub. Co., New York 1976.
Eskridge, W. Ch,. Criminal justice education and its 
potential impact on the socio-political-economic 
climate of Central European nations: a short 
study, Journal of Criminal Justice Education, Vol. 
14, No. 1 (2003):105-118.
Esmaeili, H., J. Gansast, Islamic law across 
cultural borders: the involvement of Western 
nationals in Saudi murder trials, Denver Journal 
of International Law and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) 
2003:145-174.
Evans, G., Cooperating for Peace: The Global 
Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen and 
Unwin, St. Leonards 2003.
Fajnzylber, P., D. Lederman, N. Loayza, Inequality 
and Violent Crime, The Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 45 (April 2002).
Falkowska, M. (opr. i wybór), Myśl pedagogiczna 
Janisza Korczaka (Paedagogical Thought of 
Janusz Korczak). Nowe Źródła, Nasza Księgarnia, 
Warszawa 1983.
Favaroque-Cosson, B., Development of comparative 
law in France, (in:) M. Reimann, R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law, Oxford 2008:35-65.
Findlay, M., R. Henham, Beyond Punishment: 
Achieving International Criminal Justice, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2010.
Finnane, M., The ABC of criminology, Anita Muhl, 
J. V. Barry, Norval Morris and the Making of 
a Discipline in Australia, British Journal of 
Criminology, 2006 (46):399-422.
Finnane, M, Norval Morris (1923-2004), Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice, March 2004 (15/3):1-3. 
Finnane, M. (with the assistance of John Myrtle), 
JV Barry: A Life, University of New South Wales 
Press, Sydney 2007. 
244
Fisher, G., Mindsets. The Role of Culture 
and Perception in International Relations, 
Intercultural Press, Inc., Yarmouth 1997.
Fleisher, B., The effect of unemployment on juvenile 
delinquency, Journal of Political Economy, 
1963/71 (6): 543-555.
Fletcher, G. P., The Grammar of Criminal Law. 
American, Comparative, and International, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2007.
Fomerand, J. Historical Dictionary of the United 
Nations, The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Lanham 2007.
Foucault, M. ”Governmentality” (in:) G. Burchell, 
C. Gordon & P. Miller (eds), The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois 1991.
Fuchs, E. Educational sciences, morality and politics: 
international educational congresses in the early 
twentieth century, Paedagogica Historica, Vol. 40, 
Issue 5 & 6 October 2004:757-784.
Gainer, R., The culpability provisions of the Model 
Penal Code, Rutgers Law Journal (19) 575, 589-91 
(1988). 
Gallant, K. S., Learning from communities: Lessons 
from India on clinical method and liberal 
education (in:) L. G. Trubek, J. Cooper, Educating 
for Justice Around the World. Legal Education, 
Legal Practice and the Community, Ashgate, 
Dartmouth 1999:222-232.
Garland, A., The culture of high crime societies, some 
predictions of recent “law and order” policies, 
British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 40, N0. 3.
Garland, A., The Culture of Control: Crime and 
Social Order In Contemporary Society, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois 2001.
Gercenzon, A., Sovietskaya juridicheskaya nauka 
i zadacha priedotwrashchenija prestuplenij, 
Sowietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1962, Nr. 1. 
Gerra, G., et al., Childhood neglect and parental 
care perception in cocaine addicts: Relation with 
psychiatric symptoms and biological correlates, 
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Review, 29 
August 2007.
Ghodse, H. (ed.), International Drug Control in the 
21st Century, Ashgate, Aldershot 2008.
Ginther, K., Sustainable development and good 
governance: development and evolution of 
constitutional orders (in:) Ginther, K. Erik Denters, 
and Paul J.I.M. de Waart (eds.), Sustainable 
development and good governance, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1995, ch. 10. 
Ginther, K., Paul J.I.M. de Waart, Sustainable 
development as a matter of good governance; 
an introductory view (in:) Ginther, K. Erik 
Denters, and Paul J.I.M. de Waart (eds.), 
Sustainable development and good governance, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1995 
(introduction).
Glen, J. M. The Contributions of Eleanor and 
Franklin Roosevelt to the Development of 
International Protection of Human Rights, 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9, 1987:19-48.
Global Burden of Armed Violence Report, Geneva 
Declaration, Secretariat, Geneva 2008, http://
www.genevadeclaration.org/pdfs/Global-
Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf.
Godstone, J.A. Initial conditions, general laws, 
path dependence and explanation in historical 
sociology, American Journal of Sociology, 1998 
(104):829-45.
Gordon, D. M., Criminality, class and crime in 
America, Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 19, No. 2 
(1973):163-186.
Greenberg, D. F., (ed.), Crime and Capitalism: 
Readings in Marxist Criminology, Mayfield 
Publishing Company, Mountain View, CA 1981.
Graziadei, M., The functionalist heritage (in:) P. 
Legrand, R. Munday, Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2003:100-130.
Grossfeld, B., Comparatists and languages, (in:) P. 
Legrand, R. Munday (Eds.), Comparative Legal 
Studies: Traditions and Transitions, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2003:154-194.
Gurr, R. T., A causal model of civil strife, American 
Political Science Review 62 (1968):1104-1124.
Gurr, T., R., Why Men Rebel, Princeton, NJ. 1970.
Haack, K., J. Hefensteller, H. Paepke, UN Studies: 
Foundations for an Emerging Field of Study, 
Discussion Paper No. 1, New Directions in UN 
Teaching and Training, UN Studies Association 
2008, http://www.unstudies.org/twiki/pub/
Main/DiscussionPapers/UNSA_Discussion_
Paper_1.pdf.
Hagan, F. E., Introduction to Criminology: 
Theories, Methods, and Criminal Behavior, Sage, 
Thousands Oaks, California 2010.
Hanggi, H., Establishing security in conflict ridden 
societies: How to reform the security sector, 
Paper presented to the Aspen European Strategy 
Forum on International State-Building and 
Reconstruction Efforts, 18-21 September 2008.
Hastings, R., Perspectives on Crime Prevention: 
Issues and Challenges, Canadian Journal of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 47, No. 2, 
April 2005.
Hochschild, J.S., How ideas affect actions (in:) 
Goodin, R.T. & Tilly, Ch. (Eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2006:284-296.
Hoffman, J., Sustainable economic development: 
A criminal justice challenge for the 21st century, 
Crime, Law & Social Change 34 (2000):275-299.
Blue Criminology
245
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
Hood, R., Sir Leon Radzinowicz, 1906-1999, 
Proceedings of the British Academy 111 
(2001):637-55.
Huber, L., Nationalcharakter und Strafprozess. 
Erfahrungen und Lehren aus den 
Charaktereigenschaften der kriegführenden 
Völker für die Strafprozessreform, Rudolph 
Hartman/Leipzig - M. Breitenstein/Wien 1916.
Humphries, D., Don Wallace, Capitalist 
accumulation and urban crime, 1950-71, Social 
Problems, 25 (2), December 1980:163-186.
International Action Network on Small Arms 
(IANSA), Gun Violence: The Global Crisis. 
Campaigning for Fewer Guns and Safer 
Communities, London 2007. 
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, 
The effect of the war on criminality, Bulletin 
of the International Penal and Penitentiary 
Commission, Vol. 15, No. 4/II, of the Select 
Papers on Penal and Penitentiary Affairs, Bern 
1951.
International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, 
The rules of drawing up criminal statistics, 
1937, Bulletin of the International Penal and 
Penitentiary Commission, Vol. XII, nos. 3-4, 
March 1947:253-270.
International Protection for Human Rights. Human 
Rights Quarterly 9.1 (1987):19-48
Jacobsson, B., Standardization and expert 
knowledge, (in:) N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson 
(eds.), A World of Standards, University Press, 
Oxford 2000:40-48.
Jamieson, R., Towards a criminology of war in 
Europe (in:) Vincenzo Ruggiero, Nigel South, Ian 
R. Taylor, The New European Criminology: Crime 
and Social Order in Europe, Routledge, London 
1998:480-513.
Janis, M.W., Jeremy Bentham and the fashioning 
of “International Law”, The American Journal of 
Public Law, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1984:405-417.
Jasiński, J. Punitywność systemów karnych. Studia 
nad zakresem, formami i intensywnością 
penalizacji (Punitiveness of penal systems. 
Studies on the scope, forms and intensiveness of 
penalization), Studia Prawnicze nr 35 (1973):21- 
61.
Jaspers, K., Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des 
Menschen, München 1958.
Johnson, S., The Value of Kindness. Value 
Communications, La Jolla, CA 1976.
Jolly, R., L. Emmerij, T. G. Weiss, The Power of UN 
Ideas. Lessons from the First 60 Years, United 
Nations Intellectual History Project series, 
Communications Development Incorporated, 
Washington D.C with Grundy & Northedge, 
London 2005. 
Jones, A. T., Social Forces, Vol. 62, No. 4 (June 
1984):1117-1119.
Jörger, J. Die Familie Zero, Archiv für Rassen- und 
Gesellschafts-Biologie, einschließlich Rassen- 
und Gesellschafts-Hygiene, 1905:494-500.
Joutsen, M., International Crime and the UN, 
(in:) J. Mitchell Miller, Richard A Wright (eds), 
Encyclopaedia of Criminology, Routledge, 
London 2004, Vol. 2:765-768. 
Joyce, J., A., ”Social defence” and the United Nations, 
Criminology, 5/1 (19):23-34.
Kaluszynski, M., The international congresses of 
criminal anthropology: Shaping the French and 
international criminological movement, 1886-
1914, (in:) P. Becker & R. F. Wetzell, Criminals and 
Their Scientists. The History of Criminology in 
International Perspective, Cambridge University 
Press, New York 2006:301-316. 
Katovich, M.A., Durkheim’s macrofoundations 
of time: an assessment and critique, The 
Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 28, Issue 3 (2005): 
367-385.
Kaufman, M., T., Marvin E. Wolfgang, 73, Dies; 
Leading figure in criminology, New York Times, 
18 April 1998.
Kelly, M. J., Islam & international criminal law: A 
brief (in) compatibility study, International Law 
Review Online Companion, Vol. 1, Number 8 
March 2010:28-30.
Kennedy, D., Two globalizations of law & legal 
thought: 1850-1968, 36 Suffolk University Law 
Review 2003a: 631-660. 
Kennedy, D., The methods and the politics, (in:) 
P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds.), Comparative 
Legal Studies. Traditions and Transitions 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2003b:345-436.
Kiikeri, M., Comparative Legal Reasoning and 
European Law, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht 2001. 
Klein, A. R., Alternative Sentencing, Intermediate 
Sanctions and Probation, Anderson Publishing 
Co., Cincinnati, Ohio 1977.
Knepper, P., The Invention of International Crime. 
A Global Issue in the Making 1881-1914, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2010.
Knutsson, J., Standard of Evaluation in problem-
oriented policing projects: good enough, (in:) J. 
Knutsson, J., N. Tilley (eds), Evaluating Crime 
Reduction Initiatives. Crime Prevention Studies, 
Vol. 24, Criminal Justice Press, Monsey, NY, USA, 
Willan Publishing, Cullompton, Devon, UK 2009.
Knutsson, J., Tilley, N. (eds), Evaluating Crime 
Reduction Initiatives. Crime Prevention Studies, 
Vol. 24, Criminal Justice Press, Monsey, New 
York, Willan Publishing, Cullompton, Devon, UK 
2009.
246
Kohlberg, L., The Philosophy of Moral 
Development. Moral Stages and the Idea of 
Justice, Harper & Row Publishers, San Francisco, 
California Vol. I, 1981.
Kołakowski, L., Mini wykłady o maxi sprawach 
(Mini Lectures about Maxi Matters), 
Wydawnictwo Znak, Kraków 2009.
Kołakowski, L, Cywilizacja na ławie oskarżonych 
(Civilization on the defendant’s bench), Res 
Publica, Warszawa 1990. 
Kossowska, A., I. Rzeplińska, D. Wójcik, 
Kryminologia polska – tradycja i perspektywy 
(Polish criminology – traditions and perspectives), 
Studia Prawnicze z. 3-4 (149-150)/2001:379-395.
Kreso, M. Argumentation and materialization of 
the rights of the victims of mass victimization 
when the State is perpetrator, X International 
Symposium on Victimology. Abstract Book, 
Montreal 2000.
Kudriavcev, V.N., Obiektivnaya strona prestupleniya 
(The Objective Side of Crime), Gosjuszdat, 
Moskva, 1960. 
Kuhn, A. K., International cooperation in the 
suppression of crime, The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Jul., 1934):541-
544.
Kuper, A., Anthropology and Anthropologists: 
The Modern British School, Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, London 1983.
Kury, H. & Evelyn Shea (Eds.), Punitivity. 
International Developments, vol 1: Punitiveness – 
a Global Phenomenon?, Universitätsverlag Dr. N. 
Brockmeyer, Bochum 2011.
Kuzniecova, N., Prestupleniye i prestupnost’ (Crime 
and Criminality), Izdatelstvo Moskoskovo 
Universiteta, Moskva 1968.
Lawrence, W. N., R. J. Berger, Competing 
perspectives on cross-national crime: An 
evaluation of theory and evidence, Sociological 
Quarterly, Vol. 29 (2):281-313.
League of Nations, Gradual Unification of Criminal 
Laws and Cooperation of States in the Prevention 
of and Suppression of Crime, Geneva 1933. 
Leaver, R., Sanctions, enforcement, and the Blue 
Book, (in:) S. Lawson, The New Agenda for 
Global Security. Cooperating for Peace and 
Beyond, Allen & Unwin, Canberra 1995:89-117.
Lemoine, J., The International Civil Servant. An 
Endangered Species, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1994. 
Leonards, C. G. T. M., Priceless children? 
Penitentiary congresses debating childhood: 
A quest for social order in Europe 1846-1995, 
(in:) H. Rodenburg, Pieter Spierenburg, Clive 
Emsley (eds), Social Control Europe, Vo1. 2:1500-
1800, 1800-2000, Ohio State University Press, 
Columbus, Ohio 2004.
Lernell, L., Zarys kryminologii ogólnej (Outline of 
General Criminology), Państwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, Warszawa 1973. 
Lerner, M., America as a Civilization, Simon & 
Schuster, New York 1957.
Levi, L., Resume of the Statistical Congress, held at 
Brussels, September 11th, 1853, for the Purpose of 
Introducing Unity in the Statistical Documents 
of all Countries, Journal of the Statistical Society 
of London, March 1854:1-14.
Levine, R. F., A Geography of Time. The Temporal 
Misadventures of a Social Psychologists, Basic 
Books, New York 1997.
López-Rey, M. The First U.N. Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 47, No. 5 
(Jan. - Feb., 1957):526-538. 
López-Rey, M., A Guide to United Nations Criminal 
Policy, Gower Publishing Company, Brookfield, 
Vermont 1985. 
López-Rey, M., United Nations social defence policy 
and the problem of crime, (in:) R. Hood (ed.), 
Crime, Criminology and Public Policy. Studies in 
Honour of Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Heinemann, 
London 1974.
Lowe, V., International Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2007.
Luneev, V.V., Prestupnost’ XX. veka. Mirovyje, 
Regionalnyje i Rossijskije Tendencii. Mirovoj 
Kriminologitscheskij Analiz (Criminality of the 
XXth Century. Global, Regional and Russian 
Tendencies. Global Criminological Analysis), 
Norma, Moskva 1997.
Lunay, R., Montesquieu: The spectre of despotism 
and the origins of comparative law, (in:) A. Riles 
(ed.), Rethinking the Masters of Comparative 
Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford – Portland, Oregon 
2001: 21-39.
Lustig, M. W., J. Koester, Intercultural Competence. 
Interpersonal Communication across Cultures, 
Sixth Edition, Pearson International Edition, 
Allyn & Bacon, Boston 2010.
Lynch,M.J., P.B. Stretsky, The meaning of green, 
Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 7, No. 2, (2003): 
217-238. 
Maguire, M., R. Morgan, R. Reiner (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Oxford 2007. 
Mahoney, J., D. Schensul, Historical context and path 
dependence, The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 
Political Analysis, Oxford 2008:454:471.
Maljević, A. ‘Participation in a Criminal 
Organisation’ and ‘Conspiracy’. Different 
Models against Crime Collectives, Band S 124, 
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und 
internationales Strafrecht, Freiburg i. Br. 2010.
Blue Criminology
247
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
Mannheim, H, Comparative Criminology: A text 
book in two volumes, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London 1965.
Mannheim, H., Criminal Justice and Social 
Reconstruction, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London 1946.
Mathiesen, G., From rendezvous to relationship 
(in:) Jørn Øyerhagen Sunde & Knut Einar 
Skodvin (eds.), Rendezvous of European Legal 
Cultures, Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2010:195-208.
Mathiason, J., What kind of international public 
service do we need for the twenty-first century?, 
Global Governance 14 (2008):127-133.
Matsui, Y., The road to sustainable development: 
evolution of the concept of development in the 
UN (in:) Ginther, K. Erik Denters, and Paul J.I.M. 
de Waart (eds.), Sustainable development and 
good governance, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
Dordrecht 1995. 
McCool, M., Writing around the World. A Guide to 
Writing across Cultures, Continuum, London 2009.
McDonald, W.F., The globalization of criminology: 
the new frontier is the frontier, Transnational 
Organized Crime, Vol. 1, Spring 1995:1-22.
Mehlum, H., E. Miguel, R. Torvik, Rainfall, poverty 
and crime in 19th century Germany (2003), 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/olney/
e211_fa03/e211-miguel.pdf
Merryman, J. H., The Civil Law Tradition: An 
Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western 
Europe and Latin America, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, California 1969.
Merton, R.K., Science and the social order, 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5, 1938: 321-337.
Merton, R., Teoria socjologiczna i struktura społeczna 
(Sociological Theory and Social Structure), 
Państowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa 1982.
Mobekk, E., Transitional justice and security sector 
reform: Enabling sustainable peace, Geneva 
Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF), Occasional Paper – No. 13, Geneva, 
November 2006. 
Moffitt, T. E. The neuropsychology of juvenile 
delinquency: A critical review, (in:) M. Tonry and 
N. Morris (eds), Crime and Justice: An Annual 
Review of Research, 12:99-169, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, ILL 1990.
Moffitt, T. E., The new look of behavioural genetics 
in developmental psychopathology: gene-
environment interplay in antisocial behaviours, 
Psychological Bulletin, 2005/131(4):533-54. 
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de, The 
Spirit of Laws, Transl. by Thomas Nugent, revised 
by J. V. Prichard, based on an public domain 
edition published in 1914 by G. Bell & Sons, 
Ltd., London bk I, ch. 3, p.7 (1748), http://www.
constitution.org/cm/sol.txt. 
Morris, T., Sir Leon Radzinowicz, Obituary, The 
Guardian, 1 January 2000, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/news/2000/jan/01/guardianobituaries.
Moser C., and Holland J., Urban Poverty in Jamaica, 
World Bank Latin America and Caribbean 
Studies, World Bank, Washington, D.C.1997.
Mueller, G.O.W., The United Nations and 
criminology, (in:) Elmer Johnson (ed.), 
International Handbook of Contemporary 
Developments in Criminology, Greenwood 
Publishing Group 1983:63-81. 
Mueller, G. O. W., Whose prophet is Cesare 
Beccaria? A study on the origins of criminological 
theory (in:) Adler, F., Laufer, W., Advances 
in Criminological Theory, Vol. 2, Transaction 
Publishers, Piscata Way, New Jersey 1988.
Mueller, G. O. W., 1994, World Survey on the 
Availability of Criminal Justice Statistics, http://
www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.
aspx?ID=152998.
Mumford, L., The City in History: Its Origins, Its 
Transformations, and Its Prospects, MJF Books, 
New York 1961.
Natarajan, M., International Crime and Justice, 
Cambridge 2010.
Nezkusil, J., a kol., Československá kriminologie 
(Czechoslovak Criminology), Panorama, Praha 
1978.
Obituaries, Benedict S. Alper (1906-1994), ASA 
Footnotes, March 1994 Vol. 22 No. 3.
O’Brien, M., M. Yar, Criminology. The Key 
Concepts, Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group, 
London 2008.
O’Connor, V., Rausch, C., (ed.), Model Codes for 
Post-Conflict Criminal Justice, United States 
Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C. 2007.
Oliver, W., Catholic Perspectives on Crime and 
Criminal Justice, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD 
2008.
Phillips, D. M. The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology (1973-), Vol. 75, No. 4 (Winter, 
1984):1430-1433. 
Pierson, G.W., Tocqueville in America, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 
1996.
Piontkovski, A.A., Ugolovnye pravo RSSR. Tshast 
obschaya (Criminal Law of the RSSR. General 
Part), Moskva 1924. 
Plesch, D., How the United Nations beat Hitler 
and prepared for peace, Global Society 22, No. 1 
(2008):137-158.
Popper, K. R., Logik der Forschung, J.C.B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1934/1984.
Portes, A., On the sociology of national 
development: Theories and issues, American 
Journal of Sociology 82 (1976):55-85.
248
Pound, R., The end of law as developed in juristic 
thought II, Harvard Law Review (1917): 201- 225.
Prins, A., La Défense Sociale et les Transformations 
du Droit Pénal, Institut de sociologie, collection 
”Actualitées sociales”, Misch et Thorn, Bruxelles-
Leipzig 1910.
Pye, L., The behavioural revolution and the 
remaking of comparative politics (in:) Goodin, 
R. E., Tilly, Ch., The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford University 
Press 2006:797-805.
Quirchmayr, G., Internet for International Criminal 
Justice Organizations, International Review of 
Law, Computers & Technology, Vol. http://www.
informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content
=t713427052~tab=issueslist~branches=12 - v1212, 
Issue 1 March 1998:7-14.
Rabinowicz, L. , Podstawy nauki o więziennictwie 
(The Basis of Penitentiary Science), Warszawa 1933.
Radzinowicz, L., J. W. C. Turner, The Modern 
Approach to Criminal Law, Collected Studies. 
Preface by P. H. Winfield, University of 
Cambridge, London 1945.
Radzinowicz, L., The Roots of International 
Association of Criminal Law and their 
Significance. A Tribute and Re-assessment of the 
Centenary of the IKV, Max-Planck-Institut für 
ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 
Vol. 45, Freiburg i. Br. 1991.
Radzinowicz, L., J. W. C. Turner, The language of 
criminal science, The Cambridge Law Journal, 
Vol. 7, issue 2 (1940):224-237.
Rajagopal, B., Invoking the rule of law: International 
discourses (in:) A. Hurtwitz & Reyko Huang, Civil 
War and the Rule of Law. Security, Development, 
Human Rights, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
London 2008:47-70 (ch. 3).
Rappaport, E.S., Polityka kryminalna w zarysie 
(Criminal Policy in Outline), Spółdzielnia 
Wydawnicza ”Prawo”, Łódź 1948. 
Razwinul, I., The Nexus of Economic Growth, 
Employment and Poverty Reduction: An 
Empirical Analysis. Issues in Employment and 
Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 14, International 
Labour Organization, Geneva 2004, http://
www.ilo.int/public/english/employment/recon/
poverty/download/disc14.pdf.
Ravallion, M., Shaohua Chen & Prem Sangraula, 
New Evidence on the Urbanization of Global 
Poverty, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4199, The World Bank, Washington, 
D.C, 2007.
Reckless, C. W., Criminal Behaviour, McGraw-Hill, 
New York 1940.
Reckless, C. W., A new theory of delinquency 
and crime, Federal Probation, Vol. XXV, No. 4 
(December, 1961):42-46.
Redo, S., Organized Crime and Its Control in 
Central Asia, Office of International Criminal 
Justice, Sam Houston State University, 
Huntsville, TX. 2004.
Redo, S., The United Nations and criminology (in:) 
C. J. Smith, S. X. Zhang & R. Barberet, Routledge 
Handbook of International Criminology, 
Routledge, London 2011:125-133.
Redo, S., The United Nations crime trends surveys: 
comparative criminology in a global perspective, 
International Annals of Criminology, Vol. 24, No. 
1-2 (1986):40-56. 
Redo, S., Zwalczanie przestępczości zorganizowanej 
w Azji Centralnej (The Fight against Organized 
Crime in Central Asia), Dom Wydawniczy 
ELIPSA, Warszawa 2007. 
Reichel, P. (ed.), Handbook of Transnational Crime 
& Justice, Sage, Thousand Oaks, California 2005.
Reiman, J.H., Sue Headlee, Marxism and criminal 
justice policy, Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 27, No. 
1, (1981):24-47. 
Reinsch, P.S., Public International Unions: Their 
Work and Organization, published by the World 
Peace Foundation, by Ginn and Company, Boston 
1911.
Renshaw, P., Introduction (in:) Alexis de 
Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Wordworth 
Editions, Ware 1998.
Riemer, L. H.: Das Netzwerk der ”Gefängnisfreunde” 
(1830-1872). Karl Josef Anton Mittermaiers 
Briefwechsel mit europäischen Stravollzugs-
experten, Frankfurt am Main 2005.
Riemer, L. H., ”Areopog der Wissenschaft”, Die 
Behandlung der Gesellschaftlichenkrisen auf im 
Vormärz am Beispiel des ersten internationalen 
Gefängniskongresses 1846, (in:) V. Kretschmann, 
P. Scholz, Wissen in der Krise: Institutionen des 
Wissens in gesellschaftlichen Wandel, Akademie 
Verlag 2004. 
Rifkin, J., Time Wars, Henry Holt, New York 1987.
Riles, A., (ed.) Rethinking the Masters of 
Comparative Law, Oxford - Portland, Oregon, 
Hart Publishing 2001.
Rotenstreich, N., Volksgeist, The Dictionary 
of the History of Ideas, http://www.google.
co.uk/search?sourceid=navclient&aq=2&
oq=Volksgeist&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4GGLJ_
enAT301AT304&q=volksgeist+wiki.
Ruggiero, V., Introduction - fuzzy criminal actors, 
Crime, Law and Social Change, No. 37 (2002):177-
190.
Samuel, K., Influence of Islamic Shari’ah on Current 
UN Discourse on Justice, (in:) D. French, Global 
Justice and Sustainable Development, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2007:109-130.
Blue Criminology
249
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
Sassen, S., The state and the global city: Notes 
towards a conception of place-centered 
governance (in:) Competition Change,  
1995(1):31-50. 
Schechter, M. G., United Nations Global 
Conferences. Global Institution Series, 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London 
2005.
Schleiffer, J.T., The Making of Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America, Foreword by George 
W. Pierson (2nd edition), Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2000, http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.
php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.
php%3Ftitle=667&layout=html#toc_list. 
Schrijver, N., Natural resources and sustainable 
development, (in:) Thomas G. Weiss, Sam Daws, 
The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 
Oxford 2007:592-610.
Schubert, A., I. Lang, The Literature Aftermath 
of the Brundtland Report “Our Common 
Future”. A Scientometric Study Based On 
Citations in Science and Social Science Journals, 
Environment, Development and Sustainability, 
Vol.7, No. 1, January 2005:1-8. 
Schukoske, J. E., Meaningful exchange: 
Collaboration among clinicians and law teachers 
in India and the United States (in:) L. G. Trubek, 
J. Cooper, Educating for Justice Around the 
World. Legal Education, Legal Practice and the 
Community, Ashgate, Dartmouth 1999:233-264.
Schwarzenberg, G., The Inductive Approach to 
International Law, Stevens & Sons, London 1965.
Sellin, T., Introduction: Tocqueville and Beaumont 
and Prison Reform in France (in:) Gustave 
de Beaumont, Alexis de Tocqueville, On the 
Penitentiary System in the United States and 
Its Application in France, Southern Illinois 
University Press, Chicago, Illinois 1979. 
Shalloo, P. Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology (1931-1951), Vol. 41, No. 1 (May - June 
1950):82-82. 
Sharogrodsky, M.D., Determinism i otwietsviennost’ 
(Determinism and Responsibility), Pravoviedenije 
1968, Nr. 1. 
Shelley, L. Crime and Modernization: The Impact 
of Industrialization and Urbanization on Crime, 
Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 
Illinois 1981.
Siegel, L. H., Criminology. Theories, Patterns 
and Typologies, Eighth Edition, Thomson 
Wadsworth, Belmont 2008.
Simma, B. (ed.), Paulus, A., Chatodou, E. (ass. eds), 
in collaboration with H. Mosler, A. Radelzhofer, 
Ch. Tomuschat, R. Wolfrum, The Charter of 
the United Nations. A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press, second edition, Oxford 2002. 
Singer, J. D., The Finances of the League of Nations, 
International Organizations, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(Spring, 1959):255-273. 
Skotnicki, A., Criminal Justice and the Catholic 
Church, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 
Maryland 2007.
Slobogin, Ch. The civilization of the criminal law, 
Vanderbilt Law Review, Jan 2005, Vol. 58, 121-168. 
Small Arms Survey Report. Profiling the Problem, A 
Project of the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.
Small Arms Survey Report. Counting the Human 
Cost, A Project of the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2002. 
Small Arms Survey Report. Unfinished Business, A 
Project of the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006.
Small Arms Survey Report. Guns, Groups and 
Guns. A Project of the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2010.
Smelser, N., The modernization of social relations, 
(in:) M. Wyner (ed.) Modernization: The 
Dynamics of Growth, Basic Books, New York 
1966:110-121.
Stretesky, P. B., Michael J. Lynch, The relationship 
between lead and crime, Journal of Health and 
Social Behaviour, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2004):214-
229.
Sunga, L., The concept of human security: Does 
it add anything of value to international legal 
theory or practice? (in:) Oberprantacher A., 
Power and Justice in International Relations, 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Global 
Challenges, Ashgate 2009.
Swain, M.H., Love and Politics in Wartime: Letters 
to My Wife, 1943-45. By Benedict S. Alper., ed. by 
Joan Wallach Scott. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1992, The Journal of American History, Vol. 
80, No. 2 (Sep., 1993):743-744.
Swianiewicz, St., Forced Labour and Economic 
Development; An Enquiry into the Experience of 
Soviet Industrialization, Oxford 1965.
Szwedkowski, S., Walka z przestępczością. Studium 
społeczne, (The Fight against Crime. Social Study), 
Księgarnia Naukowa T. Szczęsny i S-ka, Toruń 
1947.
Teeters, N. K. (1946). The first international 
penitentiary congresses, 1846-47-57, The Prison 
Journal 1946 (26):190-193.
Teitel, R.G., Transitional justice genealogy, Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, Vol. 16 (2003):69-94.
Terril, R. J., Justice as overlooked component in 
international peacekeeping initiatives (in:) 
X International Symposium on Victimology. 
Abstract Book, Montreal 2000.
250
Thome, H., Explaining the Long-Term Trend in 
Violent Crime: A Heuristic Scheme and Some 
Methodological Considerations, International 
Journal of Conflict and Violence, Vol. 1 (2) 
2007:185 -202.
Thornhill, J. The Philosophy of History of 
Artnold Toyenbee, Pontificium Athenaeum 
Internationale ”Angelicum”, Facultas 
Philosophiae, Washington 1966:25.
Tromenaars, F., Law across cultures: an overview, 
(in:) Roger Blanpain (ed.), Law in Motion. 
International Encyclopeadia of Laws. Recent 
Developments in Civil Procedure, Constitutional, 
Contract, Criminal, Environmental, Family 
& Succession, Intellectual Property, Labour, 
Medical, Social Security, Transport Law. World 
Law Conference (Brussels, 9-12 September 1996), 
Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht 1997:27-46.
Towards a New Consensus on Justice Reform: 
Mapping the Criminal Justice System, Open 
Society Report, July 2008.
Tyszkiewicz L., Zarys rozwoju kryminologii w 
Polsce w latach 1945-1969, Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny, 1970/3:61-74. 
van Dijk, J., Justice and Development Across the 
World, Sage, Thousand Oaks, California 2008.
Verkko, V., Henki- ja pahoinpitelyrikollisuuden 
kehityssuunnan ja tason määräämisestä 
(Determining the trends in and level of homicide 
and assault), Helsinki 1931. 
Verkko V., Homicides and Suicides in Finland 
and their Dependence on National Character, 
Preface by Thorsten Sellin, G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 
København 1951.
Verkko, V., Verbrechen Wider aus das Leben 
und Körper Verletzungsverbrechen über 
die Bestimmung ihrer Etwicklungsrichtung 
und Stufe. Eine Statistisch-Methodologische 
Untersuchung. Finland und die Benachbarten 
Ländern, Helsinki 1937.
Vetere, E., Graeme Newman, International crime 
statistics: an overview from a comparative 
perspective, Abstracts on Criminology and 
Penology 1978:251-273.
Villé, R., U. Zvekic, J. F. Klaus, Promoting probation 
internationally, Proceedings of the International 
Training Workshop on Probation (2-5 July 1997, 
Valetta, Malta, United Nations Interregional 
Crime and Justice Research Institute - 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Publication No. 58, 
Rome December 1997.
Vlassis, D., Drafting the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, in: 
Williams, P., D. Vlassis, (eds.) Combating 
Transnational Crime. Concepts, Activities and 
Responses, Frank Cass, London 2001.
Violence, Injuries and Disability. Biennial Report 
2006-2007, World Health Organization, Geneva
von Hentig, H., Remarks on the Interaction of 
Perpetrator and Victim, Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 1940/41/31:303-309.
Wagner, G., Comparative tort law (in:) M. Reimann, 
R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law, Oxford 2008.
Wallach Scott, J. (ed.), Benedict S. Alper, Love and 
Politics in Wartime. Letters to My Wife, 1943-1945, 
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois 1992.
Walters R., Social defence and international 
reconstruction. Illustrating the governance of 
post-war criminological discourse, Theoretical 
Criminology, Vol. 5, No. 2, 203-221 (2001).
Walters, R., Deviant Knowledge. Criminology, 
Politics and Policy, Willan Publishing, Abingdon 
2003.
Wallerstein, E., The capitalist world economy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979.
Weber, T., Gandhi, Deep Ecology, Peace Research 
and Buddhist Economics, Journal of Peace 
Research; Vol. 36, Number 3, May 1999: 349-361.
Weeramantery, Ch., opinion in Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Project, ICJ Reports 1997. 
Weiss, T., What’s Wrong with the United Nations, 
and How to Fix it?, Polity, Hoboken, New Jersey 
2008.
Weiss, T., S. Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the 
United Nations, Oxford 2007.
Weiss, T. G., T. Carayannis, L. Emmerij, UN Voices: 
The Struggle for Development and Social Justice, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana 
2005.
White, L., The science of culture: a study of man 
and civilization, Grove Press, New York 1949
Williams, D., The Minimum Sentences Act, 1972 of 
Tanzania, Journal of African Law, Vol. 18, No. 1, 
1974:79-91.
Winslow, R. W., Sheldon X. Zhang, Criminology. A 
Global Perspective, Pearson-Prentice Hall, Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey 2008.
Wines, E. C., The State of Prisons and Child-Saving 
Institutions in the Civilized World, University 
Press: John Wilson & Son, Cambridge 1880.
Wines, E.C., Penitentiary Congress, Pennsylvania 
Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy. 
Oct 1846. Vol. 2, Issue 4.
Wolfgang, M, International Crime Statistics: 
a Proposal, The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 58, No. 1 
(1967):65-69.
Wolfgang, M., The future of crime, criminology  
and corrections, (in:) Edward M. Wise, Studies in 
Honor of Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Fred B. Rothman 
& Co, Littleton, Colorado 1994:285-290. 
Blue Criminology
251
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
III B Chronological list of relevant  
United Nations resolutions and other  
official documentation (1946-2011):  
General Assembly, Economic and Social  
Council, Security Council, the United Nations  
congresses on crime prevention and criminal  
justice and other intergovernmental 
conferences556
1945
WD 65 CO/31, The United Nations Conference on 
International Organization, Summary Report of Se - 
cond Meeting of Advisory Committee of Jurists, 1 
June 1945 (in:) Documents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, San 
Francisco, 1945, Vol. XVII, Part. I, United Nations, 
New York 1954.
WD 268 CO/110, The United Nations Conference 
on International Organization, Summary Report 
of Second Meeting of Advisory Committee of Ju-
rists, 10 June 1945, (in:) Documents of the United 
Nations Conference on International Organization, 
San Francisco, 1945, Vol. XVII, Part. I, United Na-
tions, New York 1954.
1947
E/CN 5/30, Rev.1, Preliminary report on the preven-
tion of crime and treatment of offenders.
556	 The	symbols	identifying	UN	documents	are	composed	of	capital	letters	combined	with	figures.	The	capital	letters	which	begin	the	citation	
specify	 the	organ	or	subsidiary	body	 from	which	 the	document	emanates.	Save	 for	a	 few	1945	texts,	United	Nations	 resolutions	may	be	
retrieved	 from	 the	United	Nations	Yearbooks	 (1946-2010)	http://unyearbook.un.org,	 through	 the	United	Nations	Optical	Documentation	
System,	http://www.ods.un.org	or	via	the	UNODC	home	page	http://www.unodc.org	(documentation	on	the	quinquennial	United	Nations	
congresses	on	crime	prevention	and	criminal	justice	and	on	the	annual	sessions	of	the	Commission	on	Crime	Prevention	and	Criminal	Justice	
plus	UNODC	publications).	The	electronic	availability	of	other	texts,	especially	the	older	ones,	is	limited.
Wołoszyn, S., Korczak, Wiedza 
Powszechna,Warszawa, 1978.
Woodward, B.K. Global Civil Society in 
International Lawmaking and Global 
Governance. Theory and Practice, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2010.
World Commission on Environment and 
Development, Our Common Future, Oxford 
1987. 
Zehr, H., Mika, H. (1998). Fundamental Concepts of 
Restorative Justice, Contemporary Justice
Review: Issues in Criminal, Social, and Restorative 
Justice, Vol. 1, Issue 1:47-56.
Zweigert, K., H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative 
Law, Tony Weiers trans., 3rd ed., Oxford 1998.
1948
ECOSOC resolution 155 (VIII) C, 13 August 1948.
A/200 (III), Technical assistance for economic devel-
opment, 4 December 1948. 
A/246 (III), International facilities for the promo-
tion of training in public administration, 4 Decem-
ber 1948.
A/ 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 10 December 1948.
1950
E/CN.5/204, Statistical report on the state of crime 
1937-1946, 23 February 1950.
E/CN.5/AC.4/L.4, Criminal statistics. Comparative 
observations on criminal statistics. Memorandum 
submitted by Mr. Marc Ancel, member of the In-
ternational Group of Experts on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 28 Novem-
ber 1950.
A/415 (V), Transfer of functions of the Internation-
al Penal and Penitentiary Commission, 1 December 
1950.
E/CN.5/AC.4/L.6, Survey of previous international 
comparison in criminal statistics, prepared by Prof. 
Veli Verkko, 6 December 1950.
A/CN. 4/39, V.V. Pella, Memorandum Concerning a 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Secu-
rity of Mankind, 4 November 1950.
A/418 (V), Advisory social welfare services, 1 Decem-
ber 1950. 
A/1547, Coordination between the United Nations and 
the specialized agencies: report of the Joint Second and 
Third Committee and the Fifth Committee meeting 
jointly, 314th Plenary Meeting, 1 December 1950.
1952
A/626 (VII), Right to exploit freely natural wealth 
and resources, 21 December 1952.
1955
A/CONF. 6/L/1, Rules of Procedure. First United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
252
Treatment of Offenders, (Geneva, 22 August-3 Sep-
tember 1955). 
1957
ECOSOC resolutions 663 C (XXIV) and 2076 (LXII), 
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, 31 July 1957 and 13 May 1977.
1959
E/CN.5/337, Criminal statistics. Standard classifica-
tion of offences, 2 March 1959.
1960
A/CONF.17/20, Report on the Second United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (London, 8-19 August 1960).
A/1514 (XV), Declaration on the granting of inde-
pendence to colonial countries and peoples, 14 De-
cember 1960.
1961
A/1710 (XVI), United Nations Decade. A programme 
for international economic co-operation, 19 Decem-
ber 1961.
A/1711 (XVI), Reaffirmation of General Assembly res-
olution 1522 (XV) on the accelerated flow of capi-
tal and technical assistance to the under-developed 
countries, 19 December 1961.
1962
A/1803 (XVII), Permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, 14 December 1962.
1966
A/2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 16 December 1966.
1969
A/2542 (XXIV), Declaration on social progress and 
development, 11 November 1969.
1970
A/CONF. 43/5, Fourth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders (Kyoto, Japan, 17-26 August 1970), Report 
prepared by the Secretariat.
A/2626 (XXV), International Development Strate-
gy for the Second United Nations Development De-
cade, 24 October 1970.
1971
A/2857 (XXVI), Capital punishment, 20 December 
1971.
1973
ECOSOC resolution 1745 (LIV), Capital punishment, 
16 May 1973.
1974
A/3201 (S VI), Declaration on the establishment of a 
New International Economic Order, 1 May 1974.
A/3202 (S VI), Programme of action on the establish-
ment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 
1974.
A/3281 (XXIX), Charter of economic rights and du-
ties of States, 12 December 1974.
1975
A/CONF. 56/10, Fifth United Nations Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders (Geneva, 1-12 September 1975), Report pre-
pared by the Secretariat.
A/3452(XXX), Declaration on the protection of all 
persons from being subjected to torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, 9 December 1975.
1977
ECOSOC resolutions 663 C (XXIV) and 2076 (LXII), 
The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, 31 July 1957 and 13 May 1977.
1979
A/5 (XXXV), Question of the realization in all coun-
tries of economic, social and cultural rights con-
tained in the Universal Declaration and in the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and study of special problems which the de-
veloping countries face in their efforts to achieve 
those human rights, 2 March 1979.
General Assembly resolution 34/16, Code of Conduct 
for Law Enforcement Officials, 17 December 1979. 
1980
A/CONF. 144/6, Third United Nations Survey of 
Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Sys-
tems and Crime Prevention Strategies, Report pre-
pared by the Secretariat, 27 July 1990. 
Blue Criminology
253
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
A/37/171, Report of the Sixth United Nations Con-
gress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders (Caracas, Venezuela, 1980), 15 Decem-
ber 1980.
1983
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/24/Rev.1, The New Internation-
al Economic Order and the Promotion of Human 
Rights. Study prepared by Raúl Ferrero, Special Rap-
porteur of the Subcommission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities, United 
Nations, New York 1986.
ECOSOC resolution 1983/25, Functions and the 
long-term programme of work of the Committee on 
Crime Prevention and Control, 26 May 1983.
1984
ECOSOC resolution 1984/50, Safeguards guarantee-
ing protection of the rights of those facing the death 
penalty, 25 May 1984.
A/39/46, Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, 10 December 1984.
1985
A/40/32, Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, 29 November 1985.
A/40/34, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 29 Novem-
ber 1985.
1986
A/41/128, Annex, Declaration on the Right to Devel-
opment, 4 December 1986.
1987
A/42/187, Report of the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development, 11 December 1987. 
1989
ECOSOC resolution 1989/65, Principles on the Effec-
tive Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbi-
trary and Summary Executions, Annex, 24 May 1989.
1990
E/1990/31/Add. 1, Report of the Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control, the need for the creation of an 
effective international crime and justice programme.
A/CONF.144/6, Third United Nations Survey of 
Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Sys-
tems and Crime Prevention Strategies, Report pre-
pared by the Secretariat, 27 July 1990. 
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 112 (1990), Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Pre-
vention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Ha-
vana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.
A/45/107, International co-operation for crime pre-
vention and criminal justice in the context of devel-
opment, 14 December 1990.
A/45/110, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules 
for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules), 14 
December 1990.
A/45/112, Guidelines for the Prevention of Juve-
nile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines), 14 December 
1990.
A/CONF. 156/CRP.1, Draft international conven-
tion on cooperation in crime prevention and crimi-
nal justice, Ministerial Meeting on the Structure and 
Programme of Work of the United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (Paris, 
21-23 November 1991). 
A/46/703, Note of the Secretary-General transmit-
ting the report of the Ministerial Meeting on the 
Creation of an Effective Crime Prevention and Crim-
inal Justice Programme (Paris, 21-23 November 1991).
1992
A/47/277-S/2411, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Report 
of the Secretary-General, 17 June 1992.
ST/ESA/234, Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable 
Development: Goals in Conflict? Views and Rec-
ommendations of the Committee for Development 
Planning. Department of Economic and Social De-
velopment, United Nations, New York, 1992.
1993
E/1993/32, Report of the Commission on Crime Pre-
vention and Criminal Justice on its second session 
(Vienna, Austria, 13-23 April 1993).
ACC/1993/PER/R/11/Add.1, An Annotated History of 
the Compensation Philosophy of the League of Na-
tions and the United Nations, 26 May 1993.
1994
ECOSOC resolution 1994/18. United Nations stand-
ards and norms in crime prevention and criminal 
justice, 24 July 1994.
254
A/49/159, The Naples Political Declaration and 
Global Action Plan against Organized Transnation-
al Crime, 23 December 1994.
1995
A/50/60S/1995/1, Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General, 22 
January 1995.
A/CONF. 169/16, Report of the Ninth United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of 
Offenders (Cairo, Egypt, 29 April-8 May 1995).
ECOSOC resolution 1995/9, Guidelines for the pre-
vention of urban crime, 24 July 1995.
ECOSOC resolution 1995/27, Measures to regulate 
firearms for the purpose of combating illicit traf-
ficking in firearms, 24 July 1995.
A/ 50/181, Human rights in the administration of jus-
tice, 22 December 1995.
1996
A/C.3/51/7, Draft United Nations framework con-
vention against organized crime, Letter dated 24 
September 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Poland addressed to the Secretary-
General.
A/51/60, United Nations Declaration on Crime and 
Public Security, 12 December 1996, Annex.
1997
ECOSOC resolution 1997/30, Administration of ju-
venile justice, 21 July 1997.
A/C.5/52/28, United Nations Common System, Note 
by the Secretary-General, 2 December 1997.
A/52/136, Right to development, 12 December 1997. 
1998
A/CONF. 183/13, United Nations Diplomatic Confer-
ence of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998 
Official Records, Vol. I, Final documents. Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court and Final 
Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court [with an annex containing 
the resolutions adopted by the Conference], United 
Nations, New York 2002.
A/CONF.183/Cl/L.27/Rev. l, Notes contained in the 
transmittal letter from the Chairman of the Com-
mittee of the Whole to the Chairman of the Drafting 
Committee, Part 2. Jurisdiction, admissibility and 
applicable law, 6 July 1998.
1999
A/54/404, Small arms. Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, 24 September 1999.
A/54/125, The Tenth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers, 17 December 1999.
2000
A/55/305-S/2000/809, Report of the Panel on UN 
Peace Operations, 21 August 2000.
A/55/25, United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime, 15 November 2000.
A/55/59, The Vienna Declaration on Crime and Jus-
tice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Cen-
tury, The Tenth United Nations Congress on the Pre-
vention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Vienna, 10-17 April 2000. 4 December 2000. 
2001
A/55-985-S/2001/565, Prevention of Armed Conflict: 
Report of the Secretary-General, 7 June 2001.
A/56/83, Report on the inspection of programme 
management and administrative practices in the Of-
fice for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Note by 
the Secretary-General, 1 June 2001.
General Assembly, Decision 55/488 of 7 September 
2001.
2002
ECOSOC resolution 2002/12, Basic principles on the 
use of restorative justice programmes in criminal 
matters, 24 July 2002, Annex.
ECOSOC resolution 2002/13, Guidelines for the Pre-
vention of Crime, 24 July 2002, Annex.
2003
E/CN.15/2003/10 and Add 1, Report of the Meeting 
of Experts on the Use and Application of United Na-
tions Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, Stadtschlaining, Austria, 10-12 Feb-
ruary 2003.
A/58/4, United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion, 31 October 2003.
2004
ECOSOC resolution 2004/25, The rule of law and de-
velopment: strengthening the rule of law and the re-
Blue Criminology
255
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
form of criminal justice institutions, with emphasis 
on technical assistance, including in post-conflict re-
construction, 21 July 2004. 
ECOSOC resolution 2004/28, United Nations stand-
ards and norms in crime prevention and criminal 
justice, 21 July 2004.
ECOSOC resolution 2004/31, Prevention of urban 
crime, 24 July 2004.
S/2004/616, The rule of law and transitional justice 
in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the 
Secretary-General, 3 August 2004.
A/59/565, Report of the Secretary General’s High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 1 
December 2004. 
2005
A/59/2005, In larger freedom: towards development, 
security and human rights for all. Report of the Sec-
retary-General, 21 March 2005. 
ECOSOC resolution 2005/22, Action to promote ef-
fective crime prevention, 22 July 2005.
A/60/177, The Bangkok Declaration – Synergies and 
Responses: Strategic Alliances in Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice, The Eleventh United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
Bangkok, 18-25 April, 2005, 16 December 2005.
2006 
A/60/692 and Corr. 1, Investing in the United Na-
tions: for a stronger Organization worldwide, 7 
March 2006.
ECOSOC resolution 2006/23, Strengthening basic 
principles of judicial conduct, 27 July 2006.
ECOSOC resolution 2006/25 Strengthening the rule 
of law and the reform of criminal justice institu-
tions, including in post-conflict reconstruction, 27 
July 2006.
A/61/583, Delivering as one, Report of the High-level 
Panel on United Nations System-Wide Coherence in 
the areas of development, humanitarian assistance 
and the environment, 20 November 2006.
2007
E/CN.15/2007/CRP.3, Note by the Secretariat on 
crime prevention and criminal justice responses to 
urban crime, including gang-related activities, and 
effective crime prevention and criminal justice re-
sponses to combat sexual exploitation of children, 13 
March 2007.
A/61/271, International Day of Non-Violence, 27 June 
2007.
A/62/149, Moratorium on the use of the death penal-
ty, 18 December 2007.
E/CN.7/2007/14–E/CN.15/2007/5, Strategy for the 
period 2008-2011 for the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 1 October 2007.
E/CN.15/2007/6, Report of the Intergovernmental 
Group of Experts on Lessons Learnt from United Na-
tions Congresses on Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice, Bangkok, 15-18 August 2006, 20 October 
2006.
E/CN.15/2007CRP.1, Summary of the Bangkok Dec-
laration and its Application in Thailand - Report of 
the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Lessons 
Learnt from United Nations Congresses on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Bangkok, 15-18 Au-
gust 2006, 9 November 2006.
A/62/175, Strengthening the United Nations Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in par-
ticular its technical cooperation capacity, 18 Decem-
ber 2007.
2009
A/64/6, Proposed programme budget for the bien-
nium 2010-2011, Foreword and introduction, 5 June 
2009.
2010
A/CONF.213/3, Twelfth United Nations Congress on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Report on 
the state of crime and criminal justice worldwide, 1 
February 2010.
A/CONF.213/12, Twelfth United Nations Congress 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Interna-
tional criminal justice education for the rule of law, 
5 February 2010.
Guidance note of the Secretary-General, United Na-
tions approach to transitional justice, 11 March 2010.
A/CONF.213/18, Report of the Twelfth United Na-
tions Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice (Salvador, Brazil), 19 April 2010. 
S/PRST/2010/4 of 24 February 2010, Threats to inter-
national peace and security.
SC 9867, Security Council calls for strengthened in-
ternational, regional cooperation to counter trans-
national organized crime, in presidential statement, 
press release, 24 February 2010.
256
E/CN.15/2010/CRP.1, Drug control, crime prevention 
and criminal justice: A human rights perspective. 
Note by the Executive Director, 3 March 2010.
E/CN.15/2010/30, Report on the nineteenth session 
of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Control 
(9 December 2009 & 17-21 May 2010).
RC/4, International Criminal Court, Assembly of 
State Parties, Kampala Declaration, 11 June 2010.
RC/Res.1, International Criminal Court, Assembly of 
State Parties, Complementarity, 14 June 2010.
A/64/289, System-wide coherence, 21 July 2010.
A/65/206, Moratorium on the use of the death pen-
alty, 21 December 2010.
A/65/229, The Standard Minimum Rules for Women 
Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women 
Offenders (“The Bangkok Rules”), 21 December 2010. 
A/65/230, The Twelfth United Nations Congress on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 23 Decem-
ber 2010.
2011
E/CN.15/2011/15, Follow-up to the Twelfth United 
Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Crimi-
nal Justice and preparations for the Thirteenth Unit-
ed Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Cri-
minal Justice, 1 February 2011.
III C United Nations publications
Ancel, M., Capital punishment. United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New 
York 1962.
Ancel, M., Observations on the international 
comparison of criminal statistics, International 
Review of Criminal Policy, 1952 No. 1:41-8.
Annan, K.F., Common values for a common era: 
Even as we cherish our diversity, we need to 
discover our shared values, Civilization: The 
Magazine of the Library of Congress, 28 June 
1999, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/
articleFull.asp?TID=37.
Carroll, D. (ed.), The University Teaching of Social 
Sciences: Criminology, UNESCO, Paris 1957. 
Clifford, W., The evaluation of methods for the 
prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquents 
in Africa south of Sahara, International Review of 
Criminal Policy 1963 No. 21. 
Commentary on the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (the 
Tokyo Rules), UN doc. ST/CSDHA/22, United 
Nations, New York 1993.
Grassberger, R., Austria, Summary of the report 
(in:) Carroll, D. (ed.), The University Teaching 
of Social Sciences: Criminology, UNESCO, Paris 
1957:59-67. 
Office of the Higher Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States. 
Monitoring the Legal System, New York 2006.
UNDP Human Development Report 1994, United 
Nations, New York 1994.
UNDP Human Development Report 2007, United 
Nations, New York 2007.
UNDP, Justice and SSR, BPCR’s Programmic 
Approach, November 2002.
UNEG, Norms for Evaluation in the UN System, 
April 2005a.
UNEG, Standards for Evaluation in the UN System, 
April 2005b.
UNESCO, The Seville Statement on Violence, 
http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=3247&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html .
UN-HABITAT, Slums of the World: The face of 
urban poverty in the new millennium?, Working 
Paper, GUO, 2003.
UN-HABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2006/7. 
The Millennium Development Goals and Urban 
Sustainability. 30 Years of Shaping the Habitat 
Agenda, Erathscan 2006.
UNIS/CP/609E, Delegates at United Nations Crime 
Congress Hear Call for Overhaul of Criminal 
Justice Systems to Reduce Prison Overcrowding, 
16 April 2010.
United Nations, High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, New York 2004.
United Nations, Manual for the Development of 
Criminal Justice Statistics. Studies in Methods, 
Series F No. 43 ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/43, New 
York 1986.
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Newsletter, Special double issue on the 
history of the United Nations in the field of crime 
prevention and criminal justice up to 1 February 
1992, Vienna 1992.
United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for 
United Nations Police, New York 2009.
United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-
General, Report on Supporting Victims of 
Terrorism, http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/
UN%20Report%20on%20Supporting%20
Victims%20of%20Terrorism.pdf.
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 
Global Report on Human Settlements 2007, 
Enhancing Urban Safety and Security, Earthscan, 
London-Sterling, VA 2007. 
United Nations Juvenile Justice Panel, Criteria for 
the Design and Evaluation of Juvenile Reform 
Programmes, 2010.
Blue Criminology
257
A
nn
ex
es
A
nn
ex
 II
I
United Nations Today, United Nations, New York, 
2008.
UNODC, A Century of International Drug Control. 
100 Years, Vienna 2009.
UNODC, Corruption. Compendium of 
International Legal Instruments on Corruption. 
Second edition, United Nations, New York 2005.
UNODC, Guide to Implementing Family 
Skills Training Programmes for Drug Abuse 
Prevention, United Nations, New York 2009. 
UNODC & UNECE, Manual on Victimization 
Surveys, United Nations, Geneva 2010.
UNODC & UN Habitat, Crime Prevention 
Assessment Tool, Criminal Justice Handbook 
Series, New York 2009.
UNODC, Handbook on Planning and Action 
for Crime Prevention in South Africa and the 
Caribbean Regions, Vienna 2008. 
UNODC, Handbook on Restorative Justice 
Programmes, Vienna 2006.
UNODC, Sustainable Livelihood. A broader vision. 
Social Support and Integration to Prevent Illicit 
Drug Use, HIV /AIDS and Crime. Discussion 
Paper, Vienna 2010.
UNODC, The Globalization of Crime: A 
Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment, Vienna 2010. 
UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of UNODC 
Alternative Development Initiatives, 
Independent Evaluation Unit, November 2005. 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/
Thematic_eval_AD_Nov05.pdf.
UNOV, United Nations Criminal Justice Standards 
for Peace-keeping Police. Handbook prepared 
by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Branch, Vienna, February 1994. 
UNU 2008, United Nations University and 
University of Tokyo to Sign Memorandum on 
Joint Sustainability Research, 10 July 2008, MR/
J29/08.
III D Publications of the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
Programme Network Of Institutes
A/CONF. 144/NGO 2, Anstee, M. J., Opening 
address (in:) International Congress. Cesare 
Beccaria and Modern Criminal Policy, Committee 
of the Municipality of Milan for the Celebration 
of the 250th Anniversary of Cesare Beccaria’s 
Birth, under the auspices of the United Nations 
Organization, organized by Centro Nazionale 
di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale, Giuffrè editore, 
Milan 1988. 
Aromaa, K., Redo, S., (eds.), For the Rule of Law: 
Criminal Justice Teaching and Training @cross 
the World, HEUNI-KICJP, Helsinki-Seoul 2008.
David, P. (ed.), Crime and Criminal Policy: Papers 
in Honour of Manuel López-Rey Y Arrojo, 
UNICRI publication No 25, 1985.
Korean Institute of Criminal Justice Policy & United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Report, June 
28-30, 2006, Seoul, Korea.
Shelley, L., The Internationalization of Crime: 
The changing relationship between crime 
and development (in:) U. Zvekic, United 
Nations Studies on Crime and Development, 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute, Publication No. 36, Rome, July 1990:119-
133.
United Nations Interregional Research Crime 
and Justice Institute, First joint international 
conference on research in crime prevention, 
Riyadh, 23-25 January 1984, UNICRI publication 
No. 26, 1984.
United Nations Social Defence Research Institute, 
Social Defence in Uganda: A Survey of Research, 
Publication No. 3, 1971.
United Nations Social Defence Research Institute, 
Economic Crises and Crime. Correlations 
between the State and the Economy, Deviance 
and the Control of Deviance, Publication No. 15, 
Rome May 1976.
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute, Studies on Crime and 
Development, Publication No. 36, Rome, July 
1990.
Vasak, K., Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: 
the Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law 
to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, UNESCO Courier 30:11, Paris: United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, November 1977.
Villé, R., U. Zvekic, J. F. Klaus, Promoting probation 
internationally, Proceedings of the International 
Training Workshop on Probation (2-5 July 1997, 
Valetta, Malta), United Nations Interregional 
Crime and Justice Research Institute - 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Publication No. 58, 
Rome/London December 1997.
IV Guidance Note, UNOCD movie 
documentaries, photo album 
and other resource material 
(DVD)
258
HEUNI Reports
71. Men’s experiences of violence in Finland 2009. 
Markku Heiskanen & Elina Ruuskanen. Helsinki 
2011.
70. Trust in justice: Why it is important for crimi-
nal policy, and how it can be measured. Final report 
of the euro-Justis project. Mike Hough and Mai Sato 
(eds.). Helsinki 2011. 
69. Organised crime, corruption and the movement 
of people across borders in the new enlarged EU: A 
case study of Estonia, Finland and the UK. Jon Spen-
cer, Rose Broad, Kauko Aromaa et. al. Helsinki 2011. 
Web-publication.
68. Trafficking for Forced Labour and Labour Exploi-
tation in Finland, Poland and Estonia. Anniina Jo-
kinen, Natalia Ollus and Kauko Aromaa (eds.). Hel-
sinki 2011. 
67. Ehdoilla millä hyvänsä. Työperäinen ihmiskaup-
pa ja ulkomaalaisten työntekijöiden hyväksikäyttö 
Suomessa. Anniina Jokinen, Natalia Ollus ja Minna 
Viuhko. Helsinki 2011.
66. Tuhansien iskujen maa – Miesten kokema väki-
valta Suomessa. Markku Heiskanen & Elina Ruuska-
nen. Helsinki 2010. Verkkojulkaisu/Web publicati-
on.
65. Survey of United Nations and other Best Practic-
es in the Treatment of Prisoners in the Criminal Jus-
tice System: Proceeding of the workshop held at the 
Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice Salvador, Brazil, 12-19 April 
2010. Kauko Aromaa & Terhi Viljanen. Helsinki 2010.
64. International Statistics on Crime and Justice. Ed-
ited by S. Harrendorf, M. Heiskanen, S. Malby. Hel-
sinki 2010.
63. Syyttäjiin ja tuomareihin kohdistunut epäasial-
linen vaikuttaminen Suomessa 2007-2008. Mika 
Junninen & Kauko Aromaa. Helsinki 2010. English 
summary. Verkkojulkaisu/Web-publication.
62. Human Trafficking and Organised Crime. Traf-
ficking for sexual exploitation and organised procur-
ing in Finland. Minna Viuhko and Anniina Jokinen. 
Helsinki 2009.
61. Corruption on the Finnish - Russian border. Ex-
periences and observations of Finnish and Russian 
civil servants and business persons on corruption on 
the border between Finland and Russia. Kauko Aro-
maa et al. Helsinki 2009. 
60. Korruptio Suomen ja Venäjän rajalla. Suomalais-
ten viranomaisten näkemyksiä korruptiosta itärajal-
la. Minna Viuhko and Martti Lehti. Helsinki 2009.
59. JUSTIS Project Working Papers. Review of Need: 
Indicators of Public Confidence in Criminal Justice 
for Policy Assessment. Anniina Jokinen, Elina Ruus-
kanen et al. Helsinki 2009.
58. Suomalaisten vankiloiden turvallisuus. Mika 
Junninen Helsinki 2008. Joint publication with the 
Criminal Sanctions Agency Finland. English descrip-
tion only.
57. Hate Crime. Papers from the 2006 and 2007 
Stockholm Criminology Symposiums Joanna Good-
ey and Kauko Aromaa (eds.). Helsinki 2008. 
56. Victimisation Surveys in Comparative Perspec-
tive. Kauko Aromaa and Markku Heiskanen (eds.). 
Helsinki 2008. 
55. Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Europe 
and North America 1995-2004. Kauko Aromaa and 
Markku Heiskanen (eds.). Helsinki 2008. 
54. Service Provision for Detainees with Problematic 
Drug and Alcohol Use in Police Detention. A Com-
parative Study of Selected Countries in the European 
Union. Morag MacDonald et al. Helsinki 2008. 
53. For the Rule of Law: Criminal Justice Teaching 
and Training @cross the World. Kauko Aromaa and 
Slawomir Redo (eds.). Helsinki 2008. (Out of print)
52. Restorative Justice Theory and Practice: Ad-
dressing the Discrepancy. Theo Gavrielides. Helsin-
ki 2007. 
51. Violence Against Women in Finland (English 
summary) Minna Piispa, Markku Heiskanen, Juha 
Kääriäinen and Reino Sirén. Helsinki 2006. 
50. International Key Issues in Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice - Papers in celebration of 25 years 
of HEUNI. Edited by Kauko Aromaa and Terhi Vil-
janen. Helsinki 2006. 
49. Maximizing the Effectiveness of the Technical 
Assistance Provided in the Fields of Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice. Edited by Margaret Shaw 
and Yvon Dandurand. Helsinki 2006. 
48. Penal Policy, Justice Reform and Social Exclu-
sion: Plenary presentations held at the Fifth Annu-
al Conference of the European Society of Criminol-
ogy, Krakow, Poland 2005. Edited by Kauko Aromaa. 
Helsinki 2007.
Blue Criminology
259
47. Adventurers and Risk-Takers: Finnish profes-
sional criminals and their organisations in the 1990s 
cross-border criminality. Mika Junninen. Helsinki 
2006.
46. Enhancing International Law Enforcement Co-
operation, including Extradition Measures. Edited 
by Kauko Aromaa and Terhi Viljanen. Helsinki 2005. 
45. A Study of the Health Care Provision, Existing 
Drug Services and Strategies Operating in Prisons 
in Ten Countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Morag MacDonald. Helsinki 2005.
44. Crime and Crime Control in an Integrating Eu-
rope. Plenary presentations held at the Third Annu-
al Conference of the European Society of Criminolo-
gy, Helsinki 2003. Edited by Kauko Aromaa and Sami 
Nevala. Helsinki 2004.
43. Self-Reported Juvenile Delinquency in England 
and Wales, the Netherlands and Spain. Rosemary 
Barberet, Benjamin Bowling, Josine Junger-Tas, Cris-
tina Rechea-Alberola, John van Kesteren, Andrew 
Zuruwan. Helsinki 2004.
42. Organised crime, Trafficking, Drugs: Selected 
papers presented at the Annual Conference of the 
European Society of Criminology, Helsinki 2003. 
Edited by Sami Nevala and Kauko Aromaa. Helsin-
ki 2004. 
41. Further Developments in the Prison Systems of 
Central And Eastern Europe: Achievements, prob-
lems and objectives. Roy Walmsley. Helsinki 2003.
40. Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Europe 
and North America 1995-1997. Kauko Aromaa, Sep-
po Leppä, Sami Nevala and Natalia Ollus, editors. 
Helsinki 2003. 
39. Crime Victims: Doing Justice to their Support 
and Protection. Irwin Waller. Helsinki 2003. 
38. Trafficking in Human Beings, Illegal Immigra-
tion and Finland. Martti Lehti and Kauko Aromaa. 
Helsinki 2002. 
37. Assessing International Assistance in Law En-
forcement: Themes, findings and recommendations 
from a case-study of the Republic of Estonia. Bill He-
benton and Jon Spencer. Helsinki 2001. 
36. Women in the Criminal Justice System: Inter-
national examples & national responses. Proceed-
ings of the workshop held at the Tenth United Na-
tions Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders. Vienna, Austria, 10-17 April 
2000. Natalia Ollus and Sami Nevala, editors. Hel-
sinki 2001. 
35. 2001 directory computerised criminal justice in-
formation systems. Richard Scherpenzeel. The 
Hague/Helsinki 2000. 
34. Five Issues in European Criminal Justice: Corrup-
tion, Women in the Criminal Justice System, Crimi-
nal Policy Indicators, Community Crime Prevention, 
and Computer Crime. Proceedings of the VI Europe-
an Colloquium on Crime and Criminal Policy, Hel-
sinki 10-12 December 1998. Matti Joutsen, editor. 
Helsinki 1999. 
33. Profiles of Criminal Justice Systems in Europe 
and North America, 1990-1994. Kristiina Kangas-
punta, Matti Joutsen, Natalia Ollus and Sami Nevala 
(eds). Helsinki 1999. 
32. Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe and North 
America, 1990-1994. Kristiina Kangaspunta, Matti 
Joutsen and Natalia Ollus (eds). Helsinki 1998. 
31. Organised Crime Around the World. Sabrina Ad-
amoli, Andrea Di Nicola, Ernesto U. Savona and Pao-
la Zoffi. Helsinki 1998.  
30. Computerization in the Management of the 
Criminal Justice System. Edited by Richard Scher-
penzeel, The Hague 1996 (published jointly with the 
Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands). 
29. Prison Systems in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Roy Walmsley. Helsinki 1996. 
28A. Strategii preduprezdenija prestupnosti v Ev-
rope i Severnoj Amerike. Dzon Grehem i Trevor Ben-
nett. Helsinki 1996.
28. Crime Prevention Strategies in Europe and North 
America. By John Graham and Trevor Bennett, Lon-
don/Helsinki 1995 (published jointly with the Home 
Office).  
27. Directory of Computerized Criminal Justice In-
formation Systems 1995. Richard Scherpenzeel. The 
Hague/Helsinki 1995. 
26. Profiles of Criminal Justice Systems in Europe 
and North America. Kristiina Kangaspunta (ed.). 
Helsinki 1995. 
25. Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe and North 
America 1986-1990. Kristiina Kangaspunta (ed.), 
Helsinki 1995.
24. Foreigners in Prison. Katarina Tomasevski. Tam-
pere 1994. 
23. Policing in Central and Eastern Europe. Report 
on a Study Tour. David Fogel. Helsinki 1994.  
260
22. Criminal Law and the Environment. Edited by 
Hans-Jörg Albrecht and Seppo Leppä. Forssa 1992. 
21. Prison Health, International Standards and Na-
tional Practices in Europe. Katarina Tomasevski. 
Helsinki 1992. 
20. Computerization of Criminal Justice Information 
Systems, vol. II. Edited by Richard Scherpenzeel, The 
Hague 1992 (published jointly with the Ministry of 
Justice of The Netherlands). 
19 A. Computarizacion de los Sistemas Informaticos 
en la Justicia Penal, I volumen. Editado por Richard 
Scherpenzeel. La Haya 1992. 
19. Computerization of Criminal Justice Information 
Systems, vol. I. Edited by Richard Scherpenzeel, The 
Hague 1992 (published jointly with the Ministry of 
Justice of The Netherlands).
18. Crime Prevention Strategies in Europe and North 
America. John Graham. Helsinki 1990. 
17. Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North 
America. Edited by Ken Pease and Kristiina Hukki-
la. Helsinki 1990. 
16. Changing Victim Policy: The United Nations Vic-
tim Declaration and Recent Developments in Eu-
rope. Report of the Ad Hoc Expert Meeting held in 
Helsinki, 16-17 November 1988. Helsinki 1989. 
15. Alternatives to Custodial Sanctions. Proceedings 
of the European Seminar held in Helsinki, Finland, 
26-28 September 1987. Helsinki 1988. 
14. Non-Custodial Alternatives in Europe. Norman 
Bishop. Helsinki 1988 (second printing 1988).
13. HEUNI - The First Five Years. Helsinki 1988. 
12. Computerization of Criminal Justice Information 
Systems: Realities, Methods, Prospects and Effects. 
Report of the European Seminar held in Popowo, Po-
land, 18-22 May 1987, Helsinki 1987 (published joint-
ly with the Ministry of Justice of the Polish People’s 
Republic) (second printing 1988). 
11. The Role of the Victim of Crime in European 
Criminal Justice Systems. A Cross-National Study of 
the Role of the Victim. Matti Joutsen. Helsinki 1987. 
10. Papers on Crime Policy 2. Contributions from 
HEUNI scholars. Helsinki 1986. 
9. Non-Prosecution in Europe. Report of the Euro-
pean Seminar held in Helsinki, Finland, 22-24 March 
1986, Helsinki 1986.
8. The Legal Scope of Non-Prosecution in Europe. 
Peter J.P. Tak. Helsinki 1986. 
7. Papers on Crime Policy. Károly Bárd, Matti Joutsen 
and Aleksander Yakovlev. Helsinki 1986.
6. Course on United Nations Criminal Justice Policy. 
Report of the European course held in Helsinki, Fin-
land, 25-29 March 1985. Helsinki 1985. 
5. Criminal Justice Systems in Europe. Report of the 
Ad Hoc Expert Group on a cross-national study on 
trends in crime and information sources on crimi-
nal justice and crime prevention in Europe. Helsin-
ki 1985. 
4. Selected Issues in Criminal Justice. Helsinki 1984. 
3. Effective, Rational and Humane Criminal Justice. 
Report of the European Seminar held in Helsinki, 
Finland, 31 May - 3 June 1984. Helsinki 1984. 
2. Towards a Victim Policy in Europe. Report of the 
Seminar held in Espoo, Finland, 31 October - 2 No-
vember 1983. Helsinki 1984. 
1. The Feasibility of a European Information System 
on Trends in Crime and Criminal Justice Report of 
the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts held in Helsinki, Fin-
land, 9-10 May 1983. Helsinki 1983. 
Blue Criminology
261
CRIMINOLOGISTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKERS AND REFORMERS (1764-2010): 
INTERNATIONAL AND UNITED NATIONS PERSPECTIVES
Cesare BECCARIA Jeremy BENTHAM
John HOWARD John AUGUSTUS
Alexander MACONOCHIE
Robert PEEL Adolphe QUÉTELET
Karl Joseph Anton von  
MITTERMAIER Édouard DUCPÉTIAUX
Benedict S. ALPER, 1946-1947
Founding member and President of the UN 
Staff Association. Consultant to the United 
Nations Consultative Group on Crime (1968) 
and to the Fourth Congress (1970); attended 
the Eighth Congress (1990).”He was gifted 
with native intelligence, an unusual sensitivity 
to people, managerial expertise, and a flair for 
writing”.
Swain 1993:744
Leon RADZINOWICZ, 1947-1949
In 1992 awarded by the United Nations 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali 
with the testimonial in grateful recognition 
of dedicated service in support of the United 
Nations Programme on Crime and Justice. 
“He was a highly published scholar and solely 
contributed to the international perspective 
of crime and public policy. In some ways, he 
was ahead of his time in his view of political 
and governmental aspects that create criminal 
policy”. 
Howell 2005:1380
Manuel LÓPEZ-REY DE ARROJO, 1952-1961
Executive Secretary of the First (1955) and 
Second United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders (1960). “Freedom, Justice, Peace 
and Development are main issues orienting 
Professor López-Rey’s creative works and 
also his existential vocation characterized by 
passionate concern to defend man’s dignity 
under every type of socio-political or cultural 
system”.
David 1985:12
Paul AMOR, 1950-1952 
First Editor of the International Review of 
Criminal Policy, published in 1952 by the 
United Nations. UN Regional Representative for 
Social Defense in Europe and the Middle East 
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